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The Dardanelles Disaster: Winston Churchill's Greatest Failure Hardcover – 9 July 2009

3.9 out of 5 stars 52 ratings

Acclaimed naval military expert Dan van der Vat argues that the disaster at the Dardanelles prolonged the war by two years, led to the Russian Revolution, forced Britain to the brink of starvation, and contributed to the destabilization of the Middle East. With never before published information on Colonel Geehl's mine laying operation, which won the battle for the Germans, The Dardanelles Disaster is essential reading for everyone interested in great naval history, Churchill's early career, and World War I.

Product description

About the Author

Dan van der Vat is a historian of naval history. He has written for The New York Times, The Times and Sunday Times (London), and now writes for The Guardian. He has written many books on naval history, including The Ship That Changed the World. He lives in England.

Product details

  • Publisher ‏ : ‎ Overlook Pr (9 July 2009)
  • Language ‏ : ‎ English
  • Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 226 pages
  • ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 1590202236
  • ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1590202234
  • Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 16 x 2.18 x 23.42 cm
  • Customer reviews:
    3.9 out of 5 stars 52 ratings

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3.9 out of 5 stars
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  • Maurice Arnold
    5.0 out of 5 stars A Bridgehead Too Far
    Reviewed in the United States on 26 July 2015
    This is a first class account of a crucial period in World War I and all the factors which turned the campaign into a disaster. The author sets out all the facts with meticulous care and provides the reader with his views about how it became such a disaster. One cannot help concluding that Kitchener had a lot to do with the adverse outcome. For example, we see on p.119 that Kitchener clearly did not know how to run a combined operation and thought the Navy could go it alone.
  • David C. Sherbrooke
    4.0 out of 5 stars A Different Opinion. . .
    Reviewed in the United States on 7 December 2009
    I would like to offer a slightly different take. If you want a book covering the Gallipoli Campaign, I would recommend Alan Moorehead's book. It has just about everything and still stands up well. This book, however, makes no pretention of covering the entire campaign. If you are interested in the decision making process (or lack thereof) to engage in this campaign, if you want to know more about the Admiralty investigation and how that process evolved, and if you want to know about the communications (or lack thereof!) between and within military and civilian leadership, then this book is for you. There are also lessons here for those who knew how to initiate step one but did not anticipate what would happen had the operation worked or had it failed. For example, even if the ships had forced the straits, what then? Clearly, there wasn't even much of a plan beyond the naval engagements until those engagements failed.

    In short, don't blame the book for not being about all that was Gallipoli. This is not a book about a military campaign as much as it is an analysis of why and how the British wound up as they did and what they did once the withdrawal of land forces had taken place. However, it is an excellent read covering grand strategy and where it can conflict with tactical demands and/or short term goals. For my part, the inexcusable weakness, once again, is the lack of charts and maps.

    PS - We all know that Gallipoli isn't the first or the last time a nation has embarked on a military campaign without "thinking ahead" about the consequences or ramifications of a military attack.
  • alan e. finch
    5.0 out of 5 stars great book get it
    Reviewed in the United States on 7 May 2014
    Dan is a great author. I have all of his books. I hope all WW1 people get them. It tells me a lot of things about the battle I did not know!
  • L. Veid
    2.0 out of 5 stars Egos + Incompetence = diaster
    Reviewed in the United States on 19 July 2009
    The Royal Navy's attack on the Dardanelles, with the associated Gallipoli land campaign is well know as Churchill's worse idea in WWI. However, Mr. van der Vat makes it clear that Churchill had a great deal of help in bringing about this diaster.

    The author does a workmanlike job of explaining why the British wanted to attack the Dardanelles, albeit with far too much emphasis on history, going all the way back to the immediate post-Trafalgar period. The conflicting ego trips among the senior political and military leaders are well presented, and explain why such an important military operation was conducted in such a poor manner. Everybody involved seemed to be making up the plan as they went along. It was very clear that the Royal Navy was in the grip of senior admirals who had not a clue as to operational and tactical realities after so many years of peace. The descriptions of the actual fighting are reasonably well done, but often confusing. Since I had only a cursory knowledge of this campaign, this book was useful to me, but I had to work very hard to get around some of Mr. van der Vat's obtuse prose.

    The reader is "treated" to an extensive analysis of the post-war history of the region. While this may be somewhat intersting, it seems out of place in this book about a particular military operation.

    The author seems allergic to charts, seldom including such in his books. This book, which covers a complex naval/ground operation occuring over months, has not one single chart or map. This is beyond the pale for any naval or military history. I also am uninterested in Mr. van der Vat's political opinions which consume the final chapter of the book.

    Overall, this book has the feel of something cranked out to meet a contract, rather than to enlighten the reader. Too much of it is recycled from previous works and the physical quality of the book is below par.
  • G. Bruce Greer
    3.0 out of 5 stars Latest Dardanelles sage
    Reviewed in the United States on 20 July 2009
    Mr Van Der Vat has written a number of excellent naval histories, and this book includes much of the materials he has amassed in his earlier research. The book is a bit thinner than his earlier works. The build up to the assault covers the history of the area, conflicts, personal and organizational and military/naval issues. The build up is the best of the book, pulling together much of his earlier stories. Maps, many more, would have helped (at least as many as pictures). Also, once the assualt, first naval then combined, starts, the pace of the story accelerates and moves very quickly, perhaps too quickly.
    The main premise, the attack lengthened the war two years has a number of examples sprinkled in, but other than citing some other sources, not really proved. His Ship that Changed the World makes a better case, and may be a better case than his thesis in this book.
    He does write well, covers much of the organizational issues with the Admiralty, as well as many of the shortcomings of Churchill as a leader of an organization that has no certain natural checks on his behavior. In this, combined with his earlier work on Turkey's entry into the war, he makes a case, but it is hard to support the dismissal of Churchill various strategic diversionary ideas and support the importance of Turkey as decisive in the war. He may be too quick to dismiss those who saw Turkey as a waste of effort. What is all too clear, is this operation was a mess at all levels, and could be used as how not to plan a successful attack and campaign.
    Points might have been made on what was learned. The US Marines took this campaign to study and develop successful landing tactics from lessons learned. Mines and gunfire were able to stop the British (and French)Navy. Planning and thinking through success and failure with alternative scenarios (even just having staffs), skills better developed by War Colleges around the world after the First World War.
    I have always enjoyed his books, and this is good, but perhaps not his best.