Allied Warships

USS Barker (DD 213)

Destroyer of the Clemson class

NavyThe US Navy
TypeDestroyer
ClassClemson 
PennantDD 213 
Built byWilliam Cramp and Sons (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.) 
Ordered 
Laid down30 Apr 1919 
Launched11 Sep 1919 
Commissioned27 Dec 1919 
End service18 Jul 1945 
History

Decommissioned 18 July 1945
Stricken 13 August 1945
Sold 30 November 1945 and broken up for scrap.

 

Commands listed for USS Barker (DD 213)

Please note that we're still working on this section
and that we only list Commanding Officers for the duration of the Second World War.

CommanderFromTo
1Justin Stephen Fitzgerald, USN10 May 1938Jun 1940
2Lt.Cdr. Louis Gerard McGlone, USNJun 194028 Jan 1942
3T/Lt.Cdr. Adolph Jerome Miller, USN28 Jan 19428 Aug 1943
4T/Lt.Cdr. Richard Gary Colbert, USN8 Aug 194322 Jul 1944
5Lt. Hoke Smith, USNR22 Jul 19443 Apr 1945
6Lt. George Edwin Cohee, USNR3 Apr 194518 Jul 1945

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Notable events involving Barker include:


10 Jan 1942

Convoys MS 2 and MS 2A.

Convoy MS 2 departed Sydney on 10 January 1942.

This convoy was made up of only one ship, the troopship Aquitania (British, 44786 GRT, built 1914).

On departure from Sydney convoy MS 2 was escorted by the heavy cruiser HMAS Canberra (Capt. G.D. Moore, RAN).

Convoy MS 2 arrived at Fremantle on 15 January and departed again in the same composition on the 16th.

On 19 January 1942, while approaching the Sunda Strait the convoy was joined by a local escort made up of the light cruisers HMS Dragon (Capt. R.J. Shaw, MBE, RN), HrMs Java (Capt. P.B.M van Straelen, RNN) and the destroyers HMS Express (Lt.Cdr. F.J. Cartwright, RN) and HMS Thanet ( Cdr.(Retd.) B.S. Davies, RN) which came from Batavia.

On 20 January 1942, the destroyer HrMs Van Nes (Lt.Cdr. C.A. Lagaay, RNN) joined. The convoy arrived at Ratai Bay, Sumatra later the same day.

On arrival at Lampung Bay, HrMs Java and HMS Thanet parted company to proceed to Batavia to fuel on completion of which they returned to Ratai Bay. HMAS Canberra and HMS Express fuelled at Ratai Bay.

At Lampung Bay the troops from the Aquitania were put onto smaller ships which were to take them to Singapore as Convoy MS 2A.

These were the merchant vessels; Both (Dutch, 2601 GRT, built 1931), Reael (Dutch, 2561 GRT, built 1931), Reijnst (Dutch, 2462 GRT, built 1928), Sloet van Beele (Dutch, 2977 GRT, built 1914), Taishan (British, 3174 GRT, built 1925), Van der Lijn (Dutch, 2464 GRT, built 1928) and Van Swoll (Dutch, 2147 GRT, built 1930).

To provide cover for the operation of putting the troops on board the smaller ships the heavy cruiser HMAS Canberra, light cruisers HMS Dragon, destroyers HMS Express, HMAS Vampire (Cdr. W.T.A. Moran, RAN), USS Barker (Lt.Cdr. L.G. McGlone, USN), USS Stewart (Lt.Cdr. H.P. Smith, USN), HrMs Evertsen (Lt.Cdr. W.M. de Vries, RNN), HrMs Van Nes, sloops HMIS Jumna (Cdr. W.R. Shewring, RIN), HrMs Soemba (Cdr. P.J.G. Huijer, RNN) and the patrol vessel USS Isabel (Lt. J.W. Payne, Jr., USN) were patrolling / present in the Bay.

Around 1045GH, convoy MS 2A departed Ratai Bay for Singapore. It was escorted by HMAS Canberra, HMAS Vampire and HMIS Jumna.

Around 1830GH/21, HrMs Java and HMS Thanet joined from Batavia.

At 1000GH/23, after the convoy had passed the Banka Strait HMAS Canberra parted company leaving HrMs Java in command of the escort. HMAS Canberra then proceeded to Batavia where she arrived the following day.

The convoy arrived at Singapore late in the morning of the 24th. (1)

4 Feb 1942
At 0130 hours, the Dutch light cruisers HrMs De Ruyter (Cdr. E.E.B. Lacomblé, RNN and flagship of Rear-Admiral K.W.F.M. Doorman, RNN), HrMs Tromp (Cdr. J.B. de Meester, RNN) and the Dutch destroyers HrMs Piet Hein (Lt.Cdr. J.M.L.I. Chompff, RNN), HrMs Banckert (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Goslings, RNN) and HrMs Van Ghent (Lt.Cdr. P. Schotel, RNN) departed their anchorage to the north of of Gili Raja Island (Pulau Gili Raja) for the Java Sea.

At 0500 hours they made rendes-vous with the US heavy cruiser USS Houston (Capt. A.H. Rooks, USN), the US light cruiser USS Marblehead (Capt. A.G. Robinson, USN) and their escorting destroyers USS Stewart (Lt.Cdr. H.P. Smith, USN), USS John D. Edwards (Lt.Cdr. H.E. Eccles, USN), USS Barker (Lt.Cdr. A.J. Miller, USN) and USS Bulmer (Lt.Cdr. D.A. Harris, USN). These American ships had also been anchored the north of of Gili Raja Island (Pulau Gili Raja) but had left a little earlier then the Dutch ships. The mission of the joint Dutch-US task force was a 'hit and run' raid into Strait Makassar.

Around 0955 hours the task force came under air attack in the by the Japanese in the Bali Sea in approximate position 07°28'S, 115°37'E and USS Houston and USS Marblehead were damaged. Houston was hit on the roof of her rear 8" gun turret heavily damaging it and it could not be repaired. (When USS Houston sank about four weeks later she still had only two operational 8" gun turrets). USS Marblehead was hit twice and also straddled and received serious damage resulting in that she had to be sent to the USA for repairs. The raid into Makassar Stait was now cancelled.

USS Houston had been sent towards Tjilatjap (Cilacap) on the south coast of Java for repairs. USS Tromp was later ordered to give her protection during her passage there and proceeded after her. She caught up with her to the south of Atlas Stait and both ships then proceeded in company until 0000/5 when Tromp left USS Houston again and proceeded to re-join the task force as ordered which she did at 1325/5 when she made rendes-vous with HrMs De Ruyter and the three Dutch destroyers. (2)

9 Feb 1942
Around 0800 hours, HrMs De Ruyter (Cdr. E.E.B. Lacomblé, RNN and flagship of Rear-Admiral K.W.F.M. Doorman, RNN) and HrMs Tromp (Cdr. J.B. de Meester, RNN), were joined by eight US destroyers USS Whipple (Lt.Cdr. E.S. Karpe, USN), USS Pillsbury (Lt.Cdr. H.C. Pound, USN), USS Edsall (Lt.Cdr. J.J. Nix, USN), USS Alden (Lt.Cdr. L.E. Coley, USN), USS Stewart (Lt.Cdr. H.P. Smith, USN), USS John D. Edwards (Lt.Cdr. H.E. Eccles, USN), USS Barker (Lt.Cdr. A.J. Miller, USN) and USS Bulmer (Lt.Cdr. D.A. Harris, USN).

At 1700 hours the Dutch destroyers HrMs Piet Hein (Lt.Cdr. J.M.L.I. Chompff, RNN), HrMs Banckert (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Goslings, RNN) and HrMs Van Ghent (Lt.Cdr. P. Schotel, RNN) also joined. Van Ghent developed engine trouble and was later replaced by HrMs Kortenaer (Lt.Cdr. A. Kroese, RNN). (After repairs Van Ghent re-joined the task force on the 11th.)

Around 2130 hours the US destroyers USS Edsall and USS Alden were detached and sent to Tjilatjap. (2)

14 Feb 1942
Around 1600 hours, an Allied task force, now made up of five cruisers; the Dutch light cruisers HrMs De Ruyter (Cdr. E.E.B. Lacomblé, RNN and flagship of Rear-Admiral K.W.F.M. Doorman, RNN), HrMs Java (Capt. P.B.M van Straelen, RNN), HrMs Tromp (Cdr. J.B. de Meester, RNN), the British heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (Capt. O.L. Gordon, MVO, RN) and the Australian light cruiser HMAS Hobart (Capt. H.L. Howden, CBE, RAN). They were escorted by a total of ten destroyers, four Dutch and six American; HrMs Van Ghent (Lt.Cdr. P. Schotel, RNN), HrMs Kortenaer (Lt.Cdr. A. Kroese, RNN), HrMs Piet Hein (Lt.Cdr. J.M.L.I. Chompff, RNN), HrMs Banckert (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Goslings, RNN), USS Stewart (Lt.Cdr. H.P. Smith, USN), USS John D. Edwards (Lt.Cdr. H.E. Eccles, USN), USS Barker (Lt.Cdr. A.J. Miller, USN), USS Bulmer (Lt.Cdr. D.A. Harris, USN), USS Pillsbury (Lt.Cdr. H.C. Pound, USN) and USS Parrott (Lt.Cdr. J.N. Hughes, USN) depared Oosthaven (Bandar Lampung), Sumatra for a hit and run raid to the north of the Gaspar Straits to attack a reported Japanese convoy. (2)

14 Feb 1942
Around 1300GH/14, the destroyers USS Stewart (Lt.Cdr. H.P. Smith, USN), USS John D. Edwards (Lt.Cdr. H.E. Eccles, USN), USS Barker (Lt.Cdr. A.J. Miller, USN) and USS Bulmer (Lt.Cdr. D.A. Harris, USN), USS Pillsbury (Lt.Cdr. H.C. Pound, USN) and USS Parrott (Lt.Cdr. J.N. Hughes, USN) arrived at Oosthaven to join the Allied Striking Force. (3)

15 Feb 1942
Around 0315GH/15, the Allied Striking Force entered the Stolze Strait (to the east of Mendanau Island (Pulau Mendanau). The task force was clear of the strait around 0800GH/15 but not before the Dutch destroyer HrMs Van Ghent (Lt.Cdr. P. Schotel, RNN) had hit a reef around 0500GH/15 resulting in the loss of this vessel. The Dutch destroyer HrMs Banckert (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Goslings, RNN) remained behind to render assistance to her stranded sister but it was soon apparent that the ship was beyond salvage. Several valuable items of the equipment were however taken off and by 1700 hours the wreck of HrMs Van Ghent was destroyed by HrMs Banckert. The Banckert now made off for Surabaya with the crew of the Van Ghent on board.

Meanwhile around 1150GH/15, the first Japanese air attack on the remainder of the Allied Striking Force started. The attacks, which came in five waves, lasted until about 1745GH/15. No major damage was done to the Allied ships which had reversed course shortly after 1300GH/15. The Australian light cruiser HMAS Hobart reported some minor damage, mostly from splinters and the US destroyers USS Barker (Lt.Cdr. A.J. Miller, USN) and USS Bulmer (Lt.Cdr. D.A. Harris, USN) required repairs to their badly shaken up machinery spaces due to near misses.

The task force was then split up with HrMs De Ruyter (Cdr. E.E.B. Lacomblé, RNN and flagship of Rear-Admiral K.W.F.M. Doorman, RNN), HrMs Tromp (Cdr. J.B. de Meester, RNN), HMS Exeter (Capt. O.L. Gordon, MVO, RN), HMAS Hobart and the destroyers USS Barker and USS Bulmer proceeding to Batavia to refuel. HrMs Java (Capt. P.B.M van Straelen, RNN) and the remaining US destroyers (USS Stewart (Lt.Cdr. H.P. Smith, USN), USS John D. Edwards (Lt.Cdr. H.E. Eccles, USN), USS Pillsbury (Lt.Cdr. H.C. Pound, USN) and USS Parrott (Lt.Cdr. J.N. Hughes, USN)) proceeded to the Ratai Bay to refuel and the two remaining Dutch destroyers (HrMs Kortenaer (Lt.Cdr. A. Kroese, RNN) and HrMs Piet Hein (Lt.Cdr. J.M.L.I. Chompff, RNN)) to Oosthaven to do the same. (2)

16 Feb 1942
Around 1000GH/16, HrMs De Ruyter (Cdr. E.E.B. Lacomblé, RNN and flagship of Rear-Admiral K.W.F.M. Doorman, RNN), HrMs Tromp (Cdr. J.B. de Meester, RNN), HMS Exeter (Capt. O.L. Gordon, MVO, RN), HMAS Hobart (Capt. H.L. Howden, CBE, RAN), USS Barker (Lt.Cdr. A.J. Miller, USN) and USS Bulmer (Lt.Cdr. D.A. Harris, USN) arrived off Tandjong Priok / Batavia.

earlier that morning, around 0625GH/16 and during a heavy rain squall, HrMs De Ruyter and HMAS Hobart had narrowly avoided grounding on Krawang Point, and subsequent colliding with each other. (3)

6 Mar 1942
Around 0800I/6, the troopship USS Mount Vernon (24289 GRT, built 1932) departed Fremantle for Adelaide. She was escorted by the light cruiser HMAS Adelaide (Capt. H.A. Showers, RAN) and the destroyers USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. A.J. Miller, USN) and USS Bulmer (Lt. D.A. Harris, USN).

Around 1320I/7, the destroyers parted company.

Around 0955I/9, USS Mount Vernon and HMAS Adelaide parted company with each other. The Mount Vernon arrived at Adelaide later the same day.

Around 1900L/10, USS Adelaide arrived at Williamstown. (4)

26 Mar 1942
Around 1625I/26, the troopship Westpoint (American 26454 GRT, built 1940) departed Fremantle for Adelaide. She was escorted by the light cruiser HMAS Adelaide (Capt. H.A. Showers, RAN) and the destroyers USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. A.J. Miller, USN) and USS Bulmer (Lt. D.A. Harris, USN).

Around 0200I/27, the destroyers parted company.

Around 1830K/29, the Westpoint and HMAS Adelaide parted company with each other. The Westpoint arrived at Adelaide later the same day.

Around 1110K/30, USS Adelaide arrived at Port Melbourne. Shortly before arrival she had conducted gunnery exercises in Port Phillip. (4)

10 Jun 1943
USS Iowa (Capt. J.L. McCrea, USN) conducted trials and exercises off Casco Bay, Maine together with USS Texas (Capt. R. Pfaff, USN). They were escorted by USS Terry (Cdr. G.R. Phelan, USN), USS Walker (Cdr. O.F. Gregor, USN), USS Bulmer (Lt.Cdr. L.F. Volk, USN) and USS Barker (Lt.Cdr. A.J. Miller, USN).

23 Dec 1943

Attempted interception, as part of Operation Stonewall, of the German blockade breaker Osorno, interception of the German blockade breaker Alsterufer and subsequent action on 28 December 1943, between HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise and German destroyers and torpedo boats.

During the latter half of November and beginning December 1943, movements of vessels considered to be possible blockade breakers along the French coast of the Bay of Biscay, together with reports received that these ships were fully loaded and likely soon to start for the Far East, gave reason for intensifying operation Stonewall. The long winter nights also would probably be used by the enemy to bring back from the Far East some of the ships which had managed to evade the blockade at the end of 1942 beginning of 1943.

The surface forces available to the C-in-C, Plymouth for the operation were two light cruisers; HMS Glasgow (Capt. C.P. Clarke, RN) and HMNZS Gambia (Capt. N.J.W. William-Powlett, DSC, RN). These were reinforced by the arrival of HMS Enterprise (Capt. H.T.W. Grant, RCN) at Plymouth on 23 December 1943 on completion of her post refit working up period at Scapa Flow.

The initial dispositions for the upcoming period were basd on the following considerations;
A) It was desirable to locate inward bound blockade breakers as far west as possible and that main reliance on this must be based on air patrols.
B) The density of these air patrol, owing to various causes, were always somewhat uncertain.
C) It was anticipated that the presence of outward bound blockade runners would be revealed at the earliest possible moment due to the aircraft on anti-uboat patrol over the Bay of Biscay.
D) Cruiser patrols should be as close as possible to the air patrol line to ensure that the earliest possible use is made of air sightings, and to reduce the likelihood of contact being lost owing to the exhaustion of fuel in the aircraft (as had happened before).
E) It was not considered desirable to maintain constant cruiser patrol east of 25°W due to the presence of German HE 177 long range bombers in Bordeaux.
F) It was considered desirable that no cruiser should have less then 3-4 days endurance remaining when the enemy would be sighted.

Arising out of the above considerations great importance was attached to the air patrol to the northward of the Azores (patrol H, between positions NN (42.05'N, 31.18'W) and OO (48°58'N, 34°04'W), 50 nautical miles on either side of this line and later patrol L, between positions QQ (43.10'N, 30.00'W) and OO (49°50'N, 30°00'W), 50 nautical miles on either side of this line).

This was backed up by the cruiser patrol from the Azores. HMS Glasgow and HMNZS Gambia relieving one other at 3 to 4 day intervals.

The endurance of HMS Enterprise, on the other hand, made her unsuitable for operations from the Azores so she was kept at Plymouth where she could be dispatched immediately on receipt of definite information regarding the enemy.

Passage of the German blockade breaker Osorno.

On 23 December 1943, HMNZS Gambia was operating on patrol line G (between positions LL (42°15'N, 30°10'W) and MM (49°10'N, 35°52'W), 50 nautical miles on either side of this line) having relieved HMS Glasgow which had returned to Horta to fuel on 22 December 1943. At 1911A/23, HMS Glasgow was informed that she was to leave Horta at 1100 hours on the 24th to relieve HMNZS Gambia on patrol G and that HMNZS Gambia was to return to Horta to fuel at 1300 hours on the 26th.

At 2035A/23, the C-in-C Plymouth, received a telephone call from the Admiralty that an aircraft from USS Card (T/Capt. A.J. Isbell, USN) had sighted an unknown vessel in position 47°45'N, 18°53'W at 1539 hours on the 23rd. This ship had been steering a course of 110° at 10 knots. This vessel could not be identified as being Allied and was therefore most probably a German blockade runner. This vessel must have passed patrol line H at some time on 21st December but had not been detected.

At the same time, reports were beginning to come in from aircraft flying patrols over the Bay of Biscay of A.S.V. (airborne surface vessel - radar) contact with surface vessels. The first of these indicated that some 12 ships were proceeding on a westerly course in position 45°38'N, 06°18'W and that their speed was 20 knots. Subsequent reports during the night gave various positions and composition of the enemy force, but all agreed that their course was westerly and that there were destroyers and also a merchant ship or ships present.

In fact there was no German outward blockade runner present. Six destroyers of the 8th German destroyer flotilla had left the Gironde around 0530B/23. These were the destroyers Z 27 (Senior Officer), Z 23, Z 24, Z 32, Z 37 and ZH 1. Half an hour before, at 0500B/23, the German 4th torpedo boat flotilla had left Brest. These were the torpedo boats T 22, T 23, T 24, T 25, T 26 and T 27. They were to join company around 1700B/23 in approximate position 45°33'N, 04°46'W (grid BF 8323) and then proceed to make rendezvous with the incoming blockade breaker.

At 2340A/23, HMS Enterprise was ordered to raise steam immediately and at the same time the Admiralty requisted the C-in-C Mediterranean to place one cruiser under the orders of the Vice-Admiral Gibraltar forthwith for anti-blockade runner duty. HMS Mauritius (Capt. W.W. Davis, RN, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral C.H.J. Harcourt, CBE, RN) was selected for this duty and the C-in-C Mediterranean requested the Vice-Admiral Malta to sail her with all despatch. She departed Malta around 1715A/23, the Rear-Admiral having quickly stuck his flag and left the ship with his staff.

HMS Enterprise left Plymouth around 0200A/24 with orders to proceed through position 180° - Wolf Rock - 10 nautical miles and then on course 258° at 25 knots. Further instructions would be signalled later.

At 0240A/24, the Admiralty signalled to all ships and authorities in the area a resume of such information as was known at the time. It was obvious that the ship seen by the aircraft of USS Card, if she was indeed an enemy blockade breaker, had successfully eluded the Allied air and surface patrols, and no surface forces now could cut her off or overtake her before she was well under the protection of enemy shore base aircraft. There remained the possible outward bound vessel and any other inward bound ship which might be following the first one sighted. In order to catch these, and especially the former, new patrols J and K were instituted, J being longitude 24°30'W between 46°12'N and 47°50'N, and K being longitude 23°00'W between 48°12'N and 49°50'N and one more L, further out, on longitude 30°00'W between 43°10'N and 49°50'N.

At 0628A/24, orders were signalled to HMS Glasgow to establish patrol J by 1000 hours on the 25th and to HMNZS Gambia to establish patrol K at the same time. If nothing had been sighted by HMS Glasgow by 1900 hours on the 25th and by HMNZS Gambia by 2000 hours on the 25th they were to leave as to establish patrol L within 60 miles from 30°00'W by daylight on the 26th. HMNZS Gambia, who would be the first that needed to refuel at Horta, taking the part to the south of 46°30'N, and HMS Glasgow taking the part north of 46°30'N. Air patrol were ordered to cover the areas to the east of these patrols.

Reports from aircraft shadowing the enemy destroyer force in the Bay of Biscay continued to come in and at daylight a report by aircraft R of 105 group, a USN Liberator, gave the composition as 7 merchant ships and 4 destroyers still on a westerly course.

At 0852A/24, however, the situation was complicated by a report from Liberator H from 53 group that two destroyers some 60 miles to the southward of previous reports had been sighted. These were steering 138° at 18 knots. It was first thought these may be Spanish but as no destroyers of that nationality were known to be in that position it seems that that these must be part of the enemy force turned back for some reason and returning along the Spanish Coast.

During the forenoon, the positions reported by various aircraft which were shadowing varied considerably, but the latitudes were all between 45°N and 46°N, and the course given was west. The speed varied between 15 and 20 knots. The composition of the force was very difficult to assess but the majority of the reports indicated 10 or 11 units, of which one or two were merchant ships.

By 1100A/24 it was quite obvious that blockade running was in full swing, and the Admiralty ordered the destroyers HMS Caldwell (Lt.Cdr. F.D. Stacpoole, RD, RNR) and HMS Chelsea (Lt.Cdr. J.E.R. Wilford, RNR), which had been in position 42°30'N, 27°01'W around 0800 hours that morning, proceeding at 15 knots to the U.K. from Horta, to come under the orders of the C-in-C, Plymouth, but their state of efficiency and the amount of fuel on board was too low for them to be effective and the orders were subsequently cancelled. The Admiralty also requested the C-in-C, Mediterranean to sail HMS Mauritius to the Azores with despatch, and to replace her at Gibraltar with another cruiser so two cruisers were now requested from the Mediterranean.

At 1127A/24, the C-in-C, Plymouth promulgated to all ships and authorities concerned his estimate of the situation, giving 9 enemy destroyers with 2 merchant ships, possibly tankers in position 45°35'N, 10°56'W steering 270° at 15 knots and two destroyers in the vicinity of Cape Ortegal, eastbound, and the inward bound blockade breaker not yet located.

Air searches were meanwhile ongoing to locate the inward bound blockade breaker and at 1220A/24, a Beaufighter of 143 Squadron reported a large merchant ship of about 5000 tons with funnel amidships and a large superstructure round the funnel. She was sighed in position 46°00'N, 11°30'W proceeding on course 090°. The enemy force had meanwhile been reported as consisting of 5 destroyers and 4 merchant vessels.

By 1245A/24, the rendezvous had been made and the enemy had turned onto an easterly course, this being reported by Beaufighters of 235 Squadron. They reported the force as consisting of 2 merchant vessels, 5 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats.

According to German files the rendezvous with the incoming blockade breaker was made at 1246B/24 in approximate position 45°33'N, 12°15'W (grid BE 9322)

Up to this time it had seemed fairly certain that there was at least one outward bound blockade breaker and possibly two, in company with the enemy destroyer force. Now doubt began to arise.

However as the enemy force was now continuously being shadowed by British aircraft, it was appreciated that the enemy would be unlikely to detach an outward bound blockade runner alone and unescorted and it was also appreciated that the enemy would attach the greatest importance to the inward bound blockade breaker.

Consequently there remained two possibilities with regard to outward bound blockade breakers (if these were indeed present);
A) That the enemy had abandoned the attempt and were returning to France with the incoming blockade breaker and the escort.
B) That they would part company with the escort after dark then to proceede once more to the westward.

HMS Enterprise was therefore ordered after passing 09°30'W to steer for position 46°20'N, 15°40'W. She altered course to comply at at 1455A/24.

During the afternoon aircraft continued to shadow the enemy convoy on its easterly course but their signals on its composition failed to resolve the doubt about the presence of outward bound blockade breakers. It seemed that there were now 12 ships in all but the number of merchant ships reported varied from 2 to 7.

Around 1600A/24, 8 Halifax aircraft from 502 Squadron arrived near the enemy convoy and attacked it with 500 lb bombs. Few were able to report the results. Flak was heavy and evasive action by the enemy prevented any accurate observation. One however reported a hit on the larger merchantman who she assessed at 5000 tons. Another aircraft claimed a very near miss on another ship. Aircraft of 19 Group continued to shadow but any attack on the convoy, except by aircraft, was now out of the question.

Besides the possibility of an outward bound blockade breaker turning to the westward after dark there was the further possibility of a second inward bound blockade breaker closely following the first.

In order to guard against these contingencies, the C-in-C, Plymouth, requested at 1624A/24, the Senior British Naval Officer, Azores to arrange for an air search at maximum density, to be carried out during daylight on the 25th in the area between longitudes 18°45'W and 22°55'W, south of latitude 50'N as far towards latitude 42°N as resources would permit, the northern part of the area being the most important. This was to be instead of patrol H. HMS Glasgow and HMNZS Gambia had been ordered to patrol on J and K to the west of this area. Subsequently to commence on the 26th December, air patrol L was instituted between (QQ) 43°10'N, 30°00'W and (RR) 49°50'N, 30°00'W and was to be maintained daily.

At 1837A/24, a further situation report was issued, informing all forces and authorities that it was estimated that an inward bound blockade breaker had joined the enemy force at 1225A/24, in position 45°42'N, 11°45'W, and that the whole force of enemy vessels had turned to the westward at about 1300A/24 in position 45°35'N, 12°08'W and that it was considered all the enemy vessels were now eastbound, though it was possible that any outward bound blockade breaker might turn to the westward after dark.

HMS Enterprise was ordered, at 2012A/24, to establish a patrol on longitude 15°W between 46°50'N and 46°01'N until 0630A/25, when she was to proceed to take up patrol in the vicinity of position 47°50'N, 19°01'W until last light on the 25th after which she is to return to Plymouth. She reached the north end of the patrol line at 0023A/25.

during the night of the 24/25 December aircraft of 19 Group maintained contact with the enemy convoy, the reports of which continued to vary on it's composition but agreed on it's easterly course. At 0255A/25 an aircraft reported that two destroyers were 15 miles astern of the main convoy. Bombs were dropped by 9 aircraft between 0100 and 0500 hours, but no apparent result was achieved.

The weather on the morning of the 25th was unfavourable for flying and shadowing of the enemy convoy could no be kept up after 1140A/25. A striking force of 14 torpedo carrying Beaufighers and two special cannon Mosquitoes, escorted by 29 Beaufighters and 12 Mosquitoes was organised, but their departure had to be delayed owing to the unfavourable weather forecast. They did however, leave in time to arrive in the area around 1530A/25 but were unable to find the enemy.

By 1200A/25, it seemed certain that the enemy had not sent out any ship, and that the inward bound vessel would reach the Gironde, unless stopped by Beaufighters. HMS Enterprise was therefore ordered to return to Plymouth forthwith so that she might be refuelled as soon as possible to be ready for the next incoming blockade breaker. At 1255A/25, HMNZS Gambia was ordered to return to Horta to arrive before dark on the 26th and fuel with despatch. HMS Glasgow was also ordered to leave the northern end of patrol J at 2000A/25 and proceed to patrol L north of 46°50'N.

The Osorno and her escorts arrived in the Gironde in the early hours of the 26th where the blockade breaker hit the wreck of the sunken Sperrbrecher 21 and started to sink. To prevent this the ship was beached. The cargo was successfully salvaged though.

During the passage, at 1850B/24, T 27 suffered a rudder failure and dropped behind for some time before she was able to rejoin. She had to be steered on the engines.

At 0927B/25, ZH 1, which was suffering from engine trouble, requested to be taken in tow for which purpose T 25 was detached. She towed the damaged destroyer to the Gironde where they arrived late in the afternoon of the 26th.

Also, around 1945B/25, T 22, T 23, T 24 and T 26 were detached to proceed to Brest where they arrived around 1015B/26.

Interception of the German blockade breaker Alsterufer.

Attention was now very much directed to the possibility, and indeed the probability, that there was a second inward bound blockade breaker in the offing. It was appreciated that the Germans would wish to meet her and escort her in as much as they had done with the Osorno, and that the rendezvous might well be in much the same vicinity. This could be achieved by the German destroyers in a minimum time of 3 days, but this would involve a very quick turn around after reaching harbour with Osorno. 4 days was considered more likely and proved in the end to be correct. A still stronger interval was by no means out of the question. On the 3 day cycle the inward bound blockade breaker might be expected to have passed patrol line H on 24 December when patrol H was not flown and on the 25th for the 4 day cycle. Also on the 25th the patrol could not be flown due to other the commitments that had been made.

A gap had thus been left in the outer reconnaissance areas, through which a blockade runner might have passed on the 25th. To guard against this, the C-in-C, Plymouth asked Headquarters Coastal Command for an air search on 26 December, in the area between 50°N and 46°N, and 19°W and 22°W, adding that he attached the greatest importance to this. He also asked that patrol L should be flown on the 26th and daily thereafter, so as to ensure early air sighting if the enemy had not passed 30°W longitude on the 25th and to allow for interception by surface vessels as far to the westward as possible, the portion of the patrol line north of 46°30'N, being considered the more important.

Headquarters Coastal Command replied at 1640A/25, that 2 Liberators and 2 Sunderlands of 15 Group would patrol the area asked for from dawn on the 26th and that aircraft from 247 Group in the Azores would fly L patrol.

The general situation was further cleared up by photographic reconnaissance of La Pallice and the Gironde on the 25th which established that none of the possible outward bound blockade breakers had moved with the possible exception of the Himalaya whose berth at Brest had not been covered.

On the 28th photographic reconnaissance showed that the Osorno was at Le Verdon, apparently aground, but being unloaded. The identity of the ship was thus established without a doubt as the Osorno.

An alteration to the patrol ordered for HMS Glasgow was made at 1732A/25 when she was ordered to leave patrol J at dark on the 25th and establish patrol M between 47°25'N, and 48°05'N, and between 20°W and 22°30'W. She was ordered to be at eastern end of this patrol at about 1400A/26 and to leave the western end at dark on that day so as to commence patrol L north of 46°31'N, at daylight on th 27th. This patrol had to be given a general east/west line on account of the U-boat situation.

On the 26th, HMS Enterprise arrived at Plymouth at 1330A/26 and immediately fuelled. The fast minelayer HMS Ariadne (Capt. Lord Ashbourne, RN) left Gibraltar at 0930A/26 for passage to the U.K. HMNZS Gambia arrived at Horta at 1830A/26. HMS Mauritius, on arrival at Gibraltar, was found to have boiler defects. Therefore at 1952A/26, HMS Penelope (Capt. G.D. Belben, DSC, AM, RN) departed Gibraltar for Horta, Azores in her place.

During the afternoon of the 26th, further modifications were made to the patrol arrangements for the following and subsequent days. HMNZS Gambia was to leave Horta as soon as she had completed fuelling and then proceed at 22 knots to patrol L north of 46°31'N. HMS Glasgow was, at dusk onn the 26th, to search westward along 47°30'N and then to establish patrol N between 46°40'N and 47°20'N and between 23°04'W and 26°02'W at daylight on the 27th. The presence of U-boats in the area made it necessary again to establish patrol in an east/west line and further west then desired. HMS Enterprise was to leave Plymouth at 2200A/26 and proceed towards position EB which was in 48°26'N, 15°01'W at speed of advance of 21 knots.

In the evening news was received from the Senior British Naval Officer, Azores that the French large destroyer Le Malin (Cdr. J.E.C. Hourcade) had arrived at Horta on that day from Bermuda and that the French Naval authorities had placed her under British command. Her sister ship, Le Fantasque (Capt. C.Y.F.M. Perzo), currently at Algiers had also been ordered to proceed to Horta via Gibraltar.

Headquarters 19 Group arranged for 8 Liberators to carry out a search in an area bounded by the following points;
49°17'N, 20°26'W,
48°35'N, 17°40'W,
46°05'N, 19°03'W,
46°50'N, 21°50'W.

This area was based on the assumption that the next rendezvous with the destroyer escort and the inward bound blockade breaker would be in roughly the same position as that which had taken place on the 24th and be timed for noon on the 28th which, was now estimated to be the earliest possible date which the enemy destroyers could keep. In case the aircraft of 19 Group would be grounded on account of the weather aircraft from 15 Group were arranged as backup.

The stage was now set for the final act and the hoped for victim made his entry on the morning of the 27th. At 1015A/27, Sunderland T of 201 Squadron, attached to 15 Group, reported a medium seized merchant vessel in position 46°40'N, 19°30'W, steering a course of 120°. HMS Glasgow was thus to the west and HMS Enterprise to the east of the enemy. At 1036A/27, they were both ordered to steer towards position 45°00'N, 15°00'W at best speed. At 1000A/27, the estimated position of HMS Glasgow was 46°59'N, 26.35'W and that she would be on course 090° at 18 knots. On receipt of the signal at 1130 hours she altered course to 100° and increased speed to 27 knots and ten minutes afterwards speed was increased to 30 knots and course was adjusted as necessary to intercept the blockade runner.

Meanwhile Sunderland V of 201 Squadron went to the position given by T/201 and from then on contact was maintained and positions, courses and speed of the enemy were sent in by shadowing aircraft. As usual positions varied considerably, but the course of the enemy was consistently reported as a little south of east, and her speed was apparently high. At 1140A/27, a description of the ship was received from T/201 which fitted rather well with Alsterufer, an expected inward bound ship of about 2730 tons and 15 knots speed.

Shadowing aircraft were ordered not to attack until they had reached their prudent limit of endurance and at 1230A/27 the first attack was made, but it was not successful. After this several more attacks were carried out as aircraft reached their endurance limit but no hits were scored. Homing procedure for aircraft worked well and the enemy was kept under constant observation.

At 1124A/27, HMNZS Gambia who had left Horta at 2344O/26 and HMS Penelope who was on her way to Horta were ordered to steer at best possible speed towards position 45°00'N, 15°00'W. HMNZS Gambia was ordered to keep south of 42°N until west of 20°W, to avoid U-boats. They were also ordered to report their position, course and speed.

The weather over the English Channel and most of France was poor with light winds, drizzle, low cloud and fog patches. Some bases in the south were available for flying but it was probable that by nightfall all the British southern bases would be out of action due to weather. The Admiralty therefore requested the help of USS Block Island (T/Capt. L.C. Ramsey, USN) with her aircraft and her escorting destroyers (USS Paul Jones (T/Lt.Cdr. G.P. Unmacht, USN, with COMDESDIV 58, T/Capt. R.B. Ellis, USN, on board), USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. R.G. Colbert, USN), USS Bulmer (T/Lt.Cdr. G.T. Baker, USN) and USS Parrott (T/Cdr. J.N. Hughes, USN)) which were operating in the vicinity of 45°01'N, 22°00'W on anti-submarine work, to co-operate in shadowing and attack if opportunity offered.

At 1241A/27, the C-in-C, Plymouth ordered HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise to intercept and sink the enemy blockade breaker and gave her position as reported by aircraft as 46°50'N, 19°25'W at 1030A/27 steering 090° at 15 knots. The cruisers were to act on aircraft reports and were told that aircraft would be homing on 385 kc/s.

Le Malin was ordered to fill, the gap left by the chase of this blockade breaker, in the outer reconnaissance area, and to leave Horta forthwith to establish patrol L north of 46°30'N.

At 1254A/27, HMS Ariadne, on passage from Gibraltar (which she had left around 1815A/26) to the U.K., was placed under the command of the C-in-C, Plymouth. She was at that time in position 36°30'N, 16°00'W and she had to reduced her speed to 15 knots owing to the weather conditions.

At 1300A/27, HMNZS Gambia had been in position 41°50'N, 29°25'W, steering 090° at 27 knots.

At 1317A/27, the C-in-C, Plymouth organised the cruisers HMNZS Gambia, HMS Glasgow, HMS Penelope and HMS Enterprise into 'Force 3', under command of the Commanding Officer of HMNZS Gambia which was the most senior.

In the meantime, a striking force of 8 Halifaxes of 502 Squadron carrying bombs, was organised by Headquarters 19 Group and took off between 1300A/27 and 1330A/27, expecting to arrive over the enemy blockade breaker at about 1800A/27, being homed to her by the shadowing aircraft.

As a result of the shadowing reports, an estimate of the enemy's position at 1500A/27, was signalled by the C-in-C, Plymouth at 1554A/27 to the cruisers of Force 3, giving the position as 46°40'N, 18°14'W, mean course 115° with a speed of 15.5 knots maximum. Shortly afterwards Force 3 was told that it was estimated, from previous experience, that the enemy might have sailed 5 or 6 destroyers and about 6 torpedo boats to rendezvous, possibly before daylight on the 28th, with the incoming blockade breaker. Ships were also given the position of the previous rendezvous on the 24th which was estimated as being 45°40'N, 12°00'W.

At 1615A/27, Liberator H of 311 Squadron, manned by Czechs, arrived over the enemy to take over shadowing and at once attacked with bombs scoring a direct hit on the target on her after part. A heavy explosion occurred, the ship caught fire, and on the arrival of the striking force of 502 Squadron around 1800A/27, she was seen to be abandoned, heavily on fire and sinking. Excellent photographs were obtained of the attack by H of 311 Squadron which left no doubt that the ship sunk was the Alsterufer.

Action against the enemy destroyers and torpedo boats.

With the incoming blockade runner now satisfactory being dispatched there remained the possibility, if the enemy were not forewarned, of bringing the action to the escort force who would almost certainly be on their way to the rendezvous with her.

The enemy were indeed en-route in the same composition that had brought in the Osorno (see above) except for ZH 1 which was out of action due the engine trouble she had suffered.

HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise were therefore ordered at 1817A/27, to continue their present sweep, reducing speed at their discretion in order to save fuel. An hour later, at 1926A/27, further orders were sent to these two ships to rendezvous in position (SS) 45°14'N, 15°23'W at approximately 0200A/28. They were then to leave this position at 0300A/28 and to sweep on a course of 105° to latitude 45°N and then on a course of 090° so as to reach the meridian of 12°W at 0900A/28. If no information had been received by then, they were to sweep north as far as 45°30'N, and thence on a course of 270°. This approach was designed to bring the cruisers in south of, and out of radar touch of the westbound enemy destroyers / torpedo boats, and then to move them north between the enemy and his base.

It now seemed probable that HMNZS Gambia was too far to the west to be able to make a rendezvous on the next day with HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise so she was therefore told, at 1945A/27, to reduce speed to 23 knots. This was done with the object of saving fuel in case an outward bound enemy blockade runner accompanied the expected escort force coming from the French coast, and evaded HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise while they were dealing with the escort. In such an event, HMS Gambia would be well placed to intercept, but might have to do some hours of high speed steaming.

At this time also there arose some question as to HMS Penelope's state of repair, however, in reply to a signal asking her what maximum speed she could attain, and whether she had still normal endurance, a reassuring answer was received that she could steam 30 knots, her endurance was normal, and that she had 76% of fuel remaining. She took the opportunity to give her position, course and speed as 38°50'N, 13°32'W, 350° at 19 knots. The weather being cloudy with an easterly wind force 5. She was, therefore, likely to be out of the hunt.

In order to locate the enemy force as soon as possible, Headquarters 19 Group intended to send off 2 Liberators of 224 Squadron at 2145A/27, to carry out a modified patrol on the longitude of 10°W, and the cruisers were informed of this at 2300A/27. In the event, this patrol could not leave, due to weather, and it was not until 0630A/28 that the first two Liberators of USN Squadron 105 left to patrol between latitudes 45°N and 47°N and longitudes 12°W and 13°W. the second followed at 0830A/28.

Owing to the suspected presence of U-boats ahead of her, HMNZS Gambia at 2326A/26, was ordered to pass through position 41°20'N, 20°59'W, and then as previously ordered.

About midnight, the Admiralty broadcast a signal to all forces in the area that a suspicious merchant ships, probably an inward bound blockade runner, had been sighted by aircraft in position 47°20'N, 30°15'W at 1030Z/27, on a course of 135°. This ship was subsequently identified as a straggler from an Allied convoy, but this fact was not known for several hours.

At 0022A/28, HMS Ariadne was ordered to proceed so as to reach position 45°00'N, 15°00'W at 0900A/28 if practicable, and to patrol in that area until 1200A/28, when she was to leave and steer towards position 49°00'N, 17°00'W. She should thus have been in a good position to shadow and land what assistance she could to HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise, though to arrange a definite rendezvous with them was impossible without impending their freedom of action on the 28th.

The movements of HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise on the 28th would certainly take them within easy range of enemy shore based aircraft and though the weather forecast, which indicated probable easterly winds force 4 and low cloud over north-west France and the northern half of the Bay of Biscay, was favourable for the Allies, it was considered advisable to inform the cruisers of the C-in-C, Plymouth's intentions, and to arrange to withdraw them if necessary before the danger of concentrated air attack should be accepted subject to the following factors;
A) If no news had been received by the enemy by 1200A/28, the cruisers were to withdraw to withdraw to the westward without further orders, and ... B) If in contact with the enemy, the decision whether and then to break off action would rest with the Senior Officer present, taking into consideration the hours of daylight remaining, conditions for aircraft and the prospects of achieving decisive results.

The news mentioned above of another possible blockade runner approaching made necessary some provision to deal with her, if she evaded the outer patrols. After the expected movements on the 28th, it was certain that HMS Glasgow, HMS Enterprise and HMNZS Gambia would need refuelling and it was by now means certain here they might be. It was decided, therefore, to order HMS Penelope to proceed to Plymouth at best speed so as to be ready fur future commitments, and a signal was made to her to inform her of this. The Vice-Admiral, Gibraltar was also requested to sail HMS Mauritius, whose defect was now repaired, forthwith to reach position (NN) 46°01'N, 25°30'W by 1200 hours on the 30th December.

At 0317A/28, HMNZS Gambia was ordered to proceed at best speed. She increased to 28 knots for about an hour, but the state of the sea forced her to reduce to 27 knots, which speed she was able to maintain without sustaining damage. Meanwhile HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise had affected their rendezvous at about 0300A/28, by the help of radar, and were continuing their sweep, as ordered.

In order to clarify the position to Force 3, the C-in-C, Plymouth gave them his estimate of their positions at 0900A/28. They were HMS Penelope in position 42°28'N, 14°14'W, course 353° at 22 knots. HMS Ariadne patrolling near position 45°00'N, 15°00'W until 1200A/28 and then proceeding on course 342° at 20 knots. HMNZS Gambia in position 42°32'N, 18°45'E, course 050° at 20 knots. Of these positions, Ariadne's was the only oone to be considerably in error. She had been on position 40°01'N, 17°30'W at 0100A/28, thence steering north at 17.5 knots, her speed being necessitated by the adverse weather. Her Commanding Officer, states that although it was impracticable to carry out the instructions to reach 45°N, 15°W at 0900A/28, he did not break W/T silence to say so, since he had intercepted a signal sent by HMS Penelope which mentioned the weather in the area HMS Ariadne was also in. HMS Mauritius departed Gibraltar around 0915A/28 to take up the position as ordered (see above).

The first definite news of the hoped for quarry arrived at 0927A/28, when Liberator V of 105 Squadron (USN) sighted and reported 4 destroyers on a course of 270° at 14 knots. This seemed to indicate the Germans were still unaware of the sinking of the Alsterufer. A further signal from the same aircraft at 0940A/28 gave the position and course of three enemy ships as 46°48'N, 11°57'W, 270°. This appeared to be the most promising at Area Combined Headquarters at Plymouth. HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise were to the southward of the enemy and HMNZS Gambia was approaching from the south-west. Unless the enemy retired to the east again at high speed almost at once, the chances of contact appeared good. It was thought, moreover, that HMS Ariadne and HMS Penelope were nearer than, in fact, they were.

To facilitate enemy reports, two reference positions XX (45°00'N, 15°00'W) and YY (45°00'N, 10°00'W) were established and promulgated to Force 3 and HMS Ariadne. HMS Glasgow was ordered to take HMS Ariadne under her orders when action was joined. HMS Ariadne at 1031A/28, was ordered to proceed to patrol in the vicinity of position 45°12'N, 13°20'W her primary object being reconnaissance and shadowing.

Headquarters 19 Group at once arranged for shadowing to continue throughout the day, detailing for this purpose two Sunderlands and two Liberators. A striking force of 6 Liberators of 105 Squadron (USN) was also get ready.

HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise, who had turned north around 0900A/28, had meanwhile received the enemy report and at 0952A/28, increased speed to 28.5 knots and altered course to 010° to make further ground to the east of the enemy. The wind in the area of the cruisers was south-east force 5.

Further enemy reports from aircraft V/105 came in, indicating that there were probably at least 8 enemy destroyers / torpedo boats in the force sighted. This aircraft was ordered by 19 Group at 1031A/28 to carry out homing procedure, and aircraft X of 105 Squadron was ordered to listen for the homing signals.

In order to provided cover for the cruisers against enemy aircraft a force of 29 Beaufighters and 8 Mosquitoes were ordered to take off as soon as possible so as to rendezvous with with HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise in the vicinity of 46°32'N, 10°28'W. The cruisers were informed of this force by signal and the aircraft actually left between 1330 and 1530 hours.

At 1100A/28, V/105 reported that the enemy had reversed course and were proceeding to the eastward. Their position was 46°48'N, 11°47'W and the number of destroyers / torpedo boats was 10.

At 1130A/28, HMS Glasgow estimated the enemy's furthest on and furthest north probable position was that based on this report, which placed the enemy 45 nautical miles the the north of him, and steering east at 15 knots. This was not too good, as it meant that contact could only just be made. HMS Glasgow therefore altered course to 030°. However at 1120A/28, Sunderland Q of 10 Squadron obtained contact and made the enemy position 46°33'N, 12°30'W. This placed the enemy some 35 miles to the westward of the estimate previous given by V/105. Both shadowing aircraft were attacked by enemy aircraft but managed to beat off the attacks and were able to continue to shadow.

The situation was appreciated by the C-in-C, Plymouth and a signal made at 1155A/28, informing HMS Glasgow that it was estimated the position of 10 enemy destroyers at 1120A/28 was 46°33'N, 12°30'W, steering 090° at 20 knots. More weight was given to the report of the Sunderland owing to the greater expercience of the crew and the fact that she had not been in the air so long as the other aircraft.

It now appeared probable that an action would take place in the afternoon, HMNZS Gambia and HMS Penelope were therefore ordered, at 1215A/28, to proceed to position 46°N, 13°W and it was now intended to sent HMS Penelope back to Gibraltar for fuel on completion of the operation.

By 1230A/28, another Liberator, X of 105 Squadron, was in contact with the enemy force. It reported 11 destroyers in position 47°05'N, 12°40'W, steering 140° at 14 knots, indicating that the enemy had turned onto a new course to the south of east.

HMS Glasgow's movement during the forenoon were unknown at Area Combined Headquarters, Plymouth, but it had been assumed that she had been making ground to the eastward on the strength of the enemy reports received. HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise were therefore told at 1244A/28, that if no further information had been received and if nothing had been sighted by 1430A/28, they should then sweep to the north-west, their estimated position at that time being signalled as 46°31'N, 10°38'W. Before receipt of this signal, however, HMS Glasgow at 1309A/28, had decided that they had passed within radar range of any enemy to the north and decided to turn south-east to intercept the enemy. The enemy's movements were based on the estimate given by the C-in-C, Plymouth corrected for subsequent alterations of course as reported by shadowing aircraft.

HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise had been sighted by enemy aircraft at 1224 hours and again at 1330 hours, so it can be assumed that the enemy were aware of their presence. This was not known at Plymouth at the time.

While turning to the south-east at 1338A/28, HMS Enterprise reported that she had heard homing signals bearing 243° and 146° or reciprocal. HMS Glasgow therefore steadied on a course of 220° in the hope of hearing more and getting a plot, but no further D/F bearings were obtained or received.

At 1306A/28, the C-in-C, Plymouth, ordered HMS Ariadne to shift her patrol to the vicinity of 46°15'N, 12°15'W. On receipt of this signal, Ariadne appreciated that the fact that she was not in a position being unknown, might effect the tactics of HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise, who were obviously about to engage the enemy, and decided to break wireless silence and give her position, course and speed. There was also now no need to fear that her signal might give away to the enemy that fact that cruisers were to the south-west of them, as this fact must be already known. Her signal was timed 1400A/28, and gave her position as 43°30'N, 16°34'W, course 282°. Owing to a beakdown in her W/T transmitter her speed was not signalled.

At 1332A/28, HMS Glasgow sighted the masts of two vessels bearing 238° and simultaneously obtained radar contact on the same bearing at a range of 16 nautical miles. Three minutes later she made her first enemy report ' Enemy in sight, bearing 240°, range 12.5 nautical miles, 325° - Point YY - 118 nautical miles.

It was the Commanding Officer of HMS Glasgow's intention to fight the action from outside the enemy's effective range, which he took to be 13000 yards, and to engage any destroyer / torpedo boat which looked like reaching it. If more then one attained this range he proposed to turn away to reduce the closing rate.

HMS Glasgow opened fire at 1346A/28 with 8 enemy ships in sight at a range of 18500 yards. At 1350A/28, HMS Enterprise joined in. The enemy returned fire at 1358A/28.

HMS Enterprise acted under the following general instructions which had been passed when she joined company;
A) Keep on a line of bearing approximately at right angles to the enemy.
B) Keep within supporting distance of Glasgow.
C) Act independently to avoid possible torpedo fire from the enemy.

The action commenced with HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise on a southerly course, the enemy bearing 234° from them. The details of the action are best read in the action report of HMS Glasgow which we will put online on her page as well as on the page of HMS Enterprise. During the action it appeared that the enemy made much use of smoke floats, retiring behind the screen as fire upon them became effective, and in consequence the movements of the enemy are impossible to follow in detail.

In broad outline, the enemy appeared to have kept together on a south-south-easterly course for about three quarteers of an hour, during which time HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise engaged various ships among them as smoke allowed at long range. The cruisers fire appears to have been effective, and probably damaged several of the enemy during this time.

At 1400A/28, a Focke Wolf 200 aircraft released a glider bomb but effective AA fire from HMS Glasgow caused the enemy aircraft to take evasive action and the bomb fell harmlessly into the sea.

The enemy fired torpedoes with considerable accuracy at about 1420A/28, but their tracks were successfully evaded.

At 1428A/28, the enemy divided his force, four ships turning to the north-west. This was noticed by both cruisers, and though it seems that HMS Glasgow, who was forced to turn away at 1435A/28 to avoid torpedoes, fell out of the action for a few minutes. HMS Enterprise turned away to the westward after the northbound enemy, with whom she maintained contact.

HMS Glasgow soon came in touch again with the same force, the southern remnant of the enemy by now having turned away under smoke and disappeared before 1500A/28. The four remaining enemy ships which were now engaged appeared to be heavily hit and by 1515A/28, of the four one was damaged and stopped, one was damaged and retiring under smoke, one was being engaged by HMS Enterprise and one by HMS Glasgow from a range of 10000 yards.

These last two (T 25 and T 26) were sunk around 1540A/28 and as soon as the third (Z 27, stopped and damaged since around 1430A/28) had been sunk, the Commanding Officer of HMS Glasgow reviewed the situation. HMS Glasgow had fired most of her ammunition, and HMS Enterprise, whose electric gun firing circuits were out of action, was making repairs to these. Under these conditions it was not considered justified in chasing an enemy already out of sight. So therefore line ahead formation was formed and course was altered on 275°, speed 25 knots.

Meanwhile, at Area Combined Headquarters, Plymouth, the C-in-C, Plymouth had, at 1341A/28, ordered Force 3 and HMS Ariadne to close the enemy and at 1400A/28, 4 Halifaxes of 58 Squadron and 15 Liberators of the (USN) Squadrons at Dunkeswell (5 of 110 Squadron, 4 of 103 Squadron and 6 of 105 Squadron) had been despatched to the scene of the action, the cruisers being warned to expect them around 1630A/28.

At 1500A/28, the escort destroyers HMS Tanatside (Cdr. B.J. de St. Croix, RN), HMS Wensleydale (A/Lt.Cdr. W.P. Goodfellow, RNVR) and HMS Brissenden (Lt. D.D.E. Vivian, RN), were ordered to anchor in the Plymouth Sound and remain at 1/2 hour notice. Also 5 MTB's of the 23rd Flotilla from Dartmouth left at 1700A/28, to lie in wait of Brest for the returning enemy force. The rescue tug HMRT Dexterous (?), at Falmouth, was also brought to immediate notice and the M/S trawler HMS Lindisfarne (Skr. S.G. Jinks, RNR) proceeded from Plymouth to Falmouth to escort the tug if required.

The shadowing aircraft, X/105, had reported the six enemy destroyers who had escaped to the south-eastwards, and continued to shadow until reaching prudent limit of endurance at 1610A/28. Although she carried out homing procedure, no other aircraft appear to have received her homing signals.

In the dusk, several of the USN Liberators of the striking force made contact with HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise, and of these, one, P of 105 Squadron attacked Glasgow at 1933A/28. The ships, unable in the half light to distinguish friend from foe, were putting up a heavy barrage of AA fire, but this did not deter the USN, who happily scored a miss about 100 yards of Glasgow's port bow. Four others of the same squadron located and attacked an enemy squadron of destroyers on an easterly course at about 1800A/28, but no hits were claimed. The remainder of the striking force failed to find the target.

Shadowing aircraft re-gained touch after dark, and the movements of the enemy forces (it was not clear how many were together) were reported on an easterly course until midnight, when touch was finally lost.

HMS Glasgow and HMS Enterprise were ordered to return to Plymouth by the C-in-C, Plymouth signal timed 1825A/28. HMS Ariadne was also ordered to resume her passage home and HMS Penelope was ordered to proceed to Gibraltar to fuel.

HMS Glasgow reported the general result of the action as two destroyers sunk as well as a torpedo boat. Glasgow's casualties were 2 killed and 6 slightly injured, with some minor damage to the ship. HMS Enterprise had no casualties and minor damage to the ship. The losses of the enemy were later ascertained to be 1 destroyer and 2 torpedo boats and not as initially reported by Glasgow. The remainder of the cruisers passage to Plymouth was uneventful and on arrival they were taken in hand at the Devonport Dockyard for action repairs.

On the 29th a lone German destroyer was sighted off the north coast of Spain, proceeding towards Bordeaux at 25 knots. She was shadowed for a short time, but bad weather conditions prevented a striking force from being sent to deal with her. Subsequent photographic reconnaissance of Brest and the Gironde established that four torpedo boats and four destroyers had returned to those ports respectively. One destroyer was subsequently seen in dock in La Pallice.

The outer cruiser patrol was maintained by HMNZS Gambia and HMNZS Mauritius, and the outer and inner air patrols maintained by aircraft of 247 Group in the Azores and 19 Group, until news was received on the th January that all the remaining inbound blockade breakers had been sunk in the South Atlantic by forces of the United States Navy. HMNZS Gambia and HMS Mauritius were then recalled to Plymouth.

Following the battle, Z 24, T 23, T 24 and T 27 proceeded to Brest. Z 32 and Z 37 proceeded to the Gironde and Z 23 and T 22 proceeded to St. Jean de Luz. (5)

15 Mar 1944

Convoy GUS 34.

This convoy departed Port Said on 15 March 1944.

On departure from Port Said the convoy was made up of the transports / tankers; Anglo-African (British, 5601 GRT, built 1929), Baron Inchcape (British, 7005 GRT, built 1917), Eli Whitney (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), George B. Selden (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), John W. Mackay (British, 4049 GRT, built 1922), Ocean Vestal (British, 7174 GRT, built 1942), Samdee (British, 7253 GRT, built 1943), San Eliseo (British (tanker), 8042 GRT, built 1939) and Tanafjord (Norwegian, 5922 GRT, built 1921).

They were escorted by the sloops HMS Amethyst (Lt.Cdr. S.C. Tuke, DSO, RN) and HMS Deptford (Lt.Cdr. H.R. White, RN).

On 16 March 1944, the following transports / tankers departed Alexandria and joined the convoy; Bantria (British, 2407 GRT, built 1928), Billy Mitchell (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Brand Whitlock (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Charles A. Warfield (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), City of Rangoon (British, 6635 GRT, built 1914), David Thompson (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Edward Canby (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Fort Capot River (British, 7128 GRT, built 1943), Hoegh Silvercloud (Norwegian, 5287 GRT, built 1943), James B. Hickox (American, 7194 GRT, built 1943), James C. Cameron (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Makedonia (Greek, 7044 GRT, built 1942), Mark Hopkins (American, 7194 GRT, built 1943), Neuralia (British, 9182 GRT, built 1912), Ocean Trader (British, 7178 GRT, built 1942), Ole Bull (Norwegian, 7176 GRT, built 1943), P.T. Barnum (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Samvannah (British, 7253 GRT, built 1943), Samwater (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943), San Venancio (British (tanker), 8152 GRT, built 1942) and Stephen T. Mather (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943). They were escorted by the destroyer HMS Active (Lt.Cdr. P.G. Merriman, DSC, RN), sloop HMS Black Swan (Cdr.(Retd.) R.C.V. Thomson, DSC, RN) and the frigate HrMs Johan Maurits van Nassau (Cdr. A. de Booy, RNethN) which also joined the convoy. The Commanding Officer of HrMs Johan Maurits van Nassau was the Senior Officer of the escort.

On 20 March 1944, the following transports / tankers departed Augusta to join the convoy; Andrew Furuseth (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), Daniel H. Hill (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), Duncan U. Fletcher (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Elbridge Gerry (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Empire Heath (British, 6643 GRT, built 1941), Empire Heritage (British (tanker), 15702 GRT, built 1930), F. Marion Crawford (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), Fort Jasper (British, 7125 GRT, built 1943), Fort Michipicoten (British, 7152 GRT, 1943), George E. Hale (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Guinean (British, 5205 GRT, built 1936)), Hardingham (British, 7269 GRT, built 1942), Henry L. Benning (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), James Gunn (American, 7191 GRT, built 1943), Norman Monarch (British, 7005 GRT, built 1943), Philander C. Knox (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Rugeley (British, 4985 GRT, built 1936), Samspring (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943), Simon Willard (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Staffordshire (British, 10683 GRT, built 1929), Starstone (British, 5702 GRT, built 1938), Thomas Cresap (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), Thomas R. Marshall (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), West Point (British, 4999 GRT, built 1920), William G. Fargo (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943) and Zane Gray (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943).

On 21 March 1944, the following transports / tankers arrived at Augusta after having parted company with the convoy; Anglo-African, Bantria, Baron Inchcape, City of Rangoon, Fort Capot River, Ocean Trader, Samwater, San Eliseo and San Venancio.

On 21 March 1941, the transports Makedonia and Neuralia escorted by HMS Active arrived at Malta after having parted company with the convoy while the RFA tankers / landing ships Dewdale (8265 GRT, built 1941) and Ennerdale (8280 GRT, built 1941) as well as the Neuralia and HMS Active (re)joined the convoy.

On 22 March 1944, the following transports / tanker joined the convoy coming from Tunis; Caleb Strong (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Houston Volunteers (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942) and Neocardia (British (tanker), 8211 GRT, built 194).

On 23 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Bizerta; Tanafjord and Thomas R. Marshall while the following transports / tankers joined the convoy coming from Bizerta; Abangarez (American, 4538 GRT, built 1909), Atle Jarl (Norwegian, 1173 GRT, built 1919), Dunelmia (British, 5207 GRT, built 1929), Egda (Norwegian (tanker), 10050 GRT, built 1939), Empire Harbour (British (tanker), 797 GRT, built 1943), Good Gulf (Panamanian (tanker), 7805 GRT, built 1938), Horace H. Lurton (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Murena (Dutch (tanker), 8252 GRT, built 1931), Pan-Delaware (American (tanker), 8128 GRT, built 1918), Pellicula (British (tanker), 6254 GRT, built 1936) and Robert Dale Owen (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943). Also joining from Bizerta was the AA cruiser HMS Colombo (Capt. H.W. Williams, RN).

On 23 March 1944, the following transports / tankers were detached to Bone; Atle Jarl, Empire Harbour, Fort Jasper and Hardingham while the following transports / tankers joined the convoy coming from Bone; Fort Frederick (British, 7135 GRT, built 1942), Framlington Court (British, 4888 GRT, built 1924), Sagittaire (French, 7706 GRT, built 1929) and Samholt (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943). Also joining from Bone was the rescue tug HMRT Vagrant.

On 23 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Philippeville; Fort Michipicoten and Norman Monarch while the transport Thistleford (British, 4781 GRT, built 1928) joined the convoy coming from Philippeville.

On 23 March 1944, the RFA tankers / landing ships Dewdale and Ennerdale arrived at Bougie after having been detached from the convoy.

On 24 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Algiers; Guinean, Neuralia, Sagittaire and West Point while the following transports / tankers joined the convoy coming from Algiers; Arthur P. Davis (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Empire Alliance (British (tanker), 9909 GRT, built 1943), Felix Grundy (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Frans Hals (Dutch, 6626 GRT, built 1941), Harry A. Garfield (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), James G. Blaine (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), James M. Wayne (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), James Turner (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), Kobad (French (tanker), 7329 GRT, built 1930), Louis McLane (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Nicholas Gilman (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Nicolaos Michalos (Greek, 4342 GRT, built 1913), Norholm (Norwegian (tanker), 9813 GRT, built 1941), Peregrine White (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Rhea (French (tanker), 7813 GRT, built 1928), Salawati (Dutch, 6643 GRT, built 1920), Samtampa (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943) and Winslow Homer (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942). Also the boom carrier HMS Leonian (5424 GRT, built 1936) (A/Cdr.(Retd.) R.W. Lundy, OBE, RNR) joined the convoy. HrMs Johan Maurits van Nassau and HMS Active also briefly entered Algiers before rejoining the convoy.

On 25 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Oran; Daniel H. Hill, Dunelmia, Fort Frederick, Framlington Court, Horace H. Lurton and Houston Volunteers while the following transports / tankers joined the convoy coming from Oran; Charles Nordhoff (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), China Mail (American, 8616 GRT, built 1942), Culebra (Panamanian, 5260 GRT, built 1919), Daniel H. Lownsdale (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Emma Willard (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Empire Stour (British, 4678 GRT, built 1930), Esso Concord (American (tanker), 7698 GRT, built 1940), Exanthia (American, 6533 GRT, built 1941), Fort Venango (British, 7166 GRT, built 1943), Frances E. Willard (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), George F. Patten (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Hannis Taylor (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), John Murray Forbes (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Joseph Warren (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Leland Stanford (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Midnight (American, 8258 GRT, built 1944) and William R. Davie (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942).

On 26 March 1944, the following transports were detached to Gibraltar; Empire Heath, Empire Stour, John W. Mackay, Rugeley, Staffordshire, Starstone and Thistleford as were HMS Colombo, HMS Leonian and HMRT Vagrant. The transport Homer Lea (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943) joined coming from Gibraltar as did the corvette Commandant Detroyat.

On 26 March 1944, the transports / tankers Alexander Ramsey (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), British Tradition (British (tanker), 8443 GRT, built 1942), Chief Joseph (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Magdala (Dutch (tanker), 8248 GRT, built 1931), Robert T. Hill (American, 7244 GRT, built 1943), Samtroy (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943) and Teucer (British, 9079 GRT, built 1906) as well as the naval tanker USS Cowanesque (Cdr. L.S. McKenzie, USNR) departed Casablanca to join the convoy. They were escorted by the destroyer escorts USS Eldridge (Lt.Cdr. C.R. Hamilton, USNR), USS Neunzer (T/Lt.Cdr. J.E. Greenbacker, USN) and the patrol vessels USS PC-472 (Lt.Cdr. P.A. Dallis, Jr., USNR) and USS PC-475 (Lt. W.W. Devine, Jr., USNR). They joined the convoy around 1140Z/27. On these ships joining the transports Culebra and Nicolaos Michalos parted company to proceed to Casablanca escorted by Commandant Detroyat, USS PC-472 and USS PC-475. They arrived at Casablanca on 28 March 1944.

On 27 March 1944, the destroyer Le Triomphant departed Gibraltar to join the convoy. She was to proceed to Boston, USA where she was to refit. She joined the convoy around 1410Z/28.

Around 1000A/27, the American Task Force 62 relieved the Mediterranean escort in position 35°32'N, 07°47'W. The Mediterranean escort then set course for Gibraltar where they arrived later the same day. The American escort was made up of the cutter USCGC Spencer (Cdr. W.C. Capron, USCG, with COMTASKFOR62, T/Capt. C.L. Winecoff, USN, on board), destroyers USS Paul Jones (T/Cdr. G.P. Unmacht, USN, which was also COMDESDIV 58), USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. R.G. Colbert, USN), USS Bulmer (T/Lt.Cdr. G.T. Baker, USN), USS Parrott (T/Lt.Cdr. E.F. Rye, USN) and the destroyer escorts USS Amick (Lt.Cdr. J.A. Hetherington, 2nd, USNR, with COMCORTDIV 15, T/Cdr. F.C.B. McCune, USN, on board), USS Atherton (T/Lt.Cdr. M. Kelly, Jr., USN), USS Booth (T/Cdr. D.W. Todd, USN), USS Carroll ( T/Lt.Cdr. F.W. Kuhn, USN) and USS Cooner (T/Cdr. J.M. Stuart, USN).

On 28 March 1944, two transports, the Baron Cawdor and Linda were unable to keep up with the convoy. They were ordered to proceed to Casablanca.

Around 1600Z/31, in position in position 36°49'N, 24°42'W, Le Triomphant parted company with the convoy to fuel at Horta, Azores.

Around 2105Z/1, the tanker Iroquois (British (tanker), 8937 GRT, built 1907) and the transport Pocahontas (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942) joined the convoy in position 37°01'N, 32°33'W coming from Horta, Azores. They had been escorted to the rendezvous by the A/S trawler HMS Mazurka (A/Skr.Lt. J. Baxter, RNR).

Around 0945Z/3, Le Triomphant rejoined the convoy in position 36°41'N, 28°02'W after having fuelled at the Azores.

Also on 3 April 1944, USS Barker and USS Bulmer were fuelled by USS Cowanesque.

On 4 April 1944, USS Paul Jones, USS Parrott and Le Triomphant were fuelled by USS Cowanesque.

On 8 April 1944, USCGC Spencer, USS Conner and Le Triomphant were fuelled by USS Cowanesque.

On 10 April 1944, USS Bulmer was fuelled by USS Cowanesque.

Around 0100Z/11, in position 34°51'N, 61°09'W, Le Triomphant was detached to proceed to Boston independently.

Around 2345Z/11, in position 35°05'N, 65°01'W, USS Cowanesque was detached to Bermuda for which the destroyer escorts USS Durik (T/Lt.Cdr. K.B. Smith, USN) and USS Hayter (Lt.Cdr. H.J. Theriault, USNR) had come over to escort her to that place. They arrived at Bermuda the following morning.

Around 0730Z/13, while in position 36°30'N, 70°55'W, the convoy split into the New York / Delaware section and Chesapeake Bay section

The New York / Delaware section section was escorted by USCGC Spencer, USS Paul Jones, USS Barker, USS Bulmer, USS Parrott, USS Cooner and USS Neunzer. Around 2030Z/13, in position 38°03'N, 71°05'W, the transport Homer Lea parted company to proceed independently towards Delaware Bay. The New York section of the convoy arrived at its destination in the evening of 14 April 1944.

The Chesapeake Bay, escorted by USS Amick, USS Atherton, USS Booth, USS Carroll and USS Eldridge had meanwhile arrived at its destination in the morning of 14 April 1944.

3 May 1944

Convoy UGS 41.

This convoy departed Hampton Roads on 3 May 1944.

It was made up of the following transports / tankers; Albert C. Ritchie (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Andrew Briscoe (American, 7244 GRT, built 1944), Andrew Furuseth (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), Andrew Pickens (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Brand Whitlock (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Caleb Strong (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Calvin Coolidge (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Charles Crocker (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Charles Scribner (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Daniel H. Lownsdale (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Daniel Huger (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Eastgate (British, 5032 GRT, built 1940), Edward H. Crockett (American, 7176 GRT, built 1944), Edward Rutledge (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), Elbridge Gerry (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Emma Willard (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Empire Collins (British (tanker), 9796 GRT, built 1942)), Empire Dickens (British (tanker), 9819 GRT, built 1942), Empire Emerald (British (tanker), 8032 GRT, built 1941), F. Marion Crawford (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942), Felix Grundy (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Fort Coulonge (British, 7136 GRT, built 1943), Francisco Coronado (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), George F. Patten (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), George W. Campbell (American, 7180 GRT, built 1943), Hannis Taylor (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Henry Bacon (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), Henry D. Thoreau (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Henry George (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Jacob Perkins (American, 7244 GRT, built 1944), James McCosh (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), James Turner (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), John Murray Forbes (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), John S. Casement (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Johns Hopkins (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), Jose J. Acosta (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), King Stephen (British, 5274 GRT, built 1928), Kong Haakon VII (Norwegian, 7073 GRT, built 1942), Lawrence J. Brengle (American, 7209 GRT, built 1944), Leland Stanford (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Levi Woodbury (American, 7191 GRT, built 1943), Louis McLane (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Mary Lyon (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Miguel Hidalgo (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Nonsuco (American, 5212 GRT, built 1938), Norden (Norwegian (tanker), 8440 GRT, built 1931), Norfjell (Norwegian (tanker), 8129 GRT, built 1942), Norsol (Norwegian (tanker), 8236 GRT, built 1941), Nueva Granada (Norwegian (tanker), 9968 GRT, built 1937), Ocean Vestal (British, 7174 GRT, built 1942), Ole Bull (Norwegian, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Pocahontas (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), President de Vogue (Norwegian (tanker), 9320 GRT, built 1935), Richard H. Alvey (American, 7191 GRT, built 1942), Robert Dale Owen (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Robert Howe (American, 7177 GRT, built 1943), Robert Luckenbach (American, 8152 GRT, built 1919), Samdee (British, 7253 GRT, built 1943), Samhope (British, 7210 GRT, built 1944), Samjack (British, 7210 GRT, built 1944), Samtampa (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943), Samtroy (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943), Samuel Johnston (American, 7191 GRT, built 1943), Thomas Cresap (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943), Thomas Nelson Page (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Thorstein Veblen (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Timothy Dwight (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), William Coddington (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), William M. Eastland (American, 7244 GRT, built 1944), William R. Davie (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942), William W. Mayo (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943) and Woodbridge N. Ferris (American, 7200 GRT, built 1943).

The naval tanker USS Chepachet (Cdr. H.R. Adams, USNR), stores ship USS Merak (Lt.Cdr. J.W. Cawthon, USN), attack cargo ship USS Betelgeuse (T/Cdr. J.F. Grube, USN) and the LSI(L)'s USS LCI(L)-562 (Lt.(jg) S.M. Ruffin, USNR), USS LCI(L)-563 (Ens. P. App, USNR), USS LCI(L)-581 (Lt.(jg) R.P. Mulligan, USNR), USS LCI(L)-582 (Lt.(jg) D. Radford, USNR), USS LCI(L)-583 (Lt. W.J. Sharp, Jr., USNR), 21649 584 (Lt.(jg) T.M. Smagala, USNR), USS LCI(L)-585 (Lt.(jg) J.L. Thomas, USNR), USS LCI(L)-586 (Lt.(jg) J.S. Murtha, USNR), USS LCI(L)-664 (Lt.(jg) J. Kennedy, USNR), USS LCI(L)-665 (Lt.(jg) O.E. Neidlinger, USNR), USS LCI(L)-666 (Ens. J.E. Earls, USNR), USS LCI(L)-667 (Lt.(jg) J.L. Dowd, USNR), USS LCI(L)-668 (Lt.(jg) J.B. Snapp, USNR), USS LCI(L)-669 (Lt.(jg) I.S. Bookman, USN), USS LCI(L)-670 (Lt.(jg) T.M. Hoban, USNR) and USS LCI(L)-671 (Lt.(jg) J.H. Carmona, USNR).

On departure from Hampton Roads the convoy was escorted by Task Force 62 which was made up of the cutter USCGC Spencer (Cdr. W.C. Capron, USCG, with COMTASKFOR62, T/Capt. C.L. Winecoff, USN, on board), destroyers USS Paul Jones (T/Cdr. G.P. Unmacht, USN, which was also COMDESDIV 58), USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. R.G. Colbert, USN), USS Bulmer (T/Lt.Cdr. G.T. Baker, USN), and the destroyer escorts USS Amick (Lt.Cdr. E.L. Barsumian, USNR, with COMCORTDIV 15, T/Cdr. F.C.B. McCune, USN, on board), USS Atherton (T/Lt.Cdr. M. Kelly, Jr., USN), USS Booth (T/Cdr. D.W. Todd, USN), USS Carroll (T/Lt.Cdr. F.W. Kuhn, USN), USS Cooner Lt.Cdr. T.L. Bergen, USNR), USS Eldridge (Lt. W.K. Vanallen, USNR) and USS Neunzer (Lt. V.E. Gex, USNR).

Around 0930Z/6, the Norden was detached to Bermuda as she was unable to maintain the convoys speed.

Around 0030Z/7, in position 32°40'N, 61°18'W, the Felix Grundy was detached to Bermuda with defects. She was escorted by USS Paul Jones and USS Bulmer. The destroyers rejoined the convoy around 1400Z/8 in position 33°17'N, 55°18'W.

Around 0730Z/16, in position 36°34'N, 26°40'W, the transport Charles A. Wickliffe (American, 7218 GRT, built 1943) joined the convoy coming from the Azores. She had been escorted to the rendezvous by the auxiliary A/S trawler HMS Kingston Amber (T/Lt. R. Adams, RNR) which then proceeded to return to the Azores taking the transport Pocahonatas with her.

Around 1700Z/17, in position 34°20'N, 19°53'W, the transports Elbridge Gerry, F. Marion Crawford and Levy Woodbury were detached to proceed ahead of the main convoy to Oran where they were to disembark troop which they had on board after which they were to rejoin the convoy. They were escorted by USS Amick, USS Cooner and USS Bulmer. they arrived at Oran on 21 May before the main convoy passed. after having disembarked the troops they rejoined the convoy later on 21 May.

At 0551B/20, the transports Robert Howe and Nonusco collided in position 35°36'N, 07°38'W. The Robert Howe lost a man overboard and sustained damage in such a nature that she had to part company with the convoy. The Nonusco was holed well above the waterline and would be able to continue with the convoy in normal weather conditions.

Around 0830B/20, the Casablanca section of the convoy joined. This was made up of the following transports; Charles Schiaffino (French, 3664 GRT, built 1930) and Gouverneur General Lepine (French, 3509 GRT, built 1923). They had been escorted to the rendezvous by the patrol vessel / sloop Amiral Mouchez and the patrol vessels USS PC-473 (Lt. A.W. Silverstein, USNR) and USS PC-474 (Lt.Cdr. H.C. Hummer, USNR).

On these ships joining the following transports / tankers parted company to proceed to Casablanca with the same escort that had escorted the Casablanca section; Edward Rutledge, Empire Dickens, President de Vogue, Robert Dale Owen and Timothy Dwight.

Around 1045B/20, USS Barker parted company with the convoy to proceed to Gibraltar to pick up paperwork and a liason officer and then rejoin the convoy which she did around 1455B/20.

Around 1500B/20, the rescue tug HMRT Athlete joined the convoy to assist the damaged Robert Howe during the remainder of the passage to Gibraltar. The transport Charles A. Wickliffe also parted company for Gibraltar shortly afterwards.

Around 1645B/20, the AA cruiser HMS Colombo (Capt. C.T. Jellicoe, DSO, DSC and Bar, RN), submarine HMS Vox (Lt. J.M. Michell, RN) and rescue tug HMRT Nimble joined the convoy coming from Gibraltar. Also joining the convoy were the transports City of Keelung (British, 5186 GRT, built 1919) and Palermo (British, 2797 GRT, built 1938).

On 21 May 1944 (around 1945B/21), the following ships were detached to Oran; Andrew Furuseth, Caleb Strong, Calvin Coolidge, Edward H. Crockett, George F. Patten, John S. Casement, Kong Haakon VII, Leland Stanford, Palermo, William R. Davie, USS Chepachet, USS Merak, USS Betelgeuse while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Oran; Cushing Eells (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Dux (Norwegian, 1590 GRT, built 1934), Edwin L. Godkin (American, 7198 GRT, built 1943), Esso Charleston (American (tanker), 7949 GRT, built 1938), Henry Ward Beecher (American, 7176 GRT, built 1942), Laura Keene (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Levi Woodbury (American, 7191 GRT, built 1943), Robert H. Harrison (American, 7181 GRT, built 1942) and William A. Graham (American, 7177 GRT, built 1942). Also the destroyers USS Madison (T/Cdr. D.A. Stuart, USN) and USS Hilary P. Jones (T/Cdr. F.M. Stiesberg, USN) joined the convoy for jamming duty against German radio controlled guided bombs.

Around 0800B/22, the Eastgate was detached from the convoy to proceed ahead to Algiers to pick up a new (British) Commodore for the convoy. She was escorted by USS Bulmer. They were to rejoin the convoy in the evening when the convoy would pass Algiers.

On 22 May 1944 (around 1930B/22), the following ships were detached to Algiers; Andrew Pickens, Charles Schiaffino, Cushing Eells, Gouverneur General Lepine, John Murray Forbes, Louis McLane and Norsol while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Algiers; Barfleur (French, 3259 GRT, built 1938), Empire Noble (British, 7125 GRT, built 1944), Empire Unicorn (British, 7067 GRT, built 1943), Fort Carlton (British, 7131 GRT, built 1942), Fort Chesterfield (British, 7100 GRT, built 1943), Fort Cumberland (British, 7134 GRT, built 1943), Fort Frobisher (British, 7134 GRT, built 1943), Sambre (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943) and Samphire (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943).

Around 2200B/23, USS Madison and USS Hilary P. Jones were detached.

On 23 May 1944 (around 2300B/23), the Samphire and HMRT Nimble were detached to Bone while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Bone; Empire Marlowe (British, 6768 GRT, built 1941), Fort Lennox (British, 7149 GRT, built 1943), Fort Pembina (British, 7134 GRT, built 1942), Harlesden (British, 7273 GRT, built 1943) and Sampford (British, 7219 GRT, built 1943).

On 24 May 1944 (around 1100B/24), the following ships were detached to Bizerta; Andrew Briscoe, Barfleur, Nueva Granada, Robert H. Harrison and all the LCI(L)'s while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Bizerta; Empire Lass (British (tanker), 813 GRT, built 1941), Empire Spartan (British, 7009 GRT, built 1942), Empire Stalwart (British, 7045 GRT, built 1943), Henry Groves Connor (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), Lawrence D. Tyson (American, 7176 GRT, built 1943), North Devon (British, 3658 GRT, built 1924) and Ocean Valour (British, 7174 GRT, built 1942).

Also the current escort, was replaced by a new escort which was made up of the sloops HMS Fleetwood (Cdr. W.B. Piggott, DSC and Bar, OBE, RD, RNR), HMS Amethyst (Lt.Cdr. S.C. Tuke, DSO, RN), minesweeper HMS Hazard (Lt.Cdr. L.C. Smith, RN), minesweeping sloop Commandant Bory (Lt.Cdr. S.C. Tuke, DSO, RN) and the corvettes HMS Anemone (Lt. J.B. Sparkes, RNR) and HMS Convolvulus (A/Lt.Cdr. R.F.R. Yarde-Buller, RNVR).

On 25 May 1944, the Empire Lass and HMS Vox were detached to Malta while the following ships joined the convoy coming from Malta; Elise (Norwegian (tanker), 7910 GRT, built 1931) and Polartank (Norwegian (tanker), 6356 GRT, built 1930).

On 26 May 1944, the following ships arrived at Augusta after having been detached from the convoy; Daniel H. Lownsdale, Daniel Huger, Dux, Edwin L. Godkin, Elbridge Gerry, Emma Willard, Empire Collins, Empire Emerald, Empire Noble, Empire Stalwart, Empire Unicorn., F. Marion Crawford, Fort Carlton, Fort Chesterfield, Fort Cumberland, Fort Frobisher, Fort Lennox, Fort Pembina, George W. Campbell, Hannis Taylor, Harlesden, Henry George, Henry Groves Conner, Henry Ward Beecher, James McCosh, James Turner, Johns Hopkins, King Stephen, Laura Keene, Levi Woodbury, Mary Lyon, Norfjell, North Devon, Sambre, Samhope, Sampford, Samuel Johnston, Thomas Cresap, Thomas Nelson Page, William A. Graham, William M. Eastland and Woodbridge N. Ferris.

On 28 May 1944, HMS Amethyst parted company with the convoy to return to Bizerta. The corvette HMS Bergamot (A/Lt.Cdr. W. McInnes, RNR) joined the convoy on 28 May 1944.

On 29 May 1944, the following ships arrived at Augusta after having been detached from the convoy; City of Keelung, Empire Spartan, Miguel Hidalgo, Polartank, Richard H. Alvey, Samtampa and Thorstein Veblen. Also HMS Fleetwood, HMS Anemone, HMS Convolvulus and Commandant Bory arrived at Alexandria.

The remainder of the convoy arrived at Port Said on 30 May 1944 escorted by HMS Bergamot.

24 May 1944
HMS Colombo (Capt. C.T. Jellicoe, DSO, DSC and Bar, RN), USCGC Spencer (Cdr. W.C. Capron, USCG, with COMTASKFOR62, T/Capt. C.L. Winecoff, USN, on board), USS Paul Jones (T/Cdr. G.P. Unmacht, USN, which was also COMDESDIV 58), USS Barker (T/Lt.Cdr. R.G. Colbert, USN), USS Bulmer (T/Lt.Cdr. G.T. Baker, USN), USS Amick (Lt.Cdr. E.L. Barsumian, USNR, with COMCORTDIV 15, T/Cdr. F.C.B. McCune, USN, on board), USS Atherton (T/Lt.Cdr. M. Kelly, Jr., USN), USS Booth (T/Cdr. D.W. Todd, USN), USS Carroll (T/Lt.Cdr. F.W. Kuhn, USN), USS Cooner Lt.Cdr. T.L. Bergen, USNR), USS Eldridge (Lt. W.K. Vanallen, USNR), USS Neunzer (Lt. V.E. Gex, USNR), USS LCI(L)-562 (Lt.(jg) S.M. Ruffin, USNR), USS LCI(L)-563 (Ens. P. App, USNR), USS LCI(L)-581 (Lt.(jg) R.P. Mulligan, USNR), USS LCI(L)-582 (Lt.(jg) D. Radford, USNR), USS LCI(L)-583 (Lt. W.J. Sharp, Jr., USNR), 21649 584 (Lt.(jg) T.M. Smagala, USNR), USS LCI(L)-585 (Lt.(jg) J.L. Thomas, USNR), USS LCI(L)-586 (Lt.(jg) J.S. Murtha, USNR), USS LCI(L)-664 (Lt.(jg) J. Kennedy, USNR), USS LCI(L)-665 (Lt.(jg) O.E. Neidlinger, USNR), USS LCI(L)-666 (Ens. J.E. Earls, USNR), USS LCI(L)-667 (Lt.(jg) J.L. Dowd, USNR), USS LCI(L)-668 (Lt.(jg) J.B. Snapp, USNR), USS LCI(L)-669 (Lt.(jg) I.S. Bookman, USN), USS LCI(L)-670 (Lt.(jg) T.M. Hoban, USNR) and USS LCI(L)-671 (Lt.(jg) J.H. Carmona, USNR) all arrived at Bizerta from convoy UGS 41.

16 Dec 1944
USS Brill (Cdr. H.B. Dodge, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) and USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR).

17 Dec 1944
USS Brill (Cdr. H.B. Dodge, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR) and USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR).

18 Dec 1944
USS Brill (Cdr. H.B. Dodge, USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR) and USS MacLeish (Lt. D.S. Cramer, USNR).

1 Jan 1945
USS Chub (Cdr. C.D. Rhymes, Jr., USN) conducted exercises in Panama Bay together with USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR) and USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR).

17 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR) and USS Paul Jones.

18 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-684 (Lt.(jg) J.P. Mason, USNR), USS SC-996 (Lt.(jg) S.N. Stearns, USNR), USS SC-1017 (Lt.(jg) R.A. Grimm, USNR) and USS SC-1340 (Lt.(jg) M.R. Evarts, USNR).

19 Jan 1945
USS Hackleback (T/Lt.Cdr. F.E. Janney, USN) conducted exercises in the Gulf of Panama with USS Barker (Lt. H. Smith, USNR), USS Bulmer (Lt. T.C. Farrell, USNR), USS Paul Jones (Lt.Cdr. H.M. Payne, USNR), USS SC-684 (Lt.(jg) J.P. Mason, USNR), USS SC-986 (Lt.(jg) O.W. Scott, USNR), USS SC-996 (Lt.(jg) S.N. Stearns, USNR), USS SC-1017 (Lt.(jg) R.A. Grimm, USNR) and USS SC-1340 (Lt.(jg) M.R. Evarts, USNR).

Media links


Destroyers of World War Two

Whitley, M. J.


U.S. Destroyers

Friedman, Norman


United States Destroyer Operations In World War II.

Roscoe, Theodore

Sources

  1. Report of proceedings of HMAS Canberra for January 1942 + Report of proceedings of HMAS Vampire for January 1942
  2. Files 2.12.03.6849 and 2.12.27.121 (Dutch Archives, The Hague, Netherlands)
  3. Report of proceedings of HMAS Hobart for February 1942
  4. Report of proceedings of HMAS Adelaide for March 1942
  5. ADM 199/1038

ADM numbers indicate documents at the British National Archives at Kew, London.


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