General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
RE: Neutral shipping losses
Posted by:
Ken Dunn
()
Date: March 25, 2001 10:53PM
<HTML>Hi Visje,
I am reading “Memoirs Ten Years and Twenty Days†by Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz (ISBN: 0-306-80764-5) at the moment and I just found this:
“In the same way Naval High Command reacted only with extreme caution and step by step to the British measures which I have just described and which constituted a breach of the London Submarine Agreement. Slowly and one by one the restrictions on the conduct of U-boat operations were removed in a series of orders from Naval High Command-beginning with permission to fire upon vessels which used their wireless, which sailed without lights and which carried guns, followed (as a result of the instructions to ram given to British ships) by permission to attack all vessels identified as hostile and ending with a declaration of sea areas that would be regarded as operational zones. These latter were at first restricted, but finally, on August 17, 1940, the whole of the seas round the British Isles were declared an operational zone, in which attack without warning would be permissible.
It is, then, an established fact that from the very outset the German Naval High Command painstakingly adhered to the provisions of international law contained in the London agreement and that it was only step by step, in response to breaches of these provisions by the enemy, that we allowed ourselves more and more latitude, until finally we reached the stage, as it was inevitable that we would, where the London agreement was abandoned completely and for good.
All these vicissitudes and orders with regard to U-boat operations in the war on commerce were, on account of their political significance, the subject of joint consultation and decision between the Naval High Command, the Foreign Ministry and the Government. They were very clearly governed by the political exigencies-in contrast to the corresponding instructions given to their own submarines by the Americans and the British. At the beginning of April 1940, for example, Churchill ordered British submarines operating in the Skagerrak by day to attack all German ships and by night to attack all ships without warning. This order went far beyond anything contained in German orders, since it meant that in these waters from then onwards neutral ships sailing with full lights would also be sunk by British submarines. (Statement by Churchill in the House of Commons, May 8, I 940.)
In the same way, on the outbreak of war with Japan on December 7, I941, the United States at once declared the whole Pacific Ocean to be a theatre of operations and from the outset waged unrestricted submarine warfare in these waters. The United States, then, were obviously quite unperturbed by political or any other considerations.â€
I don’t think it answers our questions but it is the first reference to an “operational area†I could find. It also isn’t clear how it applies to neutral ships. There were other “operational areas†with their own rules about who could be sunk and under what circumstances during the war but I can’t remember much more than that. I know the rules changed continuously during the war.
I didn’t realize so many Dutch merchant ships were sunk during the war. I know Doenitz felt it didn’t make any difference where an enemy ship was sunk. He felt it would have to be replaced no matter where it was sunk. I don’t know why he would consider Dutch ships hostile at that time. I know that U-boats sinking Brazilian and Mexican ships eventually brought both countries into the war against Germany. The Mexican ships were sunk in the Gulf of Mexico and the Brazilian ships were sunk off of the coast of Brazil.
I think that sailing without lights, zigzagging, and/or being close to or on a course for an enemy port were the kind of things the German rules of engagement defined as hostile. I just have never seen a document that said so. That is what I am looking for.
German U-boat commanders would not have been allowed to just sink anything they saw. There must have been rules or guidelines they were following. How they fit with international law at the time I don’t know. There may be more information in the book I am reading. If I find anything, I’ll let you know.
Regards,
Ken Dunn
</HTML>
I am reading “Memoirs Ten Years and Twenty Days†by Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz (ISBN: 0-306-80764-5) at the moment and I just found this:
“In the same way Naval High Command reacted only with extreme caution and step by step to the British measures which I have just described and which constituted a breach of the London Submarine Agreement. Slowly and one by one the restrictions on the conduct of U-boat operations were removed in a series of orders from Naval High Command-beginning with permission to fire upon vessels which used their wireless, which sailed without lights and which carried guns, followed (as a result of the instructions to ram given to British ships) by permission to attack all vessels identified as hostile and ending with a declaration of sea areas that would be regarded as operational zones. These latter were at first restricted, but finally, on August 17, 1940, the whole of the seas round the British Isles were declared an operational zone, in which attack without warning would be permissible.
It is, then, an established fact that from the very outset the German Naval High Command painstakingly adhered to the provisions of international law contained in the London agreement and that it was only step by step, in response to breaches of these provisions by the enemy, that we allowed ourselves more and more latitude, until finally we reached the stage, as it was inevitable that we would, where the London agreement was abandoned completely and for good.
All these vicissitudes and orders with regard to U-boat operations in the war on commerce were, on account of their political significance, the subject of joint consultation and decision between the Naval High Command, the Foreign Ministry and the Government. They were very clearly governed by the political exigencies-in contrast to the corresponding instructions given to their own submarines by the Americans and the British. At the beginning of April 1940, for example, Churchill ordered British submarines operating in the Skagerrak by day to attack all German ships and by night to attack all ships without warning. This order went far beyond anything contained in German orders, since it meant that in these waters from then onwards neutral ships sailing with full lights would also be sunk by British submarines. (Statement by Churchill in the House of Commons, May 8, I 940.)
In the same way, on the outbreak of war with Japan on December 7, I941, the United States at once declared the whole Pacific Ocean to be a theatre of operations and from the outset waged unrestricted submarine warfare in these waters. The United States, then, were obviously quite unperturbed by political or any other considerations.â€
I don’t think it answers our questions but it is the first reference to an “operational area†I could find. It also isn’t clear how it applies to neutral ships. There were other “operational areas†with their own rules about who could be sunk and under what circumstances during the war but I can’t remember much more than that. I know the rules changed continuously during the war.
I didn’t realize so many Dutch merchant ships were sunk during the war. I know Doenitz felt it didn’t make any difference where an enemy ship was sunk. He felt it would have to be replaced no matter where it was sunk. I don’t know why he would consider Dutch ships hostile at that time. I know that U-boats sinking Brazilian and Mexican ships eventually brought both countries into the war against Germany. The Mexican ships were sunk in the Gulf of Mexico and the Brazilian ships were sunk off of the coast of Brazil.
I think that sailing without lights, zigzagging, and/or being close to or on a course for an enemy port were the kind of things the German rules of engagement defined as hostile. I just have never seen a document that said so. That is what I am looking for.
German U-boat commanders would not have been allowed to just sink anything they saw. There must have been rules or guidelines they were following. How they fit with international law at the time I don’t know. There may be more information in the book I am reading. If I find anything, I’ll let you know.
Regards,
Ken Dunn
</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
Neutral shipping losses
|
Visje | 03/25/2001 12:45PM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Ken Dunn | 03/25/2001 02:43PM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Visje | 03/25/2001 04:26PM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Ken Dunn | 03/25/2001 10:53PM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Visje | 03/27/2001 08:02AM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Rainer Kolbicz | 03/26/2001 07:45PM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
kpp | 03/26/2001 09:46PM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Roy Prince | 03/26/2001 11:44PM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Visje | 03/27/2001 06:11AM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Rainer Kolbicz | 03/27/2001 09:45AM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Rainer Kolbicz | 03/27/2001 10:06AM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Jan-Olof | 03/27/2001 04:24PM |
|
RE: Neutral shipping losses
|
Antonio Veiga | 03/25/2001 07:10PM |