General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Lack of foresight and resources
Posted by:
SuperKraut
()
Date: May 04, 2001 08:19AM
<HTML>The points made in Chapter 8 are valid, although they are a bit unfocused. Attacks on escorts were unproductive given the available torpedo technology, however, this state of affairs should have accelerated the development of acoustic and wire guided torpedoes. The points made in Chapter 9 are also valid, but by then Germany did not have the resources to do much about them. The primary failure was lack of foresight concerning the ramifications of radar. The second most important failure was the issue of secure communications, both in terms of signal intelligence and cryptography.
The issue of number of U-boats available at the beginning of the war was not specifically mentioned, although I suppose one can put it under the catch all phrase \">-Failure of the German of not granting the proper importance to the underwater war and its ramifications.<\" Given the circumstances of how the war started, the limitations of the German-British Naval Treaty and shipyard capacity, it is unrealistic to expect 300 or even 200 U-boats to be in service at the start of the war. At best the U-boat building program could have been a year or so ahead of itself since 1937 was a very poor year for U-boats with one built. Even if all the stops had been pulled out, it is hard to see how much more than 100 U-boats would be available by September 1939, however, the production rate could have been raised to early 1941 levels by then.
The comment about lack of air support is very important. Good aerial recon would have greatly increased the efficiency of the U-boats and may have provided clues that Enigma was being read. Actual combat air support on the approach to the Channel and the southern Irish Sea would have caused significant British losses and may have caused the convoys to be rerouted north, which makes it easier for the U-boats to find them. Further, air attacks on ASW resources would have reduced U-boat losses. The real problem here was the lack of at least a semi-independent naval aviation service equipped with recon and attack aircraft. With 100 U-boats and a higher production rate available at the beginning of the war, solid air support and no Barbarossa 41, it is possible that the Battle of the Atlantic may have been won in 1941 with conventional U-boats.
The radar issue really has two parts, recognition of what radar can do and applying that knowledge to operations and U-boat design and the microwave radar story. The Kriegsmarine was notoriously inept at the former, although the Luftwaffe was quite good at it. What really made ASW efficient was microwave radar and that was a major German weakness. Without the cavity magnetron, which was developed in Britain in 1940, one can not make a microwave radar set. Hitler\'s 1940 R+D moratorium most likely did not prevent the discovery of a German cavity magnetron since no one was looking for it. The failure to develop this device goes much deeper into the mismanagement of Nazi science policy. By the time the device was captured and reverse engineered, it was too late.
The U-boat war was irretrievably lost in 1943, so all the comments in Chapter 9 are essentially non-actionable. The only solution in 1943 was the electroboat, but to have it in 1943 meant starting the development in 1941 at the very latest.
Regards,
SuperKraut</HTML>
The issue of number of U-boats available at the beginning of the war was not specifically mentioned, although I suppose one can put it under the catch all phrase \">-Failure of the German of not granting the proper importance to the underwater war and its ramifications.<\" Given the circumstances of how the war started, the limitations of the German-British Naval Treaty and shipyard capacity, it is unrealistic to expect 300 or even 200 U-boats to be in service at the start of the war. At best the U-boat building program could have been a year or so ahead of itself since 1937 was a very poor year for U-boats with one built. Even if all the stops had been pulled out, it is hard to see how much more than 100 U-boats would be available by September 1939, however, the production rate could have been raised to early 1941 levels by then.
The comment about lack of air support is very important. Good aerial recon would have greatly increased the efficiency of the U-boats and may have provided clues that Enigma was being read. Actual combat air support on the approach to the Channel and the southern Irish Sea would have caused significant British losses and may have caused the convoys to be rerouted north, which makes it easier for the U-boats to find them. Further, air attacks on ASW resources would have reduced U-boat losses. The real problem here was the lack of at least a semi-independent naval aviation service equipped with recon and attack aircraft. With 100 U-boats and a higher production rate available at the beginning of the war, solid air support and no Barbarossa 41, it is possible that the Battle of the Atlantic may have been won in 1941 with conventional U-boats.
The radar issue really has two parts, recognition of what radar can do and applying that knowledge to operations and U-boat design and the microwave radar story. The Kriegsmarine was notoriously inept at the former, although the Luftwaffe was quite good at it. What really made ASW efficient was microwave radar and that was a major German weakness. Without the cavity magnetron, which was developed in Britain in 1940, one can not make a microwave radar set. Hitler\'s 1940 R+D moratorium most likely did not prevent the discovery of a German cavity magnetron since no one was looking for it. The failure to develop this device goes much deeper into the mismanagement of Nazi science policy. By the time the device was captured and reverse engineered, it was too late.
The U-boat war was irretrievably lost in 1943, so all the comments in Chapter 9 are essentially non-actionable. The only solution in 1943 was the electroboat, but to have it in 1943 meant starting the development in 1941 at the very latest.
Regards,
SuperKraut</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
Military errors of World War Two
|
Antonio Veiga | 05/03/2001 07:51PM |
|
RE: Military errors of World War Two
|
Rod | 05/03/2001 09:53PM |
|
Lack of foresight and resources
|
SuperKraut | 05/04/2001 08:19AM |
|
RE: attack on escorts
|
Antonio Veiga | 05/05/2001 06:17PM |
|
RE: Lack of foresight and resources
|
Annice henderson | 05/06/2001 09:29PM |
|
RE: Military errors of World War Two
|
David W | 05/05/2001 03:07AM |
|
RE: Military errors of World War Two
|
rayk | 05/07/2001 10:07PM |