General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Re: HMS URGE
Posted by:
Platon Alexiades
()
Date: May 10, 2015 03:44PM
Since I have been challenged in this forum and others (warsailors and AIDMEN) I feel I have to put down in writing what is available and why the theory of HMS URGE’s loss at Ras Hilal can be discredited.
The loss of HMS URGE by Platon Alexiades.
During the last week of April 1942, the situation in Malta had put in jeopardy the existence of the submarines of the Tenth Flotilla and they were ordered to sail for Alexandria and join the First Flotilla.
The submarines were normally ordered to sail at a 24-hour interval to minimize the risks of mining or a case of mistaken identity should they meet each other at sea. Each submarine was to sail before dawn and follow the North-East Channel that is 071° from St. Elmo Light to 36°00’ N, 14°53’ E thence direct to 35°51’ N, 15°15’ E and from then on they would follow more or less the same course to Alexandria. We shall focus on that of HMS URGE.
The first submarine to sail was P 31 and she did so at 0430B/26 April and arrived at Alexandria at 0730C/5 May.
The next submarine was URGE and her sailing orders indicated that she would sail at 0445B/27 April. We do not know the precise time that she sailed but Vice Admiral Malta in a signal timed 1025B/27 informed Alexandria that she had indeed sailed. It is unclear if she sailed on time or if she was a few hours late. Captain (S) Tenth Flotilla (G.W.G. Simpson, RN) wrote in his report that all submarines sailed before dawn so we can assume that URGE did sail at approximately the time indicated by her sailing orders.
Captain (S) Ten in his signal of 2240B/26 addressed to Captain (S) First Flotilla (Alexandria) informed him that URGE was to reach position 34°55’ N, 20°05’ E at about 0700B/30 April. After that she was to follow Captain (S) One’s orders.
Captain (S) 1 in his signal of 1121C/27 April instructed HMS URGE to proceed next through (1) 34°53' N, 20°28' E and (2) 32°12' N, 29°06' E thence to Alexandria. Her estimated speed of advance was 90 nautical miles per day. The submarines were told to stay as far away from the Libyan coast as possible as Axis aircraft strength had been built up. She was expected to reach her destination on the morning of 6 May. None of these submarines were told to hug the Libyan coast on their way to Alexandria. They were to follow strict routes as they feared as much the RAF then Axis aircraft. They could not be diverted by a sudden whim of their commander.
[note: her normal cruising speed was about 7 knots during dark hours and 2-3 knots submerged during daylight hours, according to her logs she did reach a maximum speed of 10 knots for an hour or two on a couple of occasions].
For the record the next submarines to go were:
PORPOISE sailed at 0358B/29 April and arrived at Alexandria on 5 May.
P 34 sailed at 0430B/29 April and arrived at Alexandria at 1037C/8 May.
These last two sailed at almost the same time but PORPOISE [a submarine used to supply Malta and not part of the Tenth Flotilla] was much faster and expected to quickly outrun P 34 and URGE.
UNA sailed at 0430B/4 May and arrived at Alexandria at 0745C/13 May.
OLYMPUS sailed at 0415/8 May but was shortly after mined and sunk [as PORPOISE she was used to supply MALTA and was not part of the Tenth Flotilla].
P 35 sailed at 0401B/10 May reached Alexandria on the morning of 19 May.
The only incident reported concerning URGE was when PORPOISE encountered a U-boat at 2050C/2 May in 33°56’ N, 23°04’ E. She made a signal timed 2227C/2 to Captain (S) One and repeated to HMS URGE reporting the sighting.
This was the Italian submarine NEREIDE which also observed the British submarine but neither could make an attack. The signal was passed on to URGE because she was expected to pass through this position before dawn on 3 May.
URGE never reached Alexandria and it was believed by Captain (S) Ten that she had been probably mined on her way out of Malta. According to her route, she may have been mined on field MT 13 laid on 20 April by seven boats from the 3.Schnellbootflottille.
We have heard another theory:
That she was diverted to Ras Hilal to sink SAN GIUSTO and was herself sunk there by a CR 42 fighter plane at 0810/29 April. The pilot claimed to have missed a submarine by 30 metres with his two 50kg bombs.
Ras Hilal is approximately 32°54’ N, 22°10’ E or about 430 nautical miles from Malta.
The attack by the fighter plane occurred about 51 hours after URGE sailed from Malta.
A few hard questions for the believers of this theory:
1. At what time HMS URGE was ordered to Ras Hilal? (this fell under the jurisdiction of Captain (S) One (Alexandria). Francesco Mattesini’s theory is that she sailed at top speed on the surface (day and night a contravention of her standing orders) and achieved about 200+ miles per day when to my knowledge “U” class submarines did not do more than 130 miles per day in the best conditions and URGE was actually expected to average 90 miles on this long trip. That the concussion of the two bombs was enough to sink her.
2. Where is the order to go to Ras Hilal? The exchange of information between Captain (S) One and Captain (S) Ten which followed her loss makes no mention of a deviation of course or any order to go to Ras Hilal.
3. No ULTRA signal appeared to have surfaced that SAN GIUSTO was the object to such attention.
4. Did Lt Cdr Tomkinson had a divine guidance that told him to go to Ras Hilal and thus ignored his two superior officers?
5. Assume for an instance that an ULTRA message (that we do not know the existence) disclosed that the schooner (unescorted from Navarino to Ras Hilal) had such an important cargo that it had to be sunk at all cost. Then please explain why HMS PROTEUS was not informed? After all she was at noon on 27 April in 36°23’ N, 17°54’ E and thus less than 200 miles away from SAN GIUSTO’s course and much faster than a “U” class submarine. Why also was P 31 kept in the dark of all this? She had sailed 24 hours ahead of URGE and was still not north of Ras Hilal on 29 April but certainly she had a better chance to reach Ras Hilal than URGE. Other submarines at sea at the time were HMS THORN on patrol off Benghazi while P 612 and TAKU were proceeding directly to Alexandria from Gibraltar.
All the indications point at this period that URGE would reach the meridian of Ras Hilal during the night of 2/3 May (not on the morning of 29 April!), please refer to the signal from HMS PORPOISE.
Could HMS URGE have gone to Ras Hilal? Not entirely impossible: if she had mechanical defects that forced her to abandon her attempt to reach Alexandria. She might have tried to reach the Libyan coast ca. 3 May but then nobody claimed her sunk at that time and there were no minefields at Ras Hilal.
Some readers may be surprised at the slow speed of advance of “U” class submarines during their evacuation to Alexandria. I believe the fuel situation was desperately low in Malta and submarines probably sailed to Alexandria with the minimum fuel requirements so as not to deplete unnecessarily the local stocks. Hence the need for an economical speed of 90 miles per day. I am not certain of the above but it is just a thought. I will draw your attention that all "U" class submarines [P 31, P 34, UNA and P 35] which reached Alexandria safely (a distance of 810 miles in a straight line from Malta) did it in 9 days and a few hours (an average of 810:9 = 90 miles per day) with very little variation.
Usually submarines sailing from Malta to the United Kingdom for refit carried only two torpedoes, again not to deplete local stocks. It is possible that the "U" class sailed to Alexandria with just two torpedoes. I have not seen any mention of it but it is just a thought.
The SAN GIUSTO’s file at the Ufficio Storico does not mention any attack on 29 April. Francesco has suggested that Italian radio intercept stations had detected British radio signals on 29 April so that this could only be URGE being informed of SAN GIUSTO! I think this is jumping to conclusions too hastily…
The “proof” that she was found at Ras Hilal is that she was located by sonar at a depth of about 40 metres but no divers ever went down to confirm it! This was well within diving depth of today’s divers. I challenge a sonar expert to “positively” identify this wreck as that of HMS URGE. We are told there are three perhaps four submarines within 200 metres of each other. What a happy coincidence! I do not dispute that the wreck of U 205 is at Ras Hilal but other submarines? None of these wrecks have been dived upon since their discovery by sonar. No possibility these wrecks could be something other than submarines? Unfortunately the Libyan situation does not allow us to believe that this theory will be put to rest once and for all.
I need more proofs than wild guesses and fuzzy photographs.
I welcome any challenge or new theories.
Written in Rome on 9/10 May.
The loss of HMS URGE by Platon Alexiades.
During the last week of April 1942, the situation in Malta had put in jeopardy the existence of the submarines of the Tenth Flotilla and they were ordered to sail for Alexandria and join the First Flotilla.
The submarines were normally ordered to sail at a 24-hour interval to minimize the risks of mining or a case of mistaken identity should they meet each other at sea. Each submarine was to sail before dawn and follow the North-East Channel that is 071° from St. Elmo Light to 36°00’ N, 14°53’ E thence direct to 35°51’ N, 15°15’ E and from then on they would follow more or less the same course to Alexandria. We shall focus on that of HMS URGE.
The first submarine to sail was P 31 and she did so at 0430B/26 April and arrived at Alexandria at 0730C/5 May.
The next submarine was URGE and her sailing orders indicated that she would sail at 0445B/27 April. We do not know the precise time that she sailed but Vice Admiral Malta in a signal timed 1025B/27 informed Alexandria that she had indeed sailed. It is unclear if she sailed on time or if she was a few hours late. Captain (S) Tenth Flotilla (G.W.G. Simpson, RN) wrote in his report that all submarines sailed before dawn so we can assume that URGE did sail at approximately the time indicated by her sailing orders.
Captain (S) Ten in his signal of 2240B/26 addressed to Captain (S) First Flotilla (Alexandria) informed him that URGE was to reach position 34°55’ N, 20°05’ E at about 0700B/30 April. After that she was to follow Captain (S) One’s orders.
Captain (S) 1 in his signal of 1121C/27 April instructed HMS URGE to proceed next through (1) 34°53' N, 20°28' E and (2) 32°12' N, 29°06' E thence to Alexandria. Her estimated speed of advance was 90 nautical miles per day. The submarines were told to stay as far away from the Libyan coast as possible as Axis aircraft strength had been built up. She was expected to reach her destination on the morning of 6 May. None of these submarines were told to hug the Libyan coast on their way to Alexandria. They were to follow strict routes as they feared as much the RAF then Axis aircraft. They could not be diverted by a sudden whim of their commander.
[note: her normal cruising speed was about 7 knots during dark hours and 2-3 knots submerged during daylight hours, according to her logs she did reach a maximum speed of 10 knots for an hour or two on a couple of occasions].
For the record the next submarines to go were:
PORPOISE sailed at 0358B/29 April and arrived at Alexandria on 5 May.
P 34 sailed at 0430B/29 April and arrived at Alexandria at 1037C/8 May.
These last two sailed at almost the same time but PORPOISE [a submarine used to supply Malta and not part of the Tenth Flotilla] was much faster and expected to quickly outrun P 34 and URGE.
UNA sailed at 0430B/4 May and arrived at Alexandria at 0745C/13 May.
OLYMPUS sailed at 0415/8 May but was shortly after mined and sunk [as PORPOISE she was used to supply MALTA and was not part of the Tenth Flotilla].
P 35 sailed at 0401B/10 May reached Alexandria on the morning of 19 May.
The only incident reported concerning URGE was when PORPOISE encountered a U-boat at 2050C/2 May in 33°56’ N, 23°04’ E. She made a signal timed 2227C/2 to Captain (S) One and repeated to HMS URGE reporting the sighting.
This was the Italian submarine NEREIDE which also observed the British submarine but neither could make an attack. The signal was passed on to URGE because she was expected to pass through this position before dawn on 3 May.
URGE never reached Alexandria and it was believed by Captain (S) Ten that she had been probably mined on her way out of Malta. According to her route, she may have been mined on field MT 13 laid on 20 April by seven boats from the 3.Schnellbootflottille.
We have heard another theory:
That she was diverted to Ras Hilal to sink SAN GIUSTO and was herself sunk there by a CR 42 fighter plane at 0810/29 April. The pilot claimed to have missed a submarine by 30 metres with his two 50kg bombs.
Ras Hilal is approximately 32°54’ N, 22°10’ E or about 430 nautical miles from Malta.
The attack by the fighter plane occurred about 51 hours after URGE sailed from Malta.
A few hard questions for the believers of this theory:
1. At what time HMS URGE was ordered to Ras Hilal? (this fell under the jurisdiction of Captain (S) One (Alexandria). Francesco Mattesini’s theory is that she sailed at top speed on the surface (day and night a contravention of her standing orders) and achieved about 200+ miles per day when to my knowledge “U” class submarines did not do more than 130 miles per day in the best conditions and URGE was actually expected to average 90 miles on this long trip. That the concussion of the two bombs was enough to sink her.
2. Where is the order to go to Ras Hilal? The exchange of information between Captain (S) One and Captain (S) Ten which followed her loss makes no mention of a deviation of course or any order to go to Ras Hilal.
3. No ULTRA signal appeared to have surfaced that SAN GIUSTO was the object to such attention.
4. Did Lt Cdr Tomkinson had a divine guidance that told him to go to Ras Hilal and thus ignored his two superior officers?
5. Assume for an instance that an ULTRA message (that we do not know the existence) disclosed that the schooner (unescorted from Navarino to Ras Hilal) had such an important cargo that it had to be sunk at all cost. Then please explain why HMS PROTEUS was not informed? After all she was at noon on 27 April in 36°23’ N, 17°54’ E and thus less than 200 miles away from SAN GIUSTO’s course and much faster than a “U” class submarine. Why also was P 31 kept in the dark of all this? She had sailed 24 hours ahead of URGE and was still not north of Ras Hilal on 29 April but certainly she had a better chance to reach Ras Hilal than URGE. Other submarines at sea at the time were HMS THORN on patrol off Benghazi while P 612 and TAKU were proceeding directly to Alexandria from Gibraltar.
All the indications point at this period that URGE would reach the meridian of Ras Hilal during the night of 2/3 May (not on the morning of 29 April!), please refer to the signal from HMS PORPOISE.
Could HMS URGE have gone to Ras Hilal? Not entirely impossible: if she had mechanical defects that forced her to abandon her attempt to reach Alexandria. She might have tried to reach the Libyan coast ca. 3 May but then nobody claimed her sunk at that time and there were no minefields at Ras Hilal.
Some readers may be surprised at the slow speed of advance of “U” class submarines during their evacuation to Alexandria. I believe the fuel situation was desperately low in Malta and submarines probably sailed to Alexandria with the minimum fuel requirements so as not to deplete unnecessarily the local stocks. Hence the need for an economical speed of 90 miles per day. I am not certain of the above but it is just a thought. I will draw your attention that all "U" class submarines [P 31, P 34, UNA and P 35] which reached Alexandria safely (a distance of 810 miles in a straight line from Malta) did it in 9 days and a few hours (an average of 810:9 = 90 miles per day) with very little variation.
Usually submarines sailing from Malta to the United Kingdom for refit carried only two torpedoes, again not to deplete local stocks. It is possible that the "U" class sailed to Alexandria with just two torpedoes. I have not seen any mention of it but it is just a thought.
The SAN GIUSTO’s file at the Ufficio Storico does not mention any attack on 29 April. Francesco has suggested that Italian radio intercept stations had detected British radio signals on 29 April so that this could only be URGE being informed of SAN GIUSTO! I think this is jumping to conclusions too hastily…
The “proof” that she was found at Ras Hilal is that she was located by sonar at a depth of about 40 metres but no divers ever went down to confirm it! This was well within diving depth of today’s divers. I challenge a sonar expert to “positively” identify this wreck as that of HMS URGE. We are told there are three perhaps four submarines within 200 metres of each other. What a happy coincidence! I do not dispute that the wreck of U 205 is at Ras Hilal but other submarines? None of these wrecks have been dived upon since their discovery by sonar. No possibility these wrecks could be something other than submarines? Unfortunately the Libyan situation does not allow us to believe that this theory will be put to rest once and for all.
I need more proofs than wild guesses and fuzzy photographs.
I welcome any challenge or new theories.
Written in Rome on 9/10 May.
