General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
relavance of the tonnage war
Posted by:
kurt
()
Date: August 16, 2001 04:00PM
<HTML>High Yuri! Thanks for your reply.
Obviously, I disagree with your main point, that a war against merchant shipping in WWII had no effect on the course of the war.
I will partially grant you that the infrequent German U-boat sinkings of lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union were of little direct consequence to the vast Soviet war effort. However, there were times, lasting months, when these deliveries were stopped (100% blockage) due to U-boat, surface fleet, and air threats to the allied convoys. This obviously decreased lend lease deliveries dramatically.
But the main point of the German tonnage war was not to directly deprive soldiers fighting at the front of weapons and supplies, but to starve Britain into submission. Knocking Britian out of the war would have been a major victory for the Germans. If Great Britain had surrendered before 1941 because of U-boat deprivation of supplies, then I think it unlikely that the Soviet Union could have survived the undiluted strength of the German army.
Germany almost drove Britian to surrender in WWI with sub warfare, and made a good run of it in the early years of WWII, though by 1943 the danger had passed and the U-boat did little more than tie down allied resources in an ASW effort. Doenitz had often argued that it was allied tonnage, anywhere it was found, that mattered. A freighter carrying cow manure (or some such uselss stuff) off of New Zealand might be carrying munitions (let\'t hope that it won\'t be food!) to England next. Any cargo ship, anywhere mattered.
You can argue that this was not true, that sinking coastal freighters off of the coast of Madagascar had little to do with blockading Great Britian, but that is the point; it is an argument, with neither side clearly correct.
In the Pacific, there is an even stronger case. The US deprivations of Japanese merchant shipping, primarily by sub, but also by air, destroyed the Japanese war machine long before Lemay\'s bombers delivered the coup de grace by burning the cities and factories down. Subs also sank merchantmen far behind enemy lines, long before air power could be brought to bear, hastening the downfall of the Japanese economy, and directly saving lives and shortening the war.
And, unlike Europe, where the Western allies admittedly had limited ground contact with the Gemrans till 1944, the US was grappling in large ground battles with the IJA throughout the war. Many, many of the \'merchant\' ships sunk by US subs were carrying munitions and military supplies directly to the front in Guadacanal, Marianas, Philipines, Saipan, etc. Many transports filled with reinforcements for islands that were going to be battle zones were sunk by US subs, directly contributing to the ground combat.
The submarine war against merchant shipping had a direct and immediate impact on the the enemies\' war machine, and directly affected the battle front. It was a very usefull and legitimate aspect of WWII combat, with strategic impact far out of scope compared to their small numbers.</HTML>
Obviously, I disagree with your main point, that a war against merchant shipping in WWII had no effect on the course of the war.
I will partially grant you that the infrequent German U-boat sinkings of lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union were of little direct consequence to the vast Soviet war effort. However, there were times, lasting months, when these deliveries were stopped (100% blockage) due to U-boat, surface fleet, and air threats to the allied convoys. This obviously decreased lend lease deliveries dramatically.
But the main point of the German tonnage war was not to directly deprive soldiers fighting at the front of weapons and supplies, but to starve Britain into submission. Knocking Britian out of the war would have been a major victory for the Germans. If Great Britain had surrendered before 1941 because of U-boat deprivation of supplies, then I think it unlikely that the Soviet Union could have survived the undiluted strength of the German army.
Germany almost drove Britian to surrender in WWI with sub warfare, and made a good run of it in the early years of WWII, though by 1943 the danger had passed and the U-boat did little more than tie down allied resources in an ASW effort. Doenitz had often argued that it was allied tonnage, anywhere it was found, that mattered. A freighter carrying cow manure (or some such uselss stuff) off of New Zealand might be carrying munitions (let\'t hope that it won\'t be food!) to England next. Any cargo ship, anywhere mattered.
You can argue that this was not true, that sinking coastal freighters off of the coast of Madagascar had little to do with blockading Great Britian, but that is the point; it is an argument, with neither side clearly correct.
In the Pacific, there is an even stronger case. The US deprivations of Japanese merchant shipping, primarily by sub, but also by air, destroyed the Japanese war machine long before Lemay\'s bombers delivered the coup de grace by burning the cities and factories down. Subs also sank merchantmen far behind enemy lines, long before air power could be brought to bear, hastening the downfall of the Japanese economy, and directly saving lives and shortening the war.
And, unlike Europe, where the Western allies admittedly had limited ground contact with the Gemrans till 1944, the US was grappling in large ground battles with the IJA throughout the war. Many, many of the \'merchant\' ships sunk by US subs were carrying munitions and military supplies directly to the front in Guadacanal, Marianas, Philipines, Saipan, etc. Many transports filled with reinforcements for islands that were going to be battle zones were sunk by US subs, directly contributing to the ground combat.
The submarine war against merchant shipping had a direct and immediate impact on the the enemies\' war machine, and directly affected the battle front. It was a very usefull and legitimate aspect of WWII combat, with strategic impact far out of scope compared to their small numbers.</HTML>
