Hi Brian,

Unfortunately I have never found the complete text of Standing Order 154 however its intent is clear based on the proceedings of the Nuremberg trials:

Nuremberg War Crimes Trial - Doenitz verdict:

“Among these preliminary standing orders of the U-Boat Command is Order Number 154, signed by Doenitz:

"Paragraph (e). Do not pick up survivors and take them with you. Do not worry about the merchant-ship's boats. Weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters." (D-642)
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Shortly after the outbreak of war the British Admiralty, in accordance with its Handbook of Instructions of 1938 to the merchant navy, armed its merchant vessels, in many cases convoyed them with armed escort, gave orders to send position reports upon sighting submarines, thus integrating merchant vessels into the warning network of naval intelligence. On 1 October 1939, the British Admiralty announced British merchant ships had been ordered to ram U-Boats if possible.
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It is also asserted that the German U-Boat arm not only did not carry out the warning and rescue provisions of the Protocol but that Doenitz deliberately ordered the killing of survivors of shipwrecked vessels, whether enemy or neutral. The Prosecution has introduced much evidence surrounding two orders of Doenitz, War Order Number 154, issued in 1939, and the so-called Laconia order of 1942. The Defense argues that these orders and the evidence supporting them do not show such a policy and introduced much evidence to the contrary. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the evidence does not establish with the certainty required that Doenitz deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors. The orders were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the strongest censure.”

As you can see from the above standing Order 154 was basically the same as the Laconia Order – well actually vice versa. At any rate it had nothing to do with killing survivors and no matter how hard the prosecution tried to convince the court that it did they refused to accept it as evidence that Doenitz ordered the killing of survivors.

What’s more we know in hindsight that the U-bootwaffe did not in fact kill survivors with the exception of the Eck case and there were also similar British and American cases of individuals doing so. It was not the policy of any of the governments involved in WWII to kill submarine attack survivors.

Additionally

“FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for the Defendant Doenitz):
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“In order also to present an opinion about the tactics of the opposite side, I quote from the statement of Admiral Nimitz:

"In general U.S. submarines did not rescue enemy survivors if it meant an unusual additional danger for the submarine or if the submarine was prevented from further carrying out its mission."

In the light of these principles I will briefly deal with rescue measures by U-boats until the autumn of 1942. The basic order was issued by the Naval Operations Staff on 4 October 1939, and specified rescue whenever possible from the military standpoint. This was temporarily restricted by Standing War Order 154. This order, issued in December 1939, applied to the small number of submarines at that time operating immediately off the British coast. It may be seen from the order itself that every paragraph deals with combat in the presence of enemy escort and patrol forces. The last paragraph therefore also deals only with this aspect and serves the warranted purpose of protecting submarine commanders against the dangers to which, under the existing circumstances, they would in every case expose their boats by rescue measures. When after the Norwegian campaign the scene of activity of the submarines gradually shifted to the open Atlantic, this order became outdated, and it was finally canceled in the autumn of 1940. In the period that followed, the German submarine commanders carried out rescue measures whenever they could assume responsibility from the military standpoint. This is known to the Tribunal from numerous specific examples cited here, contained both in the statements of submarine commanders submitted here and in the war diaries. This situation was changed through Admiral Doenitz's order of 17 September 1942, in which he forbade rescue measures on principle. The decisive sentences are:

"The rescue of members of the crew of a ship sunk is not to be attempted. Rescue is contradictory to the most primitive demands of warfare, which are the annihilation of enemy ships and crews."

It has been disputed by the Prosecution that this actually prohibits rescue. It looks upon this order as a hidden provocation to kill the shipwrecked, and it has gone through the press of the world as a command for murder. If any accusation at all has been refuted in this Trial, then it seems to me to be this ignominious interpretation of the order mentioned above.”

Also note that the testimony of both sides has Standing Order 154 being issued in (December according to Kranzbuehler) 1939 and according to Kranzbuehler it was canceled in 1940. In actual fact U-boat commanders generally tried to help survivors (short of rescuing them) when doing so didn’t jeopardize their own boat at all times during the war.

Regards,

Ken Dunn