General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Allied MPA in Direct support on ASW pre radar
Posted by:
gavin
()
Date: July 04, 2001 09:07AM
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Author: Gavin
Date: 06-30-2001 12:27
Just thought I\'d raise the question about RAF influence on RN maritime air power pre ww2 and during early stages of NA Battles to suggest that one of the secrets to the early success of UBOATS was the absence of air patrols by appropriate aircraft and in fact this was a product of the consequences of having a Navy losing control of its aircraft to an organisation of maritime know nothings like the RAF!! Its an interesting point because the RAF persists with the strategy to this day!!
Author: Rainer Kolbicz
Date: 07-01-2001 00:19
Hi Gavin
It was not possible to avoid the early successes of the U-boats with more air patrols. Even when they could use Liberators. The U-boats had many successes with the night attacks on the surface. Only the Radar was able to stop these attacks and radar-equipped planes made it difficult for the U-boats to stay at the surface at day and night.
Regards
Rainer
Author: gavin
Date: 07-03-2001 10:07
I\'m not sure I\'m really convinced of this. We will never know because it wasn’t tried but I would be suprised if significant direct support of convoys by day by VLR pre radar aircraft would not have been of significant effect as it would have forced and held down significant numbers of Uboats near covoys allowing the convoys to use their greater speed to by pass or shake off threatening boats. Of course the earlier in the day this occured would have had a bearing on the results. Say for example a UBOAT is shadowing a convoy 10nm astern convoy speed 12 knots. As an example If the uboat was sighted and held down from 1200 and assuming sunset was at 1800. Given a speed of say three knots for the sub the convoy would be ahead by 64 miles at 1800. If the uboat then surfaced to chase at say 17 knots it would take 13 hours to catch up. Of course this would be 0700 in time for sunrise and further aircraft. Similar results can be achieved by using course alterations for uboats abeam or ahead of the force. Wouldnt have worked all the time but certainly better than putting the wagons in a circle and plodding on. The diversion of heavy aircraft from bombing cities would also have had the added advantage of saving thousands of allied aircrew lives as well.
Author: SuperKraut
Date: 07-03-2001 11:32
An interesting idea which would have had a significant effect on both the air war over Germany and the Battle of the Atlantic. The British did not have enough aircraft to prosecute the air war against the cities and cover the convoys in the 1940-42 timeframe so it was either much or all of one and little or nothing of the other.
It took the RAF around 1 ½ years to get their night bombing act together, a time used by the Luftwaffe night fighters to do the same. If the beginning of night bombing had been postponed to 1942, then it would not have become effective until 1943/44. The result would have been less chaos in the German economy in 1941/42 and a reallocation of resources (especially 8.8 cm AA/AT guns) to the eastern front.
Giving convoys full daytime air cover in 1940/41 would initially have reduced the efficiency of the U-boats. The question is what does Doenitz do about it.
- Does he equip the U-boats with heavy AA and lets them shoot it out with the aircraft as he tried in 1943? That ploy would not have lasted very long.
- Does he rely only on lying in wait in front of a convoy? Rather inefficient with the small number of U-boats he had.
- Does he increase the battery capacity and electric motor power of the U-boats so they can shadow the convoy by day underwater? Cut a VII in half, install a new section to gain enough space to at least double the battery capacity, throw in the E-motors from the IX, get rid of the guns, clean up the top of the hull and in ½ a year you get a U-boat which can run 8 knots underwater for around 16 hours. Note that drag reduction is very important. Since convoys in those days rarely ran faster than 8 knots, the U-boat would be able to keep up during daylight. This concept would also force sonar R+D and lead directly to a proper full time submarine design.
Regards,
SuperKraut
Author: gavin
Date: 07-04-2001 10:31
Hi Super K. (a breakfast cereal in this country!!)
I\'m not really sure statements such as \'effective aka get together BC night bombing campaign, really cut much ice vis a vis the strategic bombing survey conducted at the end of the war\' My trade off would have been many many many allied merchant ships saved versus (I\'ll give you this one) many many many geman houses and people and a small number of factories and trains etc destroyed. By my reading of the british bomber offensive for much of the war to do nothing would have been a victory. Exceptions exist of course like Peenumunde etc (sic?) but by the by I think the widesread consensus in the original west if not in Germany today is that it was a failure. I note German industrial production spiralled during the course of the campaign and casualties on the allied side sky rocketed. For example I think casualties to Australia fighting the Bomber offensive for almost no gain exceeded infantry casualties fighting the Japanese!! (and we wont discuss how bitter that was!) All in all it shows a classic traditional dogma orientated incompetent air force attitutude to battle in the maritime sphere vis a vis a more wise headed approach.
AND I\'M NOT EVEN TOUCHING ON THE MORAL SIDE OF BOMBING CITIES
This is my long thread to try to encourage topics other than how great Nazi medals are and what is uboat CO X doing now. That is they discuss intelligent and significant points about the Battle of the Atlantic. (Hope that’s not off topic!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)
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Author: Gavin
Date: 06-30-2001 12:27
Just thought I\'d raise the question about RAF influence on RN maritime air power pre ww2 and during early stages of NA Battles to suggest that one of the secrets to the early success of UBOATS was the absence of air patrols by appropriate aircraft and in fact this was a product of the consequences of having a Navy losing control of its aircraft to an organisation of maritime know nothings like the RAF!! Its an interesting point because the RAF persists with the strategy to this day!!
Author: Rainer Kolbicz
Date: 07-01-2001 00:19
Hi Gavin
It was not possible to avoid the early successes of the U-boats with more air patrols. Even when they could use Liberators. The U-boats had many successes with the night attacks on the surface. Only the Radar was able to stop these attacks and radar-equipped planes made it difficult for the U-boats to stay at the surface at day and night.
Regards
Rainer
Author: gavin
Date: 07-03-2001 10:07
I\'m not sure I\'m really convinced of this. We will never know because it wasn’t tried but I would be suprised if significant direct support of convoys by day by VLR pre radar aircraft would not have been of significant effect as it would have forced and held down significant numbers of Uboats near covoys allowing the convoys to use their greater speed to by pass or shake off threatening boats. Of course the earlier in the day this occured would have had a bearing on the results. Say for example a UBOAT is shadowing a convoy 10nm astern convoy speed 12 knots. As an example If the uboat was sighted and held down from 1200 and assuming sunset was at 1800. Given a speed of say three knots for the sub the convoy would be ahead by 64 miles at 1800. If the uboat then surfaced to chase at say 17 knots it would take 13 hours to catch up. Of course this would be 0700 in time for sunrise and further aircraft. Similar results can be achieved by using course alterations for uboats abeam or ahead of the force. Wouldnt have worked all the time but certainly better than putting the wagons in a circle and plodding on. The diversion of heavy aircraft from bombing cities would also have had the added advantage of saving thousands of allied aircrew lives as well.
Author: SuperKraut
Date: 07-03-2001 11:32
An interesting idea which would have had a significant effect on both the air war over Germany and the Battle of the Atlantic. The British did not have enough aircraft to prosecute the air war against the cities and cover the convoys in the 1940-42 timeframe so it was either much or all of one and little or nothing of the other.
It took the RAF around 1 ½ years to get their night bombing act together, a time used by the Luftwaffe night fighters to do the same. If the beginning of night bombing had been postponed to 1942, then it would not have become effective until 1943/44. The result would have been less chaos in the German economy in 1941/42 and a reallocation of resources (especially 8.8 cm AA/AT guns) to the eastern front.
Giving convoys full daytime air cover in 1940/41 would initially have reduced the efficiency of the U-boats. The question is what does Doenitz do about it.
- Does he equip the U-boats with heavy AA and lets them shoot it out with the aircraft as he tried in 1943? That ploy would not have lasted very long.
- Does he rely only on lying in wait in front of a convoy? Rather inefficient with the small number of U-boats he had.
- Does he increase the battery capacity and electric motor power of the U-boats so they can shadow the convoy by day underwater? Cut a VII in half, install a new section to gain enough space to at least double the battery capacity, throw in the E-motors from the IX, get rid of the guns, clean up the top of the hull and in ½ a year you get a U-boat which can run 8 knots underwater for around 16 hours. Note that drag reduction is very important. Since convoys in those days rarely ran faster than 8 knots, the U-boat would be able to keep up during daylight. This concept would also force sonar R+D and lead directly to a proper full time submarine design.
Regards,
SuperKraut
Author: gavin
Date: 07-04-2001 10:31
Hi Super K. (a breakfast cereal in this country!!)
I\'m not really sure statements such as \'effective aka get together BC night bombing campaign, really cut much ice vis a vis the strategic bombing survey conducted at the end of the war\' My trade off would have been many many many allied merchant ships saved versus (I\'ll give you this one) many many many geman houses and people and a small number of factories and trains etc destroyed. By my reading of the british bomber offensive for much of the war to do nothing would have been a victory. Exceptions exist of course like Peenumunde etc (sic?) but by the by I think the widesread consensus in the original west if not in Germany today is that it was a failure. I note German industrial production spiralled during the course of the campaign and casualties on the allied side sky rocketed. For example I think casualties to Australia fighting the Bomber offensive for almost no gain exceeded infantry casualties fighting the Japanese!! (and we wont discuss how bitter that was!) All in all it shows a classic traditional dogma orientated incompetent air force attitutude to battle in the maritime sphere vis a vis a more wise headed approach.
AND I\'M NOT EVEN TOUCHING ON THE MORAL SIDE OF BOMBING CITIES
This is my long thread to try to encourage topics other than how great Nazi medals are and what is uboat CO X doing now. That is they discuss intelligent and significant points about the Battle of the Atlantic. (Hope that’s not off topic!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)
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| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
Allied MPA in Direct support on ASW pre radar
|
gavin | 07/04/2001 09:07AM |
|
RE: Allied MPA in Direct support on ASW pre radar
|
WKl | 07/04/2001 04:07PM |