\">It was mediocre weapons against mediocre weapons <\"
How can a winning weapon be a mediocre weapon? Most of the successful weapons in WW2 were developed reactively. The majority of the weapons and tactics involving \"high tech\" developed proactively prior and during WW2 were found to be ineffective in the field and required quick reactive development. The pace of reactive development of technology in wartime always exceeds that of proactive development in peacetime, a prime example is the RAF, 1939 = biplanes, 1945 = jets, 2001 = more jets.
The U-boat 1939 - late 1942 was a very effective weapon and could not be described as mediocre (it should have won the Western conflict for the Germans, how can a war winning weapon be described as mediocre?).

\">why the electroboat project was not started in 1941 <\"
The electroboat project was not started in 1941 because the Germans believed that victory in the West was imminent (and it would have been had all efforts been concentrated against the UK).

\">You forget that it was shipborne radar which inflicted the first casualties at night. <\"
Airborne radar was (probably) the most important element in turning the tide against the U-boats, particularly in mid-1943; a U-boat could dive to avoid attacking Allied surface escorts but the time available (particularly at night) was insufficient to avoid a radar equipped, Leigh Light carrying plane. Airborne radar was developed reactively from H2S developed for the land bombing offensive.

\">What did the think tanks do in the Cold War? Think up new weapons as soon as a new scientific principle or technical development became available.<\" Think tanks in the cold war could not improve substantially on the B52 in 50 years.

\">The US was never involved in a high tech war in the style of WWII after it as over.<\" The US has used high tech in conventional conflicts eg cruise, laser guided munitions, satellite surveillance. In some ways, conventional warfare requires higher tech than all-out nuclear, the latter form of conflict is not restricted by the need to reduce collateral damage.

The US was defeated in Vietnam primarily because the US voters could not countenance the continuing stream of body bags returning to the US. This has led to increasing use of high tech in conventional conflicts to distance the US forces from close combat and reduce subsequent losses (minimal low flying in the Balkans etc) but this has reduced the effectiveness of conventional weapons (again the Balkans is a prime example).

\">As for the B-52, no more was needed.<\" This is not proactive, it is exactly the mentality which delayed the development of electroboats

\">\">The Germans could have won any time up to late 1942….<\" That is a real no, no here, but you know where this discussion is being or can be carried out. <\" Sounds interesting, where exactly?

Regards