General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
RE: Good analysis
Posted by:
Fredrik Härenstam
()
Date: April 27, 2001 06:20AM
<HTML>But, when Hitler announced the \'total blockade\' of the British Isles in 1940, the U-boats were to play a significant role in it, no? Although the campaign in general was a failure, the U-boats still were the major bulk of it?
I believe Dönitz said something similar to : \"The U-boat will always be the backbone of warfare against England, and of political pressure on her,\" concerning the blockade. Although he might not be the most unbiased nor objective source of information out there, he is one major primary source and should be taken into concideration. Although regardless of the fact that the campaign itself was a failure, the U-boat was the backbone of it?
Additionally, the paralell introduction of the Rudeltaktik was highly effective; the allied sunk aproximately 4 subs in a month, whilst the U-boats sunk about as much merchantmen per day. For a time, at least.
Moreover, the resulting figures of Allied shipping lost to the U-boats after the introduction of the wolf packs are quite easily recognizable as a success?
In the second half of 1940 through 1942 the U-boats show tremedous success (with exception to a downfal in late 1943, anyone know the cause? -Improved British protection?), with its top throughout 1942. Then, as you know, the introduction of aerial support to convoys, the ship-building program, the MAC\'s, frigates, the handover of US destroyers to Englad, and of course, all in all, the anti-submarine support groups in the Atlantic.
However, can the U-boats be granted success in the first half of the war?
Then, due to the more or less failure of Plan Z, can Uboats be concidered the backbone of the German navy? Statistically they were, but in policy?
Dönitz without doubt favoured the U-boat, and used it excessively in comparison to \'ordniary\' ships?
However, Germany\'s policy of building the greatest battle fleet known - Plan Z - instead of submarines, minelayers etc, would take them ten years, and it was put in practice 1938. Without doubt, the German battleship-navy was not ready for the seas when war broke out, therefore submarines -more or less- achieved the main role of the navy, and Plan Z was -again, more or less- abandonned for the time being.
When the submarines met difficulties in late \'42 and \'43, however, Dönitz turned to Plan Z once again, and used what was finished. However, as you may know, their pocket-ships were -mainly- unsuccessful (symbolized by the scuttling of Graf Spee?), and additionally to underline the fact that Plan Z was failing, Bismarck, Schanhorst, and the Tripitz were all sunk without contributing much to the war on Germany\'s behalf?
Therefore, left with a crippled battle-fleet, and a failing submarine fleet, Dönitz stated: \"In the present phase of the campaing it is not victory, but the survival of boats and their crews that must take priority.\"
- Therfore, to conclude, the submarines had the major role in the German navy throughout the war, statistically? Plan Z was never allowed the time to get finished, which left the navy with submarines - and since the economical focus, nor the political, was on them, they never were allowed to fight back the advancements made by the Allies in \'43?
right/wrong?
\"The only thing that ever frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril\" - Churchill
----------------
--\" Another interesting effect would be on the night bomber war, since a lot of bombers could be used against Germany which were used for patrolling the Atlantic. \"--
> True, could I use this in my paper, crediting you?
--\" At the beginning of the war, the U-boats were used in an attempt to choke Britain into some sort of negotiated peace. Later on they were used to delay the American military build up in Britain. They failed to do both, in the first case there were not enough of them and in the second case they were technically obsolete. \" --
> Could I use this too?
In fact, could I use this discussion as a reference? Kurt? SuperKraut?</HTML>
I believe Dönitz said something similar to : \"The U-boat will always be the backbone of warfare against England, and of political pressure on her,\" concerning the blockade. Although he might not be the most unbiased nor objective source of information out there, he is one major primary source and should be taken into concideration. Although regardless of the fact that the campaign itself was a failure, the U-boat was the backbone of it?
Additionally, the paralell introduction of the Rudeltaktik was highly effective; the allied sunk aproximately 4 subs in a month, whilst the U-boats sunk about as much merchantmen per day. For a time, at least.
Moreover, the resulting figures of Allied shipping lost to the U-boats after the introduction of the wolf packs are quite easily recognizable as a success?
In the second half of 1940 through 1942 the U-boats show tremedous success (with exception to a downfal in late 1943, anyone know the cause? -Improved British protection?), with its top throughout 1942. Then, as you know, the introduction of aerial support to convoys, the ship-building program, the MAC\'s, frigates, the handover of US destroyers to Englad, and of course, all in all, the anti-submarine support groups in the Atlantic.
However, can the U-boats be granted success in the first half of the war?
Then, due to the more or less failure of Plan Z, can Uboats be concidered the backbone of the German navy? Statistically they were, but in policy?
Dönitz without doubt favoured the U-boat, and used it excessively in comparison to \'ordniary\' ships?
However, Germany\'s policy of building the greatest battle fleet known - Plan Z - instead of submarines, minelayers etc, would take them ten years, and it was put in practice 1938. Without doubt, the German battleship-navy was not ready for the seas when war broke out, therefore submarines -more or less- achieved the main role of the navy, and Plan Z was -again, more or less- abandonned for the time being.
When the submarines met difficulties in late \'42 and \'43, however, Dönitz turned to Plan Z once again, and used what was finished. However, as you may know, their pocket-ships were -mainly- unsuccessful (symbolized by the scuttling of Graf Spee?), and additionally to underline the fact that Plan Z was failing, Bismarck, Schanhorst, and the Tripitz were all sunk without contributing much to the war on Germany\'s behalf?
Therefore, left with a crippled battle-fleet, and a failing submarine fleet, Dönitz stated: \"In the present phase of the campaing it is not victory, but the survival of boats and their crews that must take priority.\"
- Therfore, to conclude, the submarines had the major role in the German navy throughout the war, statistically? Plan Z was never allowed the time to get finished, which left the navy with submarines - and since the economical focus, nor the political, was on them, they never were allowed to fight back the advancements made by the Allies in \'43?
right/wrong?
\"The only thing that ever frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril\" - Churchill
----------------
--\" Another interesting effect would be on the night bomber war, since a lot of bombers could be used against Germany which were used for patrolling the Atlantic. \"--
> True, could I use this in my paper, crediting you?
--\" At the beginning of the war, the U-boats were used in an attempt to choke Britain into some sort of negotiated peace. Later on they were used to delay the American military build up in Britain. They failed to do both, in the first case there were not enough of them and in the second case they were technically obsolete. \" --
> Could I use this too?
In fact, could I use this discussion as a reference? Kurt? SuperKraut?</HTML>
