General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Re: Bombing of Lorient during construction
Posted by:
Flaccus
()
Date: August 19, 2013 09:58PM
Thank you again, Luc, for your very detailed account of Allied bombings of the sub pens at Lorient. Also for your note that after the war British leaders observed that they should have hit Lorient harder during that period.
Here's some other material I've been able to gather to answer my own question, “Why weren't the new Keroman sub pens at Lorient bombed in a concentrated way when they were under construction and vulnerable between mid-1940 and September 1941?”
It turns out there were some understandable reasons:
The RAF of 1940-41 was not yet the “thousand-bomber-stream” it became later. It did not have enough bombers to concentrate on one target night after night. Britain, of course, was standing alone in Europe against the Nazis.
Even though Churchill had given clear directions that the RAF must help the navy protect the Atlantic shipping lifeline, there were several naval threats to protect against.
First, there were German surface raiders. These could be used against cargo vessels, so the RAF sent planes to attack German cruisers and battleships whenever they were spotted in port. Germany had a small fleet compared to the UK's, but the Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Tirpitz and (until May 1941) Bismarck were still afloat at this time.
Second, there were submarine-manufacturing factories. RAF bombers attacked these in northern Germany; there were no factories in France. It was reasonable to try to counter the sub threat at its source. There were also sub pens and repair docks in northern Germany and Norway which needed attention.
Third, U-boats and other German raiders were operating in and near British waters, and had to be chased. Many planes were needed to lay sea mines in and near British home waters.
All these needs detracted from the number of bombers available to attack the emerging Lorient pens.
In addition to these matters, as of 1940 Bomber Command believed concentrated attacks on German oil production would force Germany to end the war quickly. It took some persuading to change Bomber Command's orientation toward the U-boat threat.
(Note: In August 1941 the Dutt Report showed that fewer than a third of British bombs were striking within five miles of their aiming points, which at that time were oil-industry targets in Germany, attacked at night. The report was of course not made public at the time, but it outraged Churchill personally. Bureaucratic disbelief and inertia among the RAF leadership meant that the Dutt report did not change RAF bombing practices right away, but the report shows that concentrated attacks on Lorient night not have been accurate enough in any event.)
These are the books I used: Bomber Command, by Hastings; Reaching for the Stars, by Connolly; and The Hardest Victory by Richards. Also useful: the Osprey book, U-Boat Bases and Bunkers 1941-45, by Williamson.
Here's some other material I've been able to gather to answer my own question, “Why weren't the new Keroman sub pens at Lorient bombed in a concentrated way when they were under construction and vulnerable between mid-1940 and September 1941?”
It turns out there were some understandable reasons:
The RAF of 1940-41 was not yet the “thousand-bomber-stream” it became later. It did not have enough bombers to concentrate on one target night after night. Britain, of course, was standing alone in Europe against the Nazis.
Even though Churchill had given clear directions that the RAF must help the navy protect the Atlantic shipping lifeline, there were several naval threats to protect against.
First, there were German surface raiders. These could be used against cargo vessels, so the RAF sent planes to attack German cruisers and battleships whenever they were spotted in port. Germany had a small fleet compared to the UK's, but the Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Tirpitz and (until May 1941) Bismarck were still afloat at this time.
Second, there were submarine-manufacturing factories. RAF bombers attacked these in northern Germany; there were no factories in France. It was reasonable to try to counter the sub threat at its source. There were also sub pens and repair docks in northern Germany and Norway which needed attention.
Third, U-boats and other German raiders were operating in and near British waters, and had to be chased. Many planes were needed to lay sea mines in and near British home waters.
All these needs detracted from the number of bombers available to attack the emerging Lorient pens.
In addition to these matters, as of 1940 Bomber Command believed concentrated attacks on German oil production would force Germany to end the war quickly. It took some persuading to change Bomber Command's orientation toward the U-boat threat.
(Note: In August 1941 the Dutt Report showed that fewer than a third of British bombs were striking within five miles of their aiming points, which at that time were oil-industry targets in Germany, attacked at night. The report was of course not made public at the time, but it outraged Churchill personally. Bureaucratic disbelief and inertia among the RAF leadership meant that the Dutt report did not change RAF bombing practices right away, but the report shows that concentrated attacks on Lorient night not have been accurate enough in any event.)
These are the books I used: Bomber Command, by Hastings; Reaching for the Stars, by Connolly; and The Hardest Victory by Richards. Also useful: the Osprey book, U-Boat Bases and Bunkers 1941-45, by Williamson.
