RE: Comments
Posted by:
kurt
()
Date: September 17, 2001 05:31PM
Thanks for the feedback.
Perhaps I worded things too absolutely in the desire for brevity.
Yes fire control radar and other types of electronics were out there very early - good point. But no one was using fire control radar on capital ships for ASW work in convoy protection. What I meant (and think you\'ll agree with) is that in the beginning of the war, radar, whether shipborne, airborne, or sub borne, was not a significant part of the Battle of the Atlantic. Radar did become a major part of the allied ASW arsenal, eventually becoming a key technology that had a first order impact on U-boat tactics and effectiveness (and losses). The equipment fielded on U-boats in thois area was pretty much always a step behind the allies, and this was a major weakness.
Obviously the Germans knew the allies had long wave radar. I should have said \'high frequency, sub meter wavelength radar capabable of detecting small surface objects like a surfaced submarine\'. Thanks for the catch.
But Doenitz, as we agree, spent too long discounting battle reports that indicated that the U-boats could be picked up by radar - long after he should have admitted it, and that his countermeasures never caught up with the threat. It is also interesting to note that a number of these mysteriously prescient allied encounters written off to allied radar were probably due to Huff-duff, or even Ultra decrypts - two other allied crucial capabilities the Germans were even slower to pick up on.
Perhaps I worded things too absolutely in the desire for brevity.
Yes fire control radar and other types of electronics were out there very early - good point. But no one was using fire control radar on capital ships for ASW work in convoy protection. What I meant (and think you\'ll agree with) is that in the beginning of the war, radar, whether shipborne, airborne, or sub borne, was not a significant part of the Battle of the Atlantic. Radar did become a major part of the allied ASW arsenal, eventually becoming a key technology that had a first order impact on U-boat tactics and effectiveness (and losses). The equipment fielded on U-boats in thois area was pretty much always a step behind the allies, and this was a major weakness.
Obviously the Germans knew the allies had long wave radar. I should have said \'high frequency, sub meter wavelength radar capabable of detecting small surface objects like a surfaced submarine\'. Thanks for the catch.
But Doenitz, as we agree, spent too long discounting battle reports that indicated that the U-boats could be picked up by radar - long after he should have admitted it, and that his countermeasures never caught up with the threat. It is also interesting to note that a number of these mysteriously prescient allied encounters written off to allied radar were probably due to Huff-duff, or even Ultra decrypts - two other allied crucial capabilities the Germans were even slower to pick up on.
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