Macksey's scenario assumes that Germany made serious plans to invade England in May 1940 right after the breakthrough at Sedan. He takes the German's and Brit's actual assets and plans in July 1940, analyzes them by way of case examples from the 1940-1941time frame, then continues the story from there. The only other historical premise that Macksey changes follows from the invasion coming in July rather than September: Germany's amphibious operation occurs on a narrow front, a practical and likely change due to Britain's relative weakness in the alternative July invasion scenario. This would have allowed for the seaborne supply and reinforcement line to be easily defended, as well as requiring fewer supplies for the bridgehead forces (Chapter I, pp. 20-21; Chapter XV, pp. 210). This would have been a key factor in the German's ability to gain a bridgehead,and helpful in maintaining one.
A key factor was Britain's historical expectation that a German invasion would land in East Anglia, rather than Kent as the Germans actually planned (ChapterIV, 57, 60; Chapter VI, pp. 89-90, plus notes 8, 9, 10 on pp. 213-214; Chapter VI, p. 81; Chapter VII, p. 115; Chapter XIII, p. 177; Chapter XIV, pp. 181, 189 (twice); Chapter X, p. 144). This would have made the initial German landings much easier, and assuming that the Germans gained a foothold in Kent, it would have taken too long to shift units there in time to contain them there. I find it odd that the Brits actually thought that the Germans would invade East Anglia rather than Kent, but they did, as late as September (again, see Macksey's notes for Chapter VI on pp. 213-214). Luckily, the Germans didn't actually invade!
Other factors are that the extra time historically gave the British army and RAF more time to recover their losses from France, and the RAF's low altitude radar historically didn't come on line until the end of July (Chapter IV, pp. 63, 209).
The upshot is that if the Germans had attacked in July, the RAF would have had a much harder time stopping the Luftwaffe, the Royal Navy would have been a minor factor, and the army would have had a hard time stopping the German ground forces.
I notice that some reviewers claim that Macksey "handwaves" logistics. Well, except for mentions on pp. 86, 139-140,143-144, 144, 146, 147, 152-153, 153, 164, 167-168, 168 (twice), 173, 174, 174-175, 175, 177, 177-178, 178 (twice), 180, 181, 187, 195, 197-198,204, and a few that I may have missed, I guess they have a point. As mentioned above, Macksey mentions that logistics is one of the benefits of the narrow front. Some also claim that he doesn't give the Royal Navy enough credit. His endnote 3 for chapter X compares his speculative July 1940 scenario to what the Royal Navy historically faced at Dunkirk and Crete, and why Sealion would have been much worse for them.
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Bob Loade
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Reviewed in the United Kingdom on June 20, 2019