General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Expansionism and the U-boats
Posted by:
SuperKraut
()
Date: April 28, 2001 02:35PM
<HTML>I suppose the issue here becomes what you mean by German expansionism. Hitler\'s expansionism was directed east and he considered the British a brother Aryan race. Hitler was a landlubber and had no concept of an overseas empire or of naval strategy. He was content to leave the overseas empire to the British. When Britain declared war in Sept. 1939, he was both surprised and angered, but still open to giving generous terms to Britain until after the fall of France. Once the bombs were falling on Berlin, his attitude changed, but the reality was that a successful invasion was impossible. The bottom line is that operations against Britain were really defensive in the sense that Hitler wanted Britain to stop interfering with his plans. A territorial expansion to the British Isles was not feasible, therefore the U-boats were not used to directly support Nazi expansionism.
The U-boats were indeed the backbone of the Battle of the Atlantic, however, they were not the only tool. Let me again trot out some numbers to position the effect of the U-boats. In 1940 the U-boats sank 2.4 million tons, with an efficiency index of 7,700 tons sunk per high seas U-boat per month and a loss rate of 7.2 U-boats per million tons sunk. The same numbers for 1941 are 2.2 million tons sunk, the efficiency index is already down to 1,900 tons and the loss rate is up to 16.6 U-boats. 1942 was a record year for sinking, and the other indicators are about the same - 5.8 million tons sunk with an efficiency of 1,700 tons and a loss rate of 15.1. Then came the disastrous year 1943 - 2.4 million tons sunk, but the efficiency index is down to 500 tons and the loss index is an appalling 102.
These numbers should be put into the overall context of worldwide Allied shipping losses and new building. The 1940 data was 4.4 million tons lost and 1.2 million tons built. 1941 was 4.4 million tons lost and 2 million tons built. 1942 was 8.2 million tons lost and 7.2 million tons built, the low point with ship inventory at 81% of August 1939. Things turned around significantly in 1943 with 3.6 million tons lost and 14.6 million tons built, so in that year all ship losses were made up and the inventory was 10% greater than at the beginning of the war. 1944 was more of the same with losses at 1.4 million tons and new construction at 13.3 million tons leading to an inventory 42% higher than in August 1939.
Britain would have been in serious trouble if the efficiency and loss indices had remained at 1940 levels with the number of U-boats available in 1941 and 1942. The projected losses would have been around 10 million tons more in 1941 and 28 million tons more in 1942. This would have reduced the available merchant fleet end 1941 to 55% of what it was in August 1939 and the last merchantman would be sunk in the late summer of 1942. These are the numbers behind the claim that 300 U-boats in 1940 would have thrown Britain out of the war. BTW, if we project 1943 shipping losses using the typical indices from 1941 and 1942, we would get an additional 10-11 million tons sunk which results in no change in the Allied merchant inventory, but in around 650 U-boats in action end 1943.
The conclusions from this analysis are that it should have been clear to Doenitz in 1941 that something was seriously amiss and the Battle of the Atlantic was a closely run thing. Without Allied radar, the U-boats would have won the Battle of the Atlantic despite American shipbuilding.
A few words about Plan Z. This was a completely unrealistic strategy since Germany did not have the resources to compete with Britain and the US in surface fleets. It would have been an enormous misallocation of resources. Plan Z was abandoned when the war started and all I can say is good riddance. The plan was made by a bunch of hidebound admirals who wanted to refight Jutland and with an imaginary overseas empire to protect. Doenitz was also a rather retro strategist who found the ideal way to fight the WWI Battle of the Atlantic, but failed to take the advances in electronics into account. In summary, German naval strategy was a major disaster area.
Big surface fleets are tools for ocean control and a means to project power to foreign lands. Germany in 1939 had to do neither. German strategic requirements were completely satisfied with ocean denial. The U-boat is the best tool for denying the use of the oceans to the enemy. Doenitz was one of the very few in a position of power to recognize that and even he was too low on the totem pole to prevent Plan Z and encourage the building of more U-boats. No one in power had the foresight to recognize the danger of radar to U-boat operations.
\">- Therfore, to conclude, the submarines had the major role in the German navy throughout the war, statistically?<\" That is correct, however, the admiralty did not recognize until around 1941/42 that the U-boat was the best concept. Those battleship admirals were tough old birds. Also, remember the earlier discussion in which I argue that the Kriegsmarine as a whole was not a direct tool of Nazi expansionism. BTW, I use the term Nazi expansionism since German expansionism was limited to creating a pan-German state, that is all the German people wanted at the time.
\">When the submarines met difficulties in late \'42 and \'43, however, Dönitz turned to Plan Z once again, and used what was finished.<\" Please explain. By 1943 there was no credible German surface fleet left. Due to strategic myopia, the Kriegsmarine was finished in May 1943.
I have no problems if you quote me in context with attribution.
Regards,
SuperKraut</HTML>
The U-boats were indeed the backbone of the Battle of the Atlantic, however, they were not the only tool. Let me again trot out some numbers to position the effect of the U-boats. In 1940 the U-boats sank 2.4 million tons, with an efficiency index of 7,700 tons sunk per high seas U-boat per month and a loss rate of 7.2 U-boats per million tons sunk. The same numbers for 1941 are 2.2 million tons sunk, the efficiency index is already down to 1,900 tons and the loss rate is up to 16.6 U-boats. 1942 was a record year for sinking, and the other indicators are about the same - 5.8 million tons sunk with an efficiency of 1,700 tons and a loss rate of 15.1. Then came the disastrous year 1943 - 2.4 million tons sunk, but the efficiency index is down to 500 tons and the loss index is an appalling 102.
These numbers should be put into the overall context of worldwide Allied shipping losses and new building. The 1940 data was 4.4 million tons lost and 1.2 million tons built. 1941 was 4.4 million tons lost and 2 million tons built. 1942 was 8.2 million tons lost and 7.2 million tons built, the low point with ship inventory at 81% of August 1939. Things turned around significantly in 1943 with 3.6 million tons lost and 14.6 million tons built, so in that year all ship losses were made up and the inventory was 10% greater than at the beginning of the war. 1944 was more of the same with losses at 1.4 million tons and new construction at 13.3 million tons leading to an inventory 42% higher than in August 1939.
Britain would have been in serious trouble if the efficiency and loss indices had remained at 1940 levels with the number of U-boats available in 1941 and 1942. The projected losses would have been around 10 million tons more in 1941 and 28 million tons more in 1942. This would have reduced the available merchant fleet end 1941 to 55% of what it was in August 1939 and the last merchantman would be sunk in the late summer of 1942. These are the numbers behind the claim that 300 U-boats in 1940 would have thrown Britain out of the war. BTW, if we project 1943 shipping losses using the typical indices from 1941 and 1942, we would get an additional 10-11 million tons sunk which results in no change in the Allied merchant inventory, but in around 650 U-boats in action end 1943.
The conclusions from this analysis are that it should have been clear to Doenitz in 1941 that something was seriously amiss and the Battle of the Atlantic was a closely run thing. Without Allied radar, the U-boats would have won the Battle of the Atlantic despite American shipbuilding.
A few words about Plan Z. This was a completely unrealistic strategy since Germany did not have the resources to compete with Britain and the US in surface fleets. It would have been an enormous misallocation of resources. Plan Z was abandoned when the war started and all I can say is good riddance. The plan was made by a bunch of hidebound admirals who wanted to refight Jutland and with an imaginary overseas empire to protect. Doenitz was also a rather retro strategist who found the ideal way to fight the WWI Battle of the Atlantic, but failed to take the advances in electronics into account. In summary, German naval strategy was a major disaster area.
Big surface fleets are tools for ocean control and a means to project power to foreign lands. Germany in 1939 had to do neither. German strategic requirements were completely satisfied with ocean denial. The U-boat is the best tool for denying the use of the oceans to the enemy. Doenitz was one of the very few in a position of power to recognize that and even he was too low on the totem pole to prevent Plan Z and encourage the building of more U-boats. No one in power had the foresight to recognize the danger of radar to U-boat operations.
\">- Therfore, to conclude, the submarines had the major role in the German navy throughout the war, statistically?<\" That is correct, however, the admiralty did not recognize until around 1941/42 that the U-boat was the best concept. Those battleship admirals were tough old birds. Also, remember the earlier discussion in which I argue that the Kriegsmarine as a whole was not a direct tool of Nazi expansionism. BTW, I use the term Nazi expansionism since German expansionism was limited to creating a pan-German state, that is all the German people wanted at the time.
\">When the submarines met difficulties in late \'42 and \'43, however, Dönitz turned to Plan Z once again, and used what was finished.<\" Please explain. By 1943 there was no credible German surface fleet left. Due to strategic myopia, the Kriegsmarine was finished in May 1943.
I have no problems if you quote me in context with attribution.
Regards,
SuperKraut</HTML>
