General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Good analysis
Posted by:
SuperKraut
()
Date: April 26, 2001 02:57PM
<HTML>However, I have some quibbles.
\">A true submarine really had to await nuclear power in the postwar navies.<\" I know this has been beaten to death before, but the electroboat was as close as one could get to having a real submarine before nuclear power became available and/or affordable. The Type XXI and its teardrop successors had a performance which could beat the ASW technology of the period, or at least give it a really good run for its money.
\">At best the U-boats may have been a factor delaying the allied invasion of France from 1943 to 1944.<\" That is a real long shot. The main problem was in the air and in US experience. If you assume no Allied transport losses at all, then it is possible than enough materiel gets to the UK for a 1943 invasion, but it is an open question if the British would have gone for the invasion at that time. Also note the US Army would have been green in 1943 since the Africa adventure could not have happened. Another interesting effect would be on the night bomber war, since a lot of bombers could be used against Germany which were used for patrolling the Atlantic.
\">As for forestalling an invasion, U-boats were again not a major factor. Submarines, be they British ones off Norway, US subs off the Philipines, or German ones off of France, were uniformly ineffective in hindering heavily escorted invasions fleets.<\" Not quite. The Royal Navy almost took a major beating during the Norway operation (Weseruebung), but was saved by the dud German torpedoes. Several capital ships were hit by dud torpedoes. However, this was in early 1940 when ASW was far from being effective. The English Channel is far from ideal U-boat waters, however, imagine what 50 XXI would have done to Torch.
On a more general note, the answer to the original question is to be found in timing. In both wars, the U-boat was basically a defensive weapon, since it was used in a strategy of sea denial. Even the HSF of WWI was more a weapon of sea denial than sea control, since the ships were not designed for long range ocean operations. The German colonial flotillas were relatively small compared to the RN. In WWII, there was no thought of expanding via the ocean, at least not before the east was won. Operations in the oceans were purely defensive in the sense that they were designed to isolate Britain. At the beginning of the war, the U-boats were used in an attempt to choke Britain into some sort of negotiated peace. Later on they were used to delay the American military build up in Britain. They failed to do both, in the first case there were not enough of them and in the second case they were technically obsolete. Barbarossa came in between the two events, after the failure to isolate Britain and before the American build up could start. In a way, they were irrelevant to the war in the east in the first 1 ½ years and after that they failed to prevent both the second front and Lend Lease to the Soviet Union.
Regards,
SuperKraut</HTML>
\">A true submarine really had to await nuclear power in the postwar navies.<\" I know this has been beaten to death before, but the electroboat was as close as one could get to having a real submarine before nuclear power became available and/or affordable. The Type XXI and its teardrop successors had a performance which could beat the ASW technology of the period, or at least give it a really good run for its money.
\">At best the U-boats may have been a factor delaying the allied invasion of France from 1943 to 1944.<\" That is a real long shot. The main problem was in the air and in US experience. If you assume no Allied transport losses at all, then it is possible than enough materiel gets to the UK for a 1943 invasion, but it is an open question if the British would have gone for the invasion at that time. Also note the US Army would have been green in 1943 since the Africa adventure could not have happened. Another interesting effect would be on the night bomber war, since a lot of bombers could be used against Germany which were used for patrolling the Atlantic.
\">As for forestalling an invasion, U-boats were again not a major factor. Submarines, be they British ones off Norway, US subs off the Philipines, or German ones off of France, were uniformly ineffective in hindering heavily escorted invasions fleets.<\" Not quite. The Royal Navy almost took a major beating during the Norway operation (Weseruebung), but was saved by the dud German torpedoes. Several capital ships were hit by dud torpedoes. However, this was in early 1940 when ASW was far from being effective. The English Channel is far from ideal U-boat waters, however, imagine what 50 XXI would have done to Torch.
On a more general note, the answer to the original question is to be found in timing. In both wars, the U-boat was basically a defensive weapon, since it was used in a strategy of sea denial. Even the HSF of WWI was more a weapon of sea denial than sea control, since the ships were not designed for long range ocean operations. The German colonial flotillas were relatively small compared to the RN. In WWII, there was no thought of expanding via the ocean, at least not before the east was won. Operations in the oceans were purely defensive in the sense that they were designed to isolate Britain. At the beginning of the war, the U-boats were used in an attempt to choke Britain into some sort of negotiated peace. Later on they were used to delay the American military build up in Britain. They failed to do both, in the first case there were not enough of them and in the second case they were technically obsolete. Barbarossa came in between the two events, after the failure to isolate Britain and before the American build up could start. In a way, they were irrelevant to the war in the east in the first 1 ½ years and after that they failed to prevent both the second front and Lend Lease to the Soviet Union.
Regards,
SuperKraut</HTML>
