General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
RE: Effect of elektroboats
Posted by:
kurt
()
Date: May 14, 2001 04:31PM
<HTML>We ought to have a \'What if\' section on the XXI as a part of the main site, as this question keeps coming up again and again (no reflection on your question, Tony- it is precisely because it is such a good question that it comes up so often).
SK has previously detailed scenarios where advanced weapons could have been reasonably foreseen and developed far earlier than they were - many are intriguing what ifs.
But they are ony what if\'s. There are a number of reasons why I feel the XXI, and other advanced U-boat designs, remained only what if\'s - many of the arguments also apply to the other weapons SK mentions.
1) Germany was not prepared for WWII to start when it did. AH and company thought Poland would be there last land grab, the final consolidation of Germanic territory, after which Germany would gestate \'quietly\' till some time later, and then spring upon the world at a later, much more developed stage of military prepardness. The Naval building program was geared around a war starting in, not ending, 1945. Germany was surprised by the sudden allied resilence (they caved in on Czeckoslovakia, why not Poland?), and was not prepared for a general war in 1939. Weapon programs that needed major start ups in the pre-war years to be effective in the 41-43 time frame would not have been viewed credibly because no one expected war to start in 1939.
2) Pre-war German diplomatic strategy assumed that England could be kept out of the war, at least for a long time. Again, Germany was stunned when England declared war. This was not expected. Since war with England was not expected, large scale program building advanced submarines for a prolonged war with England would not be credible, and would be unlikely to receive funding.
3) Unlike us today, no one during WWII knew how long WWII would last once it did start. The Allies pretty much guessed that they were in a long haul war with a formidible enemy, but Germany assumed that the war would be quickly over, particularly after France collapsed so quickly in the summer of 1940. The war was always \'6 months from ending\'. It wasn\'t until the invasion of Russia fell apart that the highest levels of German gov\'t (AH and friends) realized that the war was going to last years, not a few more months. It could be argued that until Stalingrad was lost (Jan \'43) AH did not realize/would not admit that the war would be a long one. As such long term weapon development plans, from jets to elektro boats, were put on the back burner for years - until 1943, after AH realized he was in a maojr war to the finish. But by then it was too late..... SK has posted previously with details on the effects of AH\'s stop research orders, the drafting of skilled engineers into the infantry, etc. etc. This was all premised on the idea that the war would be over shortly.
4) At the very latest, a detailed and caustic analysis of the U-boat trends of 1940 -\'41 would show the need for the elektroboat. Declining tons/patrol day, and increasing losses (tons sunk/U-boat lost), statistics closely watched by Doenitz, all declined steadily in this time frame -showing that the Type VII would quickly be obsolete. But again, it is easy to see in retrospect that the big solution (a revolutionary new sub type) was needed, not the small solution (upgrades to the Type VII, different patrol sectors and tactics) chosen. But at the time, U-boat sinkings were enormous, it was their greatest hour. It would be a hard sell that just as they racked up their greatest sinking totals that they were facing obsolecense. Given the mindset of a short war time frame, it is unlikely that an appeal by Doenitz and Reader to AH for an elektroboat would have been accepted anymore than anything else. V-2s, jet fighter, nothing else was being funded heavily in this time frame. AH would have told Doenitz to stop being defeatist, tell the U-boat crews to try harder, and stop whining. If he let Doenitz keep his job....
5) Doentiz and his undermanned, overworked staff simply did not believe the technical advantages that came to dominate the allies arsenal were credible threats to U-boat operations. For the longest time he did not believe in ship borne (let alone airborne) radar, direction finding, and never did get clued in on Ultra. Ignoring the all important EW component of U-boat warfare, pooh-poohing the threat of aircraft, Doentiz, most of the high command, and most U-boat commanders, were in no mood or mindset in 1940-41 to believe that U-boats were facing obsolecense and needed a crash program to replace them with a revolutionary new elektroboat. A suggestoin like that in 1941 would be seen as alarmist, and probably get no more than small long term funding, not a crash program...
Basically, no one was in the mood to think of building an advanced sub like an elektroboat till the need was so obvious it could not be ignored, by which time it was too late.
(BTW, one could also make an argument that the British could have seen the clouds coming and built a much better ASW capability than they did in the pre-war years, crushing the U-boat threat from the first - an alternate history thread no one on this sub fan oriented board has explored yet....)</HTML>
SK has previously detailed scenarios where advanced weapons could have been reasonably foreseen and developed far earlier than they were - many are intriguing what ifs.
But they are ony what if\'s. There are a number of reasons why I feel the XXI, and other advanced U-boat designs, remained only what if\'s - many of the arguments also apply to the other weapons SK mentions.
1) Germany was not prepared for WWII to start when it did. AH and company thought Poland would be there last land grab, the final consolidation of Germanic territory, after which Germany would gestate \'quietly\' till some time later, and then spring upon the world at a later, much more developed stage of military prepardness. The Naval building program was geared around a war starting in, not ending, 1945. Germany was surprised by the sudden allied resilence (they caved in on Czeckoslovakia, why not Poland?), and was not prepared for a general war in 1939. Weapon programs that needed major start ups in the pre-war years to be effective in the 41-43 time frame would not have been viewed credibly because no one expected war to start in 1939.
2) Pre-war German diplomatic strategy assumed that England could be kept out of the war, at least for a long time. Again, Germany was stunned when England declared war. This was not expected. Since war with England was not expected, large scale program building advanced submarines for a prolonged war with England would not be credible, and would be unlikely to receive funding.
3) Unlike us today, no one during WWII knew how long WWII would last once it did start. The Allies pretty much guessed that they were in a long haul war with a formidible enemy, but Germany assumed that the war would be quickly over, particularly after France collapsed so quickly in the summer of 1940. The war was always \'6 months from ending\'. It wasn\'t until the invasion of Russia fell apart that the highest levels of German gov\'t (AH and friends) realized that the war was going to last years, not a few more months. It could be argued that until Stalingrad was lost (Jan \'43) AH did not realize/would not admit that the war would be a long one. As such long term weapon development plans, from jets to elektro boats, were put on the back burner for years - until 1943, after AH realized he was in a maojr war to the finish. But by then it was too late..... SK has posted previously with details on the effects of AH\'s stop research orders, the drafting of skilled engineers into the infantry, etc. etc. This was all premised on the idea that the war would be over shortly.
4) At the very latest, a detailed and caustic analysis of the U-boat trends of 1940 -\'41 would show the need for the elektroboat. Declining tons/patrol day, and increasing losses (tons sunk/U-boat lost), statistics closely watched by Doenitz, all declined steadily in this time frame -showing that the Type VII would quickly be obsolete. But again, it is easy to see in retrospect that the big solution (a revolutionary new sub type) was needed, not the small solution (upgrades to the Type VII, different patrol sectors and tactics) chosen. But at the time, U-boat sinkings were enormous, it was their greatest hour. It would be a hard sell that just as they racked up their greatest sinking totals that they were facing obsolecense. Given the mindset of a short war time frame, it is unlikely that an appeal by Doenitz and Reader to AH for an elektroboat would have been accepted anymore than anything else. V-2s, jet fighter, nothing else was being funded heavily in this time frame. AH would have told Doenitz to stop being defeatist, tell the U-boat crews to try harder, and stop whining. If he let Doenitz keep his job....
5) Doentiz and his undermanned, overworked staff simply did not believe the technical advantages that came to dominate the allies arsenal were credible threats to U-boat operations. For the longest time he did not believe in ship borne (let alone airborne) radar, direction finding, and never did get clued in on Ultra. Ignoring the all important EW component of U-boat warfare, pooh-poohing the threat of aircraft, Doentiz, most of the high command, and most U-boat commanders, were in no mood or mindset in 1940-41 to believe that U-boats were facing obsolecense and needed a crash program to replace them with a revolutionary new elektroboat. A suggestoin like that in 1941 would be seen as alarmist, and probably get no more than small long term funding, not a crash program...
Basically, no one was in the mood to think of building an advanced sub like an elektroboat till the need was so obvious it could not be ignored, by which time it was too late.
(BTW, one could also make an argument that the British could have seen the clouds coming and built a much better ASW capability than they did in the pre-war years, crushing the U-boat threat from the first - an alternate history thread no one on this sub fan oriented board has explored yet....)</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
elektro
|
tony | 05/12/2001 11:29AM |
|
RE: elektro
|
J.T. McDaniel | 05/12/2001 08:25PM |
|
RE: elektro
|
parade | 05/13/2001 08:37AM |
|
Effect of elektroboats
|
SuperKraut | 05/14/2001 01:01PM |
|
RE: Effect of elektroboats
|
kurt | 05/14/2001 04:31PM |
|
What ifs.
|
SuperKraut | 05/16/2001 09:42AM |
|
RE: Germay wins in the West without hi-tech
|
Leyburn | 05/19/2001 07:00PM |
|
Germay?
|
Leyburn | 05/20/2001 07:17PM |