Considering how sensitive this forum is to \"What ifs\", lets keep this at least nautical.

\">The majority of the weapons and tactics involving \"high tech\" developed proactively prior and during WW2 were found to be ineffective in the field and required quick reactive development.<\" \">German torpedos, US torpedos, Me262, V2, Rocket planes, Bismark (unable to shoot down a biplane - the swordfish- which subsequently disabled the pride of the German surface fleet), Tirpitz (designed as a convoy raider, how many convoys did it destroy?), XX1, Avro Manchester (reactively developed into the Lancaster), P51 Mustang (a good plane let down by a genuinely mediocre engine until it was reactively developed with a merlin powerplant), how many more do you want?<\" A general comment would be that any revolutionary weapons development will require a certain amount of optimization before it works well in the field. Much of this optimization can and should be done before putting the device into service, but some of the problems obviously come out only in service. However, during wartime new weapons are sometimes put into service prematurely without sufficient testing.

I will not comment on everything on your list, but as I recall the V-2 and Me 262 did not have to be withdrawn or significantly altered once put into mass production. The Me 163 rocket plane never went into mass production since its problems and the general unsuitability of the concept were discovered in early trials, so it is not really relevant. Tirpitz was designed as a battleship, how it is tactically employed is another issue. The failure of the Bismarck to shoot down the Swordfish was supposedly due to the inability of the automated AA aiming system to be adjusted to the low speed of the Swordfish. If this is a true story then we are dealing with two problems, a design fault and the inability of the crew to improvise. In any case, a battleship which sank the Hood was hardly ineffective. The XXI program was thrown together in such a hurry that over 100 U-boats were built before any could go out on a war patrol. Aside from the extra time required for crew training on this revolutionary vessel, there were lots of production quality problems to solve. In any case the XXI does not fit the definition since it was not withdrawn from service, it basically never got into service. In summary, none of the weapons in this paragraph fit the criteria.

\">German torpedo crisis, I understand that the defects were known at an early stage but the German command structure forbade uttering the unthinkable.<\" This is news to me. There were actually three issues; the unreadiness of the magnetic pistol, the failure of the impact pistol at certain contact angles and the leak in the depth control system pressure chamber. The only known pre-war problem was a large variation in torpedo depth keeping. The reason was not known and in their infinite wisdom the torpedo inspectorate decided that this was not a big problem since new torpedoes with a different depth keeping system were supposed to be going into production. Well, these new torpedoes were delayed. In any case, what we have here is 2 cases of inadequate testing and one case of organizational incompetence. All three faults could have been picked up and diagnosed with realistic testing before the beginning of the war.

\">Obsolete does not mean ineffective, the conventional U-boat was still a potential war winning weapon in spring 1943 (In March 1943 Donitz\'s boats sunk more allied shipping than at any time throughout the whole war - over 627 000 tons). So much for obsolete. The real turning point was in May 1943, 41 U-boats sunk by Allied forces.<\" The extra high score for March 1943 was pure luck because a large U-boat force ran into two convoys (SC 122 and HX 229) which resulted in the single biggest convoy battle of 44 U-boats against 91 ships. The average monthly score in 1942 was 480,000 tons. The post war corrected losses for March 43 were 590,234 tons. You forget that 16 U-boats were sunk that month which is 27 lost U-boats per million tons sunk, an unsustainable figure for the Germans. In 1943, the Germans had to sink 15 - 20 million tons per year in order to close the Atlantic, since the Allies were building around 14 million tons a year in 1943 and 1944. At a loss rate of 27 U-boats per million tons, that means losing over 400 U-boats a year, an unsustainable number.

May 43 was not the turning point, it was the end of the line with a loss rate of 186 U-boats per million tons sunk. The loss rate for the year 1943 was 101 U-boats per million tons sunk and the worst month was November with a loss rate of 677. The real turning point was in 1941 when the loss rate more than doubled to 17, from 7 U-boats lost per million tons sunk in 1940. The sustainable loss rate was not much over 10, which would have meant at least 150 - 200 lost per year while fulfilling the objective of sinking 15 to 20 million tons. This could only be done with sophisticated electroboats carrying wire guided torpedoes. A loss rate of 5 per million tons would have been comfortable and still leads to losing 75 - 100 highly trained crews per year.

\">As above, in March 1943 Donitz\'s boats sunk more allied shipping than at any time throughout the whole war - over 627 000 tons. Donitz was introducing new model Enigma with 4 rotors, further adding to the Allied codebreakers problems.<\" Actually, the best year for damage inflicted was 1942 with 5.8 million tons sunk by U-boats, but with a marginally sustainable annual loss rate of 15 U-boats per million tons. The reason for the reduction in loss rate vs. 1941 was the failure of American ASW in the first half of the year. The total for 1943 was only 2.4 million tons. The 4 rotor Enigma was introduced in 1942 and broken in the spring of 1943.

\">The answer lay in combating the threat of Allied A/S planes, particularly over the Bay of Biscay, with long range JU88 (I am sure I\'ve mentioned this before); reduction in radio traffic by U-boats and use of FW Condor to locate the convoys. No electroboats required.<\" This would have worked in 1940, 1941 and into 1942, and probably saved a few dozen U-boats from being sunk. After that there were too many escort carriers which could carry fighters. Not clearing the Bay of Biscay of British ASW assets was a major error, and it was Goering\'s fault, but it would not have changed all that much. The British could have sent their aircraft carriers into the area and given the Ju 88 a hard time. Recon support from Condors would not have reduced losses, but they would have greatly improved the tons sunk per U-boat per month statistics, the other key number which declined significantly in 1941. That indicator went from 7,700 tons sunk per month per ocean going U-boat in service in 1940 to 1,900 tons in 1941, 1,700 tons in 1942 and then collapsed to 500 tons in 1943. The reduction in radio traffic is a long discussion since frequent radio traffic was required to implement the wolf pack tactics. Radio silence was only feasible for electroboats because they could find their targets at long distances using sonar.

BTW, the heavy use of Condor recon may have blown the whistle on ULTRA since the rerouting of convoys would be noticed.

There are two Bulldogs.

Regards,
SuperKraut