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The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942 Hardcover – January 1, 1994
- Print length626 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherNaval Inst Pr
- Publication dateJanuary 1, 1994
- Dimensions7.75 x 1.75 x 9.75 inches
- ISBN-101557505268
- ISBN-13978-1557505262
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Product details
- Publisher : Naval Inst Pr; First Edition (January 1, 1994)
- Language : English
- Hardcover : 626 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1557505268
- ISBN-13 : 978-1557505262
- Item Weight : 2.75 pounds
- Dimensions : 7.75 x 1.75 x 9.75 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #1,184,015 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #2,173 in Military Aviation History (Books)
- #2,502 in Naval Military History
- #10,669 in World War II History (Books)
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"Our few against their precious few."
This is a continuation of The First Team part I. The first book chronicled the Pacific Naval air combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway (see my review on Goodreads). As the title suggests, the second book covers the carrier wars through the Guadalcanal campaign. This includes the carrier battle of the Eastern Solomons early in the campaign, fighting alongside the CACTUS Air force on Guadalcanal, and the carrier battle of Santa Cruz late in the campaign. If you want a good comprehensive book about the air, land, and sea campaign I would first read Richard Frank’s Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. If you are interested in the entire naval campaign – both surface and the carrier battles – read John D. Hornfischer’s Neptune’s Inferno. But, if you want to read a gripping blow-by-blow account of the Navy and Marine fighter and bomber pilots that fought to secure the airstrip on Henderson Field to make the first allied offensive in the Pacific War a success than this book is for you.
The First Team Part II is different than Part I because many of the Naval Aviators leave the carriers and relocate to Guadalcanal. This first happened after the carrier USS Hornet was sunk in the battle of the Eastern Solomons early in the campaign and continued through the battle of Santa Cruz and the showdown for Henderson Field shortly after Santa Cruz. What an advantage that strategic air strip was! American carrier pilots could make their bomb runs or fly their escort sorties and head for the static Henderson Field rather than try to find the dynamic carriers.
Rear Admiral McCain considered Henderson field a carrier that can’t be sunk. McCain also called Guadalcanal a “sink” for Japanese Airpower. The Japanese diverted resources from all points of the empire to fight the air war over Guadalcanal. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor with pilots that had thousands upon thousands of hours of combat experience flying over China and Korea. Guadalcanal really whittled down Japan’s experienced fighter pilots and bomber crews. Many Japanese pilots had to fly 500 miles one way from Rabaul to engage in combat over Guadalcanal. Japanese pilots shot down over Guadalcanal or who ditched shortly thereafter were much less likely to return to their units to fly again. Comparatively, many Marines and Naval aviators in shot-up F-4-Fs could dead-stick into Henderson field and fly again the same day.
As mentioned above, the Guadalcanal campaign was especially hard on the Japanese naval air force. Meanwhile, the Navy and Marine pilots were gaining more and more experience. After each campaign, the United States Navy would rotate in entirely new fresh fighter, bomber, and torpedo squadrons (and rest the experienced crews) while their Japanese counterparts never had a break. The Nipon pilots flew until they were dead, maimed too badly to fly again, or marooned on some place akin to Gilligan’s Island. Also, the Grumman F4F-4 was a dog compared to the Mitsubishi A6M. I think the difference was the simple tactics devised by the Marines and Navy such as the Thatch weave combined with features of the Wildcat such as the self-sealing gas tanks and the armor and 50 Caliber machine guns. The A6M zero required a highly skilled pilot to take advantage of the superior maneuverability and agility. These pilots were being attritted every day. Less skilled pilots were taking their place. At first the Naval aviators were being told to avoid dog fights with the zeros (Marines and Navy pilots are considered Naval Aviators). Halfway through the campaign the pilots at Henderson field were told to actively seek and engage the Zero in a dog fight. Because of the superior armor of the F-4-F the naval aviators also realized that safest place for the Zero pilot to be was right on the Wildcat’s tail. It was a battle of our few verses their precious few and our few won.
I was struck by how poorly communications were for both sides. Communications were poor for the US but they were atrocious for the Japanese. The Japanese Zero pilots removed their radios because their range was only 50 miles and they thought that this limited range was not worth the 18 KG that the radio and antenna weighed. The Zero pilots removed them and communicated by hand signals only. Also, the Japanese Navy and Army communicated with each other very poorly. An example of this is included on page 202. Halfway through the campaign the Naval air base in Rabaul had heard a rumor that Henderson Field was recaptured by the Japanese Army. Instead of communicating with the Imperial Army to confirm the Navy sent a reconnaissance in force to investigate. They were chewed to pieces by allied anti-aircraft. The Imperial Navy sent another force the next day and several more planes were shot down before they finally confirmed that Henderson Field was still in enemy hands!
On a side note, the author is also very supportive of some of the decisions made by Admiral Fletcher early in the Guadalcanal campaign. These actions led to Fletcher’s dismissal. Lundstrom indicates that Fletcher was left out of the planning stage for the campaign in the first place and communications were extremely poor during the campaign. The author believes that this led to some bad decisions. Fletcher was severely criticized when he removed the carriers prior to the Marines off-loading all their supply Armada on Guadalcanal. However, the author argues that Fletcher was informed by Admiral Kelly Turner that he was pulling up stakes of the supply armada anyway. Turner changed his mind and didn’t communicate with Fletcher. Lundstrom seems to be a big fan of Fletcher. He wrote a biography of Jack Fletcher called Black Shoe Carrier. We also have to remember that Fletcher did do very well at Coral Sea and Midway.
Lastly, I was amazed at how inaccurate and over inflated the battle reports were. Both sides over-reported aircraft combat victories and ships hit or sunk by at least 50%. What is great about this book is that Lundstrom compares the record reported by the pilots to the actual casualties in the official record of each adversary. Many times the Japanese would report shooting down more Grumman F-4-Fs than were engaged in the battle in the first place! The actual score of the venerable old Wildcat would be closer to zero (no pun intended). The Grumman Wildcat was a dog but it was a dog that could take a beating.
This story requires some dedication and I do not consider it light reading. This is because there is so much detail in the day-to-day accounts and the battle lasted over 3 months. Some of the chapters in the middle of the campaign while flying from Henderson Field could feel a little monotonous but the devout reader will be rewarded with a comprehensive understanding of the air campaign.
If you are a history buff interested in more detail about the war in the Pacific or if you are an aviation fanatic this book is for you. Enjoy.
The bravery of these American flyers comes across well, but so does the the tension (and occasional humor) of this first full year of combat in the Pacific. The F4F-4 Wildcat was a well built, strong plane but could not compete with the Zeke in manuverability or speed. Yet the "First Team" flew their Wildcats from carriers and Guadalcanal's Henderson Field, held their own or better and started the distruction of the Japanese's veteran pilot cadre.
The fact that 10 of 34 pilots from VF-5 (the carrier squadron that flew along side the Marines from Henderson in late summer/early fall '42) were killed or seriously wounded shows that the attrition rate among these pilots was high and points to their bravery and endurance.
Mechanical problems with the F4F-4, bad weather, inhospitable islands, and the endless Pacific Ocean were added to the skilled and agressive opponents to make flying a Navy fighter plane a tough occupation. These flyers were truely a special breed.
You won't find a better told tale of the first year of the Pacific War anywhere. Lundstrom focuses only on the Naval pilots and their battles for more than 500 pages mand it's a tactical story in the truest sense. If you're tired of reading military history that never gets you out of the Admiral's cabin or Washington DC and London, this is for you. "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign" is a terrific read. Highly recommended.
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Si nota chiaramente che il testo deve essere stato scritto a più mani, infatti rispetto a precedenti libri firmati da J.b.Lundstrom la prosa è decisamente meno fluida perché contiene molti passaggi farciti di "americanismi" colloquiali che ne spezzano la lettura rendendola meno piacevole del solito .

長距離侵攻してきた台南空の零戦が母艦航空隊のF4Fに圧勝
でスタートします。
しかしながらその後は、零戦は3時間以上かけ飛来して、空戦後も3時間以上かけて
無事帰投しないと「未帰還、行方不明」。
F4Fは沿岸監視員の情報で優位から待ち伏せし、零戦には近づかれる前に遠方から射撃して
効果にかかわらず急降下で逃げ、エンジン停止まで追い込まれても滑空で眼下の飛行場に
滑り込みセーフ。空戦中の損失だけど故障、天候不順、事故と米軍は記録
(これらの事例はひと月に何件も発生しています。)
という状況が災いして、結局、ガ島上空での交戦が主だった期間、P-39、P-40を除いても
F4Fだけで零戦よりやや損失が多い。ただ、米軍は故障や事故としている分を除いて考えると
記録上「未帰還、行方不明」ばかりの零戦の方はそれらで除ける分がほとんどないから
米戦闘機と損失の数字が並ぶ
という状況になります。
本書はアメリカ海軍所属のF4Fに焦点を当てており、それ以外はあまり触れられません
梅本弘氏のガ島航空戦はこの本も参照したうえでもっと手広くこの時期の両軍損害の照合を
しているため、これら航空戦の推移を情報として得たい人には梅本弘氏の著作をお勧めします。
取り上げている空戦の数が少ないため純粋に情報源としては梅本氏の著作に劣ります。
一方で海外レビューの方が、不要な登場人物が大量に出てくる。としている不満点は
私にとっては読み物として面白く、かえって好印象でした。
この本を基にするなら米海軍F4Fの零戦との交戦成績は米軍公式のキルレシオに反して
ガダルカナル戦以前より悪化しこの時期負けていることになります。
まあ、前作のレビューに書いている通り、サンプルとして取り上げてる数が少なすぎるので
(結論としてあってるか間違ってるかは別として)この回数では何とも言えん。
が私の意見です。

Las formaciones de bombarderos y cazas japonesas son diezmados una y otra vez sin conseguir resultados apreciables mientras que los pilotos americanos, gracias a la resistencia y al blindaje de sus menos ágiles cazas sobreviven las mas de las veces.
La única pega es el, a mi juicio, innecesario y apabullante número de personajes americanos que aparecen.

Un must pour ceux qui s'interessent à la WW2 dans le pacifique.