General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
RE: the submarine role...- help! (and thanks!)
Posted by:
kurt
()
Date: April 28, 2001 07:11PM
<HTML>What I meant by direct military support was in the direct particpation in a naval battle between fleets. Subs did not succeed in helping to win battles, as much as they tried.
Obviously subs had significant effects on an enemy\'s military economy, mostly by an economic war of attrition against an enemy\'s civilian merchant fleet and supplies. But I consider this to be \'indirect\' support.
The losses of the Royal Navy to German U-boats was small in all respects except compared to what the rest of the German Armed forces achieved - almost nothing. The Royal Navy was never weakened, let alone defeated, by the handful of captial ships lost to the U-boats. And U-boats proved singularly unsuccesful in sinking ASW vessels and escorts. Only in the attack on merchant shipping in the first few years of the war did Britian feel truly threatened.
However, in the Pacific US subs cut huge swaths thru the IJN, sinking numerous capital ships, including the largest warship of WWII, the aircraft carrier Shinano. A large portion of the IJN ASW fleet and destroyer flotilla died at the hands of US subs.
The IJN sub fleet, though inneffective after 1942, was also very successful against the US Navy in its first year of operation. The Yorktown, South Dakota, Saratoga, etc... a large number of very critical needed capital ships were lost or badly damaged at the hands of IJN subs in the first year of the war. These were critically needed at a time when the US Navy was fighting a losing Naval war against a stronger enemy - every capital ship sunk or laid up with long term damage was very, very, badly missed.
In other words, in the Pacific, subs on both sides had major effects on the enemy\'s naval forces. But still, subs never counted for much in winning naval battles, the way, say, carrier planes did.
The bulk of the damage to Naval fleets on either side was done by air power, either land based or from carriers. Subs were repeatedly deployed to support naval fleets in major clashes and failed to significantly contribute to the victory in any battle, generally only sinking stragglers after the battle was won. (ex: Yortown after Midway, Shikoku after Leyte Gulf).
These deployments against battle fleets severely disrupted sub operations against the Japanese merchant marine, as did the constant shifting of subs chasing done ultra intercepts about capital ships. Postwar historians (yes, including the outspoken Clay Blair) have severely faulted this for slowing down the economic war against Japanese shipping.
Subsduring WWII were a weapon of economic warfare, and were best used against enemy shipping, not naval forces.
Fredrick: you can quote me within context and credited. Glad to be of help.</HTML>
Obviously subs had significant effects on an enemy\'s military economy, mostly by an economic war of attrition against an enemy\'s civilian merchant fleet and supplies. But I consider this to be \'indirect\' support.
The losses of the Royal Navy to German U-boats was small in all respects except compared to what the rest of the German Armed forces achieved - almost nothing. The Royal Navy was never weakened, let alone defeated, by the handful of captial ships lost to the U-boats. And U-boats proved singularly unsuccesful in sinking ASW vessels and escorts. Only in the attack on merchant shipping in the first few years of the war did Britian feel truly threatened.
However, in the Pacific US subs cut huge swaths thru the IJN, sinking numerous capital ships, including the largest warship of WWII, the aircraft carrier Shinano. A large portion of the IJN ASW fleet and destroyer flotilla died at the hands of US subs.
The IJN sub fleet, though inneffective after 1942, was also very successful against the US Navy in its first year of operation. The Yorktown, South Dakota, Saratoga, etc... a large number of very critical needed capital ships were lost or badly damaged at the hands of IJN subs in the first year of the war. These were critically needed at a time when the US Navy was fighting a losing Naval war against a stronger enemy - every capital ship sunk or laid up with long term damage was very, very, badly missed.
In other words, in the Pacific, subs on both sides had major effects on the enemy\'s naval forces. But still, subs never counted for much in winning naval battles, the way, say, carrier planes did.
The bulk of the damage to Naval fleets on either side was done by air power, either land based or from carriers. Subs were repeatedly deployed to support naval fleets in major clashes and failed to significantly contribute to the victory in any battle, generally only sinking stragglers after the battle was won. (ex: Yortown after Midway, Shikoku after Leyte Gulf).
These deployments against battle fleets severely disrupted sub operations against the Japanese merchant marine, as did the constant shifting of subs chasing done ultra intercepts about capital ships. Postwar historians (yes, including the outspoken Clay Blair) have severely faulted this for slowing down the economic war against Japanese shipping.
Subsduring WWII were a weapon of economic warfare, and were best used against enemy shipping, not naval forces.
Fredrick: you can quote me within context and credited. Glad to be of help.</HTML>
