General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
RE: numbers
Posted by:
kurt
()
Date: November 21, 2000 10:57PM
<HTML>The U-boat fleet did not enjoy high building priority until the war was over half over, and extra U-boat production didn\'t matter anymore.
The war started long before it was \'supposed\' to. All the re-armament plans were based around 1945 as the start, not the end, of the war. The U-boat arm was not alone in being caught unawares and half re-armed, but it was still in the early stages of a rebuild program.
One of the advantages the we often fail to appreciate, looking back on the war from the future, is that we know how long the war lasted. At the time, no one knew. The allies, once plunged into the war, knew they had a long haul ahead of them against a powerfull and determined foe, and started full mobilization as soon as they entered hostilities (or, in the case of the US, before, about 1940).
Germany, on the other hand, did not fully mobilize till later. Hitler and the German high command, flush with early, easy victories, had contempt for the will and ability to resist of their enemies. \'They will quit or be defeated soon\', they assumed. For most of the first half of the war, AH and the German high command thought the war would end in another 6 months, and deferred full war mobilization, long term research and development, and building [programs associated with \'long term\' weapons such as U-boats. By the time fleets of U-boats would be built and manned, the war would be over, or so AH thought. It was not till after the battle of Stilingrad that it finally fully dawned on Hitler and the German high command that the war would be a long, bitter, fight to the end.
Consequently, German industrial mobilization was less decisive, and slower, than the allies. This lack of realization of a long term war led to some poor choices. U-boats are primarily a weapon of attrition, a relatively long term commitment.
This led to many production problems. U-boats got low priority compared to tanks and aircraft for limited supplies of steel, copper (which in wartime Germany was in very short supply), precision machinery work, and skilled workers. Many shipyard workers were drafted for service as foot soldiers. The productivity of the boat yards actually dropped, rather than increased, when the war started. Even the modest U-boat building plans fell behind again and again.
And of course, there was Hitler\'s famous \'stop work\' order ordering all long term research to end (this was in 1941 or 42, I can\'t recall). Projects that could not produce weapons by the time the war would end, in a few months time, were stopped. All sorts of advanced weapons, from the XXI \'electro boats\' to jet fighters and even nuclear weapons research was adversely affected. Skilled technicians were drafted as common foot soldiers.
This affected all services, even the army. It is often said that Hitler was more obsessed with Russia, and more comfortable (literally - he got seasick easily) with the Army, and tended to favor it over the Navy. This may have played a role: \' what do U-boats do for me in my war against Russia? Nothing.\' thought Hitler, it is said. But I believe that the major player was the mindset, the assumption that the war would end soon, in another few months, that hobbled German thinking for the first half of the war.
In time, by 1943, Germany fully mobilized for war, AH realized he was in for the long haul, U-boats got high priority for building and draft deferrals for skilled workers. But by this time the tide had turned. Allied shipyards were churning out ships, and destroyers, faster than could be coped with. ASW aircraft were available in quantity. Skilled sub crewman were being lost in battle, and the new crews, rushed through training, were no match for the now quantitatively and technologically supreme allies.
And of course, subs are very complex weapons, with a large amount of intricate, skilled, and time consuming manufacture and assembly required. Crews must be highly trained. To build a large fleet of subs takes time.
There was a huge flood of U-boats in the 1943-44 time frame, but by that time the Type VII and IX \'classic\' U-boat was hopelessly obsolete, and no feat of production could overcome the vast and powerfull allied ASW defences. If this flood of production had hit during an earlier time, say during \'Drumbeat\' off of the American coast in \'42, history may have been different.
But that was not what happened.
Hopes this helps.
</HTML>
The war started long before it was \'supposed\' to. All the re-armament plans were based around 1945 as the start, not the end, of the war. The U-boat arm was not alone in being caught unawares and half re-armed, but it was still in the early stages of a rebuild program.
One of the advantages the we often fail to appreciate, looking back on the war from the future, is that we know how long the war lasted. At the time, no one knew. The allies, once plunged into the war, knew they had a long haul ahead of them against a powerfull and determined foe, and started full mobilization as soon as they entered hostilities (or, in the case of the US, before, about 1940).
Germany, on the other hand, did not fully mobilize till later. Hitler and the German high command, flush with early, easy victories, had contempt for the will and ability to resist of their enemies. \'They will quit or be defeated soon\', they assumed. For most of the first half of the war, AH and the German high command thought the war would end in another 6 months, and deferred full war mobilization, long term research and development, and building [programs associated with \'long term\' weapons such as U-boats. By the time fleets of U-boats would be built and manned, the war would be over, or so AH thought. It was not till after the battle of Stilingrad that it finally fully dawned on Hitler and the German high command that the war would be a long, bitter, fight to the end.
Consequently, German industrial mobilization was less decisive, and slower, than the allies. This lack of realization of a long term war led to some poor choices. U-boats are primarily a weapon of attrition, a relatively long term commitment.
This led to many production problems. U-boats got low priority compared to tanks and aircraft for limited supplies of steel, copper (which in wartime Germany was in very short supply), precision machinery work, and skilled workers. Many shipyard workers were drafted for service as foot soldiers. The productivity of the boat yards actually dropped, rather than increased, when the war started. Even the modest U-boat building plans fell behind again and again.
And of course, there was Hitler\'s famous \'stop work\' order ordering all long term research to end (this was in 1941 or 42, I can\'t recall). Projects that could not produce weapons by the time the war would end, in a few months time, were stopped. All sorts of advanced weapons, from the XXI \'electro boats\' to jet fighters and even nuclear weapons research was adversely affected. Skilled technicians were drafted as common foot soldiers.
This affected all services, even the army. It is often said that Hitler was more obsessed with Russia, and more comfortable (literally - he got seasick easily) with the Army, and tended to favor it over the Navy. This may have played a role: \' what do U-boats do for me in my war against Russia? Nothing.\' thought Hitler, it is said. But I believe that the major player was the mindset, the assumption that the war would end soon, in another few months, that hobbled German thinking for the first half of the war.
In time, by 1943, Germany fully mobilized for war, AH realized he was in for the long haul, U-boats got high priority for building and draft deferrals for skilled workers. But by this time the tide had turned. Allied shipyards were churning out ships, and destroyers, faster than could be coped with. ASW aircraft were available in quantity. Skilled sub crewman were being lost in battle, and the new crews, rushed through training, were no match for the now quantitatively and technologically supreme allies.
And of course, subs are very complex weapons, with a large amount of intricate, skilled, and time consuming manufacture and assembly required. Crews must be highly trained. To build a large fleet of subs takes time.
There was a huge flood of U-boats in the 1943-44 time frame, but by that time the Type VII and IX \'classic\' U-boat was hopelessly obsolete, and no feat of production could overcome the vast and powerfull allied ASW defences. If this flood of production had hit during an earlier time, say during \'Drumbeat\' off of the American coast in \'42, history may have been different.
But that was not what happened.
Hopes this helps.
</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
numbers
|
tony | 11/21/2000 07:40PM |
|
RE: numbers
|
Dakota | 11/21/2000 09:56PM |
|
RE: numbers
|
kurt | 11/21/2000 10:57PM |