Re: Running comparative numbers USN/Ubootwaffe
Posted by:
tonyingesson
()
Date: October 30, 2012 08:55AM
Lcdrusnret: first of all, thank you so much for your comments! They're exactly what I was hoping for when I made my original post in this forum. The ”tough” questions are necessary to achieve any form of progress. I'll try to address your points one at a time below:
"The factors you are trying to measure changed over time For example Submarine COs aggressiveness changed with ther replacment of combat experienced commanders”
I don't disagree. Then again, everything changes over time, so it's always a matter of rounding off to get an average figure. The matter of submarine CO aggressiveness is interesting, but I'd say that it's not as simple as a matter of replacing unsuitable individuals with better suited ones. Quite a few of the unaggressive COs that were relieved of their commands received new commands after 6-12 months or so, and then they performed quite well. This is one of the things that I find most interesting.
”There are books already published on the subject. (I'll get back to you with the title after the election)” / ”What I am telling you is that historians have alredy got better data than lumping whole war data into one study”
Please do, I've had a hard time finding the appropriate type of literature, esp. on the Americans. The more detailed data, the better. As for lumping data into one study, I still stand by that approach, but the study is limited to two single years (Sept 39 to Sept 40 in the German case, Dec 41 to Dec 42 in the American case), so not the whole war. Separating the data may improve its accuracy, but it also makes it difficult to generalize and construct theories.
"with experience in effective AASW etc. What I am telling you is that historians have alredy got better data than lumping whole war data into one study. The statistical theorists are going to throw out your measures of effectiveness (as expressed here) as inappropriate statistical measures. “
I'm well aware of the limitations of the statistical approach employed in this study. The problem is that it was originally only intended to provide a backdrop for the key argument, which does not rely upon that statistical data per se. I may drop the effectiveness argument altogether and focus on the personnel differences (i.e. the figures for number of relieved commanders and KIA/POW).
“ Early in the war US policy called for submerged sound attacks without periscope observation. It was not the Skipper choice that determined his effectivness”
I agree that the US doctrine had quite a few elements that were detrimental to effectiveness, the sonar approach you mentioned being a prime example, but I'd argue that it was still up to the skipper to decide on how to engage a target. In the post-patrol endorsements written in 1942, there are a number of examples of Bob English as well as several division commanders expressing very harsh criticism against COs who used the sonar approach when there was no justifiable threat to the boat. In addition, the habit of cruising submerged during daytime, another concept that was taught to COs during the pre-war period, also led to severe criticism in the endorsements. Being in command a submarine is a demanding job and I think that English and the rest of the superiors felt that a CO should be able to use his judgment in every situation rather than fall back entirely on standard operating procedures without taking the circumstances into account. For every CO who used the sonar approach and cruised submerged, there were approx. two more who did not. In general, the latter category received more positive endorsements, so it seems that kind of autonomous behavior was approved by most if not all superiors.
“You will never know how many of the FAT and Sound king torps exploded on the first pass hit dud and how many exploded after the reattack”
No, but as far as I know, they entered into operational service after the first year of each respective submarine arm, so that's outside my scope.
"The fire control on a US S-boat was not close to the TDC"
Definitely, but then again the Germans had their fair share of Type II boats, which may have had better fire-control equipment than the S-boats but had less firepower (fewer tubes and torpedoes).
“In the Norwegian campaign the German dud rate was near 90% for magnetic variation in shallow water”
I know, but on the other hand the German average failure rate throughout April 1940 was 31.7 percent, which is not significantly different than the average failure rates for Oct-Nov 1939 or January 1940 (29.5, 33.3, 38.0 percent respectively).
"The factors you are trying to measure changed over time For example Submarine COs aggressiveness changed with ther replacment of combat experienced commanders”
I don't disagree. Then again, everything changes over time, so it's always a matter of rounding off to get an average figure. The matter of submarine CO aggressiveness is interesting, but I'd say that it's not as simple as a matter of replacing unsuitable individuals with better suited ones. Quite a few of the unaggressive COs that were relieved of their commands received new commands after 6-12 months or so, and then they performed quite well. This is one of the things that I find most interesting.
”There are books already published on the subject. (I'll get back to you with the title after the election)” / ”What I am telling you is that historians have alredy got better data than lumping whole war data into one study”
Please do, I've had a hard time finding the appropriate type of literature, esp. on the Americans. The more detailed data, the better. As for lumping data into one study, I still stand by that approach, but the study is limited to two single years (Sept 39 to Sept 40 in the German case, Dec 41 to Dec 42 in the American case), so not the whole war. Separating the data may improve its accuracy, but it also makes it difficult to generalize and construct theories.
"with experience in effective AASW etc. What I am telling you is that historians have alredy got better data than lumping whole war data into one study. The statistical theorists are going to throw out your measures of effectiveness (as expressed here) as inappropriate statistical measures. “
I'm well aware of the limitations of the statistical approach employed in this study. The problem is that it was originally only intended to provide a backdrop for the key argument, which does not rely upon that statistical data per se. I may drop the effectiveness argument altogether and focus on the personnel differences (i.e. the figures for number of relieved commanders and KIA/POW).
“ Early in the war US policy called for submerged sound attacks without periscope observation. It was not the Skipper choice that determined his effectivness”
I agree that the US doctrine had quite a few elements that were detrimental to effectiveness, the sonar approach you mentioned being a prime example, but I'd argue that it was still up to the skipper to decide on how to engage a target. In the post-patrol endorsements written in 1942, there are a number of examples of Bob English as well as several division commanders expressing very harsh criticism against COs who used the sonar approach when there was no justifiable threat to the boat. In addition, the habit of cruising submerged during daytime, another concept that was taught to COs during the pre-war period, also led to severe criticism in the endorsements. Being in command a submarine is a demanding job and I think that English and the rest of the superiors felt that a CO should be able to use his judgment in every situation rather than fall back entirely on standard operating procedures without taking the circumstances into account. For every CO who used the sonar approach and cruised submerged, there were approx. two more who did not. In general, the latter category received more positive endorsements, so it seems that kind of autonomous behavior was approved by most if not all superiors.
“You will never know how many of the FAT and Sound king torps exploded on the first pass hit dud and how many exploded after the reattack”
No, but as far as I know, they entered into operational service after the first year of each respective submarine arm, so that's outside my scope.
"The fire control on a US S-boat was not close to the TDC"
Definitely, but then again the Germans had their fair share of Type II boats, which may have had better fire-control equipment than the S-boats but had less firepower (fewer tubes and torpedoes).
“In the Norwegian campaign the German dud rate was near 90% for magnetic variation in shallow water”
I know, but on the other hand the German average failure rate throughout April 1940 was 31.7 percent, which is not significantly different than the average failure rates for Oct-Nov 1939 or January 1940 (29.5, 33.3, 38.0 percent respectively).
