Thank for your comment. Naturally, any generalization has its limits but since I'm not a historian, they are nevertheless a common entry point into what I consider to be my key objective: theory development. While you are of course correct in pointing out that a gross number cannot hope to achieve complete accuracy, I only need a gross number that is sufficiently accurate to permit comparative studies. Thus, if the gross estimate deviates from the actual number even as much as +/- 10% it still would not have a major impact on the general assumption, which is that there is a significant difference that cannot be entirely attributed to the torpedoes or TDC equipment.

However, the torpedo stats are not the main point and I will probably downplay that aspect in the future. What I consider to be most interesting are the 38 American captains who were relieved of command. I haven't yet gone through all the war patrol reports, but they seem to indicate a general pattern of exaggerated caution. Since torpedo shots, submergence, etc. is logged in each war patrol report, the impact of sea states, the TDC and such can be controlled for.

The generalization I want to make is quite modest (at least I think so); i.e. that a significant part (large enough to warrant further investigation) of the difference in both performance and risk-taking behavior between the US Navy and the Ubootwaffe can be attributed to organizational factors. The main component of my work is dedicated to studying these organizational factors qualitatively, so the comparative work with the statistics is merely intended to give a somewhat rough picture of the underlying assumptions.