Technology and Operations
This forum is for discussing technological & operational matters pertaining to U-boats.
RE: High tech weapons
Posted by:
Bulldog
()
Date: February 12, 2001 11:20PM
\">Considering how sensitive this forum is to \"What ifs\", lets keep this at least nautical.<\" As I recall, you expanded the references to US tech with comments about B-1, B-2, Hustler, ICBM. Have you now realised the futility of your arguement re: \"modern\" high tech? ;-)
\">A general comment would be that any revolutionary weapons development will require a certain amount of optimization before it works well in the field.<\" Do you mean reactive development to get the equipment working because the proactive \"think tankers\" could not do their job properly?
\">but as I recall the V-2 and Me 262 did not have to be withdrawn or significantly altered once put into mass production.<\" I thought you were keeping this nautical? The V2 acheived very little during WW2, the explosions caused by majority of V2s landing in the UK were concealed by the Allied authorities as gas explosions, hardly the measure of an effective weapon. I would be surprised if an attack by the RAF or USAAF in the latter stages of the war could be declared as gas explosions by the German authorities. Of course, the V2 ushered in a post-war era of rocket development leading to ICBM etc.
Me 262 engines required extensive maintenance following every flight, the first production versions (used in combat) had flight times as low as 15 minutes before requiring major engine work. At the other end of the scale the P47 Thunderbolt could fly a mission and usually only need refuelling and servicing. The Germans should have cancelled Me 262 and used the resources to develop the FW190.
Again, post WW2 the Me262 led to the jet age, but its impact on WW2 was minimal.
\">Tirpitz was designed as a battleship, how it is tactically employed is another issue. <\" The Tirpitz did not put to sea as a convoy raider (as designed) because it would have been sunk by the RN (quite possibly using the Swordfish amongst other obsolete but effective weapons).
\">If this is a true story then we are dealing with two problems, a design fault and the inability of the crew to improvise.<\" (Bismark) Further reactive development by the Germans would have resulted in the destruction of the Swordfish. RN forces in the Med developed (reactively) a system for dealing with enemy planes attacking at close quarters. Switch off individual fire control and throw up a wall of steel using fast independant fire from all guns; expensive on ammunition but if it saves the ship then it has worked.
\">In any case, a battleship which sank the Hood was hardly ineffective. <\" The Hood was launched in the 1920\'s and could not expect to match the Bismark, the KGV class ships provided a more evenly matched opposition to the Bismark, however it was clear that the Bismark was a match for any two of the RN warships, but not an obsolete Swordfish (which was also reactively developed to become an efficient sub-hunter).
\">\">German torpedo crisis, I understand that the defects were known at an early stage but the German command structure forbade uttering the unthinkable.<\" This is news to me.<\" With a few exceptions, the German naval high command initially would not and could not accept that defective torpedos could possibly be manufactured by the German munitions factories, whatever next? The Allies breaking Enigma codes? Never! The failure of torpedos in action was (initially) blamed on the incompetence of the U-boat men.
\">The extra high score for March 1943 was pure luck because a large U-boat force ran into two convoys (SC 122 and HX 229) <\" Pure luck, since when did the Germans rely on \"pure luck\"? Wolf pack tactics were designed to locate convoys in the Atlantic ocean, whilst an element of luck was involved is was certainly never \"pure luck\".
\">The post war corrected losses for March 43 were 590,234 tons.<\" My source \"The Month of Lost U-boats\", Geoffrey Jones, states over 627 000 tonnes.
\">At a loss rate of 27 U-boats per million tons, that means losing over 400 U-boats a year, an unsustainable number.<\" And the answer is to reduce U-boat losses (long range JU88, reduced radio traffic etc)
\">This could only be done with sophisticated electroboats carrying wire guided torpedoes. <\" Effective wire guided torpedos were decades away. The Conqueror sunk the Belgrano using a WW2 torpedo(s) in the Falklands conflict which must have brought a wry smile to veteran submariners.
\">The 4 rotor Enigma was introduced in 1942 and broken in the spring of 1943.<\" Delays of up to 30 days were common in breaking the 4 rotor Enigma until Autumn 1943, I have read (although I cannot locate the source at present) that 4 rotor Engima remained effectively unbreakable in anything like real time until mid 1944: different info from different sources.
\">After that there were too many escort carriers which could carry fighters. <\" Escort carriers in the Bay of Biscay? I think the U-boats and land based anti-shipping aircraft would have relished the abundance of targets. The JU88 could operate at night (as did Torbeaus in the Med), could any carrier based fighters operate at night? How did they land, the carrier could hardly switch on the landing lights. How far could a JU88 fly out into the Atlantic? I shall have to research that.
\">The British could have sent their aircraft carriers into the area and given the Ju 88 a hard time.<\" JU88 + U-boats vs carriers at night?
\">Not clearing the Bay of Biscay of British ASW assets was a major error, and it was Goering\'s fault, but it would not have changed all that much. <\" It was probably one of the the most important errors committed by the German naval forces in WW2, therefore the ultimate responsibility lay with AH. Reduce Allied successes in the Bay and U-boat losses would drop substantially. The Liberator was a good plane, but against 8 JU88s the outcome was obvious (although I believe an obsolete Sunderland gave a very good account of itself against a pack of JU88s in one memorable incident)
\">Radio silence was only feasible for electroboats because they could find their targets at long distances using sonar. <\" Was this proven in the field? Effective use of this tech in the field was decades away.
Condors would summon the U-boats to the convoys, minimal radio traffic from U-boats, resulting in increased tonnage sunk and reduced U-boat losses.
Is there more than one Superkraut?
BTW, I visited www.historychannel.com WWII forum, v good, it may take me some time to read through the earlier posts and perhaps by then the resident Bulldog may have retired!
Regards
\">A general comment would be that any revolutionary weapons development will require a certain amount of optimization before it works well in the field.<\" Do you mean reactive development to get the equipment working because the proactive \"think tankers\" could not do their job properly?
\">but as I recall the V-2 and Me 262 did not have to be withdrawn or significantly altered once put into mass production.<\" I thought you were keeping this nautical? The V2 acheived very little during WW2, the explosions caused by majority of V2s landing in the UK were concealed by the Allied authorities as gas explosions, hardly the measure of an effective weapon. I would be surprised if an attack by the RAF or USAAF in the latter stages of the war could be declared as gas explosions by the German authorities. Of course, the V2 ushered in a post-war era of rocket development leading to ICBM etc.
Me 262 engines required extensive maintenance following every flight, the first production versions (used in combat) had flight times as low as 15 minutes before requiring major engine work. At the other end of the scale the P47 Thunderbolt could fly a mission and usually only need refuelling and servicing. The Germans should have cancelled Me 262 and used the resources to develop the FW190.
Again, post WW2 the Me262 led to the jet age, but its impact on WW2 was minimal.
\">Tirpitz was designed as a battleship, how it is tactically employed is another issue. <\" The Tirpitz did not put to sea as a convoy raider (as designed) because it would have been sunk by the RN (quite possibly using the Swordfish amongst other obsolete but effective weapons).
\">If this is a true story then we are dealing with two problems, a design fault and the inability of the crew to improvise.<\" (Bismark) Further reactive development by the Germans would have resulted in the destruction of the Swordfish. RN forces in the Med developed (reactively) a system for dealing with enemy planes attacking at close quarters. Switch off individual fire control and throw up a wall of steel using fast independant fire from all guns; expensive on ammunition but if it saves the ship then it has worked.
\">In any case, a battleship which sank the Hood was hardly ineffective. <\" The Hood was launched in the 1920\'s and could not expect to match the Bismark, the KGV class ships provided a more evenly matched opposition to the Bismark, however it was clear that the Bismark was a match for any two of the RN warships, but not an obsolete Swordfish (which was also reactively developed to become an efficient sub-hunter).
\">\">German torpedo crisis, I understand that the defects were known at an early stage but the German command structure forbade uttering the unthinkable.<\" This is news to me.<\" With a few exceptions, the German naval high command initially would not and could not accept that defective torpedos could possibly be manufactured by the German munitions factories, whatever next? The Allies breaking Enigma codes? Never! The failure of torpedos in action was (initially) blamed on the incompetence of the U-boat men.
\">The extra high score for March 1943 was pure luck because a large U-boat force ran into two convoys (SC 122 and HX 229) <\" Pure luck, since when did the Germans rely on \"pure luck\"? Wolf pack tactics were designed to locate convoys in the Atlantic ocean, whilst an element of luck was involved is was certainly never \"pure luck\".
\">The post war corrected losses for March 43 were 590,234 tons.<\" My source \"The Month of Lost U-boats\", Geoffrey Jones, states over 627 000 tonnes.
\">At a loss rate of 27 U-boats per million tons, that means losing over 400 U-boats a year, an unsustainable number.<\" And the answer is to reduce U-boat losses (long range JU88, reduced radio traffic etc)
\">This could only be done with sophisticated electroboats carrying wire guided torpedoes. <\" Effective wire guided torpedos were decades away. The Conqueror sunk the Belgrano using a WW2 torpedo(s) in the Falklands conflict which must have brought a wry smile to veteran submariners.
\">The 4 rotor Enigma was introduced in 1942 and broken in the spring of 1943.<\" Delays of up to 30 days were common in breaking the 4 rotor Enigma until Autumn 1943, I have read (although I cannot locate the source at present) that 4 rotor Engima remained effectively unbreakable in anything like real time until mid 1944: different info from different sources.
\">After that there were too many escort carriers which could carry fighters. <\" Escort carriers in the Bay of Biscay? I think the U-boats and land based anti-shipping aircraft would have relished the abundance of targets. The JU88 could operate at night (as did Torbeaus in the Med), could any carrier based fighters operate at night? How did they land, the carrier could hardly switch on the landing lights. How far could a JU88 fly out into the Atlantic? I shall have to research that.
\">The British could have sent their aircraft carriers into the area and given the Ju 88 a hard time.<\" JU88 + U-boats vs carriers at night?
\">Not clearing the Bay of Biscay of British ASW assets was a major error, and it was Goering\'s fault, but it would not have changed all that much. <\" It was probably one of the the most important errors committed by the German naval forces in WW2, therefore the ultimate responsibility lay with AH. Reduce Allied successes in the Bay and U-boat losses would drop substantially. The Liberator was a good plane, but against 8 JU88s the outcome was obvious (although I believe an obsolete Sunderland gave a very good account of itself against a pack of JU88s in one memorable incident)
\">Radio silence was only feasible for electroboats because they could find their targets at long distances using sonar. <\" Was this proven in the field? Effective use of this tech in the field was decades away.
Condors would summon the U-boats to the convoys, minimal radio traffic from U-boats, resulting in increased tonnage sunk and reduced U-boat losses.
Is there more than one Superkraut?
BTW, I visited www.historychannel.com WWII forum, v good, it may take me some time to read through the earlier posts and perhaps by then the resident Bulldog may have retired!
Regards
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RE: Vulnerability during schnorkeling? | James Stewart | 02/05/2001 09:14PM |
RE: Vulnerability during schnorkeling? | Steve Cooper | 02/06/2001 03:07AM |
Snorkeling and XXI | SuperKraut | 02/06/2001 08:49AM |
RE: T schnorkels | kurt | 02/07/2001 10:22PM |
T-valve snorkel | SuperKraut | 02/08/2001 01:29PM |
RE: T-valve snorkel | Bulldog | 02/08/2001 10:48PM |
Foresight | SuperKraut | 02/09/2001 08:16AM |
Winning with mediocre weapons | Bulldog | 02/09/2001 09:40PM |
High tech weapons | SuperKraut | 02/10/2001 09:07AM |
RE: High tech weapons | Bulldog | 02/10/2001 08:56PM |
RE: High tech weapons | SuperKraut | 02/11/2001 01:34AM |
RE: High tech weapons | Tom Iwanski | 02/11/2001 03:19AM |
RE: High tech weapons | SuperKraut | 02/11/2001 12:53PM |
RE: High tech weapons | Bulldog (which one?) | 02/11/2001 09:50PM |
Bulldog on Frasier | Rick Mann | 02/12/2001 03:49PM |
RE: Bulldog on Frasier | Bulldog | 02/12/2001 09:17PM |
RE: High tech weapons | SuperKraut | 02/12/2001 04:21PM |
RE: High tech weapons | Bulldog | 02/12/2001 11:20PM |
RE: T-valve snorkel | kurt | 02/10/2001 07:11PM |
RE: T-valve snorkel | Tom Iwanski | 02/10/2001 09:25PM |
RE: T-valve snorkel | Anders Wingren | 02/10/2001 10:40PM |
RE: Snorkeling and XXI | Tom Iwanski | 02/10/2001 09:15PM |
Snorkel history | SuperKraut | 02/11/2001 01:50PM |
RE: Snorkel history | Tom Iwanski | 02/11/2001 04:32PM |
RE: Snorkeling and XXI | Don Dirst | 02/06/2001 10:34PM |