General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Two questions re Grand Ad. Donitz
Posted by:
Jack
()
Date: January 18, 2002 01:04PM
<HTML>Submariners,
I come to you for insight. A colleague and I have been chatting off line about GA Donitz, and our discussions make me wonder a few very important things.
Two questions:
1. Why did Donitz keep such a small headquarters staff of less than 10, when he had so many boats with new crews in service ?
2. What motivated the average German Uboat crew to sortie after May 43, when it was abundantly clear that the boats had no survival chance?
What I am searching for is the leadership attributes of Donitz (or personal character attributes of the Uboat sailor) that both limited and enabled him to lead the Uboats. After 3 years of reading many many books, I find these 2 questions unsatisfactorily addressed.
One of the obvious differences between the Allied navies organization and that of the Axis is the very very small size of the German navy HQ staff. Seems to me that a small staff severely hampered D ability to measure the performance of the Uboats, and forced him to rely on other German 'experts' who gave him bad advice (such as Enigma cannot be compromised, radar cannot be mounted onboard ships or aircraft, HQ missed the tactical harm being done by the Uboats frequent radio transmisions, etc). The Uboats suffered greatly from the lack of headquarter operational analysis. Donitz could only move the point of Uboat attack around from place to place until May '43, and after that he promised technological innovations till the end of the war, but that's all he could do.
A larger staff might have enabled D to fight the Uboats with greater insight and stratgeic coordination. For example, a larger headquarter staff would have spotted the need and advantages of integrating the Japanese navy assets into a coherent focused submarine strategy. What if the Japanese early in 1942 had been pursuaded to send a small number of subs to attack US Pacific coast shipping at the same time as the Germans were pillaging the east coast US shipping? The two coast 'front' could have enraged the US politic and public to the extent that Roosevelt would have been forced to consider rolling heads (Ad. Stark & King) and reorganizing the navy, a nasty chore & large gamble to attempt in a time of utter desperation.
On the other hand, one of the amazing feats of WWII is that of the ordinary average Uboat crew: after May '43, they sortied when they essentially had no chance to return alive. Why and how were they motivated to do this? Was it their personnal feelings of need to defend their country and family? Did Donitz motivate the crews in some direct way? Contrast the German navy rebellion at the end of WWI to the WWII Uboat willingness to sally forth to combat. I am interested in the personnal recollections of average Uboat sailors with respect to this question. Does anyone have family members that have enabled you to understand their willingness to sail, when it appeared to be suicide to do so? Was it the character of the average sailor, or was it some form of Donitz leadership?
Yeah, I've read about the personal loyalty of Uboat crews to Donitz early in the war during the Happy Times when he was Uboat chief over men he had trained and knew personally. After May 1943, that was not the case: he was physically seperated back to Berlin, he was chief of the entire German navy, and thousands of new sailors and captains were entering into Uboat service, and the Uboat was experiencing no success against overwhelming defensive forces.
Thanks for your consideration of these questions and insightful responses,
Jack</HTML>
I come to you for insight. A colleague and I have been chatting off line about GA Donitz, and our discussions make me wonder a few very important things.
Two questions:
1. Why did Donitz keep such a small headquarters staff of less than 10, when he had so many boats with new crews in service ?
2. What motivated the average German Uboat crew to sortie after May 43, when it was abundantly clear that the boats had no survival chance?
What I am searching for is the leadership attributes of Donitz (or personal character attributes of the Uboat sailor) that both limited and enabled him to lead the Uboats. After 3 years of reading many many books, I find these 2 questions unsatisfactorily addressed.
One of the obvious differences between the Allied navies organization and that of the Axis is the very very small size of the German navy HQ staff. Seems to me that a small staff severely hampered D ability to measure the performance of the Uboats, and forced him to rely on other German 'experts' who gave him bad advice (such as Enigma cannot be compromised, radar cannot be mounted onboard ships or aircraft, HQ missed the tactical harm being done by the Uboats frequent radio transmisions, etc). The Uboats suffered greatly from the lack of headquarter operational analysis. Donitz could only move the point of Uboat attack around from place to place until May '43, and after that he promised technological innovations till the end of the war, but that's all he could do.
A larger staff might have enabled D to fight the Uboats with greater insight and stratgeic coordination. For example, a larger headquarter staff would have spotted the need and advantages of integrating the Japanese navy assets into a coherent focused submarine strategy. What if the Japanese early in 1942 had been pursuaded to send a small number of subs to attack US Pacific coast shipping at the same time as the Germans were pillaging the east coast US shipping? The two coast 'front' could have enraged the US politic and public to the extent that Roosevelt would have been forced to consider rolling heads (Ad. Stark & King) and reorganizing the navy, a nasty chore & large gamble to attempt in a time of utter desperation.
On the other hand, one of the amazing feats of WWII is that of the ordinary average Uboat crew: after May '43, they sortied when they essentially had no chance to return alive. Why and how were they motivated to do this? Was it their personnal feelings of need to defend their country and family? Did Donitz motivate the crews in some direct way? Contrast the German navy rebellion at the end of WWI to the WWII Uboat willingness to sally forth to combat. I am interested in the personnal recollections of average Uboat sailors with respect to this question. Does anyone have family members that have enabled you to understand their willingness to sail, when it appeared to be suicide to do so? Was it the character of the average sailor, or was it some form of Donitz leadership?
Yeah, I've read about the personal loyalty of Uboat crews to Donitz early in the war during the Happy Times when he was Uboat chief over men he had trained and knew personally. After May 1943, that was not the case: he was physically seperated back to Berlin, he was chief of the entire German navy, and thousands of new sailors and captains were entering into Uboat service, and the Uboat was experiencing no success against overwhelming defensive forces.
Thanks for your consideration of these questions and insightful responses,
Jack</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
Two questions re Grand Ad. Donitz
|
Jack | 01/18/2002 01:04PM |
|
Re: Two questions re Grand Ad. Donitz
|
Parade | 01/18/2002 07:44PM |
|
Re: Two questions re Grand Ad. Donitz
|
oliver | 01/18/2002 11:17PM |
|
Re: Two questions re Grand Ad. Donitz
|
W. Frank | 01/19/2002 07:04PM |
|
Re: Two questions re Grand Ad. Donitz
|
Jack | 01/19/2002 08:05PM |
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Re: Two questions re Grand Ad. Donitz
|
Yuri IL'IN | 01/20/2002 05:04AM |
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Re: Two questions re Grand Ad. Donitz
|
Torlef | 01/20/2002 06:12AM |
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Re: Two questions re Grand Ad. Donitz
|
kurt | 01/21/2002 11:01PM |