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Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy's Story (Bluejacket Books) Paperback – January 1, 2001
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Mitsuo Fuchida, who led the first air strike on Pearl Harbor, commanded the Akagi carrier air group and later made a study of the battle at the Japanese Naval War College. Masatake Okumiya, one of Japan's first dive-bomber pilots, was aboard the light carrier Ryujo and later served as a staff officer in a carrier division. Armed with knowledge of top-secret documents destroyed by the Japanese and access to private papers, they show the operation to be ill-conceived and poorly planned and executed, and fault their flag officers for lacking initiative, leadership, and clear thinking. With an introduction by an author known for his study of the battle from the American perspective, the work continues to make a significant contribution to World War II literature.
- Print length352 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherNaval Institute Press
- Publication dateJanuary 1, 2001
- Dimensions6 x 0.75 x 8.75 inches
- ISBN-101557504288
- ISBN-13978-1557504289
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"An enlightening account of the Japanese naval leaders of the time..." --Military Review
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
Midway
The Battle That Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy's StoryBy Mitsuo FuchidaBluejacket Books
Copyright © 2001 Mitsuo FuchidaAll right reserved.
ISBN: 9781557504289
Chapter One
Sortie from Hashirajima
A day broke over the western Inland Sea on 27 May1942, the sun's rays slanted down on the greatestconcentration of Japanese fleet strength since the start ofthe Pacific War.
The setting was at the island of Hashirajima, which liesto the south of the well-known city of Hiroshima andsoutheast of the lesser-known coastal town of Iwakuni.The anchorage at Hashirajima is surrounded by hilly littleislands, most of which are cultivated from water's edgeto summit. Camouflaged antiaircraft batteries atop almostevery hill belied the peaceful appearance of these islands.The anchorage was large enough to accommodate the entireJapanese Navy and was well off the ordinary routes ofmerchant ships. It was a wartime stand-by anchorage forCombined Fleet, whose headquarters had been functioningin safety from a battleship group stationed there sincethe start of the war. It had remained there so long, in fact,that naval officers had come to speak of Combined FleetHeadquarters simply as "Hashirajima."
Within the anchorage Commander in Chief CombinedFleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's 68,000-ton flagship,Yamato, was moored to a red buoy. Underwater cablesto shore permitted instant communication with Tokyo.Gathered around Yamato were a total of 68 warships, constitutingthe greater part of the surface strength of theCombined Fleet.
Admiral Yamamoto's Battleship Division 1 consisted ofYamato, Nagato, and Mutsu, which with Ise, Hyuga, Fuso,and Yamashiro of Battleship Division 2 made the total ofseven battleships. Torpedo nets were extended aroundeach of these giants. Pearl Harbor had impressed on usthe importance of protecting ships against torpedo attacks,even in home waters. The other ships were disposedaround the battleships as further protection against attacksby planes or submarines. There were light cruisers Kitakamiand Oi of Cruiser Division 9, flagship Sendai and 12destroyers of Destroyer Squadron 3, eight destroyers ofDestroyer Squadron 1, light carrier Hosho with one destroyerand two torpedo boats, and seaplane carriers Chiyodaand Nisshin, each of which had six midget submarineson board.
All these ships and units except Battleship Division 1belonged to the First Fleet commanded by Vice AdmiralShiro Takasu, whose flag flew in Ise. Both the First Fleetand Battleship Division 1 had remained at Hashirajimasince the outbreak of war, awaiting an opportunity fordecisive surface battle. Aviators of the Carrier Force sarcasticallyreferred to them as the "Hashirajima Fleet."
The 21 ships of our force, commanded by Vice AdmiralChuichi Nagumo, were anchored to the north of the so-called"main strength" just described. To the west of uswas a force under Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo, commanderof the Second Fleet. Here were heavy cruisersAtago (Kondo's flagship) and Chokai of Cruiser Division4, Myoko and Haguro of Cruiser Division 5, fast battleshipsHiei and Kirishima of Battleship Division 3, light cruiserYura and seven destroyers of Destroyer Squadron 4, andlight carrier Zuiho with one destroyer.
This massive gray armada swung silently at anchor, eachship riding low in the water under a full load of fuel andsupplies taken on board at Kure in preparation for thesortie. The only traffic in the whole area consisted of chuggingyellow Navy tugboats which emitted heavy blacksmoke from their tall stacks. On board the warships therewas little evidence of activity other than the occasionalfluttering of signal flags as messages were exchanged. Butdespite the general quiet of the anchorage, one felt theexcitement permeating the entire fleet.
It was Navy Day, the anniversary of Admiral Togo'sgreat victory over the Russian Fleet in the Battle of Tsushima.Japan's achievements during the first six months ofwar in the Pacific seemed to rival that triumph of 37 yearsearlier. Spirits were highand why not? Now we wereembarking on another mission which we confidentlythought would add new glory to the annals of the ImperialNavy.
At 0800 Akagi's ensign was raised. Then on her signalmast went up a single flag which gave the tensely awaitedorder, "Sortie as scheduled!"
Standing at the flight deck control post, I turned towatch the ships of Destroyer Squadron 10. White watersplashed from the anchor cables of each destroyer, washingmud from the heavy links as they dragged through thehawseholes. The destroyers soon began to move, and theywere followed by Cruiser Division 8, the second sectionof Battleship Division 3, and Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, inthat order. The Nagumo Force was on its way toward thescene of one of the most significant naval actions in history.
As we steamed out of the anchorage the ships of theother forces, which would sortie two days later, gave us arousing send-off. The crews lined the rails and cheeredand waved their caps as we passed. They seemed to envyour good fortune in being the first to leave. We wavedback a farewell, and a general gaiety prevailed. Every manwas convinced that he was about to participate in yet anotherbrilliant victory.
Two hours later we were halfway across the Iyonada andbefore long would enter Bungo Strait. Beyond the strait itwas expected that we might encounter enemy submarines.Combined reports on their activities were sent out dailyfrom Imperial General Headquarters. Latest reports indicatedthat a dozen or more of them were operating closeto the homeland, reporting on ship movements and seekingto destroy our lines of communication. Occasionallythey would send radio reports to Pearl Harbor, and it wasat such times that our scattered radio direction finderswould endeavor to spot them.
Akagi, the sleek aircraft carrier flagship of Admiral Nagumo,headed westward through Kudako Strait, cruisingeasily at 16 knots on her course toward Bungo Channeland the broad Pacific. Through scattered clouds the sunshone brightly upon the calm blue sea. For several daysthe weather had been cloudy but hot in the western InlandSea, and it was pleasant now to feel the gentle breezewhich swept across Akagi's flight deck.
The fleet had formed a single column for the passagethrough the strait. Twenty-one ships in all, they cruisedalong at intervals of 1,000 yards, resembling for all theworld a peacetime naval review. Far out in front was RearAdmiral Susumu Kimura's flagship, light cruiser Nagara,leading the 12 ships of Destroyer Squadron 10. Next cameRear Admiral Hiroaki Abe's Cruiser Division 8Tone,the flagship, and Chikumafollowed by the second sectionof Battleship Division 3, made up of fast battleshipsHaruna and Kirishima. (The first section of Battleship Division3, Hiei and Kongo, had been assigned to AdmiralKondo's Invasion Force for this operation.) Behind Kirishimacame large carriers Akagi and Kaga, comprising CarrierDivision 1, under Admiral Nagumo's direct command.Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi's Carrier Division2Hiryu and Soryubrought up the rear, completingthe Nagumo Force.
Presently a dozen or so fishing boats waiting for the tidehove into sight to starboard, and their crews waved andcheered as we passed. To port the tiny island of Yurishimaappeared to be floating on the surface of the sea, its thickcovering of green foliage set off against the dim backgroundof Aoshima. Beyond, the coast of Shikoku lay hiddenin mist.
As the fleet steamed on, three seaplanes of the KureAir Corps passed overhead, their pontoons looking likeoversized shoes. The planes were on their way to neutralizeany enemy submarines which might be lying in wait forus outside Bungo Strait.
Yashirojima soon appeared to starboard. Wheatfields,cultivated high up the mountainsides, were lightly tingedwith yellow, proclaiming the nearness of summer. Offshorea small tug belched black smoke as she struggled topull a string of barges. We soon left them far behind asthe tiny islands of Ominasejima and Kominasejima cameinto view, lying peacefully on the sea.
To me this was familiar ground. My career had startedat the Japanese Naval Academy at Etajima, which lay but20 miles to the north. In the score of intervening years Ihad viewed every corner of the scenic Inland Sea, bothfrom the sea and from the air, and I knew this region likea book. Now, as these familiar places passed by, I was lostin reminiscences which were suddenly interrupted by theloud voice of the chief signalman as he relayed an orderthrough the voice tube.
The flight deck control post, where I sat, was situatedon the port side, amidships. Directly forward of it rosethe island which housed the bridge and the central battlecommand station, the ship's nerve center. At this momentall the top-ranking officers of the Striking Force, as well asAkagi's own skipper and his staff, were assembled on thebridge, for regulations required all hands to be at theirstations when passing through a narrow strait.
Scarcely had the chief signalman ceased calling the orderwhen four flags were quickly hoisted on the small signalmast just abaft the flight deck control post. The first flagindicated a maneuvering order. Since we had now passedthrough the strait, I concluded, without knowing the otherthree flags, that the order was for all ships to move intonormal cruising disposition.
Atop the signal mast fluttered the flag of the StrikingForce Commander. I wondered at the vast importancewhich Navy men attribute to such symbols. It is the hopeand dream of every naval officer some day to fly his ownflag. There were almost one hundred such flags in theJapanese Navy at this time, and four of them were flyingin this very force.
Suddenly the ship's loudspeakers blared: "Passagethrough strait completed. Stow gear. Restore normal conditionof readiness!" Men in undress whites and greenwork uniforms began drifting up to the flight deck to enjoya last glimpse of the receding coastline. Some twenty communicationsmen, their watch just completed, appeared ondeck, doffed their shirts and began to exercise.
Commander Minoru Genda, First Air Fleet OperationsOfficer, came down from the bridge and joined me. Aclassmate of mine at the Naval Academy, he was also anaviator, and our friendship was of long standing. He satdown beside me on a folding chair, lit a cigarette, and said,"I heard that you were ill back at Kagoshima. Are you allright now?"
"Not so good," I replied. "My stomach still bothers meoccasionally."
"What's the trouble?"
"Well, back at the base they sent me to an Army hospitalfor examination, and the doctors seemed to think it wasulcers. Anyway they told me to quit drinking for a while.Pretty rough!"
"Aha," laughed Genda. "So that's why you were on suchgood behavior back at the base?"
"That's right," I admitted, "and I'm still not feeling upto par. But my fliers are in good shape. They didn't havemuch time for training, but they are ready and confident.I suppose you've been busy, too, preparing for the sortie."
"It was terrific! We were supposed to wind up the southernoperations and get ready for this one at the same time.We really had no time to study this operation thoroughly.Why, the Chief of Staff was still running around trying toput through promotions for the fliers killed in the PearlHarbor operation!"
This last remark of Genda's touched on a sore point.Following the Pearl Harbor attack, the nine men who losttheir lives there in midget submarines had promptly beenpromoted two ranks and glorified as national war heroes.The First Air Fleet had endeavored to obtain similar promotionsfor the 55 airmen lost in the attack, but the authoritieshad disapproved them on the ground that therewere too many.
"The fliers are really disgusted with that situation," I toldGenda. "Why, now the authorities are even giving thesmall subs credit for sinking battleship Arizona! And that'sobviously ridiculous, because there was an oiler mooredoutboard of Arizona, so a submarine torpedo couldn't possiblyhave scored on her. Furthermore, the big explosionin Arizona came immediately after Kaga's second squadronof high-level bombers got two direct hits.
"We don't mean to discredit the midget submarines andtheir crews. They certainly did their part. But the moraleof the air units has to be considered too. After all, they arethe backbone of the Fleet. And their morale would bemuch higher right now if the airmen's promotions hadbeen granted before this sortie. Soryu's air officer, CommanderKusumoto, has been saying that the top echelonsin Tokyo seem to be deliberately trying to discourage us."
"I know," nodded Genda. "The Naval General Staff isn'tacting energetically enough, and Combined Fleet Headquartersalso seems to have lost some of its prewar enthusiasm.Our own Chief of Staff seems to be the only onereally sticking up for us; and, instead of that, he ought tohave been devoting himself exclusively to studying thisoperation."
"Well, at least we're sortieing according to plan," I remarked.
"Sure," Genda laughed somewhat sarcastically, "the sortieis going as scheduled. We just swallowed the CombinedFleet plan down whole and rushed out. The trouble is thatthere are several things in it that just don't add up. Butthen, I think the Nagumo Force can handle this operationall by itself. The other forces can operate as they please."
"Yes, I guess you're right," I agreed. "But one thing thatworries me is the way information about the sortie hasleaked out. Everybody seems to know of it. One officer Iknow was getting a shave the other day and was surprisedto hear his barber remark, `You're going out on a big onethis time, aren't you?'"
"Barbers always have quick ears," said Genda. "With somany ships docking at Kure for repairs, loading suppliesand so forth, nobody in town could have helped knowingwe were preparing to sortie. Also, some of our forces wererather obviously being fitted out for cold weather. Withsummer practically here, any fool could guess that northernoperations were in prospect."
I remarked on the difference in security measures betweenthis and the Pearl Harbor operation, in which strictestprecautions had been taken.
"It just couldn't be helped," replied Genda. "Our entireFleet had to prepare for sortie on such short notice. Itwould have been better if the Fleet could have made anintermediate movesay, to the Marshallsand waitedfor a while until attention was diverted from them. Thatway, we might have kept the enemy guessing longer as towhere and when we intended to strike."
I asked Genda why Combined Fleet hadn't taken thisfactor into consideration in planning the operation.
"They still think that the initiative is entirely in ourhands," he explained. "Their plans are made far in advance,based entirely on their own thinking. The result is thatthey will never budge from them an inch."
Our attention now shifted to the planes overhead.Bungo Strait was defended by the Saeki Defense Forceand the planes of the Kure Naval Air Corps. To ensurethe safe passage of our powerful task force, their entirestrength had been assigned to sweep the channel and huntout enemy submarines. But there were no alerts fromeither ships or planes.
By noon we had passed through the eastern channel ofBungo Strait into the deep blue waters of the Pacific, andthe destroyers had spread out for a swift antisubmarinesweep before assuming their positions in a ring formation.
At the center of the formation four carriers steamed intwo columns, Akagi and Kaga on the right, Hiryu andSoryu on the left. Surrounding them were two circles ofscreening ships. The inner circle consisted of heavy cruisersTone and Chikuma, disposed diagonally forward of thecarriers, and battleships Haruna and Kirishima diagonallyto the rear. Light cruiser Nagara and 12 destroyers formedthe outer circle, with Nagara out in front as the lead ship.
The atmosphere was tense in every ship. Antisubmarinestations were fully manned, and all hands were alert andready for action. There was not even time for sentimentallooks backward at the receding coast of the homeland.
Our ships sped to the southeast, making better than 20knots to escape possible pursuit by enemy submarines.Evening twilight soon spread over the ocean and we werecloaked in the security of darkness. No submarines hadbeen sighted, nor was there any indication that one hadobserved our sortie and reported it back to base. Wehad passed safely through the danger area and were speedingtoward our destinationMidway!
Continues...
Excerpted from Midwayby Mitsuo Fuchida Copyright © 2001 by Mitsuo Fuchida. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Product details
- Publisher : Naval Institute Press; Revised edition (January 1, 2001)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 352 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1557504288
- ISBN-13 : 978-1557504289
- Item Weight : 1.26 pounds
- Dimensions : 6 x 0.75 x 8.75 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #72,633 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #67 in Japanese History (Books)
- #120 in Naval Military History
- #622 in World War II History (Books)
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The author's knowledge and his particular place in the pecking order must be considered. As a former US combat pilot, with some operational planning experience, I am well aware that I was not informed of all details, only those that I had a need to know. Mitsui Fuchida was a staff officer, not a flag officer. He may have gained additional knowledge after the war's end, but most of the Admiral's who had overall knowledge of Pearl Harbor and Midway Operations were killed before the war ended.
There were also political concerns Fuchida had to navigate, in order to get his book published in 1955.
As a pilot, I was sympathetic to many of Fuchida's views. I enjoyed his descriptions of a warrior's duties, regardless of nationality. In some respects, we have more in common with our fellow aviators, than with our leaders.
For years, I accepted the standard version of the Pearl Harbor Attack on 7 Dec 41. I was at Pearl during the time the movie Tora Tora Tora was filmed. It was that event that lead to my discovery by talking to some older personnel of Japanese Ancestry, that unlike those in California, they were not sent to camps. I began reading whatever I could find on the subject, which includes this book.
Fuchida's book offers two major questions. How could two task forces covering the same sea lanes, confronting the same terrible sort of weather, without radar, within less than one year do so, under comletely "radio silence". Fuchida admits that during the Midway attack, low power radio signals were used, but were picked up in Japan. The generally accepted Japanese version of the Pearl Harbor attack, was that radio transmissions were not sent. But the question immediately arises. How would Fuchida, an Air Officer, know what conditions were confronting the various ships that comprised the Pearl Harbor attack force? Fuchida and the world knows that the Pearl Harbor force faced terrible weather and had to refuel in less than ideal conditions. They had to make course corrections. Is it unreasonable to think that the same reasons applied in May of 1942, would have applied in December of 1941?
Revisionists have challanged the traditional view of radio silence, by presenting numerous examples of transmissions from the "empty sea" during both periods. Traditionalists have maintained that Japan's sneak attack suceeded because they maintained strict radio silence. Men like Fuchida inforce that view. But was Fuchida the right person to ask? Did he mearly assume that what he was told by his superiors was correct?
Since Midway was a "victory" for the US, knowledge of the attack was acceptable and did not inflict any harm to anyone's careers or poltical postions. The same could not be said of Pearl Harbor. A Japanese Author in 1955, would be less likely of publishing something that discredited miltary and politcal reputations. I would not accuse Fuchida of deception, I would only suggest that he did not know as much about the Pearl Harbor Operation as he did about Midway.
Read the book, see if you come to the same conclussion.
Of particular interest to this engineer was how unsophisticated their capabilities were: none of the ships had radar, they usually had no idea were the enemy(that's us guys)were, their aerial recon was pathetic and they had no night fighting capability because they could never find the targets or return to their own ships in darkness!
Their mentality that once a plan was made, it could not be changed or delayed, played a major role in their defeat. Of course Ike's version of that mentality damn near doomed The Normandy Invasion, what with a bunch of sea sick soldiers fighting their way ashore! But that's another story, with a happier ending.
Adm Spruance didn't get the credit he deserved for launching a perfectly timed strike which arrived in the midst of refueling the returning Midway strike force.
It is surprising that when the US, Great Britan and even Germany were throwing resources at gathering intel, breaking codes and trying to gain the slightest edge in force location, Japan was blundering forward with slight regard to Military intelligence and apparently no coordination of what they did have.
A very good book!
The Fucbhida editors' comments give confidence that Fuchida et al. are largely accurate, but the later, quite different, complementary take in SHATTERED SWORD is essential to building a realistic view of Midway. Bottom line: both books could be enormously useful to understanding and predicting Americans' behaviors, especially if Fuchida were to be read first.
Interestingly, the movie, "Midway," seems to have drawn on Fuchida. For extended understanding, read these: I WAS THERE and JOE ROCHEFORT'S WAR. When reading all four books, try doing so in the order mentioned here, but only after seeing the movie.
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Anyway it was good to know the japanesse perspective for both the war and the battle.
It is also interesting to read about the reasons for the battle from the loser side.
About the book itself: quick read, direct to the points and nice font size to read (unlike shattered sword, I need a microscope for it without entering in the content comparison)