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Notable events involving Dragon include:

The page of HMS Dragon was last updated in October 2022.

31 Aug 1939
Around 1800A/31, the Home Fleet departed Scapa Flow to patrol between Scotland, Iceland and Norway for returning German merchant vessels.

Ships that participated in this patrol were; battleships HMS Nelson (Capt. G.J.A. Miles, RN, flying the flag of Admiral J.M. Forbes, KCB, DSO, RN), HMS Rodney (Capt. E.N. Syfret, RN), aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (Capt. A.J. Power, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral L.V. Wells, CB, DSO, RN), light cruisers HMS Aurora (Capt. G.B. Middleton, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral R.H.C. Hallifax, RN), HMS Sheffield (Capt. E. de F. Renouf, CVO, RN), HMS Belfast (Capt. G.A. Scott, DSC, RN) (from the 18th Cruiser Squadron), HMS Effingham (Capt. J.M. Howson, RN), HMS Cardiff (Capt. P.K. Enright, RN), HMS Dunedin (Capt. C.E. Lambe, CVO, RN), HMS Emerald (Capt. A.W.S. Agar, VC, DSO, RN) (from the 12th Cruiser Squadron), HMS Caledon (Capt. C.P. Clark, RN), HMS Calypso (Capt. N.J.W. William-Powlett, DSC, RN), HMS Diomede (Commodore E.B.C. Dicken, OBE, DSC, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) (from the 7th Cruiser Squadron. These ships were escorted by destroyers from the 8th Destroyer Flotilla; HMS Faulknor (Capt. C.S. Daniel, RN), HMS Fame (Cdr. P.N. Walter, RN), HMS Fearless (Cdr. K.L. Harkness, RN), HMS Firedrake (Lt.Cdr. S.H. Norris, RN), HMS Foresight (Lt.Cdr. G.T. Lambert, RN), HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, RN), HMS Fortune (Cdr. E.A. Gibbs, RN), HMS Foxhound (Lt.Cdr. P.H. Hadow, RN) and HMS Fury (Cdr. G.F. Burghard, RN).

To patrol off the Skagerrak was the battlecruiser squadron which was made up of the battlecruisers HMS Hood (Capt. I.G. Glennie, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral W.J. Whitworth, CB, DSO, RN), HMS Repulse (Capt. E.J. Spooner, DSO, RN) which were escorted by destroyers from the 6th Destroyer Flotilla; HMS Somali (Capt. R.S.G. Nicholson, DSC, RN), HMS Ashanti (Cdr. W.G. Davis, RN), HMS Bedouin (Cdr. J.A. McCoy, RN), HMS Eskimo (Cdr. St. J.A. Micklethwait, RN), HMS Mashona (Cdr. P.V. McLaughlin, RN), HMS Matabele (Cdr. G.K. Whitmy-Smith, RN), HMS Punjabi (Cdr. J.T. Lean, RN) and HMS Tartar (Capt. G.H. Warner, DSC, RN). These ships departed Scapa Flow around the same time.

Some of the ships had already been at sea for exercises.

The bulk of the Fleet returned to Scapa Flow in the morning of September 6th.

Most of the cruisers had acted independently to inspect shipping. HMS Caledon, HMS Calypso, HMS Cardiff and HMS Dunedin returned to Scapa Flow in the early morning of September 5th.

HMS Aurora and HMS Sheffield returned to Scapa Flow in the evening of September 5th.

HMS Belfast returned to Scapa Flow on the 6th after having joined other ships for exercises on the 5th.

HMS Diomede, HMS Dragon, HMS Effingham and HMS Emerald returned to Scapa Flow in the morning of the 7th.

Most of the destroyer had to return to Scapa Flow once to refuel, HMS Somali and HMS Ashanti were at Scapa Flow between 0100/2 and 0400/2.

HMS Faulknor, HMS Fearless, HMS Firedrake, HMS Fortune and HMS Foxhound were at Scapa Flow between 1000A/3 and 1530A/3.

HMS Bedouin, HMS Eskimo, HMS Punjabi and HMS Tartar were at Scapa Flow between 1100A/3 and 1600A/3.

HMS Fame was detached at 2359A/3 to go to the aid of the torpedoed liner Athenia but she was not needed to pick up survivors and proceeded to the Clyde arriving in the moring of the 5th having carried out an A/S sweep en-route.

HMS Matabele was detached to Scapa Flow at 1130/5. Around 2030A/5, she grounded near the boom and damaged her propellers.

HMS Foresight, HMS Forester, HMS Fury and HMS Mashona did not refuel before they returned with the Fleet in the morning of the 6th. (1)

9 Sep 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Scapa Flow for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol south-west of the Faeroer Islands. (2)

16 Sep 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) returned to Scapa Flow from patrol. (2)

18 Sep 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Scapa Flow for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Iceland - Faeroer gap. (2)

25 Sep 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) returned to Scapa Flow from patrol. (2)

28 Sep 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Scapa Flow for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Iceland - Faeroer gap. (2)

4 Oct 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) returned to Scapa Flow from patrol. (2)

10 Oct 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Scapa Flow for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Iceland - Faeroer gap. (3)

15 Oct 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Sullom Voe from patrol. (3)

20 Oct 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Sullom Voe for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol south of the Faeroer Islands. (3)

25 Oct 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) returned to Sullom Voe from patrol. (3)

27 Oct 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Sullom Voe for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Iceland - Faeroer gap. (3)

3 Nov 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) returned to Sullom Voe from patrol. (4)

7 Nov 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Sullom Voe for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol south / south-west of the Faeroer Islands. (4)

12 Nov 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) returned to Sullom Voe from patrol. (4)

14 Nov 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Sullom Voe for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Iceland - Faeroer gap. (4)

20 Nov 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at ' Port A ' (Loch Ewe) from patrol. She had arrived with weather damage and also needed to boiler clean. (4)

26 Nov 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed ' Port A ' (Loch Ewe) to patrol in the Norwegian Sea. (4)

2 Dec 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) returned to ' Port A ' (Loch Ewe) from patrol. (5)

8 Dec 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed ' Port A ' (Loch Ewe) for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Iceland - Faeroer gap. (5)

10 Dec 1939

Convoy TC 1.

This convoy of troopships departed Halifax around 0510Q/10, for the Clyde where it arrived on 17 December 1939.

The convoy was made up of the following troopships / liners; Aquitania (British, 44786 GRT, built 1914, carrying 2638 troops), Duchess of Bedford (British, 20123 GRT, built 1928, carrying 1312 troops), Empress of Australia (British, 21833 GRT, built 1914, carrying 1235 troops), Empress of Britain (British, 42348 GRT, built 1931, carrying 1303 troops) and Monarch of Bermuda (British, 22424 GRT, built 1931, carrying 961 troops),

Close escort was provided on leaving Halifax by the battleship HMS Resolution (Capt. O. Bevir, RN) and the Canadian destroyers HMCS Fraser (Cdr. W.N. Creery, RCN), HMCS Ottawa (Capt. G.C. Jones, RCN), HMCS Restigouche (Lt.Cdr. W.B.L. Holms, RCN) and HMCS St. Laurent (Lt.Cdr. H.G. de Wolf, RCN). These Canadian destroyers remained with the convoy until 12 December 1939 when they set course to return to Halifax.

Cover for the convoy was provided by the battlecruiser HMS Repulse (Capt. E.J. Spooner, DSO, RN), aircraft carrier HMS Furious (Capt. M.L. Clarke, DSC, RN), light cruiser HMS Emerald (Capt. A.W.S. Agar, VC, DSO, RN) and the destroyers HMS Hunter (Lt.Cdr. L. de Villiers, RN) and HMS Hyperion (Cdr. H.St.L. Nicholson, RN). At dusk on the 10th both destroyers were detached to join the local escort. They returned to Halifax with the Canadian destroyers.

Early on the 15th, HMS Emerald was detached, HMS Newcastle (Capt. J. Figgins, RN) had joined the cover force in the afternoon of the 14th to take her place.

When the convoy approached the British isles, the destroyers HMS Eskimo (Cdr. St.J.A. Micklethwait, RN), HMS Bedouin (Cdr. J.A. McCoy, RN), HMS Mashona (Cdr. P.V. McLaughlin, RN), HMS Somali (Capt. R.S.G. Nicholson, DSC, RN), HMS Kandahar (Cdr. W.G.A. Robson, RN), HMS Khartoum (Cdr. D.T. Dowler, RN), HMS Kingston (Lt.Cdr. P. Somerville, RN), HMS Kashmir (Cdr. H.A. King, RN), HMS Fearless (Cdr. K.L. Harkness, RN), HMS Ilex (Lt.Cdr. P.L. Saumarez, RN) and HMS Impulsive (Lt.Cdr. W.S. Thomas, RN) departed the Clyde on the 12th to sweep ahead of the convoy. HMS Imperial (Lt.Cdr. C.A.de W. Kitcat, RN) was also to have sailed but was unable to join. HMS Matabele (Cdr. G.K. Whitmy-Smith, RN) was sailed in her place and later joined the other destroyers at sea.

After German warships had been reported in the North Sea, and concerned for the safety of convoy TC.1, Admiral Forbes, departed the Clyde on the 13th to provide additional cover with the battleships HMS Warspite (Capt. V.A.C. Crutchley, VC, DSC, RN), HMS Barham (Capt. H.T.C. Walker, RN), battlecruiser HMS Hood (Capt. I.G. Glennie, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral W.J. Whitworth, CB, DSO, RN) and the destroyers HMS Inglefield (Capt. P. Todd, RN), HMS Icarus (Lt.Cdr. C.D. Maud, RN), HMS Imogen (Cdr. E.B.K. Stevens, RN), HMS Imperial, HMS Isis (Cdr. J.C. Clouston, RN) and HMS Foxhound (Lt.Cdr. P.H. Hadow, RN). The destroyers HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, RN) and HMS Firedrake (Lt.Cdr. S.H. Norris, RN) sailed from Loch Ewe and later joined this force at sea. Three cruisers from the Northern Patrol were ordered to patrol in position 53°55’N, 25°00’W to provide cover for the convoy. These were the heavy cruisers HMS Berwick (Capt. I.M. Palmer, DSC, RN), HMS Devonshire (Capt. J.M. Mansfield, DSC, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral J.H.D. Cunningham, CB, MVO, RN) and the light cruiser HMS Glasgow (Capt. F.H. Pegram, RN).

The light cruisers HMS Southampton (Capt. F.W.H. Jeans, CVO, RN), HMS Edinburgh (Cdr. C. Wauchope, RN, temporary in command) departed Rosyth to patrol between the Shetlands and the Faroes.

The destroyers HMS Afridi (Capt. G.H. Creswell, DSC, RN), HMS Maori (Cdr. G.N. Brewer, RN) and HMS Nubian (Cdr. R.W. Ravenhill, RN) departed Rosyth and proceeded north at high speed to try to cut of the enemy warhips if they were to enter the Atlantic.

The light cruisers HMS Cardiff (Capt. P.K. Enright, RN), HMS Ceres (Capt. E.G. Abbott, AM, RN), HMS Delhi (Capt L.H.K. Hamilton, DSO, RN), HMS Diomede (Commodore E.B.C. Dicken, OBE, DSC, RN) which were on the Northern Patrol were to concentrate near the Faroes where they were joined by HMS Colombo (Commodore R.J.R. Scott, RN) and HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) which were on passage to their patrol stations.

Around 0430Z/17, in foggy conditions, the outward bound liner Samaria (British, 19597 GRT, built 1921) collided with both HMS Furious and the Aquitania but no major damage was done to either one of the three ships.

The convoy arrived safely in the Clyde on 17 December 1939. (6)

12 Dec 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Scapa Flow from patrol. (5)

15 Dec 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Scapa Flow for the Northern Patrol. She was ordered to patrol south-west of the Faeroer Islands. (5)

18 Dec 1939
In the early evening, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN), departed her patrol area to proceed to the Chatham Dockyard where she was to refit. (5)

21 Dec 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Sheerness from the Northern Patrol. (5)

22 Dec 1939
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) proceeded from Sheerness to the Chatham Dockyard where she was immediately docked in No.5 Dock. (5)

18 Jan 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) is undocked. She continued her refit afloat in the basin. (7)

28 Feb 1940
With her refit completed, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN), proceeded from the Chatham Dockyard to Sheerness. (8)

5 Mar 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Sheerness for Portland. (8)

6 Mar 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) made a short stop at Portland before departing for Gibraltar to join the Mediterranean Station. (8)

10 Mar 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Gibraltar. After fuelling she departed immediately for Malta. (8)

13 Mar 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Malta. (8)

14 Mar 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Malta for contraband patrol in the Otranto Straits. (8)

22 Mar 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Alexandria from patrol. (8)

26 Mar 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Alexandria for contraband patrol in the Aegean. (8)

3 Apr 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) returned to Alexandria from patrol. (9)

7 Apr 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Alexandria for contraband patrol in the Aegean. (9)

15 Apr 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN), which had been on passage from her patrol area to Malta, took the gunboat HMS Ladybird (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) J.F. Blackburn, RN) in tow which had broken down in heavy weather while on passage from Alexandria to Malta together with HMS Aphis (Lt.Cdr R.S. Stafford, RN).

The destroyer HMAS Vampire (Lt.Cdr. J.A. Walsh, RAN) was also sent out from Malta to assist.

The tow parted on the 16th after which the tow was taken over by the tug HMS St. Issey. (9)

16 Apr 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Malta from patrol. (9)

18 Apr 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) is docked in No.4 Dock at the Malta Dockyard. (9)

19 Apr 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) is undocked. (9)

23 Apr 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Malta for contraband patrol off the west coast of Greece. (9)

1 May 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Alexandria from patrol. (9)

5 May 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Alexandria for contraband patrol off the west coast of Greece. (10)

12 May 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) returned to Alexandria from patrol. (10)

14 May 1940
The heavy cruisers Duquesne (Capt. G.E. Besineau), Tourville (Capt. A.J.A. Marloy), light cruisers HMS Neptune (Capt. J.A.V. Morse, DSO, RN), HMS Orion (Capt. G.R.B. Back, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral J.C. Tovey, CB, DSO, RN), HMS Delhi (Capt. A.S. Russell, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN), destroyers HMAS Stuart (Cdr. H.M.L. Waller, RAN), HMAS Vampire (Lt.Cdr. J.A. Walsh, RAN, HMAS Vendetta (Lt. R. Rhoades RAN), HMAS Voyager (Lt.Cdr. J.C. Morrow, RAN), HMS Tigre (Capt. M. De La Forest Divonne), Lynx (Cdr. A.M. De Gouyon Matignon de Pontourade) and Forbin (Lt.Cdr. R.C.M. Chartellier) conducted exercises off Alexandria. (11)

15 May 1940
Fleet exercises were carried out of Alexandria in which the following warships are thought to have participated; battleships HMS Warspite (Capt. D.B. Fisher, OBE, RN, flying the flag of A/Admiral Sir A.B. Cunningham, KCB, DSO and 2 Bars, RN), HMS Royal Sovereign (Capt. H.B. Jacomb, RN), heavy cruisers Duquesne (Capt. G.E. Besineau), Tourville (Capt. A.J.A. Marloy), light cruisers HMS Neptune (Capt. J.A.V. Morse, DSO, RN), HMS Orion (Capt. G.R.B. Back, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral J.C. Tovey, CB, DSO, RN), HMS Delhi (Capt. A.S. Russell, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN), Duguay Trouin (Capt. J.M.C. Trolley de Prevaux), destroyers HMAS Stuart (Cdr. H.M.L. Waller, RAN), HMAS Vampire (Lt.Cdr. J.A. Walsh, RAN, HMAS Vendetta (Lt. R. Rhoades RAN), HMAS Voyager (Lt.Cdr. J.C. Morrow, RAN), HMAS Waterhen (Lt.Cdr. J.H. Swain, RN), HMS Tigre (Capt. M. De La Forest Divonne), Lynx (Cdr. A.M. De Gouyon Matignon de Pontourade) and Forbin (Lt.Cdr. R.C.M. Chartellier).

Some of these ships remained out on exercises during the night of 15/16 May.

[It is possible that more ships participated in these exercises but much information is not available.]

17 May 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Alexandria for contraband patrol off the west coast of Greece. (10)

24 May 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Port Said from patrol. (10)

25 May 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) and HMS Caledon (Capt. C.P. Clarke, RN) passed the Suez Canal southbound and later departed Suez for Aden. They were both to join the East Indies Station but this was soon changed to the South Atlantic Station in the case of HMS Dragon while HMS Caledon was ordered to return to the Mediterranean. (12)

28 May 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) and HMS Caledon (Capt. C.P. Clarke, RN) arrived at Aden from Suez.

After fuelling HMS Dragon departed for Kilindini / Mombasa later the same day. (13)

2 Jun 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Mombasa from Aden. (14)

4 Jun 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Mombasa to make rendezvous with the armed merchant cruiser HMS Ranchi (Capt.(Retd.) H.C. Legge, DSC, RN) and the (troop) transports Inchanga (British, 7069 GRT, built 1934) and Empress of Japan (British, 26032 GRT, built 1930) coming from Durban.

In the early evening of 6 June 1940, rendezvous was effected in approximate position 16°42'S, 40°46'E.

HMS Durban and the ships she was escorting arrived at Mombasa in the morning of 9 June 1940. (15)

10 Jun 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Mombasa for Durban. (14)

15 Jun 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Durban from Mombasa. (14)

16 Jun 1940

Dakar, the French battleship Richelieu
and the fall of France
Timespan; 16 June to 7 July 1940.

The fall of France, 16 June 1940.

On 16 June 1940, less then six weeks after the invasion of France and the low countries had started on May 10th, all military resitance in France came to an end. The question of control of the French fleet had thus become, almost overnight, one of vital importance, for if it passed into the hands of the enemy the whole balance of sea power would be most seriously disturbed. It was therefore policy of H.M. Government to prevent, at all costs, the French warships based on British and French harbours overseas from falling into the hands of Germany.

The bulk of the French fleet was at this time based in the Mediterranean. There drastic steps were taken to implement this policy. Elsewhere the most important units were the two new battleships completing, the Jean Bart at St. Nazaire and more importantly as she was almost complete, the Richelieu, at Brest.

Events during the Franco-German negotiations 17-25 June 1940 and politics.

It was on the 17th of June 1940, when the newly-formed Pétain Cabinet asked the Germans to consider ‘honourable’ peace terms in order to stop the fighting in France. At 1516 (B.S.T.) hours that day the Admiralty issued orders that British ships were not to proceed to French ports. On receipt of these orders Vice-Admiral George D’Oyly Lyon, Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic, ordered the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes (Capt R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN) then on her way to Dakar after a patrol off the Canary Islands to proceed to Freetown instead at her best speed. At the same time he recalled the British SS Accra which had sailed from Freetown for Dakar at 1730 hours (zone +1) with 850 French troops on board. She returned to Freetown at 0800/18. The British transport City of Paris with 600 French troops on board from Cotonou was ordered to put into Takoradi. On the 18th the Commander-in-Chief was also informed by Commander Jermyn Rushbrooke, RN, the British Naval Liaison Officer at Dakar that the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, Admiral Darlan had ordered Admiral Plancon at Dakar to continue fighting and also that the shore batteries and AA personnel there had declared for the British. At 0245/18 Vice-Admiral Lyon passed this information to the Admiralty, cancelled his orders to HMS Hermes to proceed to Freetown and directed her with the armed merchant cruisers HMS Carnarvon Castle (Capt. M.J.C. de Meric, RN) and HMS Mooltan (Capt.(Retd.) G.E. Sutcliff, RN), which were on passage to Freetown from the Western Approaches, to proceed to Dakar at full speed in order to strengthen the French morale. That afternoon the Admiralty ordered HMS Delhi (Capt. A.S. Russell, RN) to leave Gibraltar and proceed to Dakar and join the South Atlantic Station. She left Gibraltar on the 19th with an arrival date of the 23rd. In the morning of the 18th the French troopship Banfora reached Freetown, from Port Bouet, Ivory Coast with 1000 troops on board, and sailed for Dakar without delay. The French armed merchant cruiser Charles Plumier, which had been on patrol south of the Cape Verde Islands reached Dakar at 1015/18.

Meanwhile the British Naval Liaison Officer, Dakar’s signal had been followed by a report from the Naval Control Service Officer at Duala that an overwhelming spirit existed amongst the military and civilian population of the French Cameroons to continue fighting on the British side, but that they required lead, as the Governer was not a forceful character; but that morning the Governor of Nigeria informed the Commander-in-Chief that he considered steps to be taken to prevent a hostile move from Fernando Po (off the entrance to the Cameroon River). Accordingly, at 1845/18, the armed merchant cruiser HMS Bulolo (A/Capt. C.H. Petrie, RN) sailed from Freetown at 14 knots to show herself off San Carlos on the morning of the 23rd, and thence to anchor of Manoka in the Cameroon River the next day (her draught prevented her from reaching Duala). A/Capt. Petrie was then to proceed to Duala and call a conference.

It was difficult to arrive at a clear appreciation of the situation in French West-Africa but on the morning of the 19th June the Commander-in-Chief informed the Admiralty that, as the evidence pointed to an established resolve on the part of the West-African Colonies to join Great Britain whatever happened, he intended to allow French troop movements to continue. This he anticipated would avoid French exasperation and mistrust. During the early afternoon he heard from the Governors of Nigeria and the Gold Coast that French officers and non-commissioned officers were planning to leave the Cameroons and to join the British forces in Nigeria. At 1900/19 the Commander-in-Chief held a conference with the Governor of Sierra Leone at which it was decided that the Governor should cable home urging immediate action to persuade the French colonial troops and authorities to remain in their territories and hold their colonies against all attacks. In the evening the Commander-in-Chief reported to the Admiralty that French Guinea was determined to keep fighting on the British side. Meanwhile the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa at Brazzaville was wavering and suggested leading his troops to the nearest British Colony. Late that night, still on the 19th, the Commander-in-Chief informed him that it was essential that he should remain at his post and that it was the expressed intention of French West Africa to fight on to victory.

Next morning, on the 20th, the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that the new French battleship Richelieu (about 95% complete) had departed Brest for Dakar on the 18th. Her sister ship, Jean Bart (about 77% complete) had left St. Nazaire for Casablanca on the 19th. During the afternoon of the 20th the British Liaison Officer at Dakar reported that according to the French Admiral at Dakar the French Government had refused the German armistice terms and would continue the fight in France. This was entirely misleading. For nearly two days the Commander-in-Chief had no definite information till at noon on 22 June when a BB C broadcast announced the signing of a armistice between France and Germany, which was to followed by one between France and Italy. Still there was much uncertainty, and the rest of the day was apparently spent in waiting for news. Early next morning, the 23rd June, the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that the French Bordeaux Government had signed an armistice with Germany. As the terms were not fully known the attitude of the French Navy remained uncertain. Shortly after 0200/23 the Admiralty gave orders that HMS Hermes was to remain at Dakar, and gave the Commander-in-Chief the text of the British Government’s appeal to the French Empire and to Frenchmen overseas to continue the war on the British side. The final collapse of France naturally exercised an important influence on the dispositions and movements of the South Atlantic forces. Also on the 23rd the cruiser HMS Dorsetshire (Capt. B.C.S. Martin, RN) and the destroyer HMS Watchman (Lt.Cdr. E.C.L. Day, RN) departed Gibraltar for Dakar and Casablanca respectively, and the same morning HMS Bulolo arrived off Fernando Po and showed herself of San Carlos and Santa Isabel. At noon she anchored off Manoka, in the Cameroon River, in the hope of restoring morale at Duala. Meanwhile HMS Mooltan had arrived at Freetown from Dakar and the United Kingdom, and during the afternoon (1500/23) the armed merchant cruiser HMS Maloja (A/Capt. V. Hammersley-Heenan, RN) reached Dakar from the Northern Patrol to join the Freetown escort force. Half an hour later the Richelieu and escorting destroyer Fleuret arrived at Dakar.

For a time the attitude of the French Governor-General at Dakar, the French North African colonies and the French Mediterranean Fleet, and the battleship Richelieu remained in doubt. Then owning to the anticipated difficulty of maintaining French salaries and supplies if the French did not accept the British offer, the situation at Dakar rapidly deteriorated, and by the evening of the 23rd reached a critical state. Early on the 24th, therefore, the Admiralty ordered the Commander-in-Chief to proceed there as soon as possible. The Commander-in-Chief replied that he intended to proceed there in the ex-Australian seaplane carrier HMS Albatross (Cdr. W.G. Brittain, RN), which was the only available ship, and expected to reach Dakar around noon on the 25th. At 1015/24 he left Freetown and reached Dakar around 1600/25. Meanwhile the Richelieu had put to sea. From then on the naval operations centred mainly on the battleship.

The problem of the Richelieu, 25-26 June 1940.

The Richelieu which had been landing cadets at Dakar, had sailed with the Fleuret at 1315/25 for an unknown destination. She was shadowed by an aircraft from HMS Hermes until 1700 hours. She was reported to be steering 320° at 18 knots. At 1700 hours the Admiralty ordered HMS Dorsetshire to shadow her, and at 2200 hours HMS Dorsetshire reported herself as being in position 16°40’N, 18°35’W steering 225° at 25 knots, and that she expected to make contact with the Richelieu at midnight. At 2126 hours, the Admiralty ordered the Vice-Admiral aircraft carriers (Vice-Admiral L.V. Wells, CB, DSO, RN) in HMS Ark Royal (Capt. C.S. Holland, RN) to proceed with dispatch to the Canary Islands with HMS Hood (Capt. I.G. Glennie, RN) and five destroyers (actually only four sailed with them; HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.F. de Salis, RN), HMS Fearless (Cdr. K.L. Harkness, RN), HMS Foxhound (Lt.Cdr. G.H. Peters, RN) and HMS Escapade (Cdr. H.R. Graham, RN)). They departed Gibraltar in the morning of the 26th.

Early on the 26th, the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, and the Vice-Admiral, aircraft carriers, that His Majesty’s Government had decided that the Richelieu was to be captured and taken into a British port. They were to take every step to avoid bloodshed and to use no more force then was absolutely necessary. It was understood that the French battleship had H.A. ammunition on board but no main armament ammunition, that forenoon however, the British Liaison Officer Brest reported that she had embarked 15” ammunition before leaving there. HMS Hood was to perform this task if possible but that there were a risk that the Richelieu might get away before her arrival, or if she tried to enter a neutral port such as La Luz in the Canaries, HMS Dorsetshire was to take action. After the capture she was to be taken to Gibraltar. The battleship HMS Resolution (Capt. O. Bevir, RN), which was at Gibraltar, was detailed to intercept the Jean Bart in case she would depart Casablanca and deal with her in the same way.

Vice-Admiral Wells reported that HMS Ark Royal, HMS Hood and their escorting destroyers would pass through position 36°00’N, 06°35’W at 0300/26, steering 225° at 20 knots. HMS Dorsetshire, meanwhile, having seen nothing of the Richelieu by 0015/26, had proceeded to the northwestward, and then at 0230/26 turned to course 030°. At 0530/26 she catapulted her Walrus aircraft to search to the northward, and at 0730 hours it sighted the Richelieu in position 19°27’N, 18°52’W on course 010°, speed 18.5 knots. Eleven minutes later she altered course to 195°. The aircraft proceeded to shadow, but missed HMS Dorsetshire when it tried to return and in the end was forced to land on the sea at 0930 hours about 50 nautical miles to the southward of her. The Dorsetshire which had turned to 190° at 0905 hours was then in position 18°55’N, 17°52’W. She turned to search for her aircraft. Around noon she abandoned the search and steered 245° at 25 knots to intercept the Richelieu, which she correctly assumed to be continuing to the southward. She made contact soon after 1430 hours and at 1456 hours reported that she was shadowing the battleship from astern.

In the meantime the French Admiral at Dakar had informed Vice-Admiral Lyon that the ‘Admiral Afrique’ had ordered the Richelieu and the Fleuret to return to Dakar. At 1512 hours the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic asked the Admiralty whether, under these circumstances, HMS Dorsetshire was to attempt to capture the Richelieu. He was confident that any interference would antagonise all the local authorities and the French people in general. He also pointed out that His Majesty’s ships at Dakar would be placed in a most difficult position.

At 1630/26, HMS Dorsetshire, reported that she was in position 17°21’N, 18°22’W with the Richelieu within easy visual distance. Relations between the two ships remained cordial. The French ship had not trained her guns when she sighted the Dorsetshire, and she expressed regret that, having no aircraft embarked, she was unable to co-operate in the search for her missing Walrus aircraft but she signalled to Dakar for a French plane to assist. In view of her declared intention to return to Dakar, Capt. Martin took no steps to capture her and at 1700 hours he was ordered by the Admiralty to only shadow the Richelieu. At the same time HMS Hermes left Dakar to search for HMS Dorsetshire’s Walrus.

Shortly after 1900/26, the Admiralty ordered Ark Royal, HMS Hood and their four escorting destroyers to return to Gibraltar. At 2015 hours, the Admiralty ordered HMS Dorsetshire to cease shadowing the Richelieu and to search for her missing Walrus. On receipt of these orders she parted company with the Richelieu and Fleuret at 2300/26, being then some 70 nautical miles from Dakar. HMS Dorsetshire then proceeded to the north-north-eastward at 23 knots.

At first light on the 27th, HMS Hermes, then some 30 nautical miles to the southward, flew off seven aircraft to assist in the search. It was however HMS Dorsetshire herself which eventually found and recovered her aircraft at 1107/27. Meanwhile the Richelieu had arrived off Dakar at 0900/27 but did not enter the port. Shortly afterwards she made off the the north yet again. HMS Hermes then steered to the northward to be in a position to intercept if needed. Nothing was seen of the Richelieu until she was again located off Dakar at 0500/28. HMS Hermes, by that time about 400 nautical miles north of Dakar, was ordered to proceed southwards and return to Dakar.

The Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, at Dakar 26-29 June 1940.

While these movements were going on at sea, the position at Dakar was steadily deteriorating. At about 1830/26, the Commander-in-Chief had reported to the Admiralty that the French Admiral at Dakar had informed him, on Admiral Darlan’s instructions, that the presence of British warships at Dakar was in contrary to the terms of the Franco-German armistice. At 1700/26 (zone -1) however, the Admiralty had signalled to the Commander-in-Chief that, as the French codes were compromised, that French authorities could no longer be sure that orders came from Admiral Darlan but Admiral Plancon refused to question the authenticity of any signal he received. During the night the appointment of the British Liaison Officer at Dakar was terminated.

At 0500/27 the Richelieu was seen approaching Dakar, but 25 minutes later she turned to seaward again and the Commander-in-Chief ordered a Walrus aircraft from HMS Albatros to shadow her. That afternoon he informed the Admiralty that the Richelieu had put to sea to escort five French armed merchant cruisers [according to another source these were the armed merchant cruisers (four in number and not five) El D’Jezair, El Kantara, El Mansour, Ville d’Oran and the large destroyers Milan and Epervier which came from Brest] to Dakar. The Admiralty was clearly anxious that the Richelieu should not escape and at 0021/28, they ordered Vice-Admiral Wells with HMS Ark Royal, HMS Hood escorted by four destroyers (HMS Faulknor, HMS Fearless, HMS Foxhound and HMS Vidette (Cdr.(Retd.) D.R. Brocklebank, RN) to proceed to the Canaries to intercept her if she continued to steam to the northward. These ships (with HMS Escapade instead of HMS Vidette) had only returned to Gibraltar late the previous evening from their first sortie to intercept the Richelieu. Now they left again around 0600/28 but were quickly ordered to return to Gibraltar and were back in port around noon.

Around 0500/28 HMS Dorsetshire, proceeding back towards Dakar after having picked up her lost aircraft encountered the Richelieu about 10 nautical miles north of Dakar. Admiral Wells was then ordered by the Admiralty to return to Gibraltar. The rapid deterioration of the situation in West Africa is clearly shown in a series of signals which passed between the Commander-in-Chief South Atlantic and the Admiralty on 28 June. At 1100 hours, the Commander-in-Chief signalled that the French had refused HMS Dorsetshire permission to enter Dakar and that she was therefore proceeding to Freetown with all dispatch to fuel and return to the Dakar area as soon as possible. HMS Dorsetshire arrived at Freetown at 0545/29. At 1415/28 the Commander-in-Chief informed the Admiralty that the French Admiral at Dakar had issued orders to prevent H.M. ships from communicating with, or receiving stores, from the shore. In reply he had told the French Admiral that HMS Hermes would enter Dakar on the 29th to embark aircraft stores and fuel, and that he himself would sail from there in HMS Albatros after seeing the commanding officer of HMS Hermes. At 1515/28 the Commander-in-Chief informed the Admiralty of the steps he would take in case the Richelieu would proceed to sea again. The Admiralty then issued orders that Dakar was to be watched by an 8” cruiser within sight of the French port by dayand within three miles by night. HMS Hermes was to remain off Dakar until relieved by HMS Dorsetshire after this ship had returned from fueling at Freetown.

HMS Hermes arrived at Dakar at 0900/29. During the day she embarked Fleet Air Arm personnel and stores which had been landed there earlier. She then completed with fuel and sailed at 1800/29. She then patrolled off Dakar until she was relieved by HMS Dorsetshire at 1800/30. The Commander-in-Chief had sailed from Dakar in HMS Albatros at 1030/29. He arrived at Freetown at 1800/30 and transferred his flag to the accommodation ship Edinburgh Castle.

Deterioration of Franco-British relations, 1 – 3 July 1940.

The first few days of July saw a swift deterioration of Franco-British relations everywhere. The paramount importance of keeping the French fleet out of the hands of the enemy forced the British Government to take steps. According to the armistice terms the French fleet had to assemble at ports under German or Italian control and be demilitarized. To the Government it was clear that this would mean that the French ships would be brought into action against us. The Government therefore decided to offer the French naval commanders the following options; - to continue the fight against the Axis, to completely immobilization in certain ports or to demilitarize or sink their ships.

Already a powerful squadron, known as ‘Force H’ had been assembled at Gibraltar, in order to fill the strategic naval vacuum in the Western Mediterranean caused by the defection of the French fleet, and on 30 June Vice-Admiral J.F. Somerville hoisted his flag in HMS Hood. His first task was to present the British alternatives to the Admiral commanding the French ships at Oran, failing the acceptance of one of them, he was to use force.

To return to West-Africa, HMS Hermes reached Freetown with the Fleet Air Arm passengers and stores from Dakar on 2 July. Early that afternoon the Commander-in-Chief asked the Consul General at Dakar to obtain, if possible, assurance from the French Admiral there that if British warships were not allowed to use Dakar, enemy men-of-war should also be forbidden to use it. At 1915/2, the ex-British Liaison Officer, who had not yet left Dakar, reported the arrival of a British merchant ship which had not been diverted. He also reported that the French ships Katiola and Potiers might be sailing for Casablanca, escorted by armed merchant cruisers and destroyers. The Admiralty however ordered HMS Dorsetshire, which was maintaining the watch on Dakar, to take no action. At 2310/2 the Commander-in-Chief asked the Consul-General whether there was any chance of the Polish and Belgian bullion which was in the armed merchant cruiser Victor Schoelcher being transferred to either the Katiola or Potiers. He received no reply, and the continued silence of the British Consul led him to believe that the Consul’s signals were either being held up or mutilated.

Next forenoon, 3 July, the Commander-in-Chief informed the Admiralty that he intended to divert all British shipping in the South Atlantic from all French ports. Early that morning Vice-Admiral Somerville’s Force H had arrived off Oran. For the next ten hours strenuous efforts were made to persuade the French Admiral to accept one of the British alternatives, but without success. At 1554 hours (zone -1) Force H sadly opened fire on the ships of their former ally at Mers-el-Kebir, inflicting heavy damage and grievous loss of life. None could predict the result of these measures on the Franco-British relations, but it was sure they would not be improved.

During the afternoon of July 3rd the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, on Admiralty instructions, directed all British Naval Control Officers and Consular Shipping Advisers to order all Biritsh and Allied ships to leave French ports as soon as possible, if necessary disregarding French instructions. All British warships in French ports were to remain at short notice and to prepared for every eventuality. The only warship in a French port within the limits of the South Atlantic Station at the time was HMS Bulolo, which was at Manoka in the Cameroons. At 2048 hours (B.S.T.) the Admiralty ordered all British warships in French ports to proceed to sea and at 2223 hours the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic ordered HMS Bulolo to proceed to Lagos, where she was to remain with HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) until further orders.

HMS Dorsetshire off Dakar, 3-7 July 1940.

Meanwhile HMS Dorsetshire had continued her watch off Dakar. On 3 July 1940 there were sixteen French warships and seven auxiliaries in the harbour. This number included the battleship Richelieu, the large destroyers Fleuret, Milan, Epervier, the armed merchant cruisers El D’Jezair, El Kantara, El Mansour, Ville d’Oran, Ville d’Alger, Victor Schoelcher and Charles Plumier, the colonial sloop Bougainville, the submarines Le Heros and Le Glorieux. At 0917/3 the Admiralty asked the Commander-in-Chief for the Richelieu’s berth at Dakar. HMS Dorsetshire informed him that at 1125/3 she was in position 045°, Cape Manuel lighthouse, 2.6 nautical miles, ships head 230°. Captain Martin seems to have drawn his own conclusions from this question and at 1350 hours he signalled to the the Commander-in-Chief his opinion that the Richelieu’s propellers could be severely damaged by depth charges dropped from a fast motor dinghy, and he asked permission to carry out such an attack about 2300 hours that night. Vice-Admiral Lyon replied that he had no instructions from the Admiralty to take offensive action against the Richelieu. At 1625 hours, however, the Admiralty ordered HMS Dorsetshire to get ready, but to await approval before actually carrying out an attack. This was followed at 1745 hours by a signal that the proposed attack was not approved as it was feared to be ineffective and for the time being the idea was ‘shelved’. [More on this idea later on.]

At 1904/3, the Admiralty ordered HMS Hermes to leave Freetown with all despatch to join HMS Dorsetshire off Dakar at 0500/5. At 2112/3 the Admiralty ordered HMS Dorsetshire to shadow the Richelieu if she sailed and proceeded northwards. If the vessel however made for the French West Indies, the Dorsetshire was to make every effort to destroy her by torpedo attack, and, if that failed, by ramming [ !!! ]. Late that evening the French Government decreed that all British ships and aircraft were forbidden, under penalty of being fired upon without warning, to approach within 20 nautical miles of French territory at home or overseas. Just before midnight the Admiralty gave orders that HMAS Australia (Capt. R.R. Stewart, RN), after refueling at Freetown, was to join HMS Dorsetshire off Dakar. At 0926/4, the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic ordered HMS Hermes and HMAS Australia to rendez-vous with HMS Dorsetshire 21 nautical miles from Dakar instead of the 15 nautical miles previously arranged and at 1037 hours he informed all three ships that as the French Air Force and submarines had orders to attack British ships off Casablanca and Dakar. He therefore issued orders that French aircraft and submarines were to be attacked and destroyed on sight. During that afternoon the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that, as an alternative to the German demands, French warships might proceed to the West Indies. At 2041 hours the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic asked whether, in view of this, the Admiralty intended that the Richelieu should be attacked if she was to proceed to the West Indies. Before this message was received, a signal was sent at 2050 hours cancelling the orders for the Richelieu’s destruction and at about midnight the Admiralty directed that she should be shadowed only.

Early on the 5th the Consul-General at Dakar reported that the merchant vessel Argyll with Commander J. Rushbrooke, RN, the ex-British Naval Liaison Officer, Dakar and his staff onboard, had, in accordance with instructions from the French authorities left Dakar the previous day but that she was recalled on reaching the outer boom, an order which had led the Consul-General to make a protest. Soon after midnight 4/5 July orders were received from the Admiralty that the sloop HMS Milford (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) should be sent to join the patrol off Dakar to provide A/S protection. She left Freetown for Dakar at 1000/5.

At 0723/5, in view of the French order forbidding the approach of British vessels and aircraft within 20 nautical miles from French territory at home and overseas, the Commander-in-Chief ordered his ships off Dakar not to approach within 20 nautical miles of the shore and replied in the affirmative when HMS Dorsetshire asked whether this rule also applied by night. During the afternoon he informed his command that French warships was orders not to attack the British unless they were within these 20 nautical miles. He later added that also submarines had the same orders.

At 1853/5, the Commander-in-Chief ordered HMS Dorsetshire, HMAS Australia, HMS Hermes and HMS Milford not to attack French submarines outside the 20 mile zone unless they were obviously hostile. An Admiralty report then came in the the Richelieu was reported to have put to sea but HMS Dorsetshire quickly contradicted that report.

Dispositions off Dakar at 0300 on 7 July 1940.

At 0300/7, two of the British warships off Dakar which were under the command of Capt. Martin (being the senior officer) were patrolling of Dakar (HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Hermes). The third ship (HMAS Australia) was patrolling about 35 to 40 nautical miles further to the north. The fourth ship HMS Milford was approaching Dakar from the south. At 0307 hours a signal from the Admiralty was received which gave a completely different complexion to their operations.

More on this in the event for 7 July 1940,
The attack on the Richelieu..
This event can be found on the pages of the ships involved; HMS Hermes, HMS Dorsetshire, HMAS Australia and HMS Milford. (16)

22 Jun 1940
After some repairs had been made, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN), departed Durban for Capetown. She was escorting the troopships Orion (British, 23371 GRT, built 1935) and Reina del Pacifico (17702 GRT, built 1931). (14)

25 Jun 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) and the troopships Orion (British, 23371 GRT, built 1935) and Reina del Pacifico (17702 GRT, built 1931). arrived at Capetown from Durban.

HMS Dragon departed Capetown for Simonstown later the same day. (14)

26 Jun 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Simonstown from Capetown. She departed for Walvis Bay later the same day. (14)

28 Jun 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived Walvis Bay from Simonstown. (14)

29 Jun 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Walvis Bay for Lagos. (14)

3 Jul 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Lagos from Walvis Bay. (17)

4 Jul 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Lagos for Santa Isabel, Fernando Poo (now Malabo, Equatoriaal-Guinea, on the Island of Bioko). Here she was to evacuate British Indian subjects which she did the following day. She then sailed for Manoka arriving there on the 6th. (17)

7 Jul 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) proceeded from Manoka to Douala. (17)

9 Jul 1940
On 9 July 1940, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN), at Douala, reported that the French Naval Officer in Charge and the Military Commandant had received orders from Dakar to attack all British Men of War without warning within 20 miles of the coast. Both French Autorities stated that these orders would be disregarded. The Governor stated that he would support the British, disobey Dakar and requisted HMS Dragon to remain at Douala. The requist was granted the following day. (18)

24 Jul 1940

Convoy RS 5.

This convoy departed Liverpool on 24 July 1940 for Suez.

It was made up of the troopship Reina del Pacifico (17702 GRT, built 1931) and the transport Clan Ferguson (7347 GRT, built 1938).

On departure from Liverpool the convoy was escorted by the destroyers HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St.J. Morgan, RN) and HMS Hotspur (Cdr. H.F.H Layman, DSO, RN).

Also on the 24th the aircraft carrier HMS Argus (Capt. H.C. Bovell, RN), armed merchant cruiser HMS Maloja (A/Capt. V. Hammersley-Heenan, RN) and the destroyers HMS Greyhound (Cdr. W.R. Marshall A'Deane, DSC, RN) and HMS Gallant (Lt.Cdr. C.P.F. Brown, RN) departed Greenock. They made rendezvous with the ships coming from Liverpool around 0600A/25.

At 1000A/26, HMS Argus and the destroyers parted company to proceed direct to Gibraltar. They arrived at Gibraltar around 0700A/30.

The convoy, escorted by HMS Maloja, continued on towards Freetown where it arrived on 4 August 1940.

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The then convoy departed Freetown on 5 August 1940 for Capetown.

On departure from Freetown the convoy was now escorted by the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN).

Around 1200Z/11, the light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) joined the convoy. HMS Hermes then parted company to proceed independently on patrol and then on to Simonstown.

The convoy arrived at Capetown on 15 August 1940.

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The convoy, still in the same composition and still escorted by HMS Dragon departed Capetown for Durban on 16 August 1940.

The convoy arrived at Durban on 19 August 1940.

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The convoy departed Durban for Aden on 21 August 1940 now escorted by the armed merchant cruiser HMS Carthage (Capt.(Retd.) B.O. Bell-Salter, RN).

Around 1500C/30, the destroyer HMS Kingston (Lt.Cdr. P. Somerville, DSO, RN) joined.

The convoy arrived at Aden in the morning of 31 August 1940.

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The convoy departed Aden for Suez on 31 August 1940 now escorted by the light cruiser HMAS Hobart (Capt. H.L. Howden, RAN) and the destroyer HMS Kandahar (Cdr. W.G.A. Robson, RN). The armed boarding vessel HMS Chakdina (Lt.Cdr. W.R. Hickey, RNR) was also with the convoy for a while.

At 1830C/2, the Reina del Pacifico parted company with the convoy to proceed ahead to Suez where she arrived on 4 September 1940.

At 1920C/2, HMS Kandahar parted company with the convoy to proceed to Port Sudan to fuel.

At 0910C/3, the sloop HMS Grimsby (Cdr. K.J. D'Arcy, RN) took over the escort of the Clan Ferguson from HMAS Hobart which in turn took over HMS Grimsby's southbound convoy.

HMS Grimsby and the Clan Ferguson arrived at Suez on 5 September 1940. (19)

28 Jul 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Douala for Lagos. The political situation in the French Cameroons was still not stable though. (17)

29 Jul 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Lagos from Douala. (17)

3 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Lagos to search for the Vichy French transport Touareg (5135 GRT, built 1924) that had been reported to be underway from Dakar to Douala. (20)

8 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Lobito to fuel. The search for the Vichy French transport Touareg (5135 GRT, built 1924) that had been reported to be underway from Dakar to Douala had been uneventful as the French ship had put into Abidjan. (20)

9 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Lobito to make rendezvous with convoy RS 5.

For more info on this convoy see the event ' Convoy RS 5 ' for 24 July 1940.] (21)

15 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Capetown escorting convoy RS 5. (21)

16 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Capetown escorting convoy RS 5.

For more info on this convoy see the event ' Convoy RS 5 ' for 24 July 1940.] (21)

19 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Durban escorting convoy RS 5. (21)

20 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) departed Durban for Capetown. (21)

23 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.G. Bowes-Lyon, MVO, RN) arrived at Capetown from Durban. She is immediately docked. (21)

28 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) is undocked. (21)

28 Aug 1940

Operation Menace, the attack on Dakar, 23-24 September 1940.

Part I, initial movements of the Allied naval forces

The actual attack on Dakar took place on 23 and 24 September 1940 but preparations off course started earlier.

28 August 1940.

The battleship HMS Barham (Capt G.C. Cooke, RN) departed Scapa Flow for Gibraltar. She was escorted by HMS Inglefield (Capt. P. Todd, DSO, RN), HMS Eclipse (Lt.Cdr. I.T. Clark, RN) and HMS Escapade (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN). They were joined at sea by HMS Echo (Cdr. S.H.K. Spurgeon, DSO, RAN) which sailed later.

29 August 1940.

The transports Anadyr (British, 5321 GRT, built 1930), Casamance (French, 5817 GRT, built 1921), Fort Lamy (British, 5242 GRT, built 1919), Nevada (French, 5693 GRT, built 1918) and the tanker Ocean Coast (British, 1173 GRT, built 1935) split off in position 54’N, 18’W from convoy OB 204 (which had departed from the British east coast on 26/27 August) to proceed to Dakar. When they split off their escort towards Dakar were the Free French sloop Savorgnan de Brazza and the Free French A/S trawler President Houduce.

31 August 1940.

On this day three groups of ships departed from British ports.

From Scapa Flow the following ships sailed; troopships Ettrick (British, 11279 GRT, built 1938), Kenya (British, 9890 GRT, built 1938) and Sobieski (Polish, 11030 GRT, built 1939). These were escorted by the light cruiser HMS Fiji (Capt. W.G. Benn, RN) and the destroyers HMS Ambuscade (Lt.Cdr. R.A. Fell, RN), HMS Antelope (Lt.Cdr. R.T. White, DSO, RN), HMS Volunteer (Lt.Cdr. N. Lanyon, RN) and HMS Wanderer.

From Liverpool the following ships sailed; troopships Karanja (British, 9891 GRT, built 1931), Pennland (Dutch, 16082 GRT, built 1922) and Westernland (Dutch, 16313 GRT, built 1918) and the transport Belgravian (British, 3136 GRT, built 1937). These were escorted by the destroyers HMS Mackay (Cdr. G.H. Stokes, RN), HMS Vanoc (Lt.Cdr. J.G.W. Deneys, RN) and the corvette HMS Erica (Lt.Cdr. W.C. Riley, RNR).

From the Clyde the following warships sailed; HMS Devonshire (Capt. J.M. Mansfield, DSC, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral J.H.D. Cunningham, CB, MVO, RN, the Commander of the upcoming operation), the destroyer HMS Harvester (Lt.Cdr. M. Thornton, RN) and the French sloops (minesweepers) Commandant Dominé and Commandant Duboc.

All these ships were expected to arrive at Freetown on 13 September where they would be joined by ships coming from Gibraltar and ships that were based at Freetown.

1 September 1940.

The outward passage was initially uneventful and Vice-Admiral Cunningham’s group joined up with the group that came from Liverpool at 0600/1 (zone -1). But that evening misfortune occurred when HMS Fiji was torpedoed by the German submarine U-32 when about 40 nautical miles north-northeast of Rockall in position 58°10’N, 12°55’W. She then returned to the Clyde. Her convoy then continued on escorted by the four destroyers until they met Vice-Admiral Cunningham’s force at 0900/2. The convoy was now known as ‘Convoy MP’. The place of HMS Fiji in the operation was subsequently taken over by the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia (Capt. R.R. Stewart, RN).

2 September 1940.

HMS Barham (Capt G.C. Cooke, RN), HMS Inglefield (Capt. P. Todd, DSO, RN), HMS Echo (Cdr. S.H.K. Spurgeon, DSO, RAN), HMS Eclipse (Lt.Cdr. I.T. Clark, RN) and HMS Escapade (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN) arrived at Gibraltar from Scapa Flow.

The destroyer escort for the MP convoy parted company at 1400/2 and was ordered to join HMS Revenge (Capt. E.R. Archer, RN) which was escorting Canadian troop convoy TC 7 to the Clyde.

Passage of the MP convoy southwards was relatively uneventful except for some submarine alarms and also some engine defects during which speed had to be reduced a bit.

6 September 1940.

HMS Barham (Capt G.C. Cooke, RN), HMS Inglefield (Capt. P. Todd, DSO, RN), HMS Echo (Cdr. S.H.K. Spurgeon, DSO, RAN), HMS Eclipse (Lt.Cdr. I.T. Clark, RN) and HMS Escapade (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN) departed Gibraltar for Freetown in the evening but now accompanied by ships from Force H; the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (Capt. C.S. Holland, RN), battleship HMS Resolution (Capt. O. Bevir, RN) and the destroyers HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.F. de Salis, RN), HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, RN), HMS Foresight (Lt.Cdr. G.T. Lambert, RN), HMS Fortune (Cdr. E.A. Gibbs, DSO, RN), HMS Fury (Lt.Cdr. T.C. Robinson, RN) and HMS Greyhound (Cdr. W.R. Marshall A'Deane, DSO, DSC, RN).

After passing between Madeira and the Canary Islands on the 8th this force, which constituted the major part of the warships involved in the upcoming operation, turned south at 0900/9. By 0800/11 the force was in position 20°18’N, 19°54’W about 1000 nautical miles south of Casablanca.

Vice-Admiral Cunningham in HMS Devonshire was then in position 16°50’N, 22°00’W, about 240 nautical miles to the south-west ward of the main force. He had just sighted the MS convoy (the five transports), escorted by Savorgnan de Brazza, some 300 nautical miles north-west of Dakar. Vice-Admiral Cunningham ordered the convoy Commodore to take the convoy into Freetown.

A signal was then received that Vichy-French warships had passed the Straits of Gibraltar and had turned south. Three light cruisers and three large destroyers were reported to have made up this force. It was not known where they were bound for but possibly Casablanca. Their appearance seriously affected the whole operation.

The Vichy-French cruiser force.

At 1850 hours on 9 September 1940, H.M. Consul General, Tangier, had informed Admiral Sir Dudley North, Flag Officer commanding North Atlantic, and repeated to the Foreign Office, that a French Squadron in the Mediterranean might try to pass through the Strait of Gibraltar within the next 72 hours. This report received confirmation the next day when the French Admiralty requested the British Naval Attaché, Madrid, to advise the Naval authorities at Gibraltar of the departure from Toulon on the 9th of three light cruisers of the Georges Leygues class and three large destroyers of the Fantasque class. They would pass through the Straits of Gibraltar on the morning of the 11th, no mention was made of their destination. This information reached the Admiralty at 2350/10 and Admiral North at 0008/11.

The Government policy with regards to Vichy warships at that time had been defined in a signal sent to all Commanders-in-Chief and Flag Officers commanding shortly after the attack on the battleship Richelieu at Dakar in July. This message, after stressing the importance of terminating the state of tension then existing between the French navy and ourselves, stated that His Majesty’s Government had decided to take no further action in regard to French ships in French colonial and North African ports, and went on to say ‘ We shall, of course, however, reserve the right to take action in regard to French warships proceeding to enemy controlled ports.’ Recent intelligence had indicated that it was highly improbable that any warships would make for the German occupied Biscay ports, and a Admiral North had not been informed of the Dakar project, he saw no reason to take any steps to interfere with the movements of the French warships.

Early on September 11th, the destroyers HMS Hotspur (Cdr. H.F.H. Layman, DSO, RN), HMS Griffin (Lt.Cdr. J. Lee-Barber, DSO, RN) and HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St J. Morgan, RN), which were hunting a reported submarine to the eastward of the Strait of Gibraltar. At 0445 they sighted six French warships steaming fast to the westward and reported them. At 0617/11, Admiral North informed the Admiralty that the lights of six ships, probably warships, steering west at high speed, had been reported by HMS Hotspur at 0515 hours in position 36°03'N, 04°14'W (60 miles east of Gibraltar) and that he had ordered the destroyers to take no further action. At 0711 hours he added that he intended to keep in touch with this force by air and that he would report probable destination.

Meanwhile, Vice-Admiral Somerville, commanding Force H, on receiving the signal from HMS Hotspur had brought HMS Renown (Capt C.E.B. Simeon, RN) and the only destroyer available, HMS Vidette (Lt. E.N. Walmsley, RN), to one hour’s notice for full speed. He did not put to sea because he too, believed the Government’s policy was to avoid interference with French warships as stated in the signal of 12 July.

The French squadron passed Gibraltar to the westward shortly after 0830/11 having given it’s composition in reply to the demand as the light cruisers Georges Leygues, Gloire, Montcalm and the destroyers Le Malin, Le Fantasque and L’Audacieux. This information reached the Admiralty at 1043/11 in a signal sent by Admiral North at 0917/11.

No further action was taken during the forenoon and the situation at noon was that the French Squadron was in position 35°00'N, 06°40'W (about 75 nautical miles south-south-west of Gibraltar) steering 213° at 20 knots. They were being observed by reconnaissance aircraft from RAF 200 Sq. based at Gibraltar. The Admiralty and Air Ministery were being kept informed.

Here was a complication that might well effect the Dakar operation should Dakar be the destination of the French Squadron. It does not seem to have been viewed in this light at the Admiralty, until the 1st Sea Lord himself, who was attending a meeting in the Cabinet Offices that forenoon, telephoned orders for HMS Renown and all available destroyers to raise steam for full speed. A signal to this end was then sent to Admiral Somerville at 1239/11. This was over twelve hours after the original message from Madrid had reached the Admiralty.

Movements of Force H, 11 to 14 September 1940.

The noon position and their course indicated Casablanca as the most probable destination of the French Squadron and at 1347/11 the Admiralty ordered Admiral Somerville to sea to intercept them. Further instructions followed at 1429 hours. These was no objection with them going to Casablanca but they could not be allowed to proceed to Dakar. Shortly after 1600 hours aircraft reported that the French Squadron had entered Casablanca.

Admiral Somerville left Gibraltar at 1630 hours in the Renown escorted by the destroyers HMS Griffin, HMS Velox (Cdr.(Retd.) J.C. Colvill, RN) and HMS Vidette. At 2006 hours he was ordered by the Admiralty to establish a patrol to intercept the French Squadron if they sailed southwards from Casablanca. In the early morning hours of the 12th at 0235 hours, HMS Vidette, encountered a four-funneled French destroyer (this was Milan) in position 33°55'N, 08°31'W (west-north-west of Casablanca). She sighted a darkened ship some 6 miles on her port bow. She challenged but got no reply. A searchlight was turned on and revealed a four-funneled French destroyer. Vidette then fired two salvoes and the French destroyer, ignoring a signal to stop, then retired at high speed behind a smoke screen. Shortly afterwards Vidette was recalled from her patrol and ordered to rejoin Renown.

The French squadron was still at Casablanca at 0923/12 according to an aircraft report. At 0934 hours, Admiral Somerville turned north to meet three more destroyers coming from Gibraltar. These were; HMS Hotspur, HMS Encounter and HMS Wishart (Cdr. E.T. Cooper, RN). These were met at 1300 hours, in position 33°05'N, 09°40'W. They then turned to the south-west again. HMS Hotspur was stationed to patrol closer inshore.

At 0405/13, HMS Renown sighted three darkened ships in position 31°25'N, 11°30'W. These were thought to be the three Fantasque class destroyers. They were steaming north at 20 knots and were allowed to proceed. Admiral Somerville continued his patrol but fuel began to become an issue. The weather was to rough for the destroyers to fill up at sea and two of them will have to be detached that evening to refuel. This would much reduce the chance to intercept the French Squadron and Admiral Somerville informed the Admiralty of this. Adding tat he considered a patrol should be established off Dakar. His signal crossed one from the Admiralty stating that according to French sources the Squadron would remain only shortly at Casablanca before proceeding to Dakar.

This forecast proved correct. At 1530/13 aircraft reported that the light cruisers were no longer at Casablanca. Due to his fuel situation Admiral Somerville signalled that he would leave his patrol area for Gibraltar at 2000 hours that evening. But at 1916 hours the Admiralty ordered him to steer for Dakar at 18 knots. This was being done but Vidette and Velox were detached to Gibraltar to fuel.

At 2335/19 the Admiralty cancelled the order so at 0121/14, Renown and the four remaining destroyers set course to return to Gibraltar which they reached at 2000/14.

Patrol of Dakar by Vice-Admiral Cunningham’s forces.

To return to Vice-Admiral Cunningham. He knew that the French Squadron had left the Mediterranean at 1542/11 and that Vice-Admiral Somerville had been ordered to intercept them. Within a couple of hours he learnt that the French Squadron had entered Casablanca. The next forenoon (0947/12) he was informed that Vice-Admiral Somerville had been ordered to establish a patrol and to prevent them from proceeding to the south.

Vice-Admiral Cunningham’s forces were then approaching Freetown. At 1145/12, an aircraft from HMS Ark Royal approached HMS Devonshire to report that the Ark Royal would be in position 13°59'N, 20°08'W at 1300 hours and expected to arrive at Freetown with HMS Barham, HMS Resolution and ten destroyers at 0700/14. The next morning, 13 September, at 0820 hours an aircraft again closed HMS Devonshire. An order was then passed that four destroyers were to be detached to join HMS Devonshire and the convoy before dark. At 1008 hours HMS Devonshire left the convoy to close Ark Royal’s force, sighing it an hour later 20 nautical miles to the north-north-east. Devonshire remained in visual touch until 1700 hours when course was set to return to the convoy taking the destroyers HMS Faulknor, HMS Foresight, HMS Forester and HMS Fury with him.

Shortly after 1800/13, Vice-Admiral Cunningham was informed that the French cruisers had left Casablanca and that Vice-Admiral Somerville in the Renown had been ordered to proceed to the Dakar area.

Shortly after midnight 13th/14th, a signal came in from the Admiralty ordering Vice-Admiral Cunningham to establish a patrol immediately to prevent the French cruisers from reaching Dakar, employing every available ship. The same orders went to the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic. HMS Cumberland (Capt. G.H.E. Russell, RN), which had departed Freetown for the U.K. at 2000/13 was placed under Vice-Admiral Cunninham’s orders and HMS Cornwall (Capt. C.F. Hammill, RN), on her way from Simonstown to Freetown, was ordered to increase speed.

The original operation was now swallowed up in the task of intercepting the French ships. Time had become a factor of the utmost importance and without waiting for daylight, Vice-Admiral Cunningham and General Irwin, went over to see General de Gaulle on board the Westernland at 0120/14, who immediately roused Capitaine Thierry d’Argenlieu and armed him with a letter forbidding any French warship to proceed to Dakar. Within twenty minutes they were on their way back to the Dorsetshire with Capt. D’Argenlieu and the following measures were taken;

HMAS Australia which was coming from the Clyde to take the place of HMS Fiji was ordered to close HMS Devonshire, which would be steering for Dakar, then 400 nautical miles distant.

The Ark Royal was ordered to sent her six remaining destroyers; HMS Inglefield, HMS Greyhoud, HMS Fortune, HMS Echo, HMS Eclipse and HMS Escapade to Freetown to fuel and herself proceed with despatch to position 16’N, 17°40’W.

HMS Barham and HMS Resolution and the other four destroyers; HMS Faulknor, HMS Foresight, HMS Forester and HMS Fury, were to fuel at Freetown and leave for the Dakar area as soon as fuelling had been completed.

Convoy’s MP and MS were to proceed to Freetown with their French escorts.

HMS Devonshire meanwhile had altered course to the northward for Dakar at 0230/14, speed 18 knots. It was not possible to transfer General Irwin and his staff and the General thus found himself speeding northward with the orders for the landing while his troops went on to Freetown. HMAS Australia joined HMS Devonshire at 0300 hours and half an hour later the cruisers had worked up to 27 knots. HMS Cumberland and HMS Ark Royal were approaching from the south.

At 1000/14, HMS Devonshire and HMAS Australia were 200 nautical miles south of Dakar in position 11°23’N, 17°42’W, with HMS Cumberland and HMS Ark Royal respectively 45 and 100 miles astern of them. Aircraft from Ark Royal carried out reconnaissance ahead of Devonshire and Australia from this time onwards. Also flights over Dakar were carried out. That afternoon a large amount of shipping was reported in the harbour and also a submarine was sighted on the surface at 1533 in position 260°, Cape Manuel, 10 nautical miles, steering 260°. It could not be seen if the French cruisers had arrived at Dakar.

At 1900/14 the Devonshire and Australia, reduced to 17 knots on reaching the latitude of Dakar and then turned back to join Cumberland. She was met at 1940 hours and then the cruisers turned northward once more. They established a patrol line at 2320 hours, 4 miles apart, courses 270°-090°, between the meridians 17°30’W and 18°00W in latitude 16°00’N.

But they were too late. Just before midnight 14/15 September a message was received from the Admiralty that a Vichy report had announced that the cruisers had arrived safely at Dakar. The Vichy cruisers actually had arrived at Dakar at 1600/14.

Dawn air reconnaissance on the 15th failed to spot the cruisers at Dakar and by this time the three heavy cruisers were running low on fuel and at 1001 hours Vice-Admiral Cunningham sent a signal to the Admiralty to ask if he should withdraw to Freetown to refuel and prepare for operation ‘Menace’, leaving HMS Cumberland to patrol off Dakar, or to report the patrol about 0001/17 and accept indefinite delay of operation ‘Menace’. He recommended the first alternative.

At 1027 hours, however, the Ark Royal signalled that the cruisers had been located at Dakar. All ships then set course for Freetown to refuel except HMS Cumberland which was left to patrol off Dakar. The next day, the 16th, she met the Vichy French merchant vessel Poitiers (4185 GRT, built 1921) 100 miles south of Dakar and fired a salvo across her bows. Her crew then set her on fire and abandoned her. She was then sunk by gunfire from the cruiser.

Cancellation of Operation ‘Menace’.

By the evening of 15 September, Vice-Admiral Cunningham’s forces were all making once again for Freetown. A destroyer had been sent on ahead with the operation orders and two staff officers. The escape of the French cruisers, however, called for a drastic re-consideration of the original plan.

In London the War Cabinet met at 1000/16 to consider the new situation. The Prime Minister pointed out that in his view the operation had to be cancelled and at 1346/16, Vice-Admiral Cunningham received a signal that the landing of troops at Dakar in ‘Operation Menace’ was impracticable. It was proposed that General de Gaulle’s force should land at Duala with the object of consolidating his influence in the Cameroons, Equatorial Africa and the Chads. The British portion of the force was to remain at Freetown. Unless de Gaulle had any strong objection, this plan had to be put into operation forthwith.

Vice-Admiral Cunningham and General Irwin were reluctant to take this view. They replied at 1642 hours suggesting that if HMS Cornwall and HMS Cumberland would be added to their force they should be enough to deal with the French cruisers. The answer came at 2245 hours; they were left a liberty to consider the whole situation and discuss it with de Gaulle, whom they informed of the new proposal.

HMS Devonshire arrived at Freetown at 0630/17. The Vice-Admiral and the General proceeded to consult with General de Gaulle. The latter was much perturbed at the possible cancellation of the original plan and that very morning he sent a telegram to the Prime Minister desiring ‘to insist’ that the plan should be carried out and emphasising the vital importance to the Allies of gaining control of the basis in French Africa. He now urged on the Force Commanders that if the unopposed landing failed the Free French troops should attempt a landing at Rufisque. They decided to support this proposal and shortly after midnight they forwarded their recommendations to the Admiralty for consideration. The reply from H.M. Government came at 1159/18;
‘ We cannot judge relative advantages of alternative schemes from here. We give you full authority to go ahead and do what you think is best, in order to give effect to the original purpose of the expedition. Keep us informed.’

With a free hand such as is seldom enjoyed in these days of rapid communication by the leaders of an overseas expedition in unbroken touch with their Government, the Joint Commanders decided to proceed with ‘Menace’ on 22 September.

The French cruisers again, 19 to 26 September 1940.

The naval and military staffs were working hard at preparations for the landing when the next day, 19 September, French cruiser appeared again on the scene. HMAS Australia, which had left Freetown the day before to relieve HMS Cumberland on patrol, at 1019/19 in position 10°23’N, 16°54’W, north-west of Freetown, sighted the three La Galissonniere class cruisers 14 nautical miles off steering south-east. Once more the naval forces had to raise steam with all despatch. HMAS Australia and HMS Cumberland were already had on the trial. General de Gaulle again arranged for Captain Thierry d’Angenlieu to carry a message requisting the French cruisers to return to Casablanca.

General Irwin and his staff, with Admiral Cunningham’s Chief Staff Officer, Capt. P.N. Walter, were transferred to the troopship Karanja, and at 1400 hours HMS Devonshire left Freetown at 27 knots with the destroyers HMS Inglefield, HMS Greyhound and HMS Escapade. It was hoped to sight the French cruisers before dark. HMS Barham with HMS Fortune and HMS Fury made for a position to the south-east of the French. HMS Ark Royal, which had engine trouble to repair first, was to follow at 0500/20. A message came from the Admiralty that the French cruisers were not to return to Dakar.

The French cruisers turned back to the north-west and increased speed to 29 knots. Torrential rain was falling, hiding everything from view, but HMAS Australia and HMS Cumberland were able to keep in touch and at 1830/19 HMAS Australia managed to pass directions not to return to Dakar. She was then in position 09°02’N, 15°14’W, just keeping in touch while doing 31 knots. Then the French cruiser Gloire broke down and separated from the other two cruisers. The British then lost touch with these two cruisers. HMS Devonshire meanwhile was steaming to a position to cut off the way to Conakri in French Guinea. HMS Cumberland then regained touch with the two French cruisers (Georges Leygues (flag) and Montcalm) who were speeding north while HMAS Australia picked up the Gloire which was steering eastwards at reduced speed. Night had fallen when HMS Devonshire with HMS Inglefield still in company showed up. HMS Inglefield took Captain d’Argenlieu on board of the Gloire. The French captain refused to accede to his representations, but when Vice-Admiral Cunningham intervened he agreed to proceed to Casablanca. HMAS Australia escorted her until 21 September, leaving her then, on Admiralty instructions, to proceed unescorted.

HMS Cumberland meanwhile managed to keep in touch with the other two cruisers. Her attempts at parley failed, but the French signalled that ‘under no circumstances shall my cruisers pass under German control’. HMS Cumberland followed them all the way to Dakar but was unable to prevent them from entering, which they did at 0550/20.

Meanwhile, on 18 September, far away to the southward, a fourth French cruiser had been sighted escorting a naval tanker. This was the Primaguet escorting the Tarn. HMS Cornwall had departed Freetown on 16 September to meet HMS Delhi (Capt. A.S. Russell, RN) and HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) off Cape Formosa (south Nigeria). They swept towards Fernando Po [now called Bioko] to intercept any French forces bound for the Cameroons with instructions to direct them back to Casablanca. On 17 September at 2000 hours information came that a French warship and an oiler had been in position 07°25’N, 14°40’W at 1500/15. The Cornwall proceeded to search and on the 18th her aircraft picked up the cruiser Primaguet and oiler Tarn 35 nautical miles ahead. The Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic ordered her to be shadowed.

Her lights were sighted at 2142/18 but disappeared at 0425/19. When dawn broke the horizon was clear. She was picked up again at 1009/19. A boarding party from HMS Delhi went on board. The Captain, after making a formal protest, asked to be allowed to remain stopped until 1700/19 after which she proceeded, first westward, then northward, being shadowed by HMS Cornwall and HMS Delhi until 1830/21 when HMS Delhi had to proceed to Freetown to refuel. HMS Cornwall shadowed her alone untul the 23rd when she was rejoined by HMS Delhi. For two days they followed her close, still steaming north. On the 25th Primaguet fuelled from the Tarn. They were then off the Cape Verde Island. The next day the Admiralty approved the cruisers to return to Freetown. The Primaguet gave a promise that she would proceed to Casablanca with the Tarn where they indeed arrived in due course. The British cruisers then turned south. They had kept the Primaguet and Tarn in sight for five days. Thus two out of the four cruisers in the area had been diverted to Casablanca without the use of force. (16)

29 Aug 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the troopship Franconia (British, 20175 GRT, built 1923) departed Capetown for Durban. (21)

1 Sep 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the troopship Franconia (British, 20175 GRT, built 1923) arrived at Durban from Capetown.

HMS Dragon departed Durban for Simonstown later the same day. (22)

3 Sep 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Simonstown from Durban. (22)

9 Sep 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Simonstown for Lagos. (22)

16 Sep 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Lagos from Simonstown. (22)

17 Sep 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Lagos to patrol off the Cameroons. She was later ordered to make rendezvous at 0700/19 in position 01.55'N, 03.20'W with HMS Cornwall (Capt. C.F. Hammill, RN) and HMS Delhi (Capt. A.S. Russell, RN).

[See also the event ' Operation Menace, the attack on Dakar, 23-24 September 1940, part I, initial movements of the Allied naval forces ' for 28 August 1940.] (23)

20 Sep 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Freetown from patrol. (22)

23 Sep 1940

Operations Menace, the attack on Dakar, 23-24 September 1940.

Part II, the actual attack.

General intentions.

By 20 September the attack force was assembled at Freetown. It was made up of the following warships; battleships HMS Barham (Capt G.C. Cooke, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral J.H.D. Cunningham, CB, MVO, RN), HMS Resolution (Capt. O. Bevir, RN), aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (Capt. C.S. Holland, RN), heavy cruisers HMS Cumberland (Capt. G.H.E. Russell, RN), HMS Cornwall (Capt. C.F. Hammill, RN) (detached), HMAS Australia (Capt. R.R. Stewart, RN), HMS Devonshire (Capt. J.M. Mansfield, DSC, RN), light cruisers HMS Delhi (Capt. A.S. Russell, RN) (detached) and HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), destroyers HMS Echo (Cdr. S.H.K. Spurgeon, DSO, RAN), HMS Eclipse (Lt.Cdr. I.T. Clark, RN) and HMS Escapade (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN), HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.F. de Salis, RN), HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, RN), HMS Foresight (Lt.Cdr. G.T. Lambert, RN), HMS Fortune (Cdr. E.A. Gibbs, DSO, RN), HMS Fury (Lt.Cdr. T.C. Robinson, RN) and HMS Greyhound (Cdr. W.R. Marshall A'Deane, DSO, DSC, RN) and HMS Inglefield (Capt. P. Todd, DSO, RN), sloops HMS Bridgewater (A/Cdr.(Retd.) H.F.G. Leftwich, RN), HMS Milford, Savorgnan de Brazza (Free French, Lt.Cdr. A. Roux), Commandant Dominé (Free French, Lt. J.P.Y. de la Porte des Vaux) and Commandant Duboc (Free French, Lt.Cdr. M.A.F. Bourgine) , auxiliary patrol vessel Président Houduce (Free French, Lt. L. Deschatres) and the net tender HMS Quannet (T/Lt. C.E. Richardson, RNR).

Vice-Admiral Cunningham then transferred his flag from HMS Devonshire to HMS Barham accompanied by General Irwin and his staff. All was ready for the passage to Dakar but at General de Gaulle request the opening day was deferred to 23 September.

The task force would arrive off Dakar at dawn on 23 September. It would patrol in groups while French airmen would take off in aircraft from HMS Ark Royal and land at Ouakam airfield to endeavour to win over the French air force. British aircraft meanwhile would drop proclamations and announcements of the arrival of de Gaulle on the town of Dakar and the forts.

An hour later, Captain d’Argenlieu would land in a motor boat with a communication from General de Gaulle to the Governor requiring a reply within two hours. The Free French sloops carrying de Gaulle’s troops would approach and, if necessary, force the anti-submarine boom. Meanwhile Vice-Admiral Cunningham’s Force with fighter and anti-submarine patrols would lie off the harbour as follows.

Group A) The two French troopships, Pennland and Westernland, ten miles to the south of Cape Manuel.

Group B) HMS Barham, HMS Resolution and the cruisers, two miles to the seaward of group A.

Group C) The four British troopships, two miles to the seaward of Group B.

Group D) The other transports, six miles to the seaward of Group C.

Group E) HMS Ark Royal further to the seaward.

If there appeared to be a good chance of a favourable reception the Free French sloops would land their troops at one of the wharves while the French troopships made for the harbour.

It was hoped that the forts would be reluctant to fire on French ships and as soon as de Gaulle was firmly established the British Force would withdraw. If the forts offered serious resistance General de Gaulle would call on Vice-Admiral Cunningham to quell it with a minimum of force. If it was clear that an organised and continuous resistance would be offered and local authorities refused to parley, the Free French ships would withdraw out of range while the British force broke down resistance and landed troops to capture the town and its defences.

The possible contingencies would be referred to as situation ‘Happy’, ‘Sticky’ or ‘Nasty’ according to events. ‘Happy’ would mean a favourable reception and unopposed landing. ‘Sticky’ would mean resistance of a formal or sporadic nature. ‘Nasty’ would mean serious resistance. HM ships then would move in to engage the forts, and British troops would prepare to land.

Commencement of operations.

The forces left Freetown in three groups;

Group I consisted of the five transports escorted by HMS Bridgewater, HMS Quannet and President Houduce. It had already left Freetown on the 19th of September.

Group II consisted of the French troopships Pennland and Westernland, the food ship Belgravian and the three Free French sloops and also of the British troopships Ettrick, Karanja, Kenya and Sobieski escorted by HMS Devonshire, HMS Faulknor, HMS Forester, HMS Fury and HMS Milford (Capt.(Retd.) S.K. Smyth, RN). This group departed Freetown at 0600/21.

Group III consisted of HMS Barham, HMS Resolution, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Inglefield, HMS Greyhound, HMS Foresight, HMS Fortune, HMS Echo and HMS Escapade. This group departed Freetown at 0900/21. Early the next day this group was joined by HMS Cumberland, HMAS Australia and HMS Dragon.

The weather was fine and the sea was calm. Passage north to Dakar was uneventful. Aircraft from the Ark Royal conducted photographic reconnaissance on the 22nd.

At Dakar there were the following French warships; the uncompleted battleship Richelieu, the light cruisers Georges Leygues and Montcalm, the destroyers Le Fantasque, Le Malin, L’Audacieux and Le Hardi, three submarines Ajax, Perseé and Bévéziers (this last one was in dock) and some smaller vessels.

Zero hour for the commencement of the attack was set at 0550/23 and all ships managed to get into their assigned positions at that time. Visibility was however very poor due to mist, and was no more then 3 to 5 nautical miles. The fog was expected to clear during the day but in fact the opposite happened and visibility decreased steadily during the day. The shore was rarely sighted.

During the forenoon, the warships and transports patrolled up and down. Punctually at daybreak (0505 hours), HMS Ark Royal, then some 25 nautical miles from Dakar, flew off five aircraft most of which were manned by Free French flying officers. Two of these aircraft landed safely at Ouakam airfield at 0554 hours. Within 10 minutes a signal was displayed indicating ‘success’. This however proved to be premature. At 0608 hours a third aircraft landed on the airfield. Disembarked her three passengers and then took off without much interference. Two minutes later the ‘success’ signal was removed and a fourth aircraft broke off her attempt to land. Nothing more was heard from the Free French officers that had been landed. Two fighters were then seen to take off and they chased away the three remaining aircraft together with AA fire from the Richelieu and from the battery on Gorée Island. The attempt to win over the airfield had failed.

HMS Barham had sighted the Westernland at 0600 hours and Vice-Admiral Cunningham had sent a message of goodwill to General de Gaulle. The Free French sloop Savorgnan de Brazza was of the boom at 0555 hours and her two motor boats, with Captain d’Argenlieu and the Generals other emissaries were on their way to the boom gate at 0605 hours. The gate was open and at 0640 hours they were entering the harbour.

Visibility was poor, and the Savorgnan de Brazza took station of the boom to keep the boats in sight. The emissaries landed and encountered a hot reception. They were fired on and wounded in resisting an attempt to arrest them, but managed to re-embark and withdraw under fire. A blank round was fired at the Savorgnan de Brazza at 0745 hours followed by three salvoes, which fell astern. Just then the motor boats were sighted and at 0750 hours Captain d’Argenlieu sent a signal that he had met serious resistance. This reached Vice-Admiral Cunningham at 0807 hours. The other French sloops were to be at the boom at 0905 hours to pass it (or force it if needed) and land their troops. If the reception had been favourable the French troopships were then to enter the harbour to disembark the main body of troops. The Commandant Dominé and Commandant Duboc were actually at the boom at 0805 hours, one hour early. They encountered no opposition until they approached the mole. They were taken under fire with heavy machine guns and were ordered to stop. The Richelieu fired a blank round and then opened fire with small guns. Both sloops then turned for the gate under the cover of a smoke screen. Also the guns from the Gorée Island battery were joining in. At 0820 hours the Commandant Dominé and Commandant Duboc were sighted by the Savorgnan de Brazza which was intended to lead them in at 0905 hours. The sloops had not expected such a hostile reception and retired on the British Fleet which was sighted a 0900 hours.

Meanwhile HMS Barham at 0706 hours had turned north-north-west towards the land, and at 0740 hours Cape Manuel was in sight some 5 nautical miles away. At 0827 hours, with the land still just visible from HMS Barham Vice-Admiral Cunningham asked General de Gaulle whether he wished the British ships to close the shore and show themselves at the risk of being fired on. Five minutes later came the signal ‘proposals rejected’. At 0840 hours General de Gaulle signalled that the Richelieu and Gorée Island guns had been firing and that he had ordered his own ships to make a determined effort; if they failed he suggested that the Vice-Admiral should show himself of Dakar. Just then, one minute later, came the signal from the Savorgnan de Brazza confirming the emissary’s proposals had been rejected.

Situation deteriorates.

It was clear by this time an unfavourable situation was rapidly developing. General de Gaulle’s proposals to the Governor had been rejected and two of his emissaries had been seriously wounded, his sloops had been fired upon and the Vichy French ships in the harbour were raising steam. In spite of these manifest tokens of hostility the General apparently still hoped for a peaceful solution. At 0905 hours, however, Vice-Admiral Cunningham warned his force that the situation was developing towards ‘Sticky’.

Valuable and comprehensive reports were coming in from the British aircraft reconnoitring Dakar. Although these aircraft were fired on by all the French ships in the harbour and by machine guns on the jetty, Vice-Admiral Cunningham gave orders that a French flying boat over the fleet should not be attaked, for there still seemed to be hopeful signs that the French air force might join de Gaulle. At 0948 hours a signal arrived from HMS Ark Royal to say that one of the Gloire class cruisers had slipped. The Vice-Admiral at once instructed HMS Foresight, the northern destroyer of the anti-submarine screen, to order any French cruiser sighted to return to harbour. At 1005 hours, however, the shore batteries opened fire on HMS Foresight and the Vice-Admiral ordered her to withdraw following this with a signal to HMS Ark Royal to stand by with six aircraft to bomb Gorée Island. He also warned the French Admiral that if the fire were continued he would regretfully be compelled to return it. The French Admiral replied that if Vice-Admiral Cunningham did not wish him to fire he should remove himself more then 20 nautical miles from Dakar. Meanwhile the force had turned westwards at 1016 hours. Two minutes later Vice-Admiral Cunningham detached HMAS Australia to examine a ship reported to the north. At 1025 hours, HMAS Australia, identified two Le Fantasque class destroyers steering westwards and ordered them to return to harbour, backing up this order with a warning shot. They at once turned back and the Australia then resumed her place in line after having been fired upon by shore guns.

At 1030 hours, two La Galissonnière class cruisers were reported leaving Dakar and Vice-Admiral Cunningham at once informed the French that if their ships left the harbour he would use force to compel their return. Two French submarines were also reported to be underway and at 1050 hours Vice-Admiral Cunningham warned the French Admiral that if they left Dakar harbour he would attack them. One minute later a report came in that the submarines were passing the entrance and when a torpedo missed HMS Foresight Vice-Admiral Cunningham cancelled the order for HMS Ark Royal to bomb Gorée Island but to bomb the submarines instead. At the same time he detached HMS Inglefield and HMS Foresight to attack them and he also turned the remained of the force to close Gorée Island to support them. Almost immediately HMS Foresight came under fire and at 1051 hours she was hit forward by a shell. Thus the actual first hit was made by the French.

By 1100 hours the whole force was under fire from the guns at Cape Manuel. HMS Inglefield reported also being missed by a torpedo. Two minutes later HMS Inglefield and HMS Foresight were were engaging one of the submarines (the Perseé) on the surface to the north-westward. Events followed rapidly. HMS Inglefield was hit by a shore battery. By 1104 hours the submarine was sighted on the Barham’s port bow. She was engaged by the 6” guns from HMS Barham, HMS Resolution and HMS Dragon. She was badly hit and soon abandoned by her crew, finally sinking at 1137 hours in position 065°, Cape Manuel lighthouse, 2740 yards. Simultaneously HMS Barham fired five 15” gun salvoes at the Cape Manuel battery but accordingly to a subsequent French broadcast they caused heavy civilian casualties ashore.

When the force turned back to the south-westwards at 1107 hours, HMS Inglefield was again hit aft by a shore battery. With HMS Foresight she engaged the second submarine (the Ajax) which at once made for the harbour entrance, and Vice-Admiral Cunningham, still hoping for a peaceful solution, and in accordance with the agreement to use no more force then necessary to overcome sporadic resistance, ordered the force to cease fire.

At 1119 hours however, HMS Dragon, ordered to attack the second submarine, came under fire from the guns at Cape Manuel. The whole force at once turned west but though the land was barely visible through the mist, HMS Foresight and HMS Cumberland, which were close to HMS Barham were hit almost immediately by the shore guns. The damage to HMS Cumberland was serious. She was struck by what was thought to be an 11.2” shell (actually it was a 9.4” shell) just above the armour belt on the port side. The engine rooms became temporary untendable and she was forced to withdraw to Bathurst, taking no further part in the operation. Nothing further was to be gained by remaining close inshore and at 1135 hours the force turned to the southward.

At 1154 hours a signal from the High Commissioner, French West Africa was received stating ‘We confirm that we will oppose all landings, you have taken the initiative in causing French blood to flow’. The situation at noon was thus far from hopeful but it was decided a final attempt to land the Free French troops at Rufisque would be undertaken (operation ‘Charles’).

Situation ‘Sticky’.

Operation ‘Charles’ was to be a final attempt for a peaceful landing of the Free French troops at Rufisque Bay before beginning a systematic reduction of the Dakar defences as a preliminary to a British landing.

It was considered essential in this plan to maintain the French character of the landing as far as possible; the Free French transports were to be accompanied as far as possible by their own warships, and by two British destroyers only, HMS Inglefield and HMS Forester, which would lead them in and, if necessary, provide flanking fire.

At 1158 hours, Vice-Admiral Cunningham signalled to de Gaulle, ‘what about operation ‘Charles’ now ?’. The General replied at 1212 hours that he desired to to ahead with operation ‘Charles’ but that he required the latest reports. He was then given the latest aircraft reports, which showed no surface ships outside the boom. A zero hour for ‘Charles’ was then set at 1530 hours if the Generals ships could reach Rufisque Bay in time. A signal was sent to the entire force that the situation was now ‘Sticky’.

General de Gaulle then asked Vice-Admiral Cunningham what opposition might be expected from shore batteries and the Vice-Admiral replied that the bad visibility would help the forces taking part in ‘Operation Charles’. At 1335 hours HMS Barham proceeded westwards to endeavour to locate the General’s flagship the Westernland but she could not be found. HMS Barham then spent three hours searching for her in the mist.

A baffling phase of uncertainty followed. In the thick weather which precluded visual signalling between Barham and Westernland radio telephony and wireless communication between Vice-Admiral Cunningham and General de Gaulle, though at first satisfactory, deteriorated progressively during the afternoon. This was due to jamming of radio telephony by a heavy traffic of military signals between the Westernland herself and the Free French sloops. At the root of the trouble was the fact that General de Gaulle was in a separate ship. Everything possible had been done to improvise additional lines of communication, but these proved inadequate to meet the situation. For some three hours that afternoon all contact was lost with General de Gaulle and the French transports.

At 1358 hours Vice-Admiral Cunningham informed the Admiralty that de Gaulle was attempting a landing but at 1445 hours a signal was received from de Gaulle to say that he was awaiting instructions to which the Vice-Admiral replied at 1504 hours ‘carry out Charles, report zero hour’.

But to carry out ‘Charles’, however, HMS Inglefield and HMS Forester had to get in touch with the French transports, and despite repeated calls for their positions no one knew where they were.

An ultimatum was made ready to be sent to the authorities and people of Dakar informing them that failing to accept General de Gaulle proposals, the British fleet would open fire on the fortifications of Dakar. This was misunderstood by General de Gaulle and he thought that the ultimatum had already been delivered so he suspended ‘Operation Charles’. Troops would not be landed by the transports but only a smaller number would be landed by the French sloops. Vice-Admiral Cunningham was only informed about this after two hours.

Meanwhile further complications had arisen. Aircraft reported a French destroyer off Gorée Island (this was the L’Audacieux), threatening the approach to Rufisque Bay. HMAS Australia, HMS Fury and HMS Greyhound were detached at 1608 hours to ward her off. The French destroyer was engaged and set on fire after she had fired two torpedoes at HMAS Australia.

Around 1630 hours HMS Devonshire finally sighted the French transports some 20 nautical miles from Rufisque Bay. This meant that ‘Charles’ could not be completed before dark. These was at least one enemy submarine (possibly two) in the area. In these weather conditions it was not though possible to give sufficient protection to the transports in Rufisque Bay. On these grounds Vice-Admiral Cunningham cancelled ‘Operation Charles’ at 1642 hours.

Two minutes later an air report reached him reporting two La Galissonniere class cruisers three nautical miles north-north-east of Gorée Island which were steering towards Rufisque Bay at 17 knots. Vice-Admiral Cunningham at once turned the battleships towards Rufisque to cover the Westernland and Pennland in case they were still making for it. He held this course until 1710 hours and then altered to the southward to regain contact with the British transports. A signal timed 1635 hours from General de Gaulle that he expected to arrive at 1650 hours, which would be zero hour, reached Vice-Admiral Cunningham at 1720 hours. Actually at that moment the Free French sloops, having parted from the French transports at 1648 hours reached Rufisque Bay. It is not clear how they were missed by the Vichy cruisers, which and air report placed, together with a large destroyer, two nautical miles were of Rufisque at 1740 hours. This was the last air report, for at 1745 hours weather conditions obliged HMS Ark Royal to withdraw all reconnaissance aircraft. It did not reach Vice-Admiral Cunningham until 1835 hours.

Meanwhile at 1805 hours, General de Gaulle’s signal timed 1620 hours had at last arrived and the Vice-Admiral knew that the Free French sloops would probably be attempting a landing. He immediately sent off HMS Inglefield and HMS Forester, which found the Westernland in position 155°, Rufisque Bay, 10 nautical miles at 1835 hours.

Free French sloops at Rufisque, 23 September 1940.

As mentioned previously the Free French sloops parted company with the Westernland and Pennland at 1648 hours some 7.5 nautical miles from Rufisque to carry out ‘their mission’. There seemed to be considerable doubt as to what this mission was. It certainly was not ‘Operation Charles’ as had been intended. The landing party in each sloop consisted of about 60 ‘fusilier marines’, making it about 180 in total. They arrived off Rusfisque at 1720 hours. The Savornan de Brazza, whose draught was greater then the other two, anchored about 500 yards from the shore. The Commandant Dominé and Commandant Duboc pushed in right towards the jetty, and all three lowered their boats. Fire was almost immediately opened on the Commandant Duboc by a 4” gun in a blockhouse at Cap de Biches. She was hit and one officer was killed and three men seriously wounded. Fire was opened by the sloops and the battery was knocked out. The Commandant Duboc then retired behind a smoke screen. Two of the Savorgnan de Brazza’s motor boats towing whalers were making for the beach to the right of the jetty. When within 300 yards from the shore they met with heavy machine gun fire and stopped, while the Commandant Dominé, covering them, opened fire on the shore emplacements, but could not locate them in the failing light and mist. But then at 1758 hours a signal was received from the Westernland cancelling ‘Operation Charles’. The landing parties were then re-embarked and at 1838 hours the three Free French sloops left for their patrol line.

Situation ‘Nasty’.

The day was drawing to a close. All hopes of a friendly reception had been scattered. The ships were lying in a fog off a hostile coast with submarines in the vicinity. Vice-Admiral Cunningham and General Irwin considered landing British forces at Rufisque, but decided against it.

At 1910/23, while the Free French sloops were closing the Westernland and Pennland, Vice-Admiral Cunningham with the ‘battlefleet’; HMS Barham, HMS Resolution and HMS Devonshire, turned west to cover the transports (which were still to the southward) for the night.

Ten minutes before, at 1900 hours, the Vichy French Governor General, M. Pierre Boisson, had in a broadcast stated emphatically that Dakar would not submit. There could be no further hope of a peaceful settlement and at 2052 hours General de Gaulle was asked whether he agreed that the situation was now ‘Nasty’ and to the issue of the ultimatum. The Admiralty had been kept fully informed of the situation and at 2105 hours a personal message from the Prime Minister arrived ‘Having begun we must go on to the end, stop at nothing’.

General de Gaulle reply arrived at 22235 hours, he agreed that the situation was now ‘Nasty’ and that the ultimatum should go out. It was broadcast at 2345 hours in French and English to the Admiral, Governor General and people of Dakar. They had prevented General de Gaulle from landing. Dakar might be seized by the Germans / Italians and the Allies were bound to prevent this. Their forces were approaching. The conditions offered must be accepted by 0600/24 or the guns of the Allies would open fire.

The Governor General’s answer reached Vice-Admiral Cunningham at 0400/24. It was an unqualified refusal; ‘I shall defend Dakar to the end’. There was nothing more to be said. At dawn the battlefleet was approaching the coast to take up their bombardment stations.

The attack on Dakar, the attack opens, 24 September 1940.

HMS Ark Royal had orders to carry out a reconnaissance as early as possible backed up by bombing attacks on the Richelieu, Forts Manual and Gorée, and the two light cruisers lying off Dakar.

Visibility had greatly improved since the previous day and was six nautical miles at 0625 hours when the first striking force of six Skua’s of No. 800 Squadron, loaded with 500 lb. S.A.P. bombs, took off from HMS Ark Royal to attack the cruisers and other suitable targets.

At 0703 hours aircraft reported a destroyer damaged off Rufisque, two cruisers in the roads and three destroyers coming slowly out. It was seven minutes later when the Skuas carried out a high level bombing attack on the Richelieu and one of the destroyers. By this time the battlefleet was on its bombardment course and the Barham’s spotting aircraft was in the air. They were followed by six Swordfish of No. 820 Squadron loaded with G.P. bombs for an attack on the town of Dakar, which was to synchronise with the ships bombardment.

It had been calculated that at 0725 hours the battlefleet would be within 16000 yards of the forts and fire could be opened, but unfortunately when the moment arrived nothing could be seen of them in the prevailing mist. A long range bombardment was clearly impractical, and the fleet turned away temporarily in order to re-dispose the cruisers and destroyers for a short range attack. At the same time HMS Fortune was detached to obtain a shore fix, but she came under accurate fire from the forts and her fix proved unreliable.

The Ark Royal’s first Swordfish striking force was diverted to bomb Cape Manuel. At 0800 hours she despatched another striking force of six Swordfish of No. 810 Squadron loaded with S.A.P. bombs to attack the Richelieu. It was hoped that by the time it attacked the Richelieu the opening of the naval bombardment would provide a diversion, but this did not occur; one Swordfish was shot down and two others failed to return.

A diversion was also provided on the enemy’s side. At 0805 hours HMS Fortune, which had rejoined the battlefleet, reported a submarine contact inside the screen and dropped three depth charges. At 0831 hours the Vichy French submarine Ajax surfaced. She was unable to dive or move and surrendered. Her whole crew was rescued before she sank. The Fortune’s boarding party found six ‘tube ready’ light burning, and it was evidently only the destroyers depth charges that saved the fleet from attack.

The incident still further delayed the bombardment and it was not till 0920 hours, forty minutes after the first Swordfish striking force had attacked the Richelieu with S.A.P. bombs, that Gorée Island was sighted. At 0935 hours the shore batteries opened fire and one minute later the Barham and Resolution replied with their 15” guns, firing on the Richelieu at ranges of 13600 to 15000 yards respectively, while the cruisers HMAS Australia and HMS Devonshire engaged a destroyer of the Le Fantasque class.

The first bombardment.

As soon as the British ships opened fire a French destroyer of the Le Fantasque class steamed south laying a smoke screen to the eastward of the anchorage and Gorée Island. The French cruisers inside the boom to the northward, sheltering amongst the many merchant vessels, also made a smoke screen, which drifted slowly south and, combining with the mist and heavy smoke from the vicinity of the Richelieu, eventually obscured all targets.

Shooting became extreme difficult, for range taking was nearly impossible. There were other serious handicaps. HMS Barham, which was newly commissioned after repairs, had never carried out any bombardment practice. Neither battleship had done any concentration firing, and neither had its customary observer in the air.

After engaging the Richelieu for nine minutes the Resolution’s director training gear failed and she shifted fire to the Cape Manuel battery, on which she probably obtained a hit. The Barham’s aircraft reported several straddles across the Richelieu, which was thought to have been hit. The smoke-laying cruiser was still active, and at 0942 hours the Barham’s 6” guns engaged her without success.

Meanwhile the Devonshire and Australia had engaged and damaged a large destroyer of Rufisque which was subsequently engaged by the Inglefield, Foresight and Forester, and left burning.

The fire encountered by the fleet consisted of occasional one- and two-gun salvoes (yellow splash) from the Richelieu’s 15” guns, salvoes of 9.4” from Cape Manuel (white splash), Gorée Island, and an unseen battery, and a number of smaller rounds from the Richelieu and various shore batteries. The French fire was slow but accurate. By 1010 hours the targets were wholly obscured by smoke, and shortly afterward the fleet withdrew to the southward, leaving the Ark Royal to report the result of the bombardment.

As the fleet made to the south, Vichy Glenn-Martin bombers made high level attacks on it without success, though three bombs fell close to HMAS Australia.

At 1141 hours the Ark Royal reported the results of the bombardment; several near misses with bombs on the Richelieu; one near miss with a bomb on a destroyers; one 15” hit on the Cape Manual battery, which had ceased fire; one 15” hit and repeated straddles on the Richelieu; straddles across the cruisers in Hahn Bay, one of which was set on fire aft. No hits had been obtained on the Gorée Island battery.

The second bombardment.

At 1146 hours relief spotting aircraft for the battleships were ordered and targets for a further bombardment at 1315 hours were allocated as follows; the Barham on Richelieu; the Resolution on Goréé Island; the Devonshire on Cape Manuel; the Australia on the cruisers inside the boom. The spotting aircraft took off from HMS Ark Royal at 1220 hours and as a report reached her about this time that Vichy cruisers and destroyers were proceeding towards Rufisque, a torpedo striking force was got ready to attack them immediately after the second bombardment.

French aircraft were still busy. At 1217 hours a French bomber dropped six bombs close to HMS Barham. It was driven off by Skuas. Shortly afterwards a shadowing cruiser was sighted while the fleet was approaching Gorée Island. She was engaged from 14500 yards by the main armament from HMS Barham and HMS Resolution. She then turned away under a smoke screen. Fire was then checked. At 1248 hours, Vice-Admiral Cunningham ordered the Devonshire and Australia to engage her, but cancelled this order five minutes later when his destroyers, which were coming under an accurate fire from shore batteries, were told to take station on his disengaged side. By an unfortunate mischance the first order – to engage the cruiser – never reached the Devonshire and she interpreted Vice-Admiral Cunningham’s second signal ‘cruisers negative engage’, which referred only to the hostile cruiser, as an order to take no further part in the bombardment. Accordingly at 1300 hours she turned away to the east with HMAS Australia and neither ship took part in the subsequent bombardment.

The bombardment was reopened in the afternoon, at 1300 hours HMS Barham obtained a shore fix and turned north-west on her bombardment course. Five minutes later she engaged the Richelieu bearing 330°, range 17000 yards. HMS Resolution opened fire on Gorée Island from 16000 yards. The batteries at Cape Manuel, which had been reported hit, Gorée Island and Dakar Point at once replied. The Richelieu also opened fire with her 15” guns firing two gun salvoes with fair accuracy. She continued firing until her fire was blanked by the mole.

The French gunfire concentrated on the Barham and was heaviest between 1312 and 1320 hours. At 1315 hours an 9.4” projectile hit the Barham. At 1320 hours she was hit again and two minutes later she was hit twice.

The smoke screen tactics of the forenoon were repeated as soon as the British ships were sighted, and by 1311 hours the targets again became obscured. Although spotting aircraft reported that the Barham was straddling the Richelieu, the salvos appeared to be out for line, and apparently the Vichy French battleship was not being hit. The Resolution did not succeed in silencing the main Gorée Island battery and it is doubtful whether she was being spotted on the correct target. She was straddled by several salvoes of 5.4” and 6” shells from the shore batteries. At 1323 hours the Richelieu ceased fire. A minute later HMS Barham and HMS Resolution broke off the attack and at at 1326 hours the shore batteries also ceased firing.

The results of the bombardment were not encouraging. Despite the expenditure of nearly 400 rounds of 15” ammunition, none of the larger shore batteries had been silenced. The Richelieu was still in action, and the position of several 5.4” batteries, whose fire had proven effective against the destroyers, and would be still more so against the transports, had not even been located.

In spite of the poor visibility the fire of the shore batteries had been remarkably accurate and indicated that their fire was directed by listening devices rather then from forward observation posts, from which the battlefleet would generally had been out of sight. French air action had increased considerably since the previous day and the French will to resist appeared unimpaired. A report from HMS Ark Royal stated that the hostile attitude of the French fighters had made it hazardous for her aircraft to operate in the Dakar harbour area.

The question of a landing in force still remained. In these circumstances Vice-Admiral Cunningham decided to consult General de Gaulle and at 1400 hours the Barham withdrew to the southward to meet the Westernland before dark.

Swordfish aircraft attack the French cruisers.

Then minutes later, at 1410 hours, HMS Ark Royal’s striking force of nine Swordfish aircraft of No. 820 and 810 Squadrons took off while a fighter escort of three Skuas to attack the Vichy-French cruisers proceeding towards Rufisque. At 1440 hours the leader was forced down with engine trouble, his crew being picked up by the destroyer HMS Escapade. At 1500 hours the eight remaining Swordfish Swordfish attacked the two La Galissonnière class cruisers and a destroyer in the bay. In the prevailing haze the attack, which was made from an east-south-easterly direction, took the French by surprise. When the first sub-flight came down just outside the anti-submarine nets the three vessels were barely moving, but they immediately put their helms hard over and turned to port at full speed. The Swordfish claimed hits on one of the cruisers and the destroyer but this seemed to be doubtful. One Swordfish was forced down by AA fire on her way back to the Ark Royal. The crew was rescued by the destroyer HMS Echo.

Conference with General de Gaulle.

HMS Barham stopped at 1615 hours. General de Gaulle then came on board to confer with Vice-Admiral Cunningham and General Irwin. General de Gaulle, though deeply distressed and surprised about the nature of the defences, was still confident that the situation in French West Africa would improve as the power of his movement grew stronger. He explained that in view of the determined opposition encountered, and the probable destructive effects of the bombardment, it was imperative, from the point of view from the French opinion, that he should not be closely connected with the destruction and loss of French life, which had presumably taken place, lest his further utility to the common cause should be hopelessly compromised.

Though he would prefer not to use his troops he was prepared, if really needed, to support a British landing regardless of consequences. He considered, however, that a British landing was no longer feasible, and emphasised that a reverse would be a most serious check to the Allied cause.

He blamed himself for undue optimism in underestimating the possibility of a resolute defence, and suggested that the bombardment should be suspended at his direct request and Dakar so informed; that his forces should go to Bathurst for exercises, with a view of a possible advance upon Dakar over land; that British naval action should be taken to cover his passage and prevent the reinforcement and revictualling of Dakar.

General de Gaulle returned to the Westernland at 1800 hours. The situation was considered by Vice-Admiral Cunningham and General Irwin in the light of these proposals. A Swordfish, which had crashed near the Barham at 1830 hours, reported that one cruiser was beached and burning east of Rufisque, one buring in Gorée Bay, and two detroyers were beached in Hann Bay (this information was subsequently found to be incorrect). It was essential to immobilise the Vichy French cruisers and neutralise the main armament of the French forts before attempting a landing. It was decided that the attack on the defences must be renewed the next day if weather conditions were favourable. General de Gaulle and the Admiralty were informed accordingly and dispositions were made for a landing of British troops at Rufisque, to follow up any success obtained by the bombardment.

Final bombardment. HMS Resolution torpedoed.

The next day, 25 September 1940, broke fine and clear with extreme visibility. The Ark Royal at 1531/24 had proposed bombing Ouakam and Gorée at dawn and at 2348/24 was ordered to do so, but owning to wireless congestion, this was not received until 0200/25 when Captain Holland considered it too late. The targets allocated to the battleships and cruisers were the same as for the second bombardment; spotting aircraft, with fighter protection, were to be in position at 0900/25. At 0530 hours three reconnaissance aircraft took off from the Ark Royal, but by 0700 hours, two had been driven back by French fighter patrols. At 0754 hours, HMS Devonshire sighted a submarine submerging some eight nautical miles to the east of the battlefleet, which was then some 25 nautical miles to the south of Dakar. HMS Forester was at once detached to hunt it, leaving only two destroyers to screen the battlefleet.

At 0803 hours they were ordered to withdraw to the disengaged flank as soon as the shore batteries opened fire. The battleships were then steaming towards Gorée Island ready to open fire, with the cruisers three miles away to the east. HMS Resolution had orders to take independent avoiding action if necessary during the bombardment. At 0857 hours a circular buoy was sighted which HMS Barham fired on, suspecting it to be a sound locating device. One minute later the Richelieu opened fire on HMS Barham from a range of 23000 yards.

At 0901 hours the signal to turn to the bombarding course (050°) was hauled down in HMS Barham. It was not only the British which acted on this signal. Captain Lancelot of the Vichy submarine Bévézièrs was watching the approaching battleships though the periscope. Experience with the Royal Navy before the fall of France had taught him our manoeuvring signals. On seeing ‘Blue 7’ hoised, he waited for it to be hauled down; then fired his torpedoes at the turning point. Thus it came about that as the Resolution was turning, five torpedoes were seen approaching her port beam. Already committed to the turn she could only apply full helm in the hope of turning short and combing the tracks. In this she almost succeeded, for three torpedoes passed ahead and another narrowly missed her astern. The fifth, however, struck her on the port side amidships causing serious flooding, but fortunately no loss of life. HMS Barham avoided the three torpedoes that had missed the Resolution ahead and they passed astern, exploding harmlessly on the bottom.

HMS Resolution, which had developed a list of 12° to port, was still able to steam. At 0905 hours HMS Barham opened fire on the Richelieu from 21000 yards and also the cruisers engaged their targets, HMS Devonshire firing on Cape Manuel and HMAS Australia on the French cruisers inside the boom. Fire from the Richelieu and shore batteries was deliberate and accurate; it was concentrated on HMS Barham and frequently straddled her. The British cruisers were also under heavy fire. HMS Barham was hit once and HMAS Australia twice. HMS Resolution was badly damaged and it was necessary for her to withdraw and at 0912 hours HMS Barham turned to cover her. About this time HMS Foresight reported that she had sunk the French submarine with depth charges (but this was not the case). She and HMS Inglefield were then ordered to cover HMS Resolution with a smoke screen. The two cruisers were recalled. About 0918 hours Vichy French fighters shot down the Australia’s Walrus aircraft. HMS Forester was ordered to try to rescue the crew but she came under heavy fire from shore batteries and had to retire.

At 0921 hours, HMS Barham ceased fire and took station close astern of HMS Resolution with HMS Devonshire and HMAS Australia on each quarter. The Ark Royal was ordered to provide maximum fighter protection, and the battlefleet withdrew to the southward.

HMS Resolution was steaming at 10 knots and between 0940 and 0950 hours two high level bombing attacks were made on her, both of them were unsuccessful. The whole force now steered south-west at the best possible speed and by 1134 hours the flagship, HMS Barham had the whole force in sight.

The Vice-Admiral now had to decide whether to continue the attack on Dakar or to withdraw his force. The chance of capturing Dakar was clearly remote and in the end it was decided to discontinue the attack and to withdraw his force to Freetown without further delay. A signal to this effect was made at 1152 hours.

Withdrawal to Freetown.

Before a signal could be passed to the Admiralty a signal was received from the Prime Minister who was aware of the damage to HMS Resolution. Vice-Admiral Cunningham was ordered to abandon the enterprise against Dakar.

By 2000/25, HMS Barham was about 100 nautical miles south of Dakar steering south at 7 knots. The next day the sea was smooth as the weather was fine. HMS Resolution was taken in tow by HMS Barham. On the 27th the tow parted but was quickly secured again and the battleships were able to continue southwards at 6 knots.

HMS Cumberland rejoined the force having effected temporary repairs at Bathurst. HMS Cornwall and HMS Delhi had also joined after having chased the French cruiser Primaguet and the tanker Tarn.

At 0550/29, HMS Barham passed the boom at Freetown followed by the rest of the force. So ended a difficult operation. No British warship had been sunk but several had been damaged. HMS Cumberland was out of action for 13 days and HMS Fiji for six months. HMS Resolution was temporarily patched up at Freetown but was not fully operational. She returned to England six months later but was then sent on to the U.S.A. for full repairs. It was a full year later before she was again ready for active service. Five more ships HMS Barham, HMAS Australia, HMS Dragon, HMS Inglefield and HMS Foresight were also damaged but their fighting efficiency was not seriously impaired. (16)

27 Sep 1940
Around 0530N/27, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), arrived at Freetown from operartions of Dakar. She arrived escorting the troopships Ettrick (British, 11279 GRT, built 1938), Karanja (British, 9891 GRT, built 1931), Kenya (British, 9890 GRT, built 1938) and Sobieski (Polish, 11030 GRT, built 1939). (23)

2 Oct 1940

Landing of Free French troops in the French Cameroons.

Around 1740N/2, the troopships Pennland (Dutch, 16082 GRT, built 1922) and Westernland (Dutch, 16313 GRT, built 1918) departed Freetown for either Ambas Bay or the Cameroons River estuary. They were escorted by the heavy cruiser HMS Devonshire (Capt. J.M. Mansfield, DSC, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral J.H.D. Cunningham, CB, MVO, RN), destroyers HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.F. de Salis, RN), HMS Foresight (Lt.Cdr. G.T. Lambert, RN), HMS Fury (Lt.Cdr. T.C. Robinson, RN) and the sloops FFS Commandant Dominé and FFS Commandant Duboc.

Around 0001N/3, the sloop Savorgnan de Brazza departed Freetown to join the troop transport convoy. She had been delayed with engine defects. She only joined after the convoy arrival at Ambas Bay, arriving there at 1130A/7. She arrived with defects, which also required the ship to be docked for repairs.

Around 1100N/3, the destroyer HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, RN) departed Freetown to joined the troop transport convoy. She joined around 1200Z/5. HMS Foresight was detached at 1430Z/5 to return to Freetown with correspondence.

At 0910N/4, FFS Commandant Duboc was detached to Lagos to embark General De Gaulle and then rejoin the convoy. She rejoined the convoy after its arrival at Ambas Bay arriving there at 1300A/7.

At 2100Z/5, HMS Forester was detached to fuel at Lagos and to proceed to Ambas Bay on completion where she arrived at 1000A/7.

The troop transport convoy arrived off Victoria (now Limbe) and anchored in Ambas Bay around 0800A/7. Two of the destroyers were kept outside the bay for A/S patrol as was the A/S trawler HMS Kelt (Skr. W.McK. Smith, RNR). At Ambas Bay troops were then transferred to smaller vessels and stores to lighters. This was completed by 1800A/9.

The heavy cruiser HMS Cornwall (Capt. C.F. Hammill, RN) was also patrolling in the area.

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At 0930N/3, a convoy of French transports [identity currently not known to us] departed Freetown for the Cameroons. The British transport Ocean Coast (1173 GRT, built 1935) was also with this convoy.

This convoy was escorted by the light cruisers HMS Delhi (Capt. A.S. Russell, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), sloop HMS Milford (Capt.(Retd.) S.K. Smyth, RN) and the A/S trawlers HMS Turcoman (Skr. A.G. Day, RNR) and FFS President Houduce.

HMS Turcoman later had to be detached to Lagos due to engine trouble. HMS Kelt departed Ambas Bay at 1200A/8 to take over from her.

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At 0900A/8, the sloops FFS Commandant Dominé and FFS Commandant Duboc departed Ambas Bay for Douala with General De Gaulle and 200 troops on board.

At 1300A/8, the transports Warrien (?) and Eketien (?) departed Ambas Bay with 500 troops for Douala. They were escorted by HMS Forester.

At 2100A/8, the Pennland departed Ambas Bay to return to Freetown unescorted.

At 2200A/8, the Westernland departed Ambas Bay for Pointe Noire. She had still about 400 Free French soldiers on board. She was escorted by HMS Cornwall.

At 0715A/9, the transports Dayspring (British, 1102 GRT, built 1928), Ajaza (?) and the tanker Glarona (Norwegian, 9912 GRT, built 1928) departed Ambas Bay for Douala. They were escorted by the destroyers HMS Forester and HMS Fury.

At 0815A/9, HMS Devonshire and HMS Faulknor departed Ambas Bay to provide cover for the transport convoy proceeding towards the Cameroon River estuary.

At 1105A/9, HMS Faulknor, HMS Forester and HMS Fury were ordered to proceed with despatch to Freetown, their services being urgently required in the Mediterranean.

All transports and HMS Devonshire anchored in the Cameroons River estuary in the afternoon. HMS Milford and HMS Kelt then conducted A/S patrols.

On the 10th HMS Delhi and HMS Dragon were ordered to proceed to Lagos to fuel. They arrived there on the 11th. HMS Milford also went to Lagos to dock and refit. She arrived there on the 12th.

HMS Devonshire for the moment remained at anchor off Monoka.

(24)

11 Oct 1940
Around 0900A/11, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Lagos from operations. After fuelling she departed for Freetown around 1830A/11. (25)

15 Oct 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Freetown from Lagos. (25)

18 Oct 1940
Around 1900A/18, the heavy cruiser HMS Cornwall (Capt. C.F. Hammill, RN), intercepted the Vichy French merchant vessel Indochinois (6966 GRT, built 1939), that was en route from Casablanca to Conakry, French Guinea, in position 05°46'N, 13°43'W. Course was then set to proceed to Freetown with the Vichy ship.

Around dawn the following morning the Vichy ship tried to scuttle herself but this failed.

The light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) then departed Freetown to go to the assistance of HMS Cornwall.

All ships arrived at Freetown in the afternoon of the 19th. (26)

20 Oct 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Freetown to patrol to the south-west of Freetown. (25)

22 Oct 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) returned to Freetown from patrol. (25)

23 Oct 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Freetown for Takoradi. (25)

25 Oct 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Takoradi from Freetown. (25)

27 Oct 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Takoradi for Bathurst escorting the troopship Pennland (Dutch, 16082 GRT, built 1922). (25)

31 Oct 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the troopship Pennland (Dutch, 16082 GRT, built 1922) arrived at Bathurst. (25)

2 Nov 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Bathurst for Freetown. (27)

3 Nov 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Freetown from Bathurst.

She departed again later the same day to make rendezvous with the armed merchant cruiser HMS Moreton Bay (A/Capt. E.M. Haes, RN) and the Vichy French transport Cuba (11420 GRT, built 1923) which she had captured on 31 October 1940 while it was en-route from Martinique to Casablanca.

She joined them in the morning of the 5th. (27)

5 Nov 1940
HMS Royal Sovereign (Capt. H.B. Jacomb, RN) departed Freetown to provide cover along with HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) for the armed merchant cruiser HMS Moreton Bay (A/Capt. E.M. Haes, RN) which was en-route to Freetown with the Vichy French transport Cuba (11420 GRT, built 1923) which she had intercepted on 31 October 1940 while it was en-route from Martinique to Casablanca. (28)

7 Nov 1940
Around 0700N/7, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Moreton Bay (A/Capt. E.M. Haes, RN) and the Vichy French transport Cuba (11420 GRT, built 1923) arrived at Freetown. (29)

11 Nov 1940
Around 0915N/11, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Freetown for patrol. She was ordered to patrol on a line 40 to 90 miles bearing 180° from Cape Palmas, Liberia. This was so as to intercept Vichy-French ships as well as the Portugese Joao Belo (6331 GRT, built 1906) which was know to be carrying a German passenger.

The Portugese ship was sighted and was then stopped around 1700N/11. The German passenger was then removed from the ship which was then allowed to continue. (29)

19 Nov 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) returned to Freetown from patrol. (29)

27 Nov 1940
At 0615A/27, the light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Freetown to intercept the Vichy-French transport Ville du Havre (5083 GRT, built 1919) which had been been en-route from Dakar southwards. She had broken down the previous day in approximate position 00°10'N, 19°30'W. The position was later amended to 00°44'N, 19°54'W.

The aircraft carrier HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN) and heavy cruiser HMS Cumberland (Capt. G.H.E. Russell, RN) which were en-route from the St.Helena area to Freetown were also ordered to search for the Vichy-French ship and give assistance to HMS Durban.

The Vichy ship was found by HMS Dragon at 0940N/29 and within half an hour an armed guard was placed on board. The Vichy ship turned out to have lost her propeller. The tug Buffle arrived to tow her back to Dakar.

The armed guard was taken off at 1440N/30 in position 01°40'N, 21°00'W and the ship was released. HMS Dragon then set course to return to Freetown. (29)

2 Dec 1940
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) returned to Freetown from patrol / operations. (30)

3 Dec 1940
Around 1700A/3, the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN) and the light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Freetown for patrol and also to try to intercept the Vichy-French transport Ville de Tamatave (4993 GRT, built 1931). (31)

10 Dec 1940
HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN) and HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at St. Helena to fuel. They departed to resume their patrol later the same day. (32)

14 Dec 1940
HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN) and HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at St. Helena to fuel. They departed to resume their patrol early the following day. (32)

19 Dec 1940
HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN) and HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at St. Helena to fuel. They departed to reume patrol in the morning of the 20th. The armed merchant cruiser HMS Pretoria Castle (Capt.(Retd.) E.J. Shelly, RN) was now also with them. They were now to patrol much further to the West as the German pocket battleship Admiral Scheer had captured the British merchant vessel Duquesa (8651 GRT, built 1918) in position 00°57'N, 22°42'W on the 18th. (33)

28 Dec 1940
HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and HMS Pretoria Castle (Capt.(Retd.) E.J. Shelly, RN) arrived at St. Helena to fuel. They departed to resume patrol the following day. (34)

30 Dec 1940
HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and HMS Pretoria Castle (Capt.(Retd.) E.J. Shelly, RN) returned to St. Helena to top off with fuel. (33)

31 Dec 1940
Around 0800A/31, HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN) and HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed St. Helena for Simonstown. (31)

5 Jan 1941
Around 1330B/5, HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN) arrived at Simonstown from patrol. She is then taken in hand for repairs by the Dockyard.

Around 0900B/5, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Capetown from patrol. She immediately entered the dry dock.

They had parted company with each other at 2000B/4. (35)

18 Jan 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) is undocked. She then proceeded from Capetown to Simonstown. (36)

20 Jan 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) conducted exercises in False Bay. (36)

22 Jan 1941
Around 0900B/22, the light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Simonstown for St. Helena.

Around 1130B/22, the heavy cruiser HMS Devonshire (Capt. R.D. Oliver, DSC, RN) also departed Simonstown for St. Helena.

HMS Dragon was overtaken and joined by HMS Devonshire around 1600B/22. They then proceeded in company.

They parted company around 1215Z/26, when HMS Durban proceeded to St. Helena to fuel arriving there around 1530Z/26.

HMS Devonshire, which did not need to fuel then proceeded to patrol in the St. Helena / Ascension area.

On completion of fuelling, HMS Durban departed St. Helena for Ascension around 2000Z/26.

The two cruisers joined company again around 0730Z/28, when they left Ascension Island in company with the Vichy French passenger/cargo ship Mendoza (8199 GRT, built 1920) to escort her to Freetown after this ship had been intercepted in the River Plate focal area.

Around 0215Z/30, HMS Devonshire parted company to act on a raider report. (37)

1 Feb 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the captured Vichy French passenger/cargo ship Mendoza (8199 GRT, built 1920) arrived at Freetown. (38)

2 Feb 1941
Around 1800N/2, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), departed Freetown to make rendezvous with the transport Tamerlane (Norwegian, 6778 GRT, built 1936) and her present escort, the armed merchant cruiser HMS Bulolo (Capt.(Retd.) R.L. Hamer, RN). The Tamerlane was en-route from North America to Takoradi with 120 aircraft on board.

Rendezvous was effected around 0730N/4 in approximate position 00°54'N, 18°05'W.

HMS Bulolo then parted company to proceed to Freetown. (38)

7 Feb 1941
Around 0900Z/7, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the transport Tamerlane (Norwegian, 6778 GRT, built 1936) arrived at Takoradi.

HMS Dragon then departed Takoradi for Lagos around 1930Z/7. (38)

8 Feb 1941
Around 1130A/8, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Lagos from Takoradi. (38)

9 Feb 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Lagos for Manoka. (38)

11 Feb 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Manoka from Lagos.

She proceeded up river to Douala later the same day. (38)

15 Feb 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Douala for Lagos. (38)

16 Feb 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Lagos from Douala. (38)

17 Feb 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Lagos to make rendezvous with French transports coming from Pointe Noire. However the French ships could not sail on time and HMS Dragon therefore set course to proceed to Pointe Noire herself. (38)

20 Feb 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Pointe Noire from Lagos. (38)

21 Feb 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Pointe Noire to return to Lagos. (38)

23 Feb 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Lagos from Pointe Noire.

After fuelling she departed Lagos again to make rendezvous with the (troop) transports Capo Olmo (British, 4712 GRT, built 1923) and Touareg (British, 5135 GRT, built 1924) coming from Pointe Noire. They had on board a brigade of European and native Free French troops.

Rendezvous was effected around 0600Z/25 and course was set to proceed to Freetown where they arrived in the afternoon of 2 March 1941. (38)

18 Mar 1941
The aircraft carrier HMS Furious (Capt. A.G. Talbot, DSO, RN), light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the destroyers HMS Duncan (Lt.Cdr. A.N. Rowell, RN) and HMS Foxhound (Cdr. G.H. Peters, DSC, RN) departed Freetown for Takoradi.

They arrived off Takoradi in the morning of the 20th. HMS Furious then commenced flying off aircraft escorted by HMS Duncan. HMS Dragon and HMS Foxhound then entered harbour where HMS Dragon supplied 170 tons of fuel to HMS Foxhound. On completion of fuelling HMS Foxhound proceeded to sea to rejoin HMS Furious.

Late on the following morning HMS Duncan entered harbour and was supplied with 250 tons of fuel by HMS Dragon. On completion of fuelling she too departed the harbour to rejoin HMS Furious and HMS Foxhound at sea.

Flying off the aircraft was completed on 22 March and HMS Furious, HMS Duncan and HMS Foxhound set course to return to Freetown where they arrived on the 25th. (39)

21 Mar 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Takoradi for Lagos. (40)

22 Mar 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Lagos from Takoradi. After fuelling she departed again to return to Takoradi. (40)

23 Mar 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Takoradi where she embarked the pilots which had flown off the aircraft from HMS Furious. She then immediately departed Takoradi for Freetown. (40)

25 Mar 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Freetown from Takoradi. (40)

28 Mar 1941
During the night of 28/29 March 1941, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), conducted exercises off Freetown. (40)

29 Mar 1941

Convoy SL 70.

This convoy departed Freetown on 29 March 1941 and arrived in UK waters (Liverpool) on 23 April 1941.

The convoy was made up of the following merchant vessels; Alfred Jones (British, 5013 GRT, built 1930), Ancylus (British (tanker), 8017 GRT, built 1935), Andrea Brovig (Norwegian (tanker), 10173 GRT, built 1940), Barrgrove (British, 5222 GRT, built 1918), Belgravian (British, 3136 GRT, built 1937), Benledi (British, 5943 GRT, built 1930), Bulysses (British, 7519 GRT, built 1927), Chelatros (Greek, 3489 GRT, built 1914), Clan MacBrayne (British, 4818 GRT, built 1916), Clan MacInnes (British, 4672 GRT, built 1920), Colytto (Dutch, 4408 GRT, built 1926), Dagomba (British, 3845 GRT, built 1928), Delius (British, 6065 GRT, built 1937), Denpark (British, 3491 GRT, built 1928), Dornoch (British, 5186 GRT, built 1939), Egda (Norwegian (tanker), 10050 GRT, built 1939), Elstree Grange (British, 6598 GRT, built 1916), Grangepark (British, 5132 GRT, built 1919), Gunda (Swedish, 1770 GRT, built 1930), Henry Stanley (British, 5026 GRT, built 1929), Industria (British, 4850 GRT, built 1940), Mandalay (British, 5529 GRT, built 1911), Marconi (British, 7402 GRT, built 1917), Meliskerk (Dutch, 6045 GRT, built 1919), Para (Norwegian, 3986 GRT, built 1921), Parklaan (Dutch, 3807 GRT, built 1911), Phidias (British, 5623 GRT, built 1913), Sacramento Valley (British, 4573 GRT, built 1924), Storanger (Norwegian (tanker), 9223 GRT, built 1930) and William Wilberforce (British, 4013 GRT, built 1930).

The rescue ship Zamalek (British, 1567 GRT, built 1921) was also part of the convoy.

On departure from Freetown the convoy was escorted by the light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), corvette HMS Calendula (Lt.Cdr. A.D. Bruford, RNVR) and the A/S trawlers HMS Kelt (T/Lt. W.T. Hodson, RNVR) and HMS Pict (???).

At 1726N/31, HMS Dragon parted company with the convoy. The armed merchant cruiser HMS Bulolo (Capt.(Retd.) R.L. Hamer, RN) had joined shortly before HMS Dragon parted company.

Around 1300N/4, HMS Kelt and HMS Pict parted company with the convoy to proceed to Bathurst.

At 1755N/4, HMS Calendula parted company with the convoy to proceed to Bathurst.

Around 1730N/5, the light cruiser HMS Birmingham (Capt. A.C.G. Madden, RN) and the troopship Christiaan Huygens (Dutch, 16287 GRT, built 1927) joined the convoy. They had departed Freetown around 1730N/2 to overtake the convoy.

Around 1600N/19, HMS Marsdale (Lt.Cdr. D.H.F. Armstrong, RNR) joined the convoy after which HMS Bulolo parted company.

Around 0900N/20, the destroyer HMS Winchelsea (Lt.Cdr. W.A.F. Hawkins, DSC, RN) joined the convoy.

Around 1800N/20, the destroyers HMS Harvester (Lt.Cdr. M. Thornton, DSC, RN), HMS Beagle, (Lt.Cdr. R.T. White, DSO and Bar, RN), HMCS Columbia (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) S.W. Davis, RN), HMCS St.Francis (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Pullen, RCN) and the corvettes HMS Heather (Cdr.(Retd.) J.G.C. Gibson, RN), HMS Orchis (Lt. A.D. White, RNR), HMCS Hepatica (T/Lt. C. Copelin, RCNR) and HMCS Windflower (T/Lt. J.H.S. MacDonald, RCNR) joined the convoy.

At 2105N/20, HMS Birmingham parted company with the convoy to proceed to Scapa Flow.

The convoy arrived in U.K. waters on 23 April 1941. Some of the A/S escorts had already parted company with the convoy earlier.

1 Apr 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) returned to Freetown after convoy escort duty. (41)

12 Apr 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Freetown to try to intercept the Vichy-French transport Cap Padaran (7626 GRT, built 1922), which was en-route from Tamatave to Dakar. (42)

16 Apr 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) returned to Freetown from patrol. The Vichy French ship she was to search for had not been sighted. (42)

17 Apr 1941

Convoy SL 72

This convoy departed Freetown on 17 April 1941 for Liverpool where it arrived on 13 May 1941.

The convoy was made up of the following merchants; Alcinous (Dutch, 6189 GRT, built 1925), Bangalore (British, 6067 GRT, built 1928), Baron Douglas (British, 3899 GRT, built 1932), Coracero (British, 7252 GRT, built 1923), Corinaldo (British, 7131 GRT, built 1921), Daldorch (British, 5571 GRT, built 1930), Dixcove (British, 3790 GRT, built 1927), Empire Lotus (British, 3696 GRT, built 1920), Gaelic Star (British, 5596 GRT, built 1917), Garoet (Dutch, 7118 GRT, built 1917), Hainaut (Belgian, 4312 GRT, built 1905), Hazelside II (British, 5297 GRT, built 1940), Inverbank (British, 5149 GRT, built 1924), Jeypore (British, 5318 GRT, built 1920), Kelbergen (Dutch, 4823 GRT, built 1914), Llanberis (British, 5055 GRT, built 1928), Lorca (British, 4875 GRT, built 1931), Moanda (Belgian, 4621 GRT, built 1937), Mokambo (Belgian, 4996 GRT, built 1938), Mount Kitheron (Greek, 3876 GRT, built 1912), Muneric (British, 5229 GRT, built 1919), Norman Star (British, 6817 GRT, built 1919), Penrose (British, 4393 GRT, built 1928), Perth (British, 2259 GRT, built 1915), Prinses Maria-Pia (Belgian, 2588 GRT, built 1938), Saint Bernard (British, 5183 GRT, built 1939), Scottish Star (British, 7224 GRT, built 1917), Somerset (British, 8790 GRT, built 1918), St. Helena (British, 4313 GRT, built 1936), Testbank (British, 5083 GRT, built 1937), Tyndareus (British, 11361 GRT, built 1916), Ulysses (British, 14647 GRT, built 1913), Velma (Norwegian (tanker), 9720 GRT, built 1930), Winkfield (British, 5279 GRT, built 1919) and Yorkwood (British, 5401 GRT, built 1936).

The merchant vessel Empire Advocate (British, 5787 GRT, built 1913) joined at sea on 25 April near the Azores.

A/S Escort was provided on the day of departure when the convoy was near Freetown by the destroyers HMS Vidette (Lt. E.N. Walmsley, RN), HMS Vidette (Lt.Cdr. E.N. Walmsley, RN) and the corvettes HMS Asphodel (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) K.W. Stewart, RN) and HMS Calendula (Lt.Cdr. A.D. Bruford, RNVR).

Ocean escort was provided by the light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) until being relieved around noon on the 19th by HMS Fiji (Capt. P.B.R.W. William-Powlett, RN) which then remained with the convoy until May 1st.

On 20 April the Armed Merchant Cruiser HMS Dunnottar Castle (Capt.(Retd.) C.T.A. Bunbury, RN) joined the convoy and she remained with it until May 11th.

Local escort in British home waters was provided from 10 to 13 May by the destroyers HMS Keppel (Cdr. A.M. Sheffield, RN), HMS Lincoln (Lt. R.J. Hanson, RN), HMS Sabre (Lt. Sir P.W. Gretton, DSC, RN) (to 12 May only), HMCS Columbia (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) S.W. Davis, RN), sloop HMS Fleetwood (Cdr. R.W. Moir, RN), corvettes HMS Alisma (A/Lt.Cdr. M.G. Rose, RANVR), HMS Dianella (T/Lt. J.G. Rankin, RNR), HMS Kingcup (Lt. R.A.D. Cambridge, RNR) and the A/S trawlers HMS Man o' War (T/Lt. W.W. Creber, RNR), HMS St. Loman (T/Lt. R.C. Warwick, RNR) and HMS Wellard (Lt.(Retd.) R.F. Turnbull, RD, RNR).

20 Apr 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) returned to Freetown after convoy escort duty. (41)

24 Apr 1941
During 24/25 April 1941, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), conducted exercises off Freetown. These included night and gunnery exercises. (41)

27 Apr 1941

Convoy SL 73.

This convoy departed Freetown on 27 April 1941 for the U.K.

On departure from Freetown the convoy was made up of the following merchant vessels; Agios Georgios (Greek, 4248 GRT, built 1911), Alcyone (Dutch, 4534 GRT, built 1921), Atland (Swedish, 5203 GRT, built 1910), British Chemist (British (tanker), 6997 GRT, built 1925), Brynymor (British, 4771 GRT, built 1936), Celtic Star (British, 5575 GRT, built 1918), City of Florence (British, 6862 GRT, built 1918), Clan Skene (British, 5214 GRT, built 1919), Daronia (British (tanker), 8139 GRT, built 1939), Defoe (British, 6245 GRT, built 1940), Elg (British, 4014 GRT, built 1930), Empire Gunner (British, 4492 GRT, built 1906), Fana (Norwegian, 1375 GRT, built 1939), Guelma (British, 4402 GRT, built 1928), Hardanger (Norwegian, 4000 GRT, built 1924), Harpalion (British, 5486 GRT, built 1932), Hartington (British, 5496 GRT, built 1932), Hartismere (British, 5498 GRT, built 1933), Hopecrown (British, 5180 GRT, built 1937), Katanga (Belgian, 5183 GRT, built 1917), Laplace (British, 7327 GRT, built 1919), Llancarvan (British, 4910 GRT, built 1937), Lysaker V (Norwegian, 1571 GRT, built 1936), Novasli (Norwegian, 3204 GRT, built 1920), Penolver (British, 3721 GRT, built 1912), Robert L. Holt (British, 2918 GRT, built 1926), Rod-el-Farag (Egyptian, 6369 GRT, built 1910), Rupert de Larrinaga (British, 5358 GRT, built 1930), Sabor (British, 5212 GRT, built 1920), Sagaing (British, 7958 GRT, built 1925), Solon II (British, 4561 GRT, built 1925), Starcross (British, 4662 GRT, built 1936), Suva (British, 4873 GRT, built 1938), Svend Foyn (British, 14795 GRT, built 1931), Tanafjord (Norwegian, 5922 GRT, built 1921), Thomas Holt (British, 3585 GRT, built 1929) and Titus (Dutch, 1712 GRT, built 1930). (British, GRT, built ).

On departure from Freetown the convoy was escorted by the armed merchant cruiser HMS Esperance Bay (Capt.(ret) G.S. Holden, RN) and the corvettes HMS Clematis (Cdr. Y.M. Cleeves, DSC, RD, RNR), HMS Crocus (Lt.Cdr. E. Wheeler, RNR), HMS Cyclamen (Lt. H.N. Lawson, RNR) and HMS Marguerite (Lt.Cdr. A.N. Blundell, RNR).

On 29 April 1941 the destroyer HMS Duncan (Lt.Cdr. A.N. Rowell, RN) joined coming from Bathurst. She parted company with the convoy on 1 May 1941 to proceed to Gibraltar.

Around 1540N/3, the light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) joined the convoy coming from Freetown. She remained with the convoy until 1820N/4 when she parted company to return to Freetown.

On 19 May 1941, the destroyers HMS Boadicea (A/Cdr. E.C.L. Turner, RN), HMCS Columbia (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) S.W. Davis, RN), HMCS St.Francis (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Pullen, RCN) and the armed boarding vessels HMS Hilary (Cdr. T.L. Owen, RD, RNR) and HMS Registan (A/Cdr. E.A. Divers, RNR) joined the convoy. Around this time HMS Esperance Bay most likely parted company with the convoy.

On 20 May 1941, the destroyer HMCS St. Clair (Lt.Cdr. D.C. Wallace, RCNR), sloop HMS Egret (A/Capt. E.M. Haes, RN) and the corvettes HMCS Arrowhead (Lt.Cdr. E.G. Skinner, RCNR), HMCS Hepatica (T/Lt. C. Copelin, RCNR), HMCS Snowberry (T/Lt. R.S. Kelley, RCNR) and HMCS Spikenard (Lt.Cdr. H.G. Shadforth, RCNR) joined the convoy.

The rescue ship Zamalek (British, 1567 GRT, built 1930) also joined the convoy around the 19/20th.

On 21 May 1941, the destroyers HMCS St. Francis and HMCS St. Clair parted company with the convoy.

The convoy arrived in U.K. waters on 25 May 1941.

30 Apr 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Freetown to join the escort of convoy SL 73.

[For more info on this convoy see the event ' Convoy SL 73 ' for 27 April 1941.] (41)

8 May 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) returned to Freetown after convoy escort duty. (43)

10 May 1941

Convoy SL 74

This convoy departed Freetown on 10 May 1941 for the U.K. where it was dissolved on 4 June 1941.

It was made up of the following merchant ships;
Afghanistan (British, 6992 GRT, built 1940), Aliakmon (Greek, 4521 GRT, built 1913) retuned 11-04 after collision with Zephyros, Amstelkerk (Dutch, 4457 GRT, built 1929), Anselm (British, 5954 GRT, built 1935), Arosa (Norwegian, 5043 GRT, built 1924), Benalder (British, 5161 GRT, built 1919), Bonita (Panamanian, 4929 GRT, built 1918), City of Lyons (British, 7063 GRT, built 1926), Clan MacNair (British, 6096 GRT, built 1921), Corvus (Norwegian, 1317 GRT, built 1921), Empire Success (British, 5988 GRT, built 1921), Empire Trader (British, 9957 GRT, built 1908), Evros (Greek, 5283 GRT, built 1918), Gamaria (British, 5255 GRT, built 1918), Glenstrae (British, 9460 GRT, built 1922), Holmside (British, 3433 GRT, built 1930), Koumoundouros (Greek, 3598 GRT, built 1925), Liberian (British, 5129 GRT, built 1936), Llandaff (British, 4825 GRT, built 1937), Linge (Dutch, 2114 GRT, built 1928), Marsa (British, 4405 GRT, built 1928), Melpomene (French, 7011 GRT, built 1923), Nagara (British, 8791 GRT, built 1919), Nicolas Pateras (Greek, 4362 GRT, built 1910), Norita (Swedish, 1516 GRT, built 1924), Olivebank (British, 5154 GRT, built 1926), Olympos (Greek, 5216 GRT, built 1918), P.L.M. 17 (French, 4008 GRT, built 1922) left the convoy on 20 May with engine trouble, Pendeen (British, 4174 GRT, built 1923), Queensbury (British, 3911 GRT, built 1931), Rosenberg (Dutch, 2068 GRT, built 1918), Saturnus (Dutch, 2741 GRT, built 1909), Scotia (Swedish, 1874 GRT, built 1918), Shahristan (British, 6935 GRT, built 1938), Southern Empress (British, 12398 GRT, built 1914), Taurus (Norwegian, 4767 GRT, built 1925), Tombouctou (French, 5636 GRT, built 1919), Tovelil (Danish, 2225 GRT, built 1925), Trentbank (British, 5060 GRT, built 1929), Tudor Star (British, 7199 GRT, built 1919), Vassilios A. Polemis (Greek, 3429 GRT, built 1907), Viking Star (British, 6445 GRT, built 1920), Waterland (Dutch, 6847 GRT, built 1922), Wentworth (British, 5212 GRT, built 1919) and Zephyros (Greek, 4796 GRT, built 1909).

Escort was initially provided by the British armed merchant cruiser HMS Bulolo (Capt.(Retd.) R.L. Hamer, RN) (10 May 1941 to 3 June 1941) and the corvettes HMS Amaranthus (Lt. N.B.J. Stapleton, RNR), HMS Anchusa (T/Lt. P. Everett-Price, DSC, RNR), HMS Asphodel (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) K.W. Stewart, RN) and HMS Calendula (Lt.Cdr. A.D. Bruford, RNVR). (All from 10 May 1941 to 19 May 1941).

They were joined on 12 May 1941 by the heavy cruiser HMS Dorsetshire (Capt. B.C.S. Martin, RN).

At 1300N/13, in approximate position 13°07'N, 19°22'W, HMS Bulolo sighted a ship which turned out to be the Vichy-French transport Bourbonnais (4484 GRT, built 1914). The ship was ordered to stop but she refused to do so initially. A shot was fired across her bow which resulted in the ship to stop. She was then boarded. It turned out that she was en-route from Dakar to Tamatave with stores and 400 native troops. HMS Bulolo and the Vichy ship then remained in the general area while the light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) was sent out from Freetown to take her over and then escort her to Freetown so that HMS Bulolo could rejoin the convoy. HMS Dragon joined around 0930N/14 and the Vichy ship was then turned over to her custody.

On 26 May 1941, HMS Dorsetshire parted company with the convoy to join the pursuit of the German battleship Bismarck. She succeeded in making contact on the next day he delivered the coup de grace to her and torpedoed the heavily damaged German battleship from both sides and she sank soon afterwards. HMS Dorsetshire picked up German survivors until she was forced to leave the scene after a U-Boat alarm. More survivors had to be left in the water.

The convoy was joined by more escorts for the passage through the Western Approaces, these were;
Destroyer HMS Reading (Lt.Cdr. D.V. Clift, RN) and the corvettes HMS Gentian (Lt.Cdr. R.O. Yeomans, RD, RNR), HMS Hibiscus (Lt. H. Roach, RNR), HMS Pimpernel (Lt. F.H. Thornton, RNR). These ships all joined on 30 May 1941 and remained with the convoy until it was dissolved on 4 June 1941. The destroyers HMS Vanquisher (Cdr. N.V. Dickinson, DSC, RN) and HMS Winchelsea (Lt.Cdr. W.A.F. Hawkins, DSC, RN) also joined on 30 May but left the convoy on 2 June 1941. Finally the corvette HMS Freesia (Lt.Cdr. T.P.G. Crick, RN) joined the convoy on 31 May and remained with it until dissolved on 4 June 1941.

13 May 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) conducted gunnery exercises off Freetown. During the exercises she was ordered to proceed to make rendezvous with HMS Bulolo (Capt.(Retd.) R.L. Hamer, RN) which had encountered, stopped and boarded the Vichy-French transport Bourbonnais (4484 GRT, built 1914) in approximate position 13°07'N, 19°22'W.

Rendezvous was made around 0930N/14 and the Vichy ship was then turned over to HMS Dragon which was then to escort it to Freetown while HMS Bulolo proceeded as to rejoin the convoy. (43)

16 May 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the Vichy-French transport Bourbonnais (4484 GRT, built 1914) arrived at Freetown. (43)

6 Jun 1941
The light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), seaplane tender HMS Albatross (A/Capt. W.A. Dallmeyer, DSO, RN), corvettes HMS Amaranthus (Lt. N.B.J. Stapleton, RNR), HMS Crocus (Lt.Cdr. E. Wheeler, RNR), target ship Centurion (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) R.W.J. Martin, RN) (portraying the dummy battleship Anson) and the troop transport Abosso (British, 11330 GRT, built 1935) departed Freetown.

Around 1500N/8, HMS Albatross and HMS Centurion parted company to proceed to St. Helena where they arrived in the afternoon of the 14th.

The other ships proceeded to Takoradi arriving there in the afternoon of the 10th. (44)

10 Jun 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Takoradi for Lagos. (45)

11 Jun 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Lagos where she landed stores. She then immediately left again to return to Takoradi. (45)

12 Jun 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Takoradi. (45)

17 Jun 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Takoradi for Lagos. (45)

18 Jun 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Lagos from Takoradi. (45)

28 Jun 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Lagos for Pointe Noire. (45)

1 Jul 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Pointe Noire from Lagos. (46)

5 Jul 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Pointe Noire for Simonstown. (46)

11 Jul 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Simonstown from Pointe Noire. (46)

14 Jul 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Simonstown for Port Elizabeth. (46)

15 Jul 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Port Elizabeth from Simonstown. (46)

17 Jul 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Port Elizabeth to return to Simonstown. (46)

19 Jul 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) sank the derelict wreck of the merchant vessel Hannington Court (British, 5449 GRT, built 1939) with gunfire near Danger Point in position 34°46'S, 19°23'E. The ship had suffered a fire in her engine room on 13 July 1941 and was soon ablaze from fore to aft. She had to be abandoned by her crew. She was finally ordered to be sunk as she was beyond salvage. She had been en-route from Beira to the U.K. with a cargo of chrome and copper ore. (46)

20 Jul 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Simonstown where she was to be taken in hand for refit. (47)

11 Aug 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) is docked at the Simonstown Dockyard. (48)

4 Sep 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) is undocked. (49)

29 Sep 1941

Convoy WS 12

This convoy departed U.K. ports on 29 / 30 September 1941.

The convoy assembled assembled at sea near Orsay Island on 1 October 1941.

The convoy was made up of the following troop transports / transports; Almanzora (15551 GRT, built 1914), City of Paris (10902 GRT, built 1922), Clan Campbell (7255 GRT, built 1937), Clan Lamont (7250 GRT, built 1939), Dominion Monarch (27155 GRT, built 1939), Duchess of Richmond (20022 GRT, built 1928), Empire Pride (9248 GRT, built 1941), Empire Trust (8143 GRT, built 1941), Empress of Canada (21517 GRT, built 1922), Empress of Russia (16810 GRT, built 1913), Franconia (20175 GRT, built 1923), Highland Brigade (14134 GRT, built 1929), Highland Princess (14133 GRT, built 1930), Prince Badouin (3219 GRT, built 1933), Leopoldville (11509 GRT, built 1929), Mendoza (8233 GRT, built 1919), Narkunda (16632 GRT, built 1920), Ormonde (14982 GRT, built 1917), Perseus (10272 GRT, built 1923), Perthshire (10496 GRT, built 1936), HMS Royal Ulsterman (T/Cdr. H.F. Jackson, RNR) (3244 GRT, built 1936), Samaria (19597 GRT, built 1921), Sarpedon (11321 GRT, built 1923) and Strathaird (22281 GRT, built 1932).

The aircraft carrier HMS Argus (Capt. T.O. Bulteel, RN) was also with the convoy in an aircraft ferry role. She was able to operate aircraft for A/S patrol though.

On assembly off Oversay around 1200A/1, the convoy was escorted by the heavy cruiser HMS Devonshire (Capt. R.D. Oliver, DSC, RN), AA cruiser HMS Cairo (A/Capt. I.R.H. Black, RN), armed merchant cruiser, HMS Cathay (A/Capt.(Retd.) C.M. Merewether, RN), auxiliary minelayer HMS Agamemnon (Capt.(Retd.) F. Ratsey, RN), destroyers HMS Sikh (Cdr. G.H. Stokes, RN), HMCS Assiniboine (A/Lt.Cdr. J.H. Stubbs, RCN), HMCS Saguenay (Lt. P.E. Haddon, RCN), HMS Lancaster (A/Cdr. N.H. Whatley, RN), HMS Newark (Lt.Cdr. R.H.W. Atkins, RN), HMS Stanley (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) D.B. Shaw, OBE, RN) and the escort destroyer HMS Blankney (Lt.Cdr. P.F. Powlett, DSC, RN).

The destroyer HMS Bradford (Lt.Cdr. J.N.K. Knight, RN) was also to be part of the escort. She did sail from Londonderry but had to return to that port soon after departure owning to defects.

Around 1745A/1, the destroyers HMS Verity (Cdr. R.H. Mills, RN), HMS Whitehall (Lt.Cdr. A.B. Russell, RN), HMS Witch (Lt.Cdr. C.H. Holmes, RN) joined the convoy coming from Londonderry.

Around 1715A/2, the destroyer HMS Beverley (Lt.Cdr. J. Grant, RN) joined the convoy.

Around 0940A/3, a German Focke Wolf reconnaissance aircraft was sighted to be shadowing the convoy. HMS Cairo opened fire but the aircraft, which was flying very low, kept out of range. Shadowing ceased around 1040A/2 when the convoy disappeared into a patch of fog.

Around 1800A/3, HMS Lancaster and HMS Newark were detached to proceed to Londonderry. They had reached the limit of their endurance.

Around 0100A/4, HMS Verity and HMS Witch were detached to join the battleship HMS Resolution (Capt. A.R. Halfhide, CBE, RN) which was on passage from Bermuda to the Clyde.

Around 0800A/4, HMS Whitehall parted company with the convoy to proceed to Londonderry as she had reached the limit of her endurace.

Around 0930A/4,in position 50°16'N, 26°10'W, the troop tranport Highland Princess and auxiliary minelayer HMS Agamemnon were detached to proceed to Halifax. They formed convoy CT 3. They were escorted by HMS Cathay, HMCS Assiniboine and HMCS Saguenay.

Around 1400A/4, HMS Cairo was detached. She was to overtake HMS Whitehall and then return to Londonderry in company.

In the early hours of the 5th, HMS Beverley was detached as she had not been able to fuel from HMS Devonshire as the weather conditions had prevented this. She was also unable to fuel at the Azores as she had already done so in August.

Around 1700A/5, in position 44°18'N, 27°20'W, the destroyers HMS Cossack (Capt. E.L. Berthon, DSC and Bar, RN) and HMS Zulu (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN) were met. They then took HMS Argus and HMS Sikh with them to proceed to Gibraltar. HMS Argus maintained A/S air patrol over the convoy until 1800A/5.

Around 2030A/5, HMS Royal Ulsterman and the Prince Badouin were detached to Ponta Delgada, Azores.

Around 1255A/7, the destroyer i>HrMs Isaac Sweers (Cdr. J. Houtsmuller, RNN) joined the convoy.

Around 2000A/7, in position 35°36'N, 26°31'W, HMS Stanley and HMS Blankney were detached to Ponta Delgada, Azores.

Around 1700A/8, the destroyer HMS Gurkha (Cdr. C.N. Lentaigne, RN) joined the convoy after having failed to find it the previous day.

Around 1430A/10, HMS Royal Ulsterman and the Prince Badouin rejoined the convoy.

Around 1250A/11, in position 18°12'N, 22°25'W, the destroyer HMS Velox (Lt.Cdr. E.G. Roper, DSC, RN) joined the convoy.

Around 1600A/11, in position 17°38'N, 21°59'W, the destroyer HMS Wrestler (Lt.Cdr. E.L. Jones, DSC, RN) joined the convoy.

Around 0800Z/12, the heavy cruiser HMS Dorsetshire (Capt. A.W.S. Agar, VC, DSO, RN) joined the convoy.

Around 1120N/12, the destroyer HMS Vimy (Lt.Cdr. H.G.D. de Chair, RN) joined the convoy.

Around 1145N/13, the destroyer HMS Vansittart (Lt.Cdr. R.L.S. Gaisford, RN) and the corvettes HMS Amaranthus (T/Lt. W.S. Thomson, RNR) and HMS Armeria (T/Lt. H.N. Russell, DSC, RNR) joined the convoy.

The convoy arrived at Freetown early in the afternoon on 14 October 1941.

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The convoy, minus the Narkunda departed Freetown for South Africa on 19 October. Escort was provided by the heavy cruiser HMS Devonshire which joined the convoy early on 20 October after having patrolled south of Freetown since 16 October.

Local A/S escort out of Freetown was provided from 19 to 21 October 1941 and consisted of the destroyers HMS Velox, HMS Wrestler and the corvettes HMS Anchusa (Lt. J.E.L. Peters, RNR), HMS Calendula (Lt.Cdr. A.D. Bruford, RNVR) and HMS Mignonette (Lt. H.H. Brown, RNR).

Around 1815Z/21, HMS Wrestler parted company with the convoy.

Around 1830Z/21, in position 02°00'N, 08°30'W, HMS Royal Ulsterman and Ulster Monarch were detached and proceeded to Takoradi. They were escorted by HMS Anchusa and HMS Calendula.

Around 1900Z/21, Prince Badouin parted company to proceed to St. Helena.

Around 1925A/22, in approximate position 02°10'S, 06°12'W, HMS Velox and HMS Mignonette parted company.

On 30 October 1941 the convoy was off Capetown and the following ships of the convoy then split off to proceed into that port; Clan Campbell, Dominion Monach, Empire Pride, Empire Trust, Empress of Canada, Leopoldville, Mendoza, Perthshire, Sarpedon and Strathaird as did HMS Devonshire which went to Simonstown.

The other ships of the convoy; Empress of Russia, Franconia, Highland Brigade, Ormonde, Perseus, Richmond and Samaria then proceeded to Durban where they arrived on 3 November escorted by the armed merchant cruiser HMS Derbyshire (Capt.(Retd.) E.A.B. Stanley, DSO, MVO, RN) which had joined them off Capetown early on 31 October.

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On 4 November 1941 the Strathaird departed Capetown for Durban where she arrived on 7 November.

On 5 November 1941 the following ships departed Capetown to continue their passage; Dominion Monarch, Empire Pride, Empire Trust, Empress of Canada, Leopoldville, Mendoza and Perthshire. They were escorted by the armed merchant cruiser HMS Dunnottar Castle (Capt.(Retd.) C.T.A. Bunbury, RN).

On 8 November the following ships departed Durban and joined the Capetown group at sea; Almanzora, City of Paris, Clan Campbell, Clan Lamont, Duchess of Richmond, Empress of Russia, Franconia, Nieuw Amsterdam (36287 GRT, built 1938), Nova Scotia (6791 GRT, built 1926), Perseus, Samaria and Strathaird. The escort of the Capetown group HMS Dunnottar Castle was relieved by the battlecruiser HMS Repulse (Capt. W.G. Tennant, CB, MVO, RN) which escorted the convoy from then on to until 0800C/14 when she was relieved in position 08°14'S, 40°34'E, by the battleship HMS Revenge (Capt. L.V. Morgan, CBE, MVO, DSC, RN) which then escorted the convoy until it arrived off Aden on 20 November. The convoy then dispersed and all ships proceeded to Suez independently.

On 14 November the convoy was joined by the Ascania (13900 GRT, built 1925) which came from Mombasa.

Around 0900C/17, HMS Glasgow (Capt. H. Hickling, DSO, RN) made rendezvous with convoy WS 12 in approximate position 06°06'N, 50°30'E. The Dominion Monarch, Duchess of Richmond, Empress of Canada and Perseus then split off from the convoy and continued on as convoy WS 12J towards Colombo, escorted by HMS Glasgow. This convoy arrived at Colombo on 23 November.

On 24 November the Dominion Monarch and Empress of Canada departed Colombo for Singapore as convoy WS 12V. They were escorted by HMS Glasgow until 26 November when HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) took over the escort. The convoy arrived at Singapore on 28 November 1941. (50)

1 Oct 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) is docked at Simonstown. (51)

2 Oct 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) is undocked. (51)

8 Oct 1941
During 8/9 October 1941, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), conducted trials and exercises off Simonstown. (51)

10 Oct 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) conducted trials and exercises off Simonstown. (51)

21 Oct 1941
With her refit completed, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), departed Simonstown. She was to join the China station. En-route she was to make rendezvous of Durban with the auxiliary minelayer HMS Teviotbank (Cdr.(Retd.) R.D. King-Harman, DSC and Bar, RN) which had departed Durban at 1258Z/23 to make rendezvous with HMS Dragon in approximate position 30°00'S, 34°00'E.

Rendezvous was effected around 0730B/24 and course was then set for Mauritius.

On 30 October 1941, HMS Dragon fuelled at Mauritius catching up with HMS Teviotbank around 0100E/31. Course was then set towards Port T (Addu Atoll) where HMS Dragon was to fuel again.

HMS Dragon and HMS eviotbank arrived at Port T (Addu Atoll) on the 6th. They departed for Colombo later the same day.

HMS Dragon and HMS Teviotbank arrived at Colombo on 8 November 1941.

HMS Dragon and HMS Teviotbank departed Colombo for Singapore on 9 November 1941.

HMS Dragon and HMS Teviotbank arrived at Singapore on 15 November 1941.

[No logbooks of HMS Dragon are available for November and December 1941 and January and February 1942 so some details for these months might be missing.] (52)

24 Nov 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Singapore escorting the troopship Awatea (British, 13482 GRT, built 1936) towards position 06°14'N, 92°00'E where HMS Glasgow (Capt. H. Hickling, DSO, RN) was to take over and HMS Durban was to take over the escort of convoy WS 12V from HMS Glasgow. (53)

26 Nov 1941
Around 0900FG/26, in approximate position 06°10'N, 92°06'E, convoy WS 12V escorted by HMS Glasgow (Capt. H. Hickling, DSO, RN) and the troop transport Awatea (British, 13482 GRT, built 1936) escorted by HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) made rendezvous. Escorting vessels were then exchanged.

[For more info on convoy WS 12V, see the event ' Convoy WS 12 ' for 29 September 1941.] (54)

28 Nov 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the troopships Dominion Monarch (British, 27155 GRT, built 1939) and Empress of Canada (British, 21517 GRT, built 1922) arrived at Singapore. (55)

29 Nov 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Singapore for Penang. (56)

30 Nov 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Penang from Singapore. (56)

6 Dec 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Penang to make rendezvous with the troopship Erinpura (5143 GRT, built 1911) in position 10°00'N, 92°50'E and then escort her to Singapore. The troopship had 924 troops on board as well was 20 naval personnel.

They arrived at Singapore on 12 December 1941. (57)

19 Dec 1941
The transport Erinpura (British, 5128 GRT, built 1911) departed Singapore for Colombo, via the Sunda Strait, with some 30 officers and 700 men from the Prince of Wales and Repulse as well as some women and children. She was escorted by the light cruisers HMS Dragon (A/Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN) and the destroyer HMAS Vampire (Cdr. W.T.A. Moran, RAN).

In the morning of 24 December 1941, the escort of Erinpura was taken over by the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (Capt. O.L. Gordon, MVO, RN) in position 00°44'N, 93°48'E. (58)

21 Dec 1941

Convoy BM 9A.

This convoy departed Bombay on 21 December 1941 and arrived at Singapore on 3 January 1942.

It was was made up of the following ships; Devonshire (British, 11275 GRT, built 1939), Lancashire (British, 9445 GRT, built 1917), Rajula (British, 8478 GRT, built 1926), Ethiopia (British 5575 GRT, built 1922) and Varsova (British, 4691 GRT, built 1914).

On departure from Bombay it was escorted by the light cruiser HMS Glasgow (Capt. H. Hickling, DSO, RN) and the patrol vessel HMIS Sonavati (T/Lt. G.W. Barnes, RINR).

At 1340/22, in position 14°03'N, 73°02'E, HMIS Sonavati obtained a strong A/S contact and attacked with six depth charges but the contact appeared to be non-sub.

On 24 December the light cruiser HMAS Hobart (Capt. H.L. Howden, CBE, RAN) and sloop HMS Falmouth (Cdr. U.H.R. James, RN) departed Colombo and they joined the convoy around 0800EF/25 in position 05°20'N, 80°00'E. HMS Glasgow then parted company with the convoy.

On 27 December HMS Falmouth and HMIS Sonavati parted company with the convoy and proceeded to Colombo.

Around 1200GH/30, in position 02°22'S, 98°00'E, the light cruisers HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN), HMS Dragon (A/Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the destroyer HMAS Vampire (Cdr. W.T.A. Moran, RAN) joined the convoy.

Around 1530GH/31, in position 06°10'S, 101°52'E the destroyers HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St J. Morgan, RN), HMS Jupiter (Lt.Cdr. N.V.J.T. Thew, RN) joined the convoy.

The Dutch light cruisers HrMs De Ruyter (Cdr. E.E.B. Lacomblé, RNN and flagship of Rear-Admiral K.W.F.M. Doorman, RNN), HrMs Tromp (Cdr. J.B. de Meester, RNN) and the Dutch destroyers HrMs Piet Hein (Lt.Cdr. J.M.L.I. Chompff, RNN) and HrMs Banckert (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Goslings, RNN) departed Batavia on 1 January 1942 to reinforce the convoy escort. The Dutch ships joined the convoy at 1345GH/1 and remained with the convoy until 2000GH/2.

The convoy arrived safely at Singapore on 3 January 1942. (55)

25 Dec 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN) and HMAS Vampire (Cdr. W.T.A. Moran, RAN) arrived at Padang to fuel.

They were however unable to obtain fuel there. The RFA tanker War Sirdar (5542 GRT, built 1920) was then ordered to proceed to Palembang to load there and then proceed to Padang. (58)

29 Dec 1941
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN) and HMAS Vampire (Cdr. W.T.A. Moran, RAN) departed Padang to make rendezvous with convoy BM 9A.

[For more info on this convoy see the event ' Convoy BM 9A ' for 21 December 1941.] (59)

3 Jan 1942
HMAS Hobart (Capt. H.L. Howden, CBE, RAN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN), HMAS Vampire (Cdr. W.T.A. Moran, RAN), HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St J. Morgan, RN) and HMS Jupiter (Lt.Cdr. N.V.J.T. Thew, RN) arrived at Singapore with convoy BM 9A. (60)

5 Jan 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN) departed Singapore for Batavia where they arrived the following day.

Vice Admiral G. Layton, KCB, DSO, RN, C-in-C Eastern Fleet had hoised his flag in HMS Dragon for this passage.

The cruisers had on board the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff and their staffs which were to join ABDA Command in Batavia.

HMS Dragon then remained at Batavia for W/T duties until the arrival of the depot ship HMS Anking. (61)

10 Jan 1942

Convoys MS 2 and MS 2A.

Convoy MS 2 departed Sydney on 10 January 1942.

This convoy was made up of only one ship, the troopship Aquitania (British, 44786 GRT, built 1914).

On departure from Sydney convoy MS 2 was escorted by the heavy cruiser HMAS Canberra (Capt. G.D. Moore, RAN).

Convoy MS 2 arrived at Fremantle on 15 January and departed again in the same composition on the 16th.

On 19 January 1942, while approaching the Sunda Strait the convoy was joined by a local escort made up of the light cruisers HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HrMs Java (Capt. P.B.M van Straelen, RNN) and the destroyers HMS Express (Lt.Cdr. F.J. Cartwright, RN) and HMS Thanet ( Cdr.(Retd.) B.S. Davies, RN) which came from Batavia.

On 20 January 1942, the destroyer HrMs Van Nes (Lt.Cdr. C.A. Lagaay, RNN) joined. The convoy arrived at Ratai Bay, Sumatra later the same day.

On arrival at Lampung Bay, HrMs Java and HMS Thanet parted company to proceed to Batavia to fuel on completion of which they returned to Ratai Bay. HMAS Canberra and HMS Express fuelled at Ratai Bay.

At Lampung Bay the troops from the Aquitania were put onto smaller ships which were to take them to Singapore as Convoy MS 2A.

These were the merchant vessels; Both (Dutch, 2601 GRT, built 1931), Reael (Dutch, 2561 GRT, built 1931), Reijnst (Dutch, 2462 GRT, built 1928), Sloet van Beele (Dutch, 2977 GRT, built 1914), Taishan (British, 3174 GRT, built 1925), Van der Lijn (Dutch, 2464 GRT, built 1928) and Van Swoll (Dutch, 2147 GRT, built 1930).

To provide cover for the operation of putting the troops on board the smaller ships the heavy cruiser HMAS Canberra, light cruisers HMS Dragon, destroyers HMS Express, HMAS Vampire (Cdr. W.T.A. Moran, RAN), USS Barker (Lt.Cdr. L.G. McGlone, USN), USS Stewart (Lt.Cdr. H.P. Smith, USN), HrMs Evertsen (Lt.Cdr. W.M. de Vries, RNN), HrMs Van Nes, sloops HMIS Jumna (Cdr. W.R. Shewring, RIN), HrMs Soemba (Cdr. P.J.G. Huijer, RNN) and the patrol vessel USS Isabel (Lt. J.W. Payne, Jr., USN) were patrolling / present in the Bay.

Around 1045GH, convoy MS 2A departed Ratai Bay for Singapore. It was escorted by HMAS Canberra, HMAS Vampire and HMIS Jumna.

Around 1830GH/21, HrMs Java and HMS Thanet joined from Batavia.

At 1000GH/23, after the convoy had passed the Banka Strait HMAS Canberra parted company leaving HrMs Java in command of the escort. HMAS Canberra then proceeded to Batavia where she arrived the following day.

The convoy arrived at Singapore late in the morning of the 24th. (62)

16 Jan 1942
At 1600GH(-7.5), at Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, Vice Admiral G. Layton, KCB, DSO, RN, C-in-C Eastern Fleet, transferred his flag from HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) to HMS Emerald (Capt. F.C. Flynn, RN). (63)

19 Jan 1942

Convoy BM 11.

This convoy departed Bombay for Singapore on 19 January 1942.

On departure from Bombay it was made up of the following ships; British troop ships; Duchess of Bedford (20123 GRT, built 1928), Empress of Japan (26032 GRT, built 1930)

British merchant Empire Star (13479 GRT, built 1935).

American troop ships; USS Wakefield (24289 GRT, built 1931) and USS West Piont (26454 GRT, built 1940).

Escort was initially provided from 19 January to 22 January 1942 by HMS Caledon (A/Capt. H.J. Haynes, DSO, DSC, RN).

Around 1630F/22, HMS Glasgow (Capt. J.W. Cuthbert, RN) took over from HMS Caledon in position 05°10'N, 80°09'E.

Around 1500G/25, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN) joined the convoy.

On 26 January 1942, HMS Electra (Cdr. C.W. May, RN) and HMS Express (Lt.Cdr. F.J. Cartwright, RN) joined the convoy around noon.

Around 0645GH/27, HMS Exeter (Capt. O.L. Gordon, MVO, RN) and HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St J. Morgan, RN) took over from HMS Glasgow in position 06°32'S, 102°29'E. HMS Glasgow then set course to return to Colombo.

It appears that HMS Exeter parted company with the convoy on 28 January and proceeded to Batavia.

The convoy arrived at Singapore on 29 January 1940. (64)

21 Jan 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) proceeded from Ratai Bay to Batavia. (65)

23 Jan 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN) departed Batavia to join the escort of convoy BM 11.

[For more info on this convoy see the event ' Convoy BM 11 ' for 19 Janaury 1942.] (66)

29 Jan 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN), HMS Electra (Cdr. C.W. May, RN), HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St J. Morgan, RN) and HMS Express (Lt.Cdr. F.J. Cartwright, RN) arrived at Singapore with convoy BM 11. (66)

30 Jan 1942

Convoy MS 3.

This convoy departed Fremantle on 30 January 1942 and part of the convoy arrived at Batavia on 8 February 1942 the other part of the arrived at Palembang on 9 February 1942.

The convoy was made up of the following ships; Antilochus (British, 9082 GRT, built 1906), Charon (British, 3703 GRT, built 1936), Elsa (Norwegian (tanker), 5381 GRT, built 1928), Erling Brovig (Norwegian (tanker), 9970 GRT, built 1937), Herborg (Norwegian (tanker), 7892 GRT, built 1931), Mangola (British, 3352 GRT, built 1931), Manvantara (Dutch (tanker), 8237 GRT, built 1931), Marella (British, 7475 GRT, built 1914), Marpessa (Dutch (tanker), 7408 GRT, built 1927), Merula (Dutch (tanker), 8228 GRT, built 1932) and Seirstad (Norwegian (tanker), 9916 GRT, built 1937).

On departure from Fremantle the convoy was escorted by the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Canberra (Capt. G.D. Moore, RAN) until near Christmas Island where on 6 February the British light cruisers HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN) took over. These cruisers had departed Batavia on 5 February 1942.

In the morning of 7 February 1942 the convoy was joined by the destroyers HMS Jupiter (Lt.Cdr. N.V.J.T. Thew, RN) and HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St J. Morgan, RN) which had departed Batavia on 6 February.

The merchant vessels Antilochus, Charon, Mangola and Marella split off from the convoy and arrived at Batavia on 8 February. The tankers continued on to the Palembang area where the arrived on the 9th.

The escorts then proceeded to Batavia where they arrived on the 10th.

31 Jan 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN) departed Singapore escorting the troopships USS Wakefield (American, 24289 GRT, built 1931), Duchess of Bedford (British, 20123 GRT, built 1928) and Empress of Japan (British, 26032 GRT, built 1930) which were to proceed to Colombo.

The cruisers arrived at Batavia on 1 February 1942. (67)

5 Feb 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN) departed Batavia to make rendezvous with convoy MS 3. On departure from Batavia they were escorting the troopship Warwick Castle (British, 20107 GRT, built 1930) which was to proceed to Fremantle with evacuees.

Rendezvous was made on 6 February between HMAS Canberra (Capt. G.D. Moore, RAN) and the convoy and HMS Dragon as HMS Durban was at that moment detached to Flying Fish Cove, Christmas Island to pick up the survivors of the merchant vessel Eidsvold (Norwegian, 4184 GRT, built 1934) which had been torpedoed there on 20 January 1942 by the Japanese submarine I-59 (offsite link). HMS Durban joined the convoy later on the 6th.

[For more info on this convoy see the event ' Convoy MS 3 ' for 30 January 1942.]

10 Feb 1942
Around 0640FG/10, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Durban (Capt. P.G.L. Cazalet, DSC, RN), HMS Jupiter (Lt.Cdr. N.V.J.T. Thew, RN) and HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St J. Morgan, RN) arrived at Batavia from convoy escort duty.

13 Feb 1942
In the afternoon HMS Dorsetshire (Capt. A.W.S. Agar, VC, DSO, RN) gave over the escort of the troopship Orcades (British, 23456 GRT, built 1937) to HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN). Orcades was diverted to Oosthaven, Sumatra, Netherlands East Indies upon the capitulation of Singapore. On the 14th the destroyer HMS Encounter (Lt.Cdr. E.V.St J. Morgan, RN) also joined as escort.

HMS Dorsetshire then proceeded to a position east of the Sunda Strait where she was to rendez-vous with convoy JS 1 and then escort it to Colombo. (68)

19 Feb 1942

Convoy SJ 4.

This convoy departed Batavia on 19 February 1942. Destination was Colombo.

It was made up of the transports; Erling Brovig (Norwegian (tanker), 9970 GRT, built 1937), Generaal Michiels (Dutch, 1258 GRT, built 1928), Generaal Van Geen (Dutch, 1268 GRT, built 1928), Generaal Van Swieten (Dutch, 1300 GRT, built 1928), Lee Sang (British, 1655 GRT, built 1907), Modasa (British, 9070 GRT, built 1921) and Stanmore (British, 4970 GRT, built 1940).

On departure from Batavia the convoy was escorted by the light cruiser HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN).

The convoy was dispersed on 21 February 1942. The ships proceeded independently to Colombo arriving there between 28 February and 3 March.

HMS Dragon then returned to Batavia. (64)

26 Feb 1942

Operations by the Western Striking Force during 26/27 February 1942.

The object of the operations was to intercept and engage a reported Japanese invasion force.

Around 2115GH/26, the Western Striking Force, made up of the light cruisers HMAS Hobart (Capt. H.L. Howden, CBE, RAN), HMS Danae (Capt. F.J. Butler, MBE, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the destroyers HMS Scout (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) H. Lambton, RN) and HMS Tenedos (Lt. R. Dyer, RN) departed Tandjong Priok (Batavia), in accordance with the Commodore Commanding China Force's signal timed 1231Z/26, to intercept and engage, by night, an enemy force consisting of three cruisers, four destroyers and thirty transports which had been reported near Banka Island proceeding southwards. The Western Striking Force therefore proceeded northwards between Arnemuiden Beacon and North Watcher Island to position 04°45'S, 106°41'E where the Force turned to the southward at 0300GH/27 in accordance with the Commodore Commanding China Force's signal timed 1529Z/26.

There was no sign of the enemy during the passage north when, except for a few heavy rain squalls, the visibility was very good. At 0345GH/27, Commodore Commanding China Force's signal timed 1946Z/26 was received, stating that D/F bearings indicated that many Japanese units were in position 04°00'S, 106°30'E. This was 55 nautical miles north of the Western Striking Force's current position. It was decided to continue on southwards as it was not possible to engage the enemy before dawn and also to await the results of the dawn air reconnaissance. Two enemy reconnaissance aircraft were sighted at 0730GH/27. They commenced to shadow. This was reported to the Commodore Commanding China Force.

By 0800GH/27, the Force had reached the latitude of Babi Island, and as no further information had been received, it again turned north until 0900GH/27. Capt. Howden, the Senior Officer, decided that if air reconnaissance reported that the enemy was not overwhelmingly superior he should engage by daylight. If they were superior he would proceed eastwards to join the Eastern Striking Force in the Surabaya area which had been reported to be expected to proceed westwards to Batavia.

At 1000GH/27, the Force was back in the vicinity of Babi Island and in view of the danger of submarine attack Capt. Howden decided it was not wise to remain in the same area for too long, therefore the Force proceeded to the south-east and then northwards towards the South Watcher Island.

The Commodore Commanding China Force stated in his signal timed 0315Z/27 that air reconnaissance had failed to locate any enemy forces south of Banka therefore Capt. Howden decided to return to Batavia informing the Commodore of his intentions.

As the Force was approaching Edam Island around 1200GH/27 enemy aircraft were sighted but they did not attack. Fires were observed on shore so probably they had already expended their bombs.

At 1305GH/27, eight aircraft approached and dropped a large quantity of small calibre bombs. HMAS Hobart sustained some splinter damage and five ratings were wounded.

The Force entered Tandjong Priok around 1420GH/27. (69)

28 Feb 1942

Operations by the Western Striking Force from 28 February 1942 to 5 March 1942.

The initial object of the operations was to intercept and engage a reported Japanese invasion force.

Around 0045GH/28, the Western Striking Force, made up of the made up of the light cruisers HMAS Hobart (Capt. H.L. Howden, CBE, RAN), HMS Danae (Capt. F.J. Butler, MBE, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and the destroyers HMS Tenedos (Lt. R. Dyer, RN) and HrMs Evertsen (Lt.Cdr. W.M. de Vries, RNN) departed Tandjong Priok (Batavia), in accordance with the Commodore Commanding China Force's signal timed 1021Z/27. An enemy landing force made up of thirty transports escorted by four cruisers and three destroyers had been reported at 1022GH/27 in position 04°20'S, 106°28'E. The Western Task Force had been unable so sail earlier due to delays in fuelling caused by Japanese air attacks. The destroyer HMS Scout (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) H. Lambton, RN) which had departed earlier for Tjilatjap had been recalled and joined the Western Task Force three miles south of Edam Island.

Capt. Howden, the Senior Officer, decided to proceed direct to the vicinity of the northern entrance to the Sunda Strait and then to sweep northward to engage the enemy which he thought to be en-route to Bantam Bay, the most likely place to land.

The Western Task Force arrived in position 05°48'S, 105°56'E at 0420GH/28. Course was then altered to the northward. Except for intermittent rain squalls the visibility was good. As no enemy had been sighted by 0500GH/28, course was altered to the southward. The passage of Sunda Strait was made at the Force's maximum speed of 24 knots. HrMs Evertsen had been lost out of sight in the darkness. She had not been seen after around 0400GH/28.

At 0650GH/28, when in position 06°04'S, 105°48'E, HMS Scout dropped astern to rescue a men she sighted on a raft. A lot of wreckage was sighted during the passage of the Sunda Straits.

In order to conserve fuel, speed was reduced to 22 knots at 0850GH/28, to 19 knots at 1000GH/28 and 18 knots at 1600GH/28.

At 2340GH/28, a signal was received from HMAS Perth that she had sighted a destroyer, later amended to being a cruiser.

At 2359GH/28, when in position 04°30'S, 101°05'E, the destroyers were detached to proceed ahead to fuel at Padang. The cruisers reduced speed to 15 knots. The destroyers were sent ahead in order to reduce the time the cruisers had to wait for the destroyers to rejoin. During the passage of the Seaflower Channel [between Siberut and Sipura island] the cruisers inceased speed again.

The cruisers arrived in position 260° Pandan Light 10 miles at 1740GH/1 and zigzagged between that position and Nyamuk Light. It had been hoped that the destroyers would be able to leave harbour around 1800 hours but this did not materialise. HMS Tenedos was seen passing Pandan Island at 2120GH/1 and at 2140GH/1 she secured alongside HMAS Hobart to transfer 512 evacuees. She reported that HMS Scout had previously left harbour with another load of evacuees but that she had to return due to contaminated oil fuel tanks.

In view of the long delay which would be entained in waiting for HMS Scout, Capt. Howden decided to proceed ahead with HMS Tenedos via Siberut Strait [to the north of Siberut Island] and then pass through position 00.32'S, 97.10'E at 15 knots towards the position where the RFA tanker Appleleaf (5891 GRT, built 1917) should be. HMS Dragon, HMS Danae and HMS Scout were then to overtake. HMAS Hobart and HMS Tenedos therefore parted company with HMS Dragon and HMS Danae at 2207GH/1 by which time the evacuees had been transferred. HMS Dragon, HMS Danae and HMS Scout were able to proceed at 0530GH/2. They were ordered to rejoin during daylight on 3 March.

At 0150G/3, the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet's signal 1635Z/2 was received by HMAS Hobart but it could not be decyphered owing to area tables for the East Indies Station not being held. Capt. Howden reduced speed to 8 knots to allow HMS Dragon, HMS Danae and HMS Scout to join around dawn and all ships were in company at 0751G/3.

HMS Dragon had been able to decypher the signal and it stated that auxiliary patrol ship HMS Kedah (Cdr.(Retd.) J.L. Sinclair, DSO, RD, RNR) was in trouble and that her speed had been reduced to three knots. Her position was 02°10'S, 90°40'E. HMS Dragon was then detached after transferring her 136 evacuees to HMAS Hobart at 1115G/3. She was to complete with fuel from the Appleleaf who was estimated to be 40 to 50 miles ahead and then to proceed to the assistance of HMS Kedah. HMS Danae and the destroyers were ordered to proceed ahead, made contact with the Appleleaf to inform her of the oil requirements of HMS Dragon.

A 1033FG/4, the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet's signal 0305Z/4 was received instructing Capt. Howden to proceed with all his ships to Colombo if sufficient fuel remained. The Force therefore altered course for Colombo at 1100FG/4 when in position 05°32'N, 86°45'E.

At 1000F/5, when in position 05°47'N, 79°56'E, HMAS Hobart parted company with HMS Danae, HMS Scout and HMS Tenedos, to proceed ahead at 28 knots so as to arrive 2 hours and 20 minutes earlier then the other ships so as to avoid congestion in the harbour. En-route HMAS Hobart ran a full power trial for 40 minutes to see if any defects might have developed due to the recent near misses from bombing. The results of the trial very highly satisfactory.

HMAS Hobart arrived at Colombo at 1333F/5.

HMS Danae, HMS Scout and HMS Tenedos arrived at Colombo around 1730F/5.

Around 1030F/7, HMS Dragon arrived with HMS Kedah in tow. She had fuelled from the Appleleaf during the afternoon of the 3rd and then proceeded towards the reported position of HMS Kedah which she sighted at 0229G/5 and had her in tow around 0730G/5.

(70)

13 Mar 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) is docked at Colombo. (71)

20 Mar 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) is undocked. (71)

29 Mar 1942

Operations by the Eastern Fleet from 29 March to 13 April 1942.
Enemy air attacks on Colombo and later Trincomalee and the loss of HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall on 5 April 1942 and HMS Hermes, HMAS Vampire on 9 April 1942.

Dispositions of the Eastern Fleet on 29 March 1942.

On 29 March 1942 the disposition of the Eastern Fleet was as follows;
At Colombo:
Aircraft carrier HMS Formidable (Capt. A.W.LaT. Bisset, RN), heavy cruisers HMS Dorsetshire (Capt. A.W.S. Agar, VC, DSO, RN) (refitting) and HMS Cornwall (Capt. P.C.W. Manwaring, RN), light cruisers HMS Enterprise (Capt. J.C.A. Annesley, DSO, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and HMS Caledon (A/Capt. H.J. Haynes, DSO, DSC, RN), the destroyers HMS Paladin (Cdr. A.D. Pugsley, RN), HMS Panther (Lt.Cdr. R.W. Jocelyn, RN), HMAS Nestor (Cdr. A.S. Rosenthal, DSO and Bar, RAN), HMS Hotspur (Lt. T.D. Herrick, DSC, RN), HMS Arrow (Cdr. A.M. McKillop, RN) and HMS Express (Lt.Cdr. F.J. Cartwright, RN).

At Trincomalee:
The flagship of the Eastern Fleet, the battleship HMS Warspite (Capt. F.E.P. Hutton, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral J.F. Somerville, KCB, KBE, DSO, RN), the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes (Capt. R.F.J. Onslow, DSC, MVO, RN), light cruisers HMS Emerald (Capt. F.C. Flynn, RN) and HrMs Jacob van Heemskerck (Cdr. E.J. van Holte, RNN), the destroyer HMAS Vampire (Cdr. W.T.A. Moran, RAN). HMS Warspite departed Trincomalee this day and arrived at Colombo in the evening. HMS Hermes and HMAS Vampire also departed Trincomalee on the 29th.

At Addu Atoll;
The battleships HMS Resolution (Capt. A.R. Halfhide, CBE, RN , flying the flag of A/Vice-Admiral A.U. Willis, DSO, RN, second in command Eastern Fleet), HMS Ramillies (Capt. D.N.C. Tufnell, DSC, RN), HMS Royal Sovereign (Capt. R.H. Portal, DSC, RN), HMS Revenge (Capt. L.V. Morgan, CBE, MVO, DSC, RN) the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable (Capt. T.H. Troubridge, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral D.W. Boyd, CBE, DSC, RN) and the destroyers HMAS Napier (Capt. S.H.T. Arliss, DSO, RN), HMAS Norman (Cdr. H.M. Burrell, RAN), HMAS Nizam (Lt.Cdr. M.J. Clark, DSC, RAN), HMS Fortune (Lt.Cdr. R.D.H.S. Pankhurst, RN), HMS Foxhound (Cdr. G.H. Peters, DSC, RN), HMS Griffin (Capt. H.St.L. Nicolson, DSO, RN), HMS Decoy (Lt.Cdr. G.I.M. Balfour, RN) and HrMs Isaac Sweers (Cdr. W. Harmsen, RNN).

The Japanese had been operating in the Indian Ocean in early March and more attacks were expected in this area by the Allies. The most likely target would be the island of Ceylon and the harbours of Colombo and Trincomalee.

30 and 31 March 1942.

Planning

Admiral Somerville therefore planned to concentrate the Eastern Fleet on the late afternoon / early evening of 31 March 1942 in position 04°40’N, 81°00’E. The fleet would then be divided in two groups; Force A (the fast division) was made up of the flagships, battleship HMS Warspite, both fleet carriers, HMS Indomitable and HMS Formidable. They were escorted by the cruisers HMS Cornwall, HMS Enterprise, HMS Emerald and six destroyers; HMAS Napier, HMAS Nestor, HMS Paladin, HMS Panther, HMS Hotspur and HMS Foxhound. This force would try to intercept the enemy and deliver a night air attack on the enemy with their carriers as the main target.

Force A would be covered by the slower Force B which was made up of the battleships HMS Resolution, HMS Ramillies, HMS Royal Sovereign and the light carrier HMS Hermes. Escort to these ships was proviced by the cruisers HMS Dragon, HMS Caledon, HrMs Jacob van Heemskerck and a total of eight destroyers HMS Griffin, HMS Decoy, HMAS Norman, HMS Fortune, HrMs Isaac Sweers, HMS Arrow and one of the old destroyers that had managed to escape from the China station also joined, this was HMS Scout (Lt.Cdr.(Retd.) H. Lambton, RN). They were to remain about 20 nautical miles to the west of Force A. If Force A encountered a superior enemy force the would withdraw towards Force B.

At 1400/30 the ships mentioned earlier at the top of this article departed Colombo. HMS Hotspur and HMAS Nestor carried out an A/S sweep of the searched channel before Force A sailed.

By 1600/31 the fleet had made the pre-arranged rendez-vous and formed up. It then proceeded northwards. After dark, to avoid detection from the air by the enemy, Force A altered course to 080° and proceeded at 15 knots until about 0230 hours when it was thought they would be in the estimated position from where the enemy would fly off their aircraft for the expected attack on Ceylon. If nothing was sighted or located by 0230/1, Force A was to turn back to the south-west and to withdraw outside the enemy’s air search area. Force B was to act as a supporting force for Force A, keeping 20 miles to the west of it and confirming to the movements of Force A through the night. This procedure was carried out as planned during the night of 31 March / 1 April but nothing was seen or located.

In the late afternoon / early evening of 31 March HMS Indomitable briefly separated from the fleet for flying operations during which she was escorted by HMS Emerald. From 2100/31 to 0600/1 a search was carried out, to a depth of 120 miles from 050° to 110°, by three A.S.V. fitted Albacores from HMS Formidable. Also two Albacores fitted with long-range tanks were kept standing by for shadowing purposes if required. One of the Albacores crash landed on HMS Formidable upon return at 0340/1.

1 April 1942.

At 0940 hours HMS Decoy reported the breakdown of her main feed pumps. She was detached to Colombo to effect repairs.

Around noon several of the destroyers reported submerged contacts. HMS Scout reported sighting a periscope. The fleet took avoiding action in each case, but nothing further transpired from these contact which are now considered to be non-sub.

At 1400 hours, HMS Scout, one of the oldest destroyers of the Royal Navy with a short enducance, was detached to oil at sea from RFA Appleleaf (5892 GRT, built 1917, Master E. Mills) in position 04°00’N, 80°00’E. Upon completion of oiling HMS Scout was to proceed to position 05°40’N, 81°08’E by 0800/2. RFA Appleleaf and her escort, HMS Shoreham (Cdr. E. Hewitt, RD, RNR), were to proceed towards a new waiting position 05°00’N, 80°30’E.

In the afternoon, around 1420 hours, HMS Dorsetshire joined Force A. This cruiser had been refitting at Colombo but this refit was cut short to enable her to take part in this operation. Air searches were carried out from Ceylon as the days before but they sighted nothing of the enemy. Also from 1430/1800 hours a search was carried out by aircraft from HMS Indomitable between 142° to 207° to a depth of 215 miles. Admiral Somerville decided to carry out the same sweep to the north-east as had been done the previous night. Again nothing was seen and Force A made rendez-vous with Force B at daybreak on 2 April 1942.

2 April 1942.

At 0800 hours the destroyers HMS Fortune and HMAS Vampire were detached to fuel from RFA Appleleaf in position 05°00’N, 80°30’E. and an Albacore was ordered to search for HMS Scout and order her to rejoin the fleet. Shortly after noon the fleet sighted RFA Appleleaf, HMS Shoreham, HMS Fortune and HMAS Vampire. The last two ships then rejoined the fleet while the tanker and it’s escort were ordered to proceed towards Colombo at 1200/3.

During the day the Eastern Fleet cruised in an area about 50 miles further to the west then the previous day to avoid being detected by enemy submarines that had been reported. Throughout the day several of the escorting destroyers obtained unconfirmed echoes. Two more destroyers fuelled during the afternoon, HMAS Napier and HMS Arrow took in fuel from HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall.

As the enemy had not shown herself by 2100 hours, Admiral Somerville decided to proceed to Addu Atoll to fuel and to take on fresh water as the R-class battleships were running out of this as they had been unable to top up at Addu Atoll before they sailed.

3 April 1942.

At 0520 hours, the destroyer HMS Fortune was detached to search for survivors from the merchant vessel Glensheil (9415 GRT, built 1924) that had been torpedoed by the Japanese submarine I-7 in position 00°48’S, 78°35’E at 0230 hours. HMS Fortune picked up 88 survivors and then proceeded to Addu Atoll where she arrived at 1130/4.

As at this time Admiral Somerville felt confident that something must have held up the Japanese or that their intentions were incorrectly appreciated. At 0940 hours, he sent HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall to Colombo. The former to continue her refit and the latter to act as escort for the Australian troop convoy SU 4. HMS Hermes and the destroyer HMAS Vampire were also detached but to Trincomalee as HMS Hermes was to prepare for the upcoming operation ‘Ironclad’, the attack on Madagascar. HMS Hermes and HMAS Vampire arrived at Trincomalee on the 4th.

Late in the morning three of the destroyers of the screen oiled from the battleships; HMAS Norman from HMS Warspite, HMS Griffin from HMS Revenge and HMS Foxhound from HMS Royal Sovereign.

At 1820 hours Force A proceeded ahead to Addu Atoll at 19 knots followed by Force B at 15 knots. Force A arrived at Addu Atoll at 1200/4. Force B at 1500/4.

4 April 1942.

In the early morning hours, and while approaching Addu Atoll, a simulated air strike was carried out on Force B by aircraft from HMS Indomitable and HMS Formidable. One aircraft crashed into the sea, it’s crew was picked up by the Dutch AA-cruiser Jacob van Heemskerck. A second simulated air attack was made on Force A later in the morning.

At 1630 hours, Admiral Somerville received a report that a large enemy force was in position 00°40’N, 83°10’E at 1605/F. Enemy course was 315°. Shortly afterwards this report was confirmed by another report in which they gave an enemy course of 330°. This positioned the enemy in a position 155° from Dondra Head, 360 miles, the distance from Addu Atoll being 085°, 600 miles. There was no indication about the composition of this force.

The condition of the Eastern Fleet at Addu Atoll at that time was as follows; Owning to the limited number of oilers available, the vessels comprising Force A had taken about half their fuel and Force B had not yet commenced fuelling. In addition the ‘R’-class battleships were very short of water which had to be taken in before they could sail. This meant that Force A could sail immediately, minus HMS Emerald and HMS Enterprise. These cruisers could sail shortly after midnight. Force B could not leave until 0700 hours the following morning at the earliest.

It appeared that the enemy’s probable plan was as follows. All the evidence supported Admiral Somerville’s original appreciation that the enemy would attack Colombo (and possibly Trincomalee) with carrier borne aircraft either before dawn or shortly afterwards and would return to the carriers in a position about 150 miles south-east of Ceylon. On completion the whole force would then withdraw to the east. The enemy’s reported position made it apparent that this attack was to be made on the morning of 5 April 1942.

Admiral Somerville considered his possible courses of action were as follows: 1) Force A, less HMS Emerald and HMS Enterprise to proceed immediately at best speed to the area to the south of Ceylon and to be joined there by HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall coming from Colombo and attack any enemy force located. 2) Delay the sailing of Force A until HMS Emerald and HMS Enterprise, valuable units with their strong torpedo armament, had completed refuelling and sail about midnight. Force B could sail in the morning of the 5th and follow astern to act as a supporting force. 3) Delay the sailing of Force A until both force could leave together on the morning of the 5th. 4) Force A and Force B would remain at Addu Atoll and leave the RAF to deal with the enemy attack.

The choise Admiral Somerville made was governed by the following considerations: 1) First and foremost the total defence of the Indian Ocean and it’s vital lines of communication depend on the existence of the Eastern Fleet. The longer this fleet remained ‘in being’ the longer it would limit and check the enemy’s advances against Ceylon and further west. This major policy of retaining ‘a fleet in being’, already approved by Their Lordships, was, in Admiral Somerville’s opinion, paramount. 2) The only hope of dealing the enemy an affective blow was by means of a carrier borne air striking force preferably at night. To operate both carriers escorted by HMS Warspite out of supporting distance of the ‘R’-class battleships would offer the enemy an opportunity to cripple our only offensive weapon. Admiral Somerville considered it a cardinal point in any operation the Force A should not proceed out of the supporting distance from Force B unless it could be presumed that that enemy capital ships would not be encountered. 3) No matter what course of action Admiral Somerville would take the enemy force could not be intercepted either before or during the attack on Ceylon on the morning of the 5th. The only hope was that the air striking force from Ceylon might inflict damage to the enemy so that the Eastern Fleet could ‘finish them off’, or that the enemy attack on Ceylon would be delayed 24 hours.

Admiral Somerville therefore decided to adopt ‘plan 2’. So he sailed Force A including both E-class cruisers at midnight and ordered Force B to proceed as early as possible the following morning.

Admiral Somerville therefore instructed HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall to sail from Colombo and to make rendez-vous with Force A at 1600/5 in position 00°58’N, 77°36’E. The position of this rendez-vous was based on their expected time of departure from Colombo and estimated as being the earliest possible time at which they could cross the track of Force A, taking into consideration that HMS Dorsetshire had resumed her refit and was at extended notice. Admiral Somerville considered that the course to be steered should take them well clear of any enemy forces operating in the vicinity. Actually these instructions had been anticipated by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet and these two cruisers, at his discretion, sailed at 2300/4 for Addu Atoll. On receipt of the signal from Admiral Somerville the Deputy Commander-in-Chief amended his instructions accordingly at 0409/5.

5 April 1942.

Force A sailed from Addu Atoll at 0015 hours and proceeded 070° at 18 knots towards a position which would bring it 250 miles south of Ceylon by dawn on the 6th. Shortly before departure the destroyer HMS Hotspur conducted an A/S search of the entrance to Addu Atoll.

During the night Admiral Somerville received reports from the Catalina reconnaissance aircraft on patrol from Ceylon of an enemy destroyer in position 01°59’N, 82°20’E, course 315°, speed 20 knots; six enemy destroyers in position 02°54’N, 82°10’E, course 325°, speed 21 knots; and at 0701 hours a report of one battleship, two cruisers an four other ships in position 195°, Dondra Head, 110 miles. Later this message was subsequently amplified to the effect that the vessels previously reported were definitely hostile and consisted of two battleships, two cruisers and destroyers.

At about 0825 hours an air raid on shipping and harbour facilities at Colombo was commenced in which some 75 aircraft were taking part. These were later reported to be mainly Navy ‘O’ fighters, armed with one bomb each. This enemy force withdrew from Colombo before 0900 hours and was seen by several merchant ships to the south-west of Ceylon probably returning to the carriers. In several cases these merchant were machine gunned.

From 0645 hours an air A/S patrol was maintained ahead of the fleet. HMS Indomitable also sent four Fulmars to commence a search to the eastward. This search covered the area between the arcs 055° to 105° to a depth of 215 miles. It proved negative except for the sighting of an enemy seaplane at 0855 hours, 076°, 150 miles from Force A. This suggested that the enemy was carrying out reconnaissance in a south-westerly direction by means of cruiser aircraft, or a seaplane carrier, in a position 70 miles of the main enemy force. There was no indication that this aircraft sighted any of our surface forces or our air search.

Between 0702 and 1145 hours, Admiral Somerville received reports of battleships in approximate positions 03°55’N, 80°40’E, steering 290° at 0648 hours, steering 120° at 0730 hours, and at 1004 hours in position 04°00’N, 80°25’E steering 282°. This suggested that the battleships were making time while the carriers recovered their aircraft. The estimated position of HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall at this time was 150 miles from the enemy and opening.

At 1327 hours a mutilated ‘Shad’ signal was received from what was thought to be Colombo but was identified half an hour later as coming from HMS Dorsetshire whose position was estimated as being 037°, 90 miles from Force A at 1400 hours. No contact could be established.

At 1344 hours an enemy air formation was detected by RD/F, 030°, 84 miles from Force A. This had faded after five minutes and it later it became clear that this was the enemy attacking the Dorsetshire and Cornwall. At 1552 hours, a reconnaissance aircraft from Force A, reported wreckage in position 02°08’N, 78°08’E.

The destroyer HMS Panther was then detached to search but was recalled about one hour later when a reconnaissance aircraft from Force A reported a force of 5 ‘unknown’ ships in position 03°38’N, 78°18’E at 100 hours. There was no indication of the course or speed of the enemy but it could be either a force previously unreported or the force previously and last reported 1004 hours.

No relief shadowers were however sent off by the Rear-Admiral aircraft carriers as soon s the report was received and Admiral Somerville omitted to obtain confirmation that this had been done. At 1700 hours, Admiral Somerville, received a report from Ceylon that there were indications of enemy aircraft carriers steering 230° at 24 knots from an unknown position at 1400 hours. This was thought to be subsequent to the attack on our 8” cruisers and Admiral Somerville’s deductions from this enemy moves were as follows. If the enemy held on this course they would at 0400 be in a position to deliver a night attack on Addu Atoll. This seemed quite a possible course of action. In any case it was necessary for Force A to keep clear to the southward and for Force B (estimated to be 135 miles astern of Force A) to steer to the southward so that Force A and B could close for supporting action at daylight the following morning (April 6th). It was also necessary for Force B to steer to the southward to keep clear of the enemy carrier force should it be proceeding to attack Addu Atoll.

At 1726 hours, therefore, Force A altered course to 210° at 18 knots and a signal was made to Vice-Admiral second-in-Command and to HMS Dorsetshire to steer south, although at this time Admiral Somerville feared about the fate of the two heavy cruisers. As he had received no signal from them that they had been attacked he thought it possible they had escaped and maintained W/T silence.

At 1800 hours Admiral Somerville received a signal from the Rear-Admiral Aircraft Carriers, stating that a reconnaissance aircraft reported the estimated enemy position as 020°, 120 miles at 1710 hours. This position was very close to the previous position reported at 1600 hours. The course of the enemy had not been given in either of these reports but the positions fitted in well with the course received earlier (230°).

At 1817 hours, a further signal was received from the Rear-Admiral Aircraft Carriers, adjusting the 1600 hours position of the enemy’s force, amplifying it to include two carriers and three unknown vessels and giving the course north-west. This was the first indication Admiral Somerville had of the enemy now proceeding to the north-west. He immediately ordered force A to alter course to 315° and instructed the Vice-Admiral, second-in-Command to conform. These movements had to object of keeping Force A within night air striking distance of the enemy force, trusting to an A.S.V. (airborne surface vessel radar) search to locate the enemy and to bring Force B within supporting distance should it be necessary to retire in that direction. A dawn rendez-vous was arranged with Force B in approximate position 03°00’N, 75°00’E.

As no news had been received of HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall it was assumed they had been sunk.

At 1930 hours a night search with A.S.V. aircraft was commenced to cover the sector 345° to 030° to a depth of 180 nautical miles. Northing was located on this search.

6 April 1942.

From 2100/5 to 0600/6 further A.S.V. searches were carried out to cover the sector 020° to 080° to a depth of 200 miles. These searches also failed to make any contact with the enemy but reported that Force B was 220°, 25 miles from Force A at 0400 hours.

At 0615 hours, Force A altered course to 135° and sighted Force B ten minutes later. By 0720 hours the Fleet was formed up and course was altered to 090°.

Whilst no furher information had been received regarding the enemy’s movements nothing had occurred to diminish the possibility of the enemy’s being in the vicinity of Addu Atoll, either to attack it by air this morning or to await the return of the Eastern Fleet.

Admiral Somerville intended to keep clear of the superior enemy forces by day. It was still his intention to get into a position to attack them with a night air striking force on their possible return from at Addu Atoll area, and also rescue the possible survivors from HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall. He therefore steered east and at 1115 hours course was altered to south-east in the direction of the wreckage that had been reported the previous evening. During the morning reports came in from merchant ships being attacked in the Bay of Bengal. There must be a second Japanese force operating there.

At 1300 hours HMS Enterprise, HMS Paladin and HMS Panther were detached to search for survivors in the vicinity of the wreckage position. Air search was provided to assist and fighter escort was sent to cover the operation. These ships were successful in picking up a total of 1122 survivors from both heavy cruisers. They rejoined the fleet at noon the following day. At 1800/6, when about 50 miles from the wreckage position course was reversed and the fleet retired to the north-west. All-round air searches were carried out to a depth of 200 miles but again nothing was seen.

At about 1400 hours a signal was received from the C-in-C, Ceylon estimating that a strong Japanese force was still somewhere between Addu Atoll and Colombo. Admiral Somerville therefore decided to keep clear of the Addu area until daylight on the 7th.

7 April 1942.

At 0200 hours the Eastern Fleet altered course to the west, 270°.

At 0427 hours, an A.S.V. aircraft located two submarines in position 02°08’N, 75°16’E and 02°46’N, 75°10’E, to the southward of the course of the Eastern Fleet. This indicated that the possibility of an enemy submarine patrol having been established to cover the eastern approaches to Addu Atoll. Admiral Somerville therefore decided to pass through Veimandu Channel to the west of the Maldives and make an unexpected approach to Addu Atoll from the west. At 0700 hours the course of the fleet was altered to 210°.

At 1335 hours, HMS Fortune was detached to investigate a ship contact made by HMS Emerald but no ship was sighted. Fortune only rejoined the fleet at about 0600/8.

At 1600 hours, HMS Enterprise, HMS Paladin and HMS Panther rejoined with the survivors they had picked up and medical stores were transferred from HMS Warspite to HMS Paladin for treatment of the wounded. Enterprise and Paladin were then detached to proceed immediately to Addu Atoll.

At 2100 hours, the Eastern Fleet altered course to 160°.

8 April 1942.

At 0700 hours aircraft were flown off from the carriers to carry out an all-round search to a depth of 175 miles. Again nothing was seen and at 1100 hours the Eastern Fleet entered Addu Atoll. Refuelling commenced immediately, Force B being refuelled first.

Admiral Somerville held a conference on board HMS Warspite with Flag and Commanding Officers in the afternoon.

Having discussed the situation Admiral Somerville decided to sent Force B to Kilindini and to proceed to Bombay with Force A. This later decision coincided with Their Lordships views as later in the day he received Their Lordships instructions that Force A was not to be sent to Colombo for the time being. Further by proceeding to Bombay the could arrange a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief, India and discuss the situation in the Far East with him.

At 1800 hours HMAS Nestor departed Addu Atoll to maintain an A/S patrol in the sector between 090° to 150° to a depth of 35 miles from the Port War Signal Station. One hour earlier HMS Resolution launched her Walrus aircraft for a ‘round the island’ A/S patrol. It returned at dusk.

9 April 1942.

Force B (less HMS Dragon sailed for Kilindini at 0200 hours where it was due to arrive on April 15th. Force A sailed at 0600 hours for Bombay shaping course to pass to the westward of the Maldives.

During the morning Admiral Somerville was informed of further Japanese attacks in the Bay of Bengal and on Trincomalee and the sinking of several ships, including HMS Hermes and HMAS Vampire but nothing could be done about this.

10 April 1942.

At 1000 hours HMS Paladin closed HMS Warspite to transfer Staff Officers for passage to Colombo where they were to inform the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet of Admiral Somerville’s views and make preliminary arrangements to transfer Admiral Somerville’s administrative staff and secretariat to Kilindini.

11 April 1942.

At 0705 hours, HMS Paladin rejoined Force A bringing back the Staff Officers who had been transferred to her on 10 April and also Rear-Admiral Danckwerts, Admiral Somerville’s Chief of Staff ashore.

Force A arrived at Bombay in the morning of the 13th (1040 hours) and commenced oiling.

Japanese operation in the Indian Ocean in late March 1942 and April 1942.

On 26 March 1942, the 1st Japanese Carrier Fleet departed Staring Bay, Celebes, Netherlands East Indies for a raid on Ceylon. This Fleet was made up of the aircraft carriers Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku, battlecruisers Kongo, Haruna, Hiei, Kirishima, heavy cruisers Tone, Chikuma and the destroyers Urakaze, Tanikaze, Isokaze, Hamakaze, Kasumi, Arare, Kagero, Shiranuhi and Akigumo. This force then proceeded west of Timor and to a position to the south of Java where they fuelled from oilers on April 1st.

On 27 March the Japanese submarines I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6 and I-7 departed Penang to take up positions in the Indian Ocean for the upcoming operation.

On 1 April the Japanese Mayala Force departed Mergui for operations in the Bay of Bengal. This force was made up of the heavy cruisers Chokai, Kumano, Mikuma, Mogami, Suzuya, aircraft carrier Ryujo, light cruiser Yura, and the destroyers Fubuki, Shirayuki, Hatsuyuki and Murakumo. On 4 April the estroyers were substituted for four other destroyers; Amagiri, Asagiri, Shirakumo and Yugiri.

On 5 April the Japanse 1st Carrier Fleet launched their air attack on Colombo. 53 bombers, 38 dive bombers and 36 fighters were launched. They destroyed 19 Hurricane fighters, 1 Fulmar fighter and 6 Swordfish torpedo bombers. At Colombo the harbour facilities were heavily damaged and the armed merchant cruiser HMS Hector and destroyer HMS Tenedos were sunk.

Then around noon a reconnaissance aircraft from the Tone sighted the heavy cruisers HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall. The 1st Carrier Fleet immediately launched an attack force of 53 dive bombers that sank both cruisers with the loss of 424 members of their crews (Dorsetshire 234 and Cornwall 190). The Japanese then retired to the south-east.

In the evening of 5 April the Japanese Malaya-Force was ordered to commence attacking Allied shipping along the Indian east coast. On 6 April the northern group (Kumano, Suzuya and Shirakumo destroyed 9 ships off Puri (Orissa). The central group (Chokai, Yura, Asagiri and Yugiri) sank 4 ships. The southern group (Mikuma, Mogami and Amagiri sank 3 ships and damaged 2 more. Meanwhile aircraft from the carrier Ryuju, which operated with the central group, sank 4 more ships and damaged 1 more. In all about 92000 GRT of shipping was sunk.

On 8 April 1942 a Catalina aircraft spotted the Japanese 1st Carrier Fleet proceeding for an attack on Trincomalee but the Eastern Fleet was approaching Addu Atoll to refuel and could do nothing. Shipping at Trincomalee was ordered to leave port and proceed to the southward. In the morning of the following day 91 Japanese bombers and 41 fighters attacked Trincomalee. They destoyed 9 Hurricane and Fulmar fighters and 14 aircraft on the ground. The harbour most mostly empty but they sank a merchant vessel and 4 aircraft it had on board and not unloaded yet. Also the British monitor HMS Erebus (Capt. H.F. Nalder, RN) was damged. The Japanese 1st Carrier Fleet was then attacked by 9 Blenheim bombers but they inflicted no damage for 5 of their own lost to Japanese fighter cover. Then Japanese reconnaissance aircraft from the Haruna sighted ships escaping southwards. 85 Dive bombers and 3 fighters were then launched which sank HMS Hermes and HMAS Vampire as well as the corvette HMS Hollyhock (Lt.Cdr. T.E. Davies, OBE, RNR), two tankers and a merchant ship.

By mid-April 1942 all Japanese forces had returned to their bases. (72)

9 Apr 1942
Around 1040F/9, HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) departed Addu Atoll for Kilindini. (73)

17 Apr 1942
Around noon HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) arrived at Kilindini from Addu Atoll. (73)

23 Apr 1942
The battleship HMS Revenge (Capt. L.V. Morgan, CBE, MVO, DSC, RN), light cruisers HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Caledon (A/Capt. H.J. Haynes, DSO, DSC, RN) and the destroyers HMS Griffin (Capt. H.St.L. Nicolson, DSO, RN) and HMS Hotspur (Lt. T.D. Herrick, DSC, RN) conducted exercises off Kilindini.

Around 1300(-2u45min)/23, HMS Revenge and both destroyers parted company with the cruisers and proceeded southwards.

HMS Revenge was to proceed to Durban and was escorted by the destroyers until 0001/24 whey they parted company to return to Kilindini.

The light cruisers continued exercising until returning to Kilindini in the morning of the 24th. (74)

27 Apr 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Caledon (A/Capt. H.J. Haynes, DSO, DSC, RN) conducted exercises off Kilindini. (75)

29 Apr 1942
During 29/30 April 1942, the battleships HMS Resolution (Capt. A.R. Halfhide, CBE, RN , flying the flag of A/Vice-Admiral A.U. Willis, DSO, RN), HMS Royal Sovereign (Capt. R.H. Portal, DSC, RN). light cruisers HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Caledon (A/Capt. H.J. Haynes, DSO, DSC, RN) and the destroyers HMS Griffin (Capt. H.St.L. Nicolson, DSO, RN), HMS Hotspur (Lt. T.D. Herrick, DSC, RN) and HMS Fortune (Lt.Cdr. R.D.H.S. Pankhurst, RN), HMS Arrow (Cdr. A.M. McKillop, RN) and HrMs Isaac Sweers (Cdr. W. Harmsen, RNN) conducted exercises off Kilindini.

Upon completion of the exercises in the morning of the 30th, HMS Royal Sovereign, HMS Arrow and HrMs Isaac Sweers returned to Kilindini.

The other ships proceeded towards the Seychelles to make rendezvous with ' Force A' of the Eastern Fleet which was coming from down from the Ceylon area. They fuelled in the Seychelles area on 2 May. (76)

4 May 1942
At 0830/4, in position 11°00'S, 56°00'E, 'Force A', made up of the battleship HMS Warspite (Capt. F.E.P. Hutton, RN, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral J.F. Somerville, KCB, KBE, DSO, RN), aircraft carrier HMS Formidable (Capt. A.W.LaT. Bisset, RN), light cruisers HMS Newcastle (Capt. P.B.R.W. William-Powlett, DSO, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral W.G. Tennant, CB, MVO, RN), HMS Emerald (Capt. F.C. Flynn, RN), HMS Enterprise (Capt. J.C.A. Annesley, DSO, RN) and the destroyers HMAS Nestor (Cdr. A.S. Rosenthal, DSO and Bar, RAN), HMAS Norman (Cdr. H.M. Burrell, RAN), HMS Foxhound (Cdr. G.H. Peters, DSC, RN) and HMS Decoy (Lt.Cdr. G.I.M. Balfour, RN), made rendez-vous with 'Force B', made up of the battleship HMS Resolution (Capt. A.R. Halfhide, CBE, RN , flying the flag of A/Vice-Admiral A.U. Willis, DSO, RN), light cruisers HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Caledon (A/Capt. H.J. Haynes, DSO, DSC, RN) and the destroyers HMS Griffin (Capt. H.St.L. Nicolson, DSO, RN), HMS Hotspur (Lt. T.D. Herrick, DSC, RN) and HMS Fortune (Lt.Cdr. R.D.H.S. Pankhurst, RN).

The whole force then proceeded to the south-east but later they proceeded to the north-west again.

At 0700/5 they reached their pre-arranged position of 220 nautial miles 070° from Diego Suarez.

It was intended that the whole force (Force A and Force B) would proceed to Kilindini on the 6th if the landings in the north of Madagascar went well. But they did not go as planned and a cover force was required in the area longer. As several ships did not have the endurance (due to shortage of fuel and water that would develop in several ships), HMS Resolution, HMS Emerald, HMS Enterprise, HMS Dragon, HMS Caledon, HMS Griffin, HMS Hotspur and HMS Fortune were detached at noon on the 6th with orders to proceed to Kilindini.

'Force A' (now less the E-class cruisers) remained in the area to provide cover for 'Operation Ironclad' until 1700/7 when they too set course to proceed to Kilindini. (64)

8 May 1942
The battleship HMS Resolution (Capt. A.R. Halfhide, CBE, RN , flying the flag of A/Vice-Admiral A.U. Willis, DSO, RN), light cruisers HMS Emerald (Capt. F.C. Flynn, RN), HMS Enterprise (Capt. J.C.A. Annesley, DSO, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN) and HMS Caledon (A/Capt. H.J. Haynes, DSO, DSC, RN) and the destroyers HMS Griffin (Capt. H.St.L. Nicolson, DSO, RN), HMS Hotspur (Lt. T.D. Herrick, DSC, RN) and HMS Fortune (Lt.Cdr. R.D.H.S. Pankhurst, RN) arrived at Kilindini from operations off Madagascar. (77)

18 May 1942
Ships from the Eastern Fleet departed Kilindini in the morning for several days of exercises, these were; light cruisers HMS Caledon (A/Capt. H.J. Haynes, DSO, DSC, RN), HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HMS Emerald (Capt. F.C. Flynn, RN), HMS Enterprise (Capt. J.C.A. Annesley, DSO, RN) and the destroyers HMS Decoy (Lt.Cdr. G.I.M. Balfour, RN), HMS Fortune (Lt.Cdr. R.D.H.S. Pankhurst, RN), HMS Griffin (Capt. H.St.L. Nicolson, DSO, RN), HMS Hotspur (Lt. T.D. Herrick, DSC, RN) and HMAS Norman (Cdr. H.M. Burrell, RAN).

They were joined in the afternoon by the battleships HMS Revenge (Capt. L.V. Morgan, CBE, MVO, DSC, RN, flying the flag of A/Vice-Admiral A.U. Willis, DSO, RN), HMS Warspite (Capt. F.E.P. Hutton, RN) (the C-in-C had transferred his flag to HMS Adamant temporary), light cruisers HMS Newcastle (Capt. P.B.R.W. William-Powlett, DSO, RN), HMS Birmingham (Capt. H.B. Crane, RN) and the destroyers HMAS Napier (Capt. S.H.T. Arliss, DSO, RN), HMAS Nestor (Cdr. A.S. Rosenthal, DSO and Bar, RAN) and HMS Foxhound (Cdr. G.H. Peters, DSC, RN).

Exercises continued on 19 and 20 May although several ships returned to harbour. HMS Dauntless (A/Capt. J.G. Hewitt, DSO, RN) joined the exercises on the 19th.

At dawn on the 20th the last exercises were concluded and the ships proceeded as follows;

HMS Revenge, HMS Warspite, HMS Dauntless, HMS Caledon, HMAS Napier, HMAS Nestor, HMAS Norman and HMS Foxhound proceeded to Zanzibar.

HMS Newcastle, HMS Birmingham, HMS Griffin, HMS Fortune and HMS Decoy proceeded to Tanga, returning to Kilindini the following day.

HMS Emerald and HMS Enterprise proceeded to Manza Bay.

At dawn on 21 May, HMS Caledon and HMS Dauntless departed Zanzibar for Tanga where they were to join the ships that had proceeded there on their departure from Tanga.

Around 0800 hours all the other ships left their anchorages and proceeded to sea. Some ships were to conduct gunnery exercises (including night exercises), these were; HMS Revenge, HMS Warspite, HMS Decoy and HMAS Napier. They used a target that was being towed by HMS Dragon which had come from Kilindini.

The other ships returned to Kilindini on that day.

The ships that had been involved in the gunnery exercises returned to Kilindili on 22 May. (78)

29 May 1942
From 29 to 31 May 1942, the light cruisers HMS Danae (Capt. M.S. Slattery, RN), HMS Dauntless (A/Capt. J.G. Hewitt, DSO, RN), HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) and HMS Caledon (A/Capt. H.J. Haynes, DSO, DSC, RN) conducted exercises off Mombasa. During gunnery exercises they used a target that was being towed by HMS Guardian (A/Capt. H.A.C. Lane, RN). (79)

6 Jun 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) departed Kilindini to patrol off the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel. (80)

9 Jun 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) returned to Kilindini from patrol. (80)

11 Jun 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) departed Kilindini to patrol off Kilindini. (80)

13 Jun 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) returned to Kilindini from patrol. (80)

14 Jun 1942
The battleship HMS Revenge (Capt. L.V. Morgan, CBE, MVO, DSC, RN, flying the flag of A/Vice-Admiral A.U. Willis, DSO, RN, second in command Eastern Fleet), light cruiser HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) and the destroyers HMS Anthony (Lt.Cdr. J.M. Hodges, RN) and HMS Foxhound (Cdr. G.H. Peters, DSC, RN) departed Kilindini for Durban. (81)

19 Jun 1942
The battleship HMS Revenge (Capt. L.V. Morgan, CBE, MVO, DSC, RN, flying the flag of A/Vice-Admiral A.U. Willis, DSO, RN, second in command Eastern Fleet), light cruiser HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) and the destroyers HMS Anthony (Lt.Cdr. J.M. Hodges, RN) and HMS Foxhound (Cdr. G.H. Peters, DSC, RN) arrived at Durban from Kilindini. (82)

20 Jun 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) departed Durban for Simonstown. (80)

21 Jun 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) made a short stop at Port Elizabeth before continuing her passage. (80)

23 Jun 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) arrived at Simonstown from Durban via Port Elizabeth. (80)

25 Jun 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) proceeded from Simonstown to Capetown where she was immediately docked. (80)

8 Jul 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) is undocked. (83)

9 Jul 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) proceeded from Capetown to Simonstown. (83)

11 Jul 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) conducted D/F calibration trials in False Bay on completion of which she departed for Durban. (83)

13 Jul 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) arrived at Durban from Simonstown. (83)

14 Jul 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) departed Durban escorting the troopship Brittanic (British, 26943 GRT, built 1930) towards the Diego Suarez area. The troopship was to proceed to Bombay.

HMS Dragon arrived at Diego Suarez on 19 July 1942, the troopship then proceeded unescorted to Bombay arriving there on 27 July 1942. (83)

19 Jul 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) departed Diego Suarez for Durban escorting the troopship Monarch of Bermuda (British, 22424 GRT, built 1931). (83)

25 Jul 1942
HMS Dragon (A/Capt. G.V.B. Faulkner, RN) and the troopship Monarch of Bermuda (British, 22424 GRT, built 1931) arrived at Durban from Diego Suarez. (83)

27 Jul 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) departed Durban for Diego Suarez. (83)

31 Jul 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Diego Suarez for the role as guardship. (83)

24 Aug 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) departed Diego Suarez for Durban. (84)

28 Aug 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Durban from Diego Suarez. At Durban was taken in hand for repairs to her steering engine. (84)

31 Oct 1942
With the repairs to her steering engine finally completed, HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN), departed Durban for Simonstown. She is to return to the U.K. for a major refit. (85)

2 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Simonstown from Durban. (86)

3 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) departed Simonstown for Pointe Noire. (86)

8 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Pointe Noire from Simonstown. (86)

9 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) departed Pointe Noire for Douala. (86)

11 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Douala from Pointe Noire. (86)

13 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) departed Douala for Lagos. (86)

14 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Lagos from Douala. She departed for Freetown later the same day. (86)

18 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Freetown from Lagos. (86)

20 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) departed Freetown for Bathurst. (86)

21 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Bathurst from Freetown. (86)

22 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) departed Bathurst for Ponta Delgada, Azores. (86)

26 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Ponta Delgada, Azores from Bathurst. (86)

27 Nov 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) departed Ponta Delgada, Azores for Birkenhead / Liverpool. (86)

1 Dec 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) arrived at Liverpool where she will be taken in hand for refit.

During her refit she was transferred to the Polish Navy. (56)

16 Dec 1942
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) is docked in No.7 Dock during her refit at the Cammell Laird shipyard. It is Emergency Repair ER 7363 contracted 7.12.42 under order No. 8881R.

15 Jan 1943
HMS Dragon (Capt. P.F. Glover, RN) is decommissioned and transferred to the Polish Government. She was named ORP Dragon on 17 May 1943.