General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Comments
Posted by:
SuperKraut
()
Date: April 30, 2001 06:23AM
<HTML>\">His resistance to the possibility of radar, and ignorance of the significance of electronics in general, was critical, as was his dismissal of the power of airborne ASW, a critical factor in WWII.< Quite right in principle, but I think the issue was more ignorance than resistance. He had very poor advice from a certain Capt. Stummel of OKM who was still denying the effects of radar in 1943. One can conclude that Stummel was either incompetent or a traitor. Doenitz himself was ignorant of the radar issue, but many of his commanders suspected that radar was being used. He chose to believe Stummel.
The key to airborne ASW was radar, so if the obvious solution to radar (electroboats) had been applied, it would automatically have solved the problem of airborne ASW.
A technically competent analysis of the situation should have shown in 1941 that ship mounted radar was picking up surfaced U-boats at night. Therefore, a competent reactive strategy against radar should have been developed in 1941 which would have led to the Type XXI in service by 1943. The data for a competent proactive strategy was already available around 1937/38, so if Doenitz had been an innovator like Guderian, the electroboats would have been available by 1940/41. The reason for the longer lead time of the proactive strategy was the immaturity of passive sonar at the time which needed to be significantly improved to gain the ability to fight by sound alone.
The main blame which can be assigned to Doenitz was talking too much. Even if Enigma had not been broken, the radio chatter was generating lots of signal analysis data from which the British could determine the approximate position of most U-boats. Signal analysis (HF-DF) and Ultra told the radar equipped ASW forces roughly where to look. Without those leads, the ASW forces would have had to cover a much larger area and hence find fewer U-boats.
Regards,
SuperKraut</HTML>
The key to airborne ASW was radar, so if the obvious solution to radar (electroboats) had been applied, it would automatically have solved the problem of airborne ASW.
A technically competent analysis of the situation should have shown in 1941 that ship mounted radar was picking up surfaced U-boats at night. Therefore, a competent reactive strategy against radar should have been developed in 1941 which would have led to the Type XXI in service by 1943. The data for a competent proactive strategy was already available around 1937/38, so if Doenitz had been an innovator like Guderian, the electroboats would have been available by 1940/41. The reason for the longer lead time of the proactive strategy was the immaturity of passive sonar at the time which needed to be significantly improved to gain the ability to fight by sound alone.
The main blame which can be assigned to Doenitz was talking too much. Even if Enigma had not been broken, the radio chatter was generating lots of signal analysis data from which the British could determine the approximate position of most U-boats. Signal analysis (HF-DF) and Ultra told the radar equipped ASW forces roughly where to look. Without those leads, the ASW forces would have had to cover a much larger area and hence find fewer U-boats.
Regards,
SuperKraut</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
What thoughts/opinions ?
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MPC | 04/28/2001 08:22PM |
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RE: What thoughts/opinions ?
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J.T. McDaniel | 04/29/2001 03:49PM |
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RE: What thoughts/opinions ?
|
John Griffiths | 04/29/2001 06:01PM |
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RE: What thoughts/opinions ?
|
kurt | 04/29/2001 09:13PM |
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Comments
|
SuperKraut | 04/30/2001 06:23AM |
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RE: Comments
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kurt | 04/30/2001 03:28PM |