I concur with the criticism of Admiral King by the naval historian Michael Gannon, while others try to defend the role the Admiral played in this. However, the level of unpreparedness of the US forces against the Operation Paukenschlag is hard to explain. The US Navy was already involved in the Battle of the Atlantic months before the official declaration of war between Germany and the USA and had also suffered casualties (USS KEARNY and USS REUBEN JAMES) at the hands of the U-boats. Admiral King was Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet during this time before he became Commander in Chief US Fleet on 30 Dec 1941, so he could hardly have underestimated the abilities of the U-boats, but yet choose to ignore almost every warning or advice by the Admiralty.

In my opinion the main blunder was not to introduce a convoy system as quick as possible. Even a weak defended convoy had a better survival rate than single unescorted merchant ships and to let them sail only at day would have taken away the disadvantage of having not enough escort vessels and aircraft equipped with radar. The US Navy did not introduce a convoy system with the explanation that they had not enough escort vessels, but at the same time an offer by the Admiralty to send them suitable escorts was turned down and only accepted in March 1942 - it took two more months to eventually introduce a convoy system. As soon this was done the losses were drastically reduced and the U-boats subsequently sent to other areas.

Best regards
Rainer

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