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This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII. 
Enigma and faith
Posted by: kurt ()
Date: May 17, 2001 04:21PM

<HTML>One thing that has struck me about the whole enigma story is the blind faith everyone put into the invulnerability of their systems, despite the growing evidence to the contrary.

During WWII virtually everyone was using a variation of the same rotor machine. Every major WWII power carefully examined their security, and they all independently reached the same conclusion: their own systems were totally secure (even when they were reading the other guy\'s mail). But in fact, most of the codes were penetrated, at least at one time or another: US and British codes were penetrated by B-Dienst, and of course the German and Japanese codes were badly compromised. Soviets had in-depth knowledge of German plans....Even the Soviet\'s codes were being read by the US, though not real time during the war.....

The penetration of the various German enigma machines is a well known story. Carelessness and various hostile security penetrations played a large part - ranging from cribs from sloppy Luftwaffe work to the capture of the U-110 3 rotor Naval enigma.

But even so, there seemed to be a measure of common sense that was missing - excessive blind faith in the engima that goes beyond the scope of one or two incompetents or even traitors.

It is all easy to say in retrospect, but common sense would make one realize that subs would be sunk in shallow water (like U-85), or even boarded (like U-110), making much of their content, including rotors and codebooks, compromisable. With dozens of U-boat sinkings, many in shallow waters near hostile shores, one would have to worry that eventually one would be sunk without time to properly destroy everything aboard. Yet no one seemed concerned about the possibility of physical compromise of the machine itself. Even if everything was compromised, once the codebooks ran out in a few weeks, the enigma machine would be useless, or so it was thought.

When the IJN sub I-1 was sunk in very shallow water in US held territory, one of the crew escaped back to his lines, and told authorities that the encryption material had not been destroyed. The codebooks were immediately changed (blacking out US decrypts for a while) but the basic encryption machine was not. Even with evidence in hand that the enemy had obtained it!

Part of this may be the feeling of racial arrogance that led Germany (and Japan) to discount the ability and resolve of their opponents, and doubt they could do something better than they could thremselves. Part of this may be the mentality of a paranoid police state, where secret information is not properly shared, and security issues are naturally viewed in terms of treason, not technology.

But regardless of what the technocrats were saying, one would think that eventually the almost prescient knowledge of the allies would clue in someone that the mail was being read - not just the German enigma, but also with the Japanese, and with regards to the Russians, who also were reading the German mail thru their spy network. Could the allies really just be lucky in almost always placing their troops and ships in the right place at the right time? I read (no independent confirmation) that often the Germans would made a secret move on the Eastern front for a counteroffensive, and then the troops would be greeted just before H-hour with Russian loudpseakers welcoming all the German units (by name and number) - demoralizing just before a \'surprise attack\' for sure as needless to say the Russians had concentrated opposite them, but this was a strong hint that the mail was being read as well..... Certainly the Russians seemed awful prescient about German moves....

Doentiz almost caught on, suspecting somehow that his mail was being read. But he concentrated more on internal spies. Even so, he did add the fourth rotor, making his naval enigma the hardest nut for the allies to crack. The Japanese also suspected a compromise - and properly suspected a technological breech, not internal spies. The IJN naval command demanded a thorough investigation mid-war once it became apparent that the allies always seemed to be prepared for their moves - yep, the answer was agiain, the mathematical possiblity of breaking the rotor codes was so tiny, it was not a realistic possiblity. And so they moved on, figuring the allies were just lucky.

Of course, even after all the triumphs of Ultra was common knowledge in the US, no one figured out the prescient knowledge of the Russians regarding US ship movements in the 60s and 70s meant that they were reading the US mail (thanks to Mr. Walker)...There must be something about an institutionalized excessive faith in technology.....</HTML>

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Subject Written By Posted
Bletchley Park or just lucky??? William Engel 05/15/2001 12:46PM
RE: Bletchley Park or just lucky??? Marc Haldimann 05/15/2001 01:47PM
RE: Bletchley Park or just lucky??? MPC 05/15/2001 07:06PM
RE: Bletchley Park or just lucky??? William Engel 05/16/2001 05:21AM
Enigma SuperKraut 05/16/2001 08:44AM
RE: Enigma William Engel 05/16/2001 09:27AM
Alternative explanation SuperKraut 05/16/2001 03:06PM
Alternative explanation SuperKraut 05/16/2001 03:07PM
RE: Alternative explanation William Engel 05/17/2001 05:46AM
Poor coordination SuperKraut 05/17/2001 08:07AM
Enigma and faith kurt 05/17/2001 04:21PM
Cipher penetrations SuperKraut 05/19/2001 07:28AM
Congratulations to you both... MPC 05/16/2001 03:49PM
RE: Bletchley Park or just lucky??? Rainer Bruns 05/16/2001 06:25PM
RE: Bletchley Park or just lucky??? Kris 05/16/2001 05:14PM


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