Allied Warships

HMS Uproar (P 31)

Submarine of the U class

NavyThe Royal Navy
TypeSubmarine
ClassU 
PennantP 31 
Built byVickers Armstrong (Barrow-in-Furness, U.K.) 
Ordered11 Mar 1940 
Laid down30 Apr 1940 
Launched27 Nov 1940 
Commissioned2 Apr 1941 
End service 
History

Originally named P 31. Briefly named Ullswater from mid February 1943 to early March 1943 when she was renamed Uproar.

Sold to be broken up for scrap in February 1946. Scrapped at Inverkeithing.

 

Commands listed for HMS Uproar (P 31)

Please note that we're still working on this section.

CommanderFromTo
1Lt. John Bertram de Betham Kershaw, RN7 Jan 1941Oct 1942
2Lt. Kenneth Henry Martin, RNOct 19421 Dec 1942
3Lt. Laurence Edward Herrick, DSC, RN1 Dec 194220 Jul 1944
4Lt. John Norman Devlin, DSC, RN20 Jul 194430 Jun 1945

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Notable events involving Uproar include:


The history of HMS P 31 / Uproar as compiled on this page is extracted from the patrol reports and logbooks of this submarine. Corrections and details regarding information from the enemy's side (for instance the composition of convoys attacked) are kindly provided by Mr. Platon Alexiades, a naval researcher from Canada.

This page was last updated in October 2014.

1 Apr 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed her builder's yard at Barrow for Holy Loch. She was escorted by HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(retired) R.H. Mack, RN). (1)

2 Apr 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Holy Loch to begin a period of trials and training. (1)

30 Apr 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Holy Loch for Dundee. She was escorted by HMS White Bear (Cdr. (retired) C.C. Flemming, RN). (1)

3 May 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Dundee where she joined the 9th Submarine Flotilla. (1)

10 May 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Dundee for Scapa Flow. She was escorted by HMS White Bear (Cdr. (retired) C.C. Flemming, RN). (1)

11 May 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Scapa Flow where she was to participate in A/S exercises. (1)

18 May 1941

Chase and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck,
18 to 27 May 1941.

Part I.

Departure of the Bismarck from the Baltic.

At 2130B/18 the German battleship Bismarck and the German heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen departed Gotenhafen for an anti-shipping raid in the North Atlantic. The following morning they were joined off Cape Arkona by the German destroyers Z 16 / Friedrich Eckhold and Z 23. They then proceeded through the Great Belt. The four ships were joined by a third destroyer, Z 10 / Hans Lody shortly before midnight on 19 May.

First reports of Bismarck and British dispositions 20-21 May 1941.

On 20 May 1941 two large warships with a strong escort were seen at 1500 hours northward out of the Kattegat. This information originated from the Swedish cruiser Gotland which had passed the Germans off the Swedish coast in the morning. The Naval Attaché at Stockholm received the news at 2100/20 and forwarded it to the Admiralty. At 0900/21 the Bismarck and her consorts entered Kors Fjord, near Bergen, Norway and anchored in nearby fiords. A reconnaissance aircraft flying over Bergen at 1330/21 reported having seen two Hipper class heavy cruisers there. One of these ships was later identified on a photograph as being the Bismarck. This intelligence went out at once to the Home Fleet.

The ships of the Home Fleet were at this time widely dispersed on convoy duties, patrols, etc. Some of the units were ranging as far as Gibraltar and Freetown. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir John Tovey, was at Scapa Flow in his flagship, HMS King George V (Capt. W.R. Patterson, CVO, RN). With him were her newly commissioned sister ship HMS Prince of Wales (Capt. J.C. Leach, MVO, RN), the battlecruiser HMS Hood (Capt. R. Kerr, CBE, RN, with Vice-Admiral L.E. Holland, CB, RN, onboard), the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious (Capt. H.C. Bovell, RN), the light cruisers HMS Galatea (Capt. E.W.B. Sim, RN), HMS Aurora (Capt. Sir W.G. Agnew, RN), HMS Kenya (Capt. M.M. Denny, CB, RN), HMS Neptune (Capt. R.C. O'Conor, RN) and the destroyers HMS Achates (Lt.Cdr. Viscount Jocelyn, RN), HMS Active (Lt.Cdr. M.W. Tomkinson, RN), HMS Antelope (Lt.Cdr. R.B.N. Hicks, DSO, RN), HMS Anthony (Lt.Cdr. J.M. Hodges, RN), HMS Echo (Lt.Cdr. C.H.deB. Newby, RN), HMS Electra (Cdr. C.W. May, RN), HMS Icarus (Lt.Cdr. C.D. Maud, DSO, RN), HMS Punjabi (Cdr. S.A. Buss, MVO, RN) and HMAS Nestor (Cdr. A.S. Rosenthal, RAN). HMS Victorious was under orders to escort troop convoy WS 8B from the Clyde to the Middle East.

Rear-Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker (commanding the first Cruiser Squadron), with the heavy cruisers HMS Norfolk (Capt. A.J.L. Phillips, RN) (flag) and HMS Suffolk (Capt. R.M. Ellis, RN) was on patrol in the Denmark Straight. The light cruisers HMS Manchester (Capt. H.A. Packer, RN) and HMS Birmingham (Capt. A.C.G. Madden, RN) were patrolling between Iceland and the Faeroes. The battlecruiser HMS Repulse (Capt. Sir W.G. Tennant, CB, MVO, RN) was at the Clyde to escort troop convoy WS 8B.

Action taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet

Admiral Tovey took the following action when he received the news the Bismarck had been spotted at Bergen. Vice-Admiral Holland with the Hood, Prince of Wales, Achates, Antelope, Anthony, Echo, Electra and Icarus was ordered to cover Rear Admiral Wake-Walker's cruisers in the Denmark Straight. His force departed Scapa Flow around 0100/22.

HMS Arethusa (Capt. A.C. Chapman, RN), which was taking the Vice-Admiral, Orkneys and Shetlands, to Reykjavik on a visit of inspection, was ordered to remain at Hvalfiord and placed at Rear-Admiral Wake-Walkers disposal. HMS Manchester and HMS Birmingham were ordered to top off with fuel at Skaalefiord and them to resume their patrol. The other ships that remained at Scapa Flow were brought to short notice for steam.

The Free French submarine FFS Minerve (Lt. P.M. Sonneville), which was on patrol off south-west Norway was ordered to proceed to position 61°53'N, 03°15'E and HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) was ordered to proceed to position 62°08'N, 05°08'E which is to the west of Stadtlandet.

The sailing of HMS Repulse and HMS Victorious with troop convoy WS 8B was cancelled and the ships were placed at the disposal of Admiral Tovey.

A reconnaissance aircraft flying over Bergen reported that the German ships were gone. This information reached Admiral Tovey at 2000/22. HMS Suffolk which had been fuelling at Hvalfiord was ordered to rejoin HMS Norfolk in the Denmark Strait. HMS Arethusa was ordered to join HMS Manchester and HMS Birmingham to form a patrol line between Iceland and the Faeroes. Vice-Admiral Holland, on his way to Iceland was told to cover the patrols in Denmark Strait north of 62°N. Admiral Tovey would cover the patrols south of 62°N.

Commander-in-Chief leaves Scapa Flow on 22 May 1941

The King George V, with Admiral Tovey on board, departed Scapa Flow at 2245/22. With the King George V sailed, HMS Victorious, HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora, HMS Kenya, HMS Hermione (Capt. G.N. Oliver, RN), HMS Windsor (Lt.Cdr. J.M.G. Waldegrave, DSC, RN), HMS Active, HMS Inglefield (Capt. P. Todd, DSO, RN), HMS Intrepid (Cdr. R.C. Gordon, DSO, RN), HMS Punjabi, HMS Lance (Lt.Cdr. R.W.F. Northcott, RN) and HMAS Nestor. HMS Lance however had to return to Scapa Flow due to defects.

At A.M. 23 May they were joined off the Butt of Lewis by HMS Repulse escorted by HMS Legion (Cdr. R.F. Jessel, RN), HMCS Assiniboine (A/Lt.Cdr. J.H. Stubbs, RCN) and HMCS Saguenay (Lt. P.E. Haddon, RCN) coming from the Clyde area.

The Commander-in-Chief was 230 miles north-west of the Butt of Lewis in approximate position 60°20'N, 12°30'W when at 2032/23 a signal came in from HMS Norfolk that she had sighted the Bismarck in the Denmark Strait.

HMS Suffolk and HMS Norfolk made contact with the Bismarck in the Denmark Strait on 23 May 1941.

At 1922/23 HMS Suffolk sighted the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen in position 67°06'N, 24°50'W. They were proceeding to the south-west skirting the edge of the ice in Denmark Strait. HMS Suffolk immediately sent out an enemy report and made for the mist to the south-east. HMS Norfolk then commenced closing and sighted the enemy at 2030 hours. They were only some six nautical miles off and the Bismarck opened fire. HMS Norfolk immediately turned away, was not hit and also sent out an enemy report.

Although HMS Suffolk had sighted the enemy first and also sent the first contact report this was not received by the Commander-in-Chief. The enemy was 600 miles away to the north-westward.

Vice-Admiral Holland had picked up the signal from the Suffolk. He was at that moment about 300 nautical miles away. Course was changed to intercept and speed was increased by his force to 27 knots.

Dispositions, 23 May 1941.

At the Admiralty, when the Norfolk's signal came in, one of the first considerations was to safeguard the convoys at sea. At this time there were eleven crossing the North-Atlantic, six homeward and five outward bound. The most important convoy was troop convoy WS 8B of five ships which had left the Clyde the previous day for the Middle East. She was at this moment escorted by the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (Capt. O.L. Gordon, MVO, RN), light cruiser (AA cruiser) HMS Cairo (A/Capt. I.R.H. Black, RN) and the destroyers HMS Cossack (Capt. P.L. Vian, DSO, RN), HMS Maori (Cdr. G.H. Stokes, DSC, RN), HMS Zulu (Cdr. H.R. Graham, DSO, RN), ORP Piorun (Cdr. E.J.S. Plawski), HMCS Ottawa (Cdr. E.R. Mainguy, RCN), HMCS Restigouche (Lt.Cdr. H.N. Lay, RCN) and the escort destroyer HMS Eridge (Lt.Cdr. W.F.N. Gregory-Smith, RN). HMS Repulse was also intended to have sailed with this convoy but she had joined the Commander-in-Chief instead.

Force H was sailed around 0200/24 from Gibraltar to protect this important convoy on the passage southwards. Force H was made up of the battlecruiser HMS Renown (Capt Sir R.R. McGrigor, RN), aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal (Capt. L.E.H. Maund, RN), light cruiser HMS Sheffield (Capt. C.A.A. Larcom, RN) and the destroyers HMS Faulknor (Capt. A.F. de Salis, RN), HMS Foresight (Cdr. J.S.C. Salter, RN), HMS Forester (Lt.Cdr. E.B. Tancock, RN), HMS Foxhound (Cdr. G.H. Peters, DSC, RN), HMS Fury (Lt.Cdr. T.C. Robinson, RN) and HMS Hesperus (Lt.Cdr. A.A. Tait, RN).

HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk shadowing Bismarck 23 / 24 May 1941.

During the night of 23 / 24 May 1941 HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk hung on to the enemy, The Norfolk on their port quarter, Suffolk on their starboard quarter. All through the night they sent signals with updates on the position, course and speed of the enemy. At 0516 hours HMS Norfolk sighted smoke on her port bow and soon HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales came in sight.

HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales 23 / 24 May 1941.

At 2054/23 the four remaining escorting destroyers were ordered to follow at best speed in the heavy seas if they were unable to keep up with the capital ships which were proceeding at 27 knots. Two destroyers, HMS Antelope and HMS Anthony had been ordered to proceed to Iceland to refuel at 1400/23. The destroyers all managed to keep up for now and at 2318 hours they were ordered to form a screen ahead of both capital ships. At 0008/24 speed was reduced to 25 knots and course was altered to due north at 0017 hours. It was expected that contact with the enemy would be made at any time after 0140/24. It was just now that the cruisers lost contact with the enemy in a snowstorm and for some time no reports were coming in. At 0031 hours the Vice-Admiral signalled to the Prince of Wales that if the enemy was not in sight by 0210 hours he would probably alter course to 180° until the cruisers regained touch. He also signalled that he intended to engage the Bismarck with both capital ships and leave the Prinz Eugen to Norfolk and Suffolk.

The Prince of Wales' Walrus aircraft was ready for catapulting and it was intended to fly it off, but visibility deteriorated and in the end it was defuelled and stowed away at 0140 hours. A signal was then passed to the destroyers that when the capital ships would turn to the south they were to continue northwards searching for the enemy. Course was altered to 200° at 0203/24. As there was now little chance of engaging the enemy before daylight the crews were allowed to rest.

At 0247/24 HMS Suffolk regained touch with the enemy and by 0300 hours reports were coming in again. At 0353 hours HMS Hood increased speed to 28 knots and at 0400/24 the enemy was estimated to be 20 nautical miles to the north-west. By 0430 hours visibility had increased to 12 nautical miles. At 0440 hours orders were given to refuel the Walrus of HMS Prince of Wales but due to delays due to water in the fuel it was not ready when the action began and it was damaged by splinters and eventuelly jettisoned into the sea.

At 0535/24 hours a vessel was seen looming on the horizon to the north-west, it was the Bismarck. She was some 17 nautical miles away bearing 330°. Prinz Eugen was ahead of her but this was not immediately realised and as the silhoutte of the German ships was almost similar the leading ship was most likely thought to be the Bismarck on board HMS Hood.

Battle of the Denmark Strait, action with the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Loss of HMS Hood.

At 0537/24 HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales were turned together 40° to starboard towards the enemy. At 0549 hours course was altered to 300° and the left hand ship was designated as the target. This was a mistake as this was the Prinz Eugen and not the Bismarck. This was changed to the Bismarck just before fire was opened at 0552 hours. At 0554 hours the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen also opened fire. In the meantime Prince of Wales had also opened fire at 0053 hours. Her first salvo was over. The sixth salvo was a straddle. The Norfolk and Suffolk were too far astern of the enemy to take part in the action.

At 0555 hours Hood and Prince of Wales turned two points to port. This opened up Prince of Wales' A arcs as her ninth salvo was fired.

Shortly before 0605 hours Hood signalled that another turn of two points to port had to be executed. Bismarck had just fired her fifth salvo when the Hood was rent in two by a huge explosion rising apparently between the after funnel and the mainmast. The fore part began to sink seperately, bows up, whilst the after part remained shrouded in a pall of smoke. Three or four minutes later, the Hood had vanished between the waves leaving a vast cloud of smoke drifting away to the leeward. She sank in position 63°20'N, 31°50'W (the wreck was found in 2001 in approximate position 63°22'N, 32°17'W, the exact position has not been released to the public.)

The Prince of Wales altered course to starboard to avoid the wreckage of the Hood. The Bismarck now shifted fire from her main and secondary armament to her. Range was now 18000 yards. Within a very short time she was hit by four 15" and three 6" shells. At 0602 hours a large projectile wrecked the bridge, killing or wounding most of the personnel and about the same time the ship was holed underwater aft. It was decided temporarily to discontinue the action and at 0613 hours HMS Prince of Wales turned away behind a smoke screen. The after turret continued to fire but it soon malfunctioned and was out of action until 0825 hours. When the Prince of Wales ceased firing the range was 14500 yards. She had fired 18 salvos from the main armament and five from the secondary. The Bismarck made no attempt to follow or continue the action. She had also not escaped unscatched and had sustained two severe hits.

Such was the end of the brief engagement. The loss by an unlucky hit of HMS Hood with Vice-Admiral Holland, Captain Kerr and almost her entire ships company was a grievous blow, but a great concentration of forces was gathering behind the Commander-in-Chief, and Admiral Sommerville with Force H was speeding towards him from the south.

The chase

When the Hood blew up, HMS Norfolk was 15 nautical miles to the northward coming up at 28 knots. By 0630/24 she was approaching HMS Prince of Wales and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, signalling his intention to keep in touch, told her to follow at best speed. The destroyers that had been with HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales were still to the northward. They were ordered to search for survivors but only HMS Electra found three. The Prince of Wales reported that she could do 27 knots and she was told to open out to 10 nautical miles on a bearing of 110° so that HMS Norfolk could fall back on her if she was attacked. Far off the Prinz Eugen could be seen working out to starboard of the Bismarck while the chase continued to the southward.

At 0757 hours, HMS Suffolk reported that the Bismarck had reduced speed and that she appeared to be damaged. Shortly afterwards a Sunderland that had taken off from Iceland reported that the Bismarck was leaving behind a broad track of oil. The Commander-in-Chief with HMS King George V was still a long way off, about 360 nautical miles to the eastward, and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker on the bridge of HMS Norfolk had to make an important decision, was he to renew the action with the help of the Prince of Wales or was he to make it his business to ensure that the enemy could be intercepted and brought to action by the Commander-in-Chief. A dominant consideration in the matter was the state of the Prince of Wales. Her bridge had been wrecked, she had 400 tons of water in her stern compartments and two of her guns were unserverable and she could go no more then 27 knots. She had only been commissioned recently and barely a week had passed since Captain Leach had reported her ready for service. Her turrets were of a new and an untried model, liable for 'teething' problems and evidently suffering from them, for at the end of the morning her salvoes were falling short and wide. It was doubted if she was a match for the Bismarck in her current state and it was on these grounds that Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker decided that he would confine himself to shadowing and that he would not attempt to force on an action. Soon after 1100/24 visibility decreased and the Bismarck was lost out of sight in mist and rain.

Measures taken by the Admiralty, 24 May 1941.

After the loss of HMS Hood the following measures were taken by the Admiralty. To watch for an attempt by the enemy to return to Germany, HMS Manchester, HMS Birmingham and HMS Arethusa had been ordered at 0120/24 to patrol off the north-east point of Iceland. They were told to proceed to this location with all despatch.

HMS Rodney (Capt. Sir F.H.G. Dalrymple-Hamilton, RN), which with four destroyers was escorting the troopship Britannic (26943 GRT, built 1930) westward, was ordered at 1022/24 to steer west on a closing course and if the Britannic could not keep up she was to leave her with one of the destroyers. Rodney was about 550 nautical miles south-east of the Bismarck. At 1200/24 she left the Britannic in position 55°15'N, 22°25'W and left HMS Eskimo (Lt.Cdr. E.G. Le Geyt, RN) with her. Rodney then proceeded with HMS Somali (Capt. C. Caslon, RN), HMS Tartar (Cdr. L.P. Skipwith, RN) and HMS Mashona (Cdr. W.H. Selby, RN) westwards on a closing course.

Two other capital ships were in the Atlantic; HMS Ramillies (Capt. A.D. Read, RN) and HMS Revenge (Capt. E.R. Archer, RN). The Ramillies was escorting convoy HX 127 from Halifax and was some 900 nautical miles south of the Bismarck. She was ordered at 1144/24 to place herself to the westward of the enemy and leaving her convoy at 1212/24 in position 46°25'N, 35°24'W, she set course to the north. HMS Revenge was ordered to leave Halifax and close the enemy.

Light cruiser HMS Edinburgh (Capt. C.M. Blackman, DSO, RN) was patrolling in the Atlantic between 44°N and 46°N for German merchant shipping and was ordered at 1250/24 to close the enemy and take on relief shadower. At 1430/24 she reported her position as 44°17'N, 23°56'W and she was proceeding on course 320° at 25 knots.

Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was ordered to continue shadowing even if he ran short of fuel so to bring the Commander-in-Chief into action.

The Bismack turns due south at 1320 hours on 24 May 1941.

In the low state of visibility, HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk had to be constantly on the alert against the enemy falling back and attacking them. At 1320/24 the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen altered course to the south and reduced speed. HMS Norfolk sighted them through the rain at a range of only 8 nautical miles. Norfolk had to quickly turn away under the cover of a smoke screen.

It was at 1530/24 when HMS Norfolk received a signal made by the Commander-in-Chief at 0800/24 from which it was estimated that the Commander-in-Chief would be near the enemy at 0100/25. This was later changed to 0900/25.

At 1545/24, Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was asked by the Admiralty to answer four questions;
1) State the remaining percentage of the Bismarck's fighting efficiency.
2) What amout of ammunition had the Bismarck expended.
3) What are the reasons for the frequent alterations of course by the Bismarck.
4) What are your intentions as regards to the Prince of Wales' re-engaging the Bismarck.

The answers by Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker were as follows.
1) Uncertain but high.
2) About 100 rounds.
3) Unaccountable except as an effort to shake off HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk.
4) Consider it wisely for HMS Prince of Wales to not re-engage the Bismarck until other capital ships are in contact, unless interception failed. Doubtful if she has the speed to force an action.

The afternoon drew on towards evening. Still the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen held on to the south while the Norfolk, Suffolk and Prince of Wales were still keeping her in sight.

At 1711/24 in order to delay the enemy if possible, by attacking him from astern, the Prince of Wales was stationed ahead of the Norfolk. The enemy was not in sight from the Norfolk at that time, but the Suffolk was still in contact.

At 1841/24 the Bismarck opened fire on the Suffolk. Her salvoes fell short, but one or two shorts came near enough to cause some minor damage to her hull plating aft. HMS Suffolk replied with nine broadsides before turning away behind a smoke screen.

On seeing the Suffolk being attacked, HMS Norfolk turned towards and she and HMS Prince of Wales opened fire, the latter firing 12 salvoes. By 1856 hours the action was over. Two of the guns on the Prince of Wales malfuntioned again. After the action the cruisers started to zig-zag due to fear for German submarines.

British dispositions at 1800 hours on 24 May 1941.

From the Admiralty at 2025/24, there went out a signal summarising the situation at 1800/24. The position, course and speed of the Bismarck was given as 59°10'N, 36°00'W, 180°, 24 knots with HMS Norfolk, HMS Suffolk and HMS Prince of Wales still in touch. The Commander-in-Chiefs estimated position at 1800/24 was 58°N, 30°W, with HMS King George V and HMS Repulse. HMS Victorious was with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora, HMS Kenya, HMS Neptune). They had parted company with the Commander-in-Chief at 1509/24. Heavy cruiser HMS London (Capt. R.M. Servaes, CBE, RN) was in position 42°45'N, 20°10'W and had been ordered to leave her convoy and close the enemy. HMS Ramillies was in estimated position 45°45'N, 35°40'W. She had been ordered to place herself to the west of the enemy. HMS Manchester, HMS Birmingham and HMS Arethusa were returning from their position off the north-east of Iceland to refuel. HMS Revenge had left Halifax and was closing convoy HX 128. HMS Edinburgh was in approximate position 45°15'N, 25°10'W. She had been ordered to close and take over stand by shadower.

Evening of 24 May 1941.

At 2031/24 HMS Norfolk received a signal sent by the Commander-in-Chief at 1455/24 stating that aircraft from HMS Victorious might make an attack at 2200/24 and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker now waited for an air attack which he expected at 2300 hours. By that time Bismarck had been lost from sight but at 2330/24 HMS Norfolk briefly sighted her at a distance of 13 nautical miles. At 2343/24 aircraft from HMS Victorious were seen approaching. They circled round HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Norfolk and the latter was able to direct them to the enemy. At 0009/25 heavy anti-aircraft gunfire was seen and the Bismarck was just visible as the aircraft attacked.

HMS Victorious and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron detached by the Commander-in-Chief.

At 1440/24 the Commander-in-Chief ordered the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora, HMS Kenya, HMS Hermione) and HMS Victorious to a position within 100 nautical miles from Bismarck and to launch a torpedo bombing attack and maintain contact as long as possible. The object of the torpedo bombing attack was to slow the enemy down. On board the Victorious were only 12 Swordfish torpedo bombers and 6 Fulmar fighters. Victorious was only recently commissioned and her crew was still rather green. She had on board a large consignment of crated Hurricane fighters for Malta which were to be delivered to Gibraltar.

At 2208/24 HMS Victorious commenced launching 9 Swordfish in position 58°58'N, 33°17'E. Two minutes later al were on their way to find the Bismarck. The Squadron was led by Lt.Cdr.(A) E. Esmonde, RN.

HMS Victorious aircraft attack the Bismarck.

When the Swordfish took off from HMS Victorious the Bismarck was estimated to be in position 57°09'N, 36°44'W and was steering 180°, speed 24 knots. At 2330/24 they sighted the Bismarck but contact was lost in the bad weater. Shortly afterwards the Swordfish sighted HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk. HMS Norfolk guided them to the enemy which was 14 nautical miles on her starboard bow. At 2350 hours a vessel was detected ahead and the squadron broke cloud to deliver an attack. To their surprise they found themselves over a United States Coastguard cutter. The Bismarck was 6 nautical miles to the southward and on sighting the aircraft opened up a heavy barrage fire. Lt.Cdr. Esmonde pressed home his attack, 8 of the Swordfish were able to attack, the other had lost contact in the clouds.

The 8 planes attacked with 18" torpedoes, fitted with Duplex pistols set for 31 feet. At midnight three Swordfish attacked simultaneously on the port beam. Three others made a longer approach low down attacking on the port bow a minute later. One took a longer course, attacking on the port quarter. One went round and attacked on the starboard bow a couple of minutes after midnight. At least one hit was claimed on the starboard side abreast the bridge. The Germans however state that no hit was scored but that the violent maneuvering of the ship to avoid the attack, together with the heavy firing by the Bismarck caused the leak in no.2 boiler room to open up. No.2 boiler room was already partially flooded and now had to be abandoned.

All Swordfish from the striking had returned to HMS Victorious by 0201/25. Two Fulmars launched at 2300/24 for shadowing failed to find their ship in the darkness due to the failure of Victorious' homing beacon. Their crews were in the end picked up from the chilly water.

HMS Norfolk and HMS Suffolk loose contact at 0306/25.

While the aircraft from HMS Victorious were making their attack, HMS Norfolk sighted a ship to the south-west and gave the order to open fire. HMS Prince of Wales was able to identify it in time as an American coast guard cutter, but in the movements prepartory to opening fire HMS Norfolk lost touch with the enemy for a time and it was not until 0116/25 that she suddenly sighted the Bismarck only 8 nautical miles away. There followed a brief exchange of fire. HMS Norfolk and HMS Prince of Wales turned to port to bring their guns to bear and the latter was ordered to engage. It was then 0130/25. The Prince of Wales fired two salvoes at 20000 yards by radar. The Bismarck answered with two salvoes which fell a long way short. The light was failing and the enemy was again lost to sight. HMS Suffolk, which had to most reliable RDF set was told to act independently so as to keep in touch.

Around 0306/25 the Suffolk lost touch with the Bismarck. At 0552/25 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker asked if HMS Victorious could launch aircraft for a search at dawn.

Search measures, 25 May 1941.

With the disappearance of the Bismarck at 0306/25 the first phase of the pursuit ended. The Commander-in-Chief, in HMS King George V with HMS Repulse in company was then about 115 nautical miles to the south-east. At 0616/25, Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker signalled that it was most probable that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen made a 90° turn to the west or turned back and 'cut away' to the eastward astern of the cruisers. Suffolk was already searching to the south-west and Norfolk was waiting for daylight to do the same. Prince of Wales was ordered to join the King George V and Repulse.

Force H was still on a course to intercept the Bismarck while steaming on at 24 knots. The Rear-Admiral commanding the 2nd Cruiser Squadron in HMS Galatea had altered course at 0558/25 to 180° for the position where the enemy was last seen and the Victorious was getting 8 aircraft ready to fly off at 0730/25 for a search to the eastward. This plan however was altered on orders being recieved from the Commander-in-Chief to take the cruisers and Victorious and carry out a search to the north-west of the Bismarck's last reported position. Five Fulmars had already been up during the night, two of them had not returned to the ship. The search therefore had to be undertaken by Swordfish, the only aircraft available. At 0810/25, seven Swordfish were flown off from position 56°18'N, 36°28'W to search between 280° and 040° up to 100 nautical miles. The search was supplemented by Victorious herself as well as the cuisers from the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (Galatea, Aurora, Kenya and Hermione) which were spread some miles apart.

DF position of the Bismarck of 0852/25.

HMS King George V was still proceeding to the south-west when at 1030/25 the Commander-in-Chief recieved a signal from the Admiralty that the Bismarck's position had been obtained by DF (direction finding) and that it indicated that the Bismarck was on a course for the North Sea by the Faeroes-Iceland passage. To counter this move by the enemy the Commander-in-Chief turned round at 1047/25 and made for the Faeroes-Iceland passage at 27 knots. HMS Repulse was no longer in company with HMS King George V, she had been detached at 0906/25 for Newfoundland to refuel. Suffolk also turned to the eastward to search, her search to the south-west had been fruitless. The search by HMS Victorious, her aircraft and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to the north-west also had no result. Six Swordfish were landed on by 1107/25, one failed to return. HMS Galatea, HMS Aurora and HMS Kenya now turned towards the DF position of the Bismarck to search in that direction. HMS Hermione had to be detached to Hvalfiord, Iceland to refuel as she was by now down to 40%. The other cruisers slowed down to 20 knots to economise their remaining fuel supply wich was also getting low. At this moment HMS King George V had about 60% remaining.

Events during 25 May 1941.

At 1100/25, HMS King George V, HMS Suffolk and HMS Prince of Wales were proceeding to the north-east in the direction of the enemy's DF signal. HMS Rodney was in position 52°34'N, 29°23'W some 280 nautical miles to the south-eastward on the route towards the Bay of Biscay. On receiving the Commander-in-Chiefs signal of 1047/25 she too proceeded to the north-east.

Meanwhile to Admiralty had come to the conclusion that the Bismarck most likely was making for Brest, France. This was signalled to the Commander-in-Chief at 1023/25 to proceed together with Force H and the 1st Cruiser Squadron on that assumption.

In the absence however of definite reports it was difficult to be certain of the position of the enemy. The DF bearings in the morning had not been very definite. At 1100/25, HMS Renown (Force H), was in position 41°30'N, 17°10'W was ordered to act on the assumption the enemy was making for Brest, France. She shaped course accordingly and prepared a comprehensive sheme of air search. At 1108/25, HMS Rodney, was told to act on the assumption that the enemy was making for the Bay of Biscay. At 1244/25 the Flag Officer Submarines ordered six submarines to take up intercepting positions about 120 nautical miles west of Brest. The submarines involved were HMS Sealion (Cdr. B. Bryant, DSC, RN), HMS Seawolf (Lt. P.L. Field, RN), HMS Sturgeon (Lt.Cdr. D. St. Clair-Ford, RN) from the 5th Submarine Flottilla at Portsmouth, HMS Pandora (Lt.Cdr. J.W. Linton, DSC, RN), which was on passage to the U.K. from the Mediterranean to refit, HMS Tigris (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bone, DSO, DSC, RN), from the 3rd Submarine Flottilla at Holy Loch and HMS H 44 (Lt. W.N.R. Knox, DSC, RN), a training boat from the 7th Submarine Flotilla at Rothesay which happened to be at Holyhead. Seawolf, Sturgeon and Tigris were already on patrol in the Bay of Biscay, Sealion departed Portsmouth on the 25th as did H 44 but she sailed from Holyhead. Pandora was on passage to the U.K. to refit and was diverted.

At 1320/25 a good DF fix located an enemy unit within a 50 mile radius from position 55°15'N, 32°00'W. This was sent by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief at 1419/25 and it was received at 1530/25. It was only in the evening that it was finally clear to all involved that Bismarck was indeed making for a French port. Air searches had failed to find her during the day. (2)

18 May 1941

Chase and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck,
18 to 27 May 1941.

Part II.

26 May 1941.

By now the question of fuel was becoming acute. For four days ships had been steaming at high speeds and the Commander-in-Chief was faced with the reality of fuel limits. HMS Repulse had already left for Newfoundland, HMS Prince of Wales had by now been sent to Iceland to refuel. HMS Victorious and HMS Suffolk had been forced to reduce speed to economise their fuel.

Coastal Command started air searches along the route towards the Bay of Biscay by long range Catalina flying boats. Lack of fuel was effecting the destroyer screens of the capital ships. There was no screen available for HMS Victorious. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla, escorting troop convoy WS 8B, was ordered at 0159/26 to join the Commander-in-Chief in HMS King George V and HMS Rodney as was HMS Jupiter (Lt.Cdr. N.V.J.P. Thew, RN) which sailed from Londonderry. Leaving the convoy the 4th D.F. proceeded to the north-east. Force H in the meantime was also approaching the immediate area of operations. These forces were to play an important part in the final stages of the chase of the Bismarck.

Force H, 26 May 1941.

HMS Renown, HMS Ark Royal and HMS Sheffield were having a rough passage north in heavy seas, high wind, rain and mist. Their escorting destroyers had already turned back towards Gibraltar at 0900/25. At dawn on the 26th there was half a gale blowing from the north-west. At 0716/26 HMS Ark Royal launched a security patrol in position 48°26'N, 19°13'W to search to the north and to the west just in case the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had departed Brest to come to the aid of the Bismarck. At 0835/26 there followed an A/S patrol of ten Swordfish. All planes had returned by 0930. None had seen anything.

Bismarck sighted at 1030/26.

It was at 1030/26 that one of the long range Catalina's of the Coastal Command sighted the Bismarck in position 49°30'N, 21°55'W. It was received in HMS King George V at 1043 hours and in HMS Renown in 1038 hours. It placed the enemy well to the westward of the Renown. It was confirmed within the hour when two Swordfish from the Ark Royal which reported the Bismarck in position 49°19'N, 20°52'W some 25 miles east of the position given by the Catalina. The Commander-in-Chief was at that moment about 130 miles to the north of the Bismarck but it was soon clear that the Bismarck had too great a lead to permit her being overtaken unless her speed could be reduced. Nor was the question one merely of distance and speed. The Bismarck was approaching a friendly coast and could run her fuel tanks nearly dry and was sure of air protection, while the British ships would have a long journey back to base in the face of air and submarine attack. HMS Renown was ahead of the Bismarck but it was important that she did not engage the Bismarck unless the latter was already heavily engaged by the better armoured HMS King George V and HMS Rodney.

When the Catalina found the Bismarck at 1030 hours, the 4th Destroyer Flotilla was steering east to join the Commander-in-Chief. They seem to have crossed astern of the enemy's track about 0800/26. The Catalina's report reached Capt. Vian in HMS Cossack at 1054/26 and 'knowing that the Commander-in-Chief would order him to intercept the enemy' Capt. Vian altered course to the south-east.

First attack by aircraft from the Ark Royal.

At 1315/26 HMS Sheffield was detached to the southward with orders to close and shadow the enemy, who was estimated to be 40 nautical miles south-west of the Renown. The visual signal ordering this movement was not repeated to HMS Ark Royal, an omission which had serious consequenses for the aircraft that were to take off did not know that HMS Sheffield had parted company.

At 1450/26 HMS Ark Royal launched a striking force of 14 Swordfish aircraft with the orders to proceed to the south and attack the Bismarck with torpedoes. Weather and cloud conditions were bad and a radar contact was obtained on a ship some 20 nautical miles from the estimated position of the enemy that had been given to the leader shortly before takeoff. At 1550 hours they broke through the clouds and fired 11 torpedoes. Unfortunately the supposed enemy was HMS Sheffield which managed to avoid all torpedoes. The Bismarck at that time was some 15 nautical miles to the southward. The striking force then returned an all aircraft had landed on by 1720/26.

At 1740/26, HMS Sheffield, sighted the Bismarck in position 48°30'N, 17°20'W and took station about 10 nautical miles astern and commenced shadowing the enemy.

Ark Royal's second attack, 2047/26.

The first striking force on its way back sighted the 4th Destroyer Flotilla 20 nautical miles west of Force H. As soon as the aircraft from the first strike had landed they were refuelled and rearmed as fast as possible. Take off started at 1910/26, a total of 15 Swordfish were launched. Reports coming in from HMS Sheffield placed the Bismarck at 167°, 38 nautical miles from the Ark Royal. The striking force was ordered to contact HMS Sheffield who was told to use DF to guide them in.

At 1955/26 HMS Sheffield was sighted but soon lost in the bad weather conditions. She was found again at 2035 hours, she guided the Swordfish in and directed them by visual signal on the enemy bearing 110°, 12 nautical miles. The force took departure for the target in subflights in line astern at 2040/26.

At 2047/26 no.1 subflight of three Swordfish dived through the clouds and sighted the Bismarck 4 nautical miles off to the south-east. One Swordfish of no.3 subflight was with them. Approaching again just inside the cloud they made their final dive at 2053/26 on the port beam under a very intense and accurate fire from the enemy. They dropped four torpedoes of which one was seen to hit. No.2 subflight, made up of two Swordfish, lost touch with no.1 subflight in the clouds, climed to 9000 feet, then dived on a bearing obtained by radar and then attacked from the starboard beam, again under heavy and intense fire. They dropped two torpedoes for one possible hit. The third plane of this subflight had lost touch with the other two and had returned to HMS Sheffield to obtained another range and bearing to the enemy. It then flew ahead of the enemy and carried out a determined attack from his port bow under heavy fire and obtained a torpedo hit on the port side amidships.

Subflight no.4 followed subflight no.3 into the clouds but got iced up at 6600 feet. It then dived through the clouds and was joined by no.2 aircraft from subflight no.3. The Bismarck was then sighted engaging subflight no.2 to starboard. The four aircraft then went into the clouds and cicled the German battleships stern and then dived out of the clouds again and attack simultaneously from the port side firing four torpedoes. All however missed the Bismarck. They came under a very heavy and fierce fire from the enemy and one of the aircraft was heavily damaged, the pilot and air gunner being wounded.

The two aircraft of subflight no.5 lost contact with the other subflights and then with each other in the cloud. They climbed to 7000 feet where ice began to form. When coming out of the cloud at 1000 feet aircraft 4K sighted the Bismarck down wind, she then went back into the cloud under fire from the enemy. She saw a torpedo hit on the enemy's starboard side, reached a position on the starboard bow, withdrew to 5 miles, then came in just above the sea and just outside 1000 yards fired a torpedo which did not hit. The second plane of this flight lost his leader diving through the cloud, found himself on the starboard quarter and after two attempts to attack under heavy fire was forced to jettison his torpedo.

Of the two Swordfish of subflight no.6 one attacked the Bismarck on the starboard beam and dropped his torpedo at 2000 yards without success. The second plane lost the enemy, returned to the Sheffield for a new range and bearing and after searching at sea level attacked on the starboard beam but was driven off by intense fire. The attack was over by 2125/26. Thirteen torpedoes had been fired and it was thought two hits and one probable hit had been obtained. Two torpedoes were jettisoned. The severe nature and full effect of the damage done was at first not fully realised. Actually the Bismarck had received a deadly blow. The last of the shadowing aircraft to return had seen her make two complete circles. One torpedo had struck her on the port side amidships doing little damage but th other torpedo that hit was on the starboard quarter damaging her propellors, wrecking her steering gear and jambing her rudders, it was this torpedo hit that sealed her fate.

HMS Sheffield was still shadowing astern when at 2140/26 the Bismarck turned to port and fired six accurate salvoes of 15". None actually hit Sheffield but a near miss killed three men and seriously injured two. HMS Sheffield turned away and while doing so she sighted HMS Cossack and the other destroyers from the 4th DF approaching from the westward. She then gave them the approximate position of the Bismarck. At 2155/26, HMS Sheffield lost touch with the Bismarck. The destroyers continued to shadow and eventually attack. Meanwhile HMS Renown and HMS Ark Royal shaped course for the southward to keep the road clear for the Commander-in-Chief in HMS King George V and for HMS Rodney. Also in the Ark Royal aircraft were being got ready for an attack on the Bismarck at dawn.

Bismarck, 26 May 1941.

The Bismarck could no longer steer after the torpedo hit aft. The steering motor room was flooded up to the main deck and the rudders were jambed. Divers went down to the steering room and managed to centre one rudder but the other remained immovable. She was by this time urgently in need of fuel. It was hoped by the Germans that while she was nearing the French coast strong forces of aircraft and submarines would come to her assistance.

At 2242/26, Bismarck sighted the British destroyers. A heavy fire was opened on them. Their appearence greatly complicated the situation. Before their arrival however, Admiral Lütjens seems to have made up his mind as one hour earlier he had signalled to Berlin 'ship out of control. We shall fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer.'

The fourth Destroyer Flotilla makes contact, 26 May 1941.

Just as the sun was setting, Captain Vian (D.4) in HMS Cossack with HMS Maori, HMS Sikh, HMS Zulu and the Polish destroyer ORP Piorun arrived on the scene.

Shortly after 1900/26 HMS Renown and HMS Ark Royal were sighted to the northward. Ark Royal was just about to fly off the second striking force. The destroyers continued on the the south-east. At 2152/26 HMS Sheffield was sighted and from her Captain Vian obtained the approximate position of the enemy.

The destroyers were spread 2.5 nautical miles apart on a line bearing 250° - 070° in the order from north-east to south-west, Piorun, Maori, Cossack, Sikh, Zulu. During the latter stages of the approach speed was reduced and the flotilla manoeuvred so as to avoid making a high speed end-on contact.

At 2238/26, ORP Piorun on the port wing reported the Bismarck 9 nautical miles distant, bearing 145° and steering to the south-eastward.

Destroyers shadowing, late on 26 May 1941.

At the time the Piorun reported being in contact with the Bismarck the destroyers were steering 120°. All were at once ordered to take up shadowing positions. Four minutes later the Bismarck opened a heavy fire with her main and secondary armaments on the Piorun and Maori. Two attempts were made by these ships to work round to the northward of the enemy but they were silhouetted against the north-western horizon making them easy to spot. The Bismarck's fire was unpleasantly accurate, through neither destroyer was actually hit. The Commanding Officer of the Maori then decided to work round to the southward and altered course accordingly.

The Piorun closed the range and herself opened fire from 13500 yards but after firing three salvoes, she was straddled by a salvo which fell about 20 yards from the ships side. She then ceased fire and turned away to port while making smoke. During this engagement she lost touch with the other destroyers and later also with the Bismarck. She remained under fire for about one hour but was not hit. She worked round to the north-east of the Bismarck but eventually lost touch with her prey at 2355/26.

The other destroyers, meanwhile, had been working round to the southward of the enemy to take up shadowing positions to the eastward of him. Soon after the initial contact it was evident the the Bismarck's speed had been so seriously reduced that interception by the battlefleet was certain, provided that contact could be held. In these circumstances Captain Vian defined his object at firstly, to deliver the enemy to the Commander-in-Chief at the time he desired, and secondly, to sink or immoblise her with torpedoes during the night but not with to great a risk for the destroyers. Accordingly at 2248/26 as signal was made to all ordering them to shadow and this operation was carried out through the night, though torpedo attacks were carried out later under the cover of darkness.

As darkness came on, the weather deteriorated and heavy rain squalls became frequent. Visibility varied between 2.5 nautical miles and half a mile but the Bismarck, presumably using radar, frequently opened up accurate fire outside these ranges.

About half an hour after sunset, the destroyers were ordered at 2324/26 to take up stations prepartory to carrying out a synchronised torpedo attack. This was subsequently cancelled on account of the adverse weather conditions and they were ordered to attack independently as opportunity offered. At about 2300 hours the Bismarck altered course to the north-westward.

At this time HMS Zulu was in touch with her and kept her under observation from the southward. At 2342 hours the Bismarck opened fire on HMS Cossack, then about 4 miles to the south-south-west and shot away her aerials. The Cossack turned away under the cover of smoke, shortly afterwards resuming her course to the eastward.

A few minutes later, at 2350 hours, HMS Zulu came under heavy fire from the Bismarck's 15" guns. The first three salvoes straddled wounding an officer and two ratings. Drastic avoiding action was taken as a result of which Zulu lost touch. HMS Sikh, however, who had lost sight of the enemy half an hour previously, had observed her firing at HMS Cossack and now succeeded in shadowing from astern until 0020/27 when the enemy made a large alteration to port and commenced firing at her. HMS Sikh altered course to port, intending to fire torpedoes, but the view of the Torpedo Control Officer was obscured by shell splashes and Sikh then withdrew to the southward.

Destroyer night torpedo attacks, 26/27 May 1941.

HMS Zulu, after her escape at 2345/26, had steered to the northward and at 0030/27 fell in with HMS Cossack. Shortly afterwards she sighted ORP Piorun. On receipt of a signal from Captain Vian, timed 0040/27, to take any opporunity to fire torpedoes, HMS Zulu altered course to the westward,and at 0100/27 sighted the Bismarck steering 340°.

Positions of the destroyers was now as follows; to the north-eastward of the enemy, HMS Cossack was working round to the north and west. HMS Maori, since losing touch, had been making to the westward. She was now to the south-west of the Bismarck. HMS Sikh was some distance to the southward, not having received any information regarding the position of the Bismarck since 0025/27. HMS Zulu was astern of the enemy and in contact. Range was only 5000 yards. Bismarck finally spotted Zulu and at once opened fire with her main and secondary armament and straddled Zulu. She fired four torpedoes at 0121/27 but no hits were observed and they are believed to have missed ahead. Zulu then ran out to the northward in order to be clear of the other destroyers. Shortly afterwards they widnessed a successful attack by HMS Maori.

HMS Maori had seen the Bismarck opening fire on the Zulu at 0107/27. Maori then closed to 4000 yards on Bismarck's port quarter apparently undetected. When abeam of the enemy, who then appeared to be altering course to starboard Maori fired a star shell to see what he was about. Two minutes later, at 0137/27, two torpedoes were fired and course was altered towards the Bismarck with the intention of attacking again from her starboard bow once the enemy had steadied on her new course. Whilst Maori was turning a torpedo hit was observed on the enemy. A bright glow illuminated the waterline of the enemy battleship from stem to stern. Shortly afterwards there appeared between the bridge and the stem a glare that might have been a second hit. The enemy immediately opened up a very heavy fire with both main and secondairy armaments and quick firing guns. As the Maori was being straddled, she turned away, and increased to full speed. Shots continued to fall on both sides of the ship until the range had been opened up to 10000 yards. Maori was not actually hit. Meanwhile HMS Cossack had been creeping up from the north-eastward and at 0140/27, only three minutes after Maori had fired two torpedoes, Cossack launched three torpedoes from 6000 yards. Bismarck stood out plainly, silhoutted by the broadsides she was firing at the Maori. One torpedo was seen to hit. Flames blazed on the forecastle of the Bismarck after this hit but they were quickly extinguished. Probably as a consequence of the torpedo hits the Bismarck stopped dead in the water, this was reported by HMS Zulu at 0148/27. After about one hour the Bismarck got underway again. On receipt of this report, HMS Sikh, who was closing the scene of the action from the southward, made an attack. Four torpedoes were fired at 0218/27 at the stopped battleship. It is believed that one hit was obtained. After this attack Sikh remained in radar contact with the enemy until 0359/27 when contact was lost.

Around 0240/27 the Bismarck was underway again, proceeding very slowly to the north-westward. At 0335/27, HMS Cossack made another attack firing her last remaining torpedo from a range of 4000 yards. It missed. HMS Cossack then came under a heavy fire. She withdrew to the northward under the cover of smoke, altering to a westerly course shortly afterwards.

At 0400/27 all destroyers had lost touch with the enemy. HMS Cossack was then to the north-west and HMS Sikh, HMS Zulu and HMS Maori were between the south-west and south-east of the Bismarck. All destroyers now endeavoured to regain contact.

Touch with the enemy was not regained until shortly before 0600 hours. By that time ORP Piorun, which was running short of fuel, had been ordered to proceed to Plymouth.

Destroyers shadowing, morning twilight, 27 May 1941, final attack.

Touch was regained by HMS Maori at 0550/27 when she sighted the Bismarck zigzagging slowly on a base course of 340° at about 7 knots. Maori commenced shadowing until daylight. At 0625 hours, HMS Sikh was also in contact when the Bismarck emerged from a rain squal 7000 yards on her starboard bow. By then it was nearly full daylight but to the surprise of the crew of the Sikh she got away with it without being fired at.

Shortly before sunrise a final torpedo attack was carried out by HMS Maori, which fired two torpedoes at 0656/27 from 9000 yards. Both missed. The Bismarck opened fire and straddled Maori which escaped at 28 knots.

At daylight the destroyers were stationed in four sectors from which they were able to keep the enemy under continuous observation until the arrival of the Battle Fleet at 0845 hours.

Force H, 26/27 May 1941.

While the destroyers were shadowing the Bismarck, the pursuing forces were drawing steadily closer. To the north was the Commander-in-Chief with the King George V and the Rodney with the Norfolk closing on them. In the south HMS Dorsetshire (Capt. B.C.S. Martin, RN) was coming up, while Force H was waiting for the dawn. When Captain Vian's destroyers got in touch at 2251/26 the Renown and Ark Royal were north-west of the enemy. It was not possible to attack with aircraft during the night but all preparations were made to attack at dawn with 12 Swordfish. Course was shaped to the northward and then to the west for a time and at 0115/27 Force H turned south. Shortly afterwards instructions were received from the Commander-in-Chief to keep not less then 20 miles to the southward of the Bismarck so as to leave a clear approach for the Battle Fleet. Force H accordingly continued to the southward during the night. Bursts of starshell and gunfire could be seen during the night while the destroyers attacked. At 0509/27 an aircraft was flown off from HMS Ark Royal to act as a spotter for HMS King George V but it failed to find the Bismarck in the bad weather. The striking of force of 12 Swordfish was ready but due to the bad weather to strike was cancelled.

At 0810/27, HMS Maori was sighted. She reported the Bismarck 11 miles to the north of her. The made the enemy 17 miles to the north of HMS Renown so course was shaped to the south-west. At 0915/27 heavy gunfire could be heard and the striking force was flown off. They found the Bismarck at 1016/27. By then the battle was almost over, her guns were silenced and she was on fire. They saw her sink. At 1115/27 they had all landed back on HMS Ark Royal. A German Heinkel aircraft dropped a couple of bombs near HMS Ark Royal when they were landing on.

HMS Norfolk, 26/27 May 1941.

When the Catalina report (1030/26) came in, HMS Norfolk altered course to the south-west and increased speed to 27 knots. At 2130/26 the Bismarck was still some 160 nautical miles to the southward and speed was increased to 30 knots. At 2228/26 the report on the torpedo hit by the aircraft from Ark Royal came in and the Norfolk turned to the southward, continuing to close the enemy. At 0753/27 Norfolk sighted the Bismarck. She did not open fire and was lost to sight after ten minutes. At 0821/27, HMS King George V, was sighted to the westward, 12 nautical miles away. The position of the enemy was passed to the Commander-in-Chief. The action opened at 0847/27 at which time HMS Norfolk was then some 10 nautical miles from the Commander-in-Chief and due north of the Bismarck. HMS Norfolk had seen the beginning and was now to see the end.

HMS Dorsetshire, 26/27 May 1941.

On 26 May 1941, HMS Dorsetshire, was with convoy SL 74 proceeding from Freetown to the U.K. When she received the sighting report from the Catalina at 1056/26 she was some 360 nautical miles to the south of the Bismarck. She then left the protection of the convoy to the Armed Merchant Cruiser HMS Bulolo (Capt.(Retd.) R.L. Hamer, RN) and set course for the northward to take up the possible task of shadowing. By 2343/26 it became clear from reports that the Bismarck was making no ground to the eastward and that at 0230/27 she appeared to be laying stopped. Due to the heavy seas HMS Dorsetshire was forced to reduce speed to 25 knots and later even to 20 knots. At 0833/27 a destroyer was sighted ahead at a range of 8 nautical miles, it was HMS Cossack which reported the enemy at a range of 6 nautical miles. At 0850/27 the flashes of the Bismarck's guns could be seen to the westward. HMS Dorsetshire arrived at the scene of the action in the nick of time.

HMS King George V and HMS Rodney, 26/27 May 1941.

During 26 May 1941 the Commander-in-Chief in HMS King George V had been making hard to the south-east at 25 knots. He had been joined by HMS Rodney at 1806/26. They were then some 90 nautical miles north of the Bismarck. Fuel was a matter of grave anxiety. At noon on the 26th, HMS King George V, had only 32% remaining and HMS Rodney reported that she had to return at 0800/27. Speed had to be reduced on this account to 22 knots at 1705/26. In these circumstances it was no longer possible to hope to intercept the enemy, and the Commander-in-Chief decided that unless the enemy's speed had been reduced by 2400/26, he must turn at that hour. The only hope lay in the Bismarck being slowed up by the Swordfish attacking from HMS Ark Royal. A report came in that the striking force had left. Then at 2132/26, HMS Sheffield, reported that the enemy was steering 340° followed by 000° four minutes later. These reports indicated that the Bismarck was not able to hold her course and that her steering gear must have been damaged. It might still be possible to intercept her.

The Commander-in-Chief turned to the south at once hoping to make contact from the eastward in the failing light. Due to the bad weather conditions and visibility the Commander-in-Chief decided to haul off the the eastward and northward and then work round to engage from the westward at dawn. He turned eastward at 2306/26. During the night reports from Captain Vian's destroyers came in confirming the northerly course of the Bismarck. At 0236/27 the Commander-in-Chief ordered Captain Vian that the destroyers were to fire star-shell every half hour, but frequent rain squalls prevented these from being seen and they tended to attrack the enemy's fire. The Bismarck was still a formidable opponent for at 0353/27 Captain Vian reported that during the last hour she had done 8 nautical miles and that she was still capable of heavy and accurate fire. The Commander-in-Chief decided not to make a dawn approach but to wait until daylight while approaching from the west taking advantage of wind, sea and light. At 0529/27 HMS Rodney reported sighting HMS Norfolk to the eastward by DF. It was light at 0600 hours. At 0820 hours HMS Norfolk was sighted on the port bow of HMS King George V. She signalled 'enemy 130°, 16 nautical miles'. At 0843/27 looming on the starboard bow there emerges out of a rain squall the dark grey blot of a large ship. 'Enemy in sight'.

Bismarck 26/27 May 1941.

The Bismarck after altering course to the north-west had been labouring along with a jambed rudder, steering an erratic course at 8 knots. During the night the attacking destroyers were met with heavy and accurate salvoes. Sixteen torpedoes were fired at her. Early in the morning a glare of star-shell burst over her, lighting her up. Three torpedoes followed from a destroyer on the port bow (HMS Maori) of which one hit on the port side amidships. Three minutes later three more came from the starboard side (these were fired by HMS Cossack) of which one hit on the starboard bow. The damage that was sustained from these torpedo hits is not known. The Bismarck lay stopped for over one hour. At 0140/27 a message was received that a large number of Junkers bombers were coming to her aid as were U-boats but the Bismarck was beyond their help besides that the aircraft did not find her. One U-boat (U-556, which was out of torpedoes) on its way back from the Atlantic joined her and was within sight during the night. Another (U-74) arrived at 0600/27 but had been damaged in a depth charge attack and could do nothing as well. In the Bismarck the crew was exhausted and men were falling asleep at their posts. It was under these conditions that at 0840/27 two British battleships were seen to approach from the westward.

Situation before the action, 27 May 1941.

A north-westerly gale was blowing when dawn broke with a good light and clear horizon to the north-eastward. Reports received during the night indicated that, despite reduced speed and damaged rudders, Bismarck's armament was functioning effectively. Given the weather conditions the Commander-in-Chief decided to approach on a west-north-westerly bearing and, if the enemy continued his northerly course, to deploy to the southward on opposite course at a range of about 15000 yards. Further action was to be dictated by events.

Between 0600 and 0700 hours a series of enemy reports from HMS Maori which was herself located by DF bearings. This enabled HMS King George V to plot her position relatively to the Bismarck which had apparently settled down on a course of 330° at 10 knots. At 0708/27, HMS Rodney, was ordered to keep station 010° from the flagship. HMS Norfolk came in sight to the eastward at 0820/27 and provided a visual link between the Commander-in-Chief and the enemy. After the line of approach had been adjusted by two alterations of course, the Bismarck was sighted at 0843/27 bearing 118°, range about 25000 yards. Both British battleships was then steering 110° almost directly towards the enemy in line abreast formation, 8 cables apart.

Commencement of action 0847/27.

HMS Rodney opened fire at 0847/27, her first salvo sending a column of water 150 feet into the air. HMS King George V opened fire one minute later. Bismarck opened fire at 0850 hours after turning to open up A arcs. The first German salvo was short. The third and fourth salvoes straddled and nearly hit, but the Rodney manoeuvered succesfully to avoid them and the nearest fell 20 yards short. At 0854/27, HMS Norfolk joined in, but the target was not clearly visible and she opened fire without obtaining a range.

Observers state that the German gunnery was accurate at first, but commenced to deteriorate after 8 to 10 salvoes. The first hit on the Bismarck was believed to be scored by the Rodney at 0854 hours with her third salvo. Both British battleships made small alterations of course away from the enemy shortly after opening fire, the King George V to increase her distance from the Rodney and the latter to open her A arcs. From then onwards they manoeuvered independently although HMS Rodney conformed to the Flagship's general movements. The Bismarck's secondary armament came into action during this phase. HMS Rodney opened fire with her secondary armament at 0858 hours.

Run to the southward.

HMS King George V deployed to the southward at 0859/27 when the Bismarck was 16000 yards distant. HMS Rodney, 2.5 nautical miles to the northward, followed suit a minute or two later. Cordite smoke was hanging badly with the following wind and spotting was most difficult. Considerable smoke interference was therefore experienced on the southerly course which was partly overcome by radar. The Bismarck had transferred her fire to the King George V shortly after the turn but except for an occasional splash the latter hardly knew that she was under fire. At 0902/27, HMS Rodney saw a 16” shell hit the Bismarck on the upper deck forward, apparently putting the forward turrets out of action. At 0904 hours, HMS Dorsetshire joined in the firing from the eastwards from a range of 20000 yards but observation of the target was difficult and she had to check fire from 0913 to 0920 hours. Between 0910 and 0915 hours the range in King George V was more or less steady at 12000 yards.

The fate of the Bismarck was decided during this phase of the action although she did not sink until later. Around 0912 hours, the Bismarck was hit on her forward control position. During the run to the south HMS Rodney fired six torpedoes from 11000 yards and HMS Norfolk four from 16000 yards. No hits were obtained. The King George V’s secondary battery came into action at 0905 hours but this increased the smoke interference and was accordingly ordered to cease fire after two or three minutes.

strong>Run to the northward.

At 0916/27 the Bismarck’s bearing was drawing rapidly aft and HMS Rodney turned 16 points to close and head her off. The King George V followed a minute or so later and both ships re-opened fire at ranges from 8600 and 12000 yards respectively. The Bismarck shifted her target to the Rodney about this time. A near miss damaged the sluice of her starboard torpedo tube. Most of the enemy’s guns had however been silenced at this time. Only one turret from her main armament was firing at this time as was part of her secondary armament. A fire was blazing amidships and she had a heavy list to port. During the run to the north HMS Rodney obtained a very favourable position on the Bismarck’s bow from which she poured in a heavy fire from close range. She also fired two torpedoes from 7500 yards but no hits were obtained.

HMS King George V’s position, further to leeward, was less favourable. Her view was obscured by smoke and splashes surrounding the target and her radar had temporarily broken down. Mechanical failures in the 14” turrets constituted, however, a more serious handicap at this stage. ‘A’, ‘X’ and ‘Y’ turrets were out of action for 30, 7 and a unspecified short period, respectively. This resulted in reduction of firepower of 80% for 7 minutes and 40% for 23 minutes which might have had serious effects under less favourable conditions. There were also several defects of individual guns in addition to those effecting the turrets.

At 0925/27, HMS King George V, altered outwards to 150° and reduced speed to avoid getting too far ahead of the Bismarck. She closed in again at 1005 hours, fired several salvoes from a range of only 3000 yards and then resumed her northerly course. Meanwhile HMS Rodney was zigzagging across the Bismarck’s line of advance at a range of about 4000 yards firing her main and secondary armaments. She also fired four torpedoes, one of which is thought to have hit. By 1015 hours the Bismarck was no more than a wreck. All her guns were silenced, her mast had been blown away, she was a black ruin, pouring high into the air a great cloud of smoke and flame. Men were seen jumping overboard at this time and the Captain of the King George V later remarked had he known it he would have ceased fire.

End of the action.

The Commander-in-Chief was confident that the enemy could never get back to harbour, and as both battleships were running short of fuel and as further gunfire was unlikely to hasten the Bismarck’s end, the Commander-in-Chief signalled the King George V and Rodney to steer 027° at 1015/27 in order to break off the action and return to base. At 1036/27 the Commander-in-Chief ordered HMS Dorsetshire to use her torpedoes, if she had any, on the enemy. In the meantime HMS Norfolk had been closing the target but due to the movements of the King George V and Rodney, had not fired her torpedoes until 1010 hours when she fired four torpedoes from 4000 yards and two possible hits were reported. The Dorsetshire was then approaching a mile or so to the southward, and anticipating the Commander-in-Chief’s signal at 1025 hours fired two torpedoes from 3600 yards into the enemy’s starboard side. She then steamed round the Bismarck’s bow and at 1036 hours fired another torpedo but now into her port side from 2600 yards. This was the final blow, the Bismarck heeled over quickly to port and commenced to sink by the stern. The hull turned over keel up and disappeared beneath the waves at 1040/27.

The Dorsetshire then closed and signalled to one of HMS Ark Royal’s aircraft to carry out a close A/S patrol while she was to pick up survivors assisted by HMS Maori. After 110 men had been picked up by both ships from the water both ships got underway again as a submarine was suspected to be in the area.

Damage to the Bismarck.

Survivors have told the story of terrible damage inflicted on her. The fore turrets seem to have been knocked out at 0902 hours. The fore control position was knocked out around 0912 hours. The after control position followed about 0915 hours. The after turrets were at that moment still in action. Then the aftermost gun turret was disabled by a direct hit on the left gun which burst sending a flash right through the turret. ‘C’ turret was the last one in action.

One survivor stated that around 0930 hours a shell penetrated the turbine room and another one entered a boiler room. A hit in the after dressing station killed all the medical staff and wounded that were in there at that moment. The upper deck was crowded with killed and wounded men and the seas surging in washed them overboard. Conditions below were even more terrible. Hatches and doors were jammed by concussion and blocked with wreckage. The air was thick with smoke and even more smoke was coming in from great holes in the upper deck. By 1000 hours all heavy guns were out of action and 10 minutes later the all secondary guns were also silent.

Commander-in-Chief returns.

As HMS King George V and HMS Rodney turned northwards they were joined by HMS Cossack, HMS Sikh and HMS Zulu at by 1600/28 more detroyers had joined the screen (HMS Maori, HMS Jupiter, HMS Somali, HMS Eskimo, HMS Punjabi, HMAS Nestor, HMS Inglefield, HMS Lance, HMS Vanquisher (Cdr. N.V. Dickinson, DSC, RN), HMCS St. Clair (Lt.Cdr. D.C. Wallace, RCNR), HMCS Columbia (Lt.Cdr. (Retd.) S.W. Davis, RN) and HMS Ripley (Lt.Cdr. J.A. Agnew, RN)). Heavy air attacks were expected that day, but only four enemy aircraft appeared, one of which bombed the screen while another one jettisoned her bombs on being attacked by a Blenheim fighter. The destroyers HMS Mashona and HMS Tartar, 100 nautical miles to the southward, were not so furtunate. They were attacked in position 52°58’N, 11°36’W at 0955/28 by German aircraft. HMS Mashona was hit and sank at noon with the loss of 1 officer and 45 men. The Commander-in-Chief reached Loch Ewe at 1230/29. Vice-Admiral Sommerville with Force H was on his way back to Gibraltar.

End of ‘Operation Rheinübung’.

The Bismarck’s consort, heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, was not heard off until 4 June 1941 when aircraft reported her having arrived at Brest. After leaving the Bismarck at 1914/24, the Prinz Eugen’s primary need was to replenish her fuel stock. She set course for a rendez-vous with two tankers, the Spichern (9323 GRT, built 1935, former Norwegian Krossfonn) and the Esso Hamburg (9849 GRT, built 1939) which were position to the north-west of the Azores. All next day the German cruiser made her way southwards, and at 0906/26 , some 600 nautical miles west-north-west of the Azores she sighted the Spichern and refuelled. Two reconnaissance ships had also been ordered into this area, the Gonzenheim and the Kota Pinang. On the 28th Prinz Eugen fuelled from the Esso Hamburg. She then proceeded southwards to carry out cruiser warfare against independently routed ships in the area to the north and west of the Cape Verde Islands but an inspection of her engines the next day showed that an extensive overhaul was needed. Her Commanding Officer then decided to break off the action and course was set for Brest, France where she arrived at 2030/1 June.

A German reconnaissance ship, a supply vessel and two tankers were intercepted by Royal Navy warships and sunk by their own crew or sunk with gunfire. Also two tankers were captured. These were in chronological order; tanker Belchen (6367 GRT, built 1932, former Norwegian Sysla) by gunfire from HMS Kenya and HMS Aurora on 3 June 1941 in the Greenland area in approximate position 59°00'N, 47°00'W.
On 4 June the tanker Esso Hamburg by HMS London and HMS Brilliant (Lt.Cdr. F.C. Brodrick, RN) in position 07°35'N, 31°25'W,
tanker Gedania (8966 GRT, built 1920) was captured in the North Atlantic in position 43°38'N, 28°15'W by naval auxiliary (Ocean Boarding Vessel) HMS Marsdale (Lt.Cdr. D.H.F. Armstrong, RNR), she was put into service with the MOWT as Empire Garden, reconnaissance vessel Gonzenheim (4000 GRT, built 1937, former Norwegian Kongsfjord) was scuttled by her own crew after being sighted by HMS Esperance Bay ((Capt.(ret) G.S. Holden, RN) and intercepted by HMS Nelson (Capt. Sir. G.J.A. Miles, RN) and finally ordered to be boarded by HMS Neptune in position 43°29'N, 24°04'W. The next day (5 June) supply vessel Egerland (10040 GRT, built 1940) was intercepted by HMS London and HMS Brilliant in approximate position 07°00'N, 31°00'W. On 12 June, HMS Sheffield, intercepted tanker Friedrich Breme (10397 GRT, built 1936) in position 49°48'N, 22°20'W and finally on 15 June, HMS Dunedin (Capt. R.S. Lovatt, RN), captured the tanker strong>Lothringen (10746 GRT, built 1940, former Dutch Papendrecht) in position 19°49'N, 38°30'W which had first been sighted by an aircraft from HMS Eagle (Capt. E.G.N. Rushbrooke, DSC, RN). The Lothringen was sent to Bermuda and was put into service by the MOWT as Empire Salvage. (2)

21 May 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed from Scapa Flow for her 1st war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Stadlandet, Norway. On 23 May the submarine was ordered to position 65°30'N, 02°00'E as the German battleship Bismarck and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen had been observed in the fjords off Bergen.

When it became clear that the two German ships had departed P 31 was ordered to patrol to the North-North-East of the Shetlands.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (3)

30 May 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 1st war patrol at Dundee. (3)

4 Jun 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) shifted from Dundee to Rosyth. (1)

5 Jun 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) is docked at Rosyth for a propeller change. (1)

7 Jun 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) is undocked. She then departed from Rosyth for Dundee where she arrived later the same day. (1)

11 Jun 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed from Dundee for her 2nd war patrol. She was ordered to patrol off Stadlandet, Norway as a German pocket battleship had been sighted passing the Skaw.

On the 13th P 31 was ordered to patrol in the North Sea for an Anti-uboat patrol. A U-boat had been sighted in position 61°10'N, 01°10'E, P 31 altered course to intercept but failed to find anything.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (3)

16 Jun 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 2nd war patrol at Scapa Flow. (3)

6 Jul 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Scapa Flow for her 3rd war patrol. She was ordered to patrol in the Norwegian Sea for an anti-uboat patrol.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (3)

18 Jul 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 3rd war patrol at Lerwick. (3)

20 Jul 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Lerwick for Dundee. She was escorted by HMS Preston North End (Lt. K.A. Vasey, RNR). (1)

21 Jul 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Dundee. (1)

5 Aug 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Dundee for Scapa Flow. (1)

7 Aug 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Scapa Flow where she was to participate in A/S exercises. (1)

9 Sep 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Scapa Flow for Dundee. She was escorted by HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(retired) R.H. Mack, RN). (1)

10 Sep 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Dundee. (1)

20 Sep 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) is taken in hand for a short refit at Dundee before she was to proceed to the Mediterranean. (1)

23 Sep 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) is docked at Dundee. The date she is undocked is currently not known to us. (1)

30 Sep 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Dundee for Gibraltar. She was escorted by HMS Cutty Sark (Cdr.(retired) R.H. Mack, RN) until Bishops Rock.

Passage towards Scapa Flow was made together with HMS P 35 (Lt. S.L.C. Maydon, RN).

Off Scapa Flow joined HrMs O 10 (Lt. D.T. Mackay, RNN) for passage towards Oban.

At Oban HMS H 32 (Lt. J.W.D. Coombe, RN) joined for the passage South through the Irish Sea as she was to proceed to Portsmouth.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (1)

2 Oct 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Oban. (1)

3 Oct 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Oban for Gibraltar. (1)

11 Oct 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Gibraltar. (1)

13 Oct 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Gibraltar for Malta.

For the daily positions of HMS P 31 during this passage see the map below.

(4)

16 Oct 1941
At 0805 hours, in position 37°32'N, 05°16'E, a periscope was sighted. HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) dived and Asdic contact was obtained at 1500 yards indicating the U-boat was on course 190°. P 31 surfaced at 0945 hours and proceeded at full speed in the hope of drawing an attack but nothing happened and the submarine dived again. (4)

20 Oct 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Malta. (4)

29 Oct 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Malta for her 4th war patrol (1st in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol near Capo Colonna, Crotone, Italy.

For the daily positions of HMS P 31 during this patrol see the map below.

(4)

9 Nov 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 4th war patrol (1st in the Mediterranean) at Malta. (4)

18 Nov 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Malta for her 5th war patrol (2nd in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol in the Ionian Sea.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS P 31 during this patrol see the map below.

(4)

20 Nov 1941
At 0205 hours, in position 36°35'N, 17°37'E, HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) transmitted a dummy message for deception purposes. (4)

29 Nov 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) attacked the Italian light cruiser Muzio Attendolo in the Gulf of Taranto. No hits were obtained.

(All times are zone -2)
1705 hours - In position 39°20'N, 17°33'E, when at 80 feet, HE was heard to the North-North-East. Closed. Went to periscope depth. Saw an Italian cruiser force escorted by destroyers.

1719 hours - Fired four torpedoes at the second cruiser. Three explosions were heard 3 to 4 minutes after firing.

1745 hours - Returned to periscope depth but it was too dark to see anything.

The cruiser force attacked by P 31 was made up of the Italian light cruisers Emanuelle Filiberto Duca d’Aosta, Raimondo Montecuccoli and Muzio Attendolo. They were escorted by Aviere, Geniere and Camicia Nera.

The light cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli (third cruiser in the formation) observed Muzio Attendolo suddenly turning to port and imitated her immediately. Torpedo tracks were seen passing to starboard between the two cruisers. (4)

3 Dec 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 5th war patrol (2nd in the Mediterranean) at Malta. (4)

13 Dec 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Malta for her 6th war patrol (3rd in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to form a patrol line in the Ionian Sea with HMS Upholder (Lt.Cdr. M.D. Wanklyn, DSO, RN), HMS P 34 (Lt. P.R.H. Harrison, DSC, RN) and ORP Sokol (Lt.Cdr. B. Karnicki, ORP).

For the daily and attack positions of HMS P 31 during this patrol see the map below.

(4)

17 Dec 1941
At 0935 hours, in position 39°22'N, 17°19'E at a distance of 7000 yards, HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) sighted an Italian submarine of the Santorre [Santarosa] class apparently returning to Taranto. P 31 proceeded to intercept but the enemy submarine dived 5 minutes later and the attack was broken off.

There is no evidence of Italian submarines in this area at that time. Ammiraglio Cagni was returning to Taranto on this morning but she was about 45 miles to the north-east of P 31 and remained on the surface until she reached Taranto. (4)

18 Dec 1941
At 0320 hours (zone -2) HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived in a new position (39.05'N, 17.32'E). She formed a new patrol line together with HMS Unbeaten (Lt.Cdr. E.A. Woodward, RN) and ORP Sokol (Lt.Cdr. B. Karnicki, ORP). (4)

19 Dec 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) is detected and depth charged by an Italian destroyer or torpedo boat in position 39°05'N, 17°28'E. No damage was done to P 31.

Following this P 31 attacked an Italian cruiser with four torpedoes in position 39°05'N, 17°31'E. No hits were obtained. P 31 was again depth charged but again she evaded these and was not damaged.

The enemy force consisted of the light cruisers Raimondo Montececcoli, Muzio Attendolo and Emanuele Filiberto Duca D’Aosta screened by the destroyers Aviere, Ascari and Camicia Nera returning to Taranto after escorting a convoy to Libya.

(All times are zone -2)
1316 hours - In position 39°05'N, 17°28'E sighted a small destroyer closing and using some sort of A/S transmissions. P 31 remained at periscope depth and took avoiding action. The destroyers tactics were to stop and presumably listen and then to go ahead using her asdics.

1330 hours - The destroyer attacked and forced P 31 deep. 12 Depth charges were dropped at intervals up to 1400 hours.

1406 hours - Returned to periscope depth, proceeding at slow speed and keeping stern on to the destroyer. Up to 1500 hours 8 depth charges were dropped but she did not appear to be in contact.

1540 hours - The destroyer increased speed and turned towards. P 31 was forced deep. 16 Depth charges were dropped.

1610 hours - P 31 appeared to be clear and came to periscope depth. The destroyer was seen sweeping the area.

1613 hours - The destroyer dropped one last depth charge and then proceeded Southward.

1615 hours - Sighted an aircraft.

1632 hours - Sighted a destroyer bearing 135° with a haze of smoke behind her. Range was about 9000 yards. Closed.

1640 hours - Sighted two large ships with the smoke of a third bearing 151°, range 9000 yards. Closed at high speed for 6 minutes. 4 Destroyers were in sight.

1648 hours - Observed that the enemy had altered course. P 31 was now 25° on the enemy's port bow. The destroyers appeared to be zigging independently and were rushing about at high speed. The large ships were thought to be battleships (after consultation upon returning to Malta they were thought to be cruisers).

1652 hours - A destroyer was now right ahead at a range of 900 yards. Went to 50 feet. The destroyer then passed overhead.

1654 hours - Returned to periscope depth. The enemy had altered course again. Altered course to complete the attack.

1658 hours - In position 39°05'N, 17°31'E fired four torpedoes from 1000 yards against one of the big ships. Took avoiding action on firing and went deep.

1703 hours - Destroyers were reported to be coming in.

1704 hours - Depth charging started. 27 Depth charged in all were dropped. The second pattern was fairly close.

1738 hours - Returned to periscope depth. Saw two destroyers bearing 010°. They were making a lot of smoke.

[The light cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli reported being missed by five torpedoes (only four were actually fired). The light cruiser Muzio Attendolo immediately dropped depth charges, imitated by the destroyers but these were only for intimidation purposes.] (4)

22 Dec 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 6th war patrol (3rd in the Mediterranean) at Malta. (4)

27 Dec 1941
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) is docked at Malta. (5)

6 Jan 1942
While in dock at Malta, HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) is damaged by bomb splinters during an air raid. The result was 28 holes in the pressure hull, 23 holes in the superstructure and 4 holes in underwater fittings. Electrical equipment was damaged in the vicinity of the splinter holes. Three of the crew were injured. (6)

24 Jan 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) is undocked. (6)

2 Feb 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Malta for her 7th war patrol (4th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol off Tripoli.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS P 31 during this patrol see the map below.

(7)

6 Feb 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) attacked but missed a vessel which was most probably the Italian merchant Bolsena (2384 GRT, built 1918) off Zuwara, Libya.

(All times are zone -2)
1431 hours - In position 33°07'N, 12°03'E sighted a laden merchant vessel of about 1500 tons. Range was about 5 nautical miles. No surface escort was present but there was an air escort. Enemy (mean) course was 090° but she was zig-zagging. Closed at high speed.

1459 hours - Fired 3 torpedoes from 5000 yards. No explosions were heard.

1508 hours - Observed that the ship had altered course and was now heading towards the coast. The aircraft prevented further observations or gun action. As the sea was oily calm the torpedo tracks were most likely sighted. (7)

12 Feb 1942
At 0615 hours (zone -2), on board HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN), the Officer Of the Watch, Lt. M.H. Gardner, RN and S/Lt. R.C. Bucknall, RN were washed overboard when P 31 accidentally dived in position 33°18'N, 12°01'E. Ballast was immediately blow but P 31 meanwhile had been at a depth of 70 feet. P 31 then returned to the position of the accident and was able to pick up S/Lt. Bucknall. Lt. Gardner however was not found despite a thorough search of the area. (7)

14 Feb 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 7th war patrol (4th in the Mediterranean) at Malta. (7)

26 Feb 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Malta for her 8th war patrol (5th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol East of Tunisia.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS P 31 during this patrol see the map below.

(7)

5 Mar 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) torpedoed and sank the Italian merchant Marin Sanudo (5958 GRT, built 1926) about 10 nautical miles West-South-West of the island of Lampedusa in position 35°27'N, 12°12'E. P 31 was hunted by her two escorts the Italian torpedo boats Cigno and Procione following this attack and they dropped respectively 22 and 12 depth charges.

(All times are zone -2)
1245 hours - In position 35°27'N, 12°12'E sighted an aircraft carrying out an A/S sweep. Went deep.

1305 hours - Heard H.E., bearing 340° and came to periscope depth.

1306 hours - Sighted a motor vessel escorted by two Folgore-class destroyers, one on either bow. Range was 7200 yards. The nearest destroyer had FL on her bow. [Here Lt. Kershaw must have made a mistake, destroyer Fulmine (FL) had been sunk on 9 November 1941.]

1310 hours - Commenced a retiring turn. The target was on a steady course with the destroyers zigging independently. The target was a vessel of about 7000 tons and fully laden.

1320 hours - Decided to attack with a salvo of four torpedoes. It was a large vessel, fully laden with a heavy escort. It must be a very valuable ship for the enemy.

1321 hours - Went to 40 feet as the sea was flat calm and the periscope would otherwise be sighted. Decided to attack using Asdic.

1323 hours - Fired four torpedoes from 780 yards. All hit. H.E. of the target ceased. P 31 increased to full speed and retired to the North.

1327 hours - Went to slow speed.

1329 hours - 5 Depth charges were dropped, fairly close.

1331 hours - 4 Depth charges exploded, very close.

1333 hours - Settled on the bottom at 240 feet. By 1345 hours a total of 30 depth charges had been dropped and minor damage was received. The destroyers were overhead, stopping and starting their engines. Decided to remain on the bottom. It was some comfort that the chart 'from the latest Italian Government Surveys' gave the greatest depth as 180 feet.

1600 hours - The final depth charges were dropped and the destroyers were heard proceeding to the North.

1700 hours - Returned to periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Went deep again to reload. (7)

12 Mar 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 8th war patrol (5th in the Mediterranean) at Malta. (7)

23 Mar 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Malta for her 9th war patrol (6th in the Mediterranean). She is ordered to patrol in the Tyrrhenian Sea.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS P 31 during this patrol see the map below.

(7)

1 Apr 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) attacked but missed a tanker with three torpedoes near Civitavecchia, Italy.

(All times are zone -2)
0925 hours - Sighted a merchant vessel and 4 schooners leaving the harbour of Civitavecchia.

0955 hours - When minesweeping trawlers that had been sighted earlier were clear P 31 was able to start closing the merchant vessel. Three of the schooners were ahead of her and one was close astern.

1014 hours - In position 42°02'N, 11°31'E fired three torpedoes from 3000 yards. The merchant vessel (a 2000 tons tanker) turned away to comb the tracks and then returned to the harbour at high speed.

The target has not yet been identified. (7)

2 Apr 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) attacked an Italian auxiliary A/S schooner with one torpedo about 10 nautical miles East-South-East of the island of Ponza. The torpedo missed.

(All times are zone -2)
1750 hours - Sighted a large 3-masted schooner in position 40°49'N, 13°07'E. She was laying stopped. Started attack in which one torpedo was fired from 1400 yards. The torpedo missed just ahead.

The target has not yet been identified. (7)

8 Apr 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 9th war patrol (6th in the Mediterranean) at Malta.

The crew of HMS P 36 temporarily took charge of the submarine until 13 April to give her crew a rest.

While submerged in Malta on 8 April, the submarine was shaken by a bomb and developed as small leak. (7)

13 Apr 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Malta for her 10th war patrol (7th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol to the South of the Strait of Messina.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (7)

18 Apr 1942
It was hoped to fire a Mark IV torpedo at the base of the viaduct north of Taormina but the bad weather prevented the attempt. (7)

21 Apr 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 10th war patrol (7th in the Mediterranean) at Malta. Only one merchant ship had been observed and it passed out of range. (7)

26 Apr 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Malta for Alexandria. Due to heavy enemy air attacks it had been decided to retire the small number of submarines currently based at Malta to Alexandria.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (8)

5 May 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Alexandria. (8)

18 May 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Alexandria for Port Said. (9)

20 May 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Port Said. Most likely she was docked here but as there is no log available we are not sure of this. (9)

3 Jun 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Port Said for Alexandria. (9)

4 Jun 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Alexandria. (9)

6 Jun 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Alexandria for her 11th war patrol (8th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol in the Ionian Sea to provide cover during 'Operation Vigorous'.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (8)

15 Jun 1942
At 0604 hours, in position 35°46'N, 18°50'E, HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) sighted two battleships and three cruisers but they passed far out of range. A few minutes later an air attack was observed and a cruiser (Trento) appeared to have been damaged. (8)

28 Jun 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) ended her 11th war patrol (8th in the Mediterranean) at Alexandria. (8)

29 Jun 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) departed Alexandria for Haifa. (9)

3 Jul 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, RN) arrived at Haifa. (10)

17 Jul 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) departed Haifa for her 12th war patrol (9th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to proceed to Malta but carry out a short patrol to the South-South-West of Crete.

P 31 had 1 officer and 10 ratings on board for passage to Malta as well as about 5 tons of cargo.

For the daily positions of HMS P 31 during this patrol see the map below.

1 Aug 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) ended her 12th war patrol (9th in the Mediterranean) at Malta.

11 Aug 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) departed Malta for her 13th war patrol (10th in the Mediterranean). She was to provide cover during 'Operation Pedestal'. Upon completion of this duty she was to proceed to Gibraltar as P 31 was to return to the U.K. as she was due to refit.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (3)

12 Aug 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) reached her patrol position in 35°51.5'N, 12°17'E. She was part of patrol line with HMS P 44 (Lt. T.E. Barlow, RN), HMS P 222 (Lt.Cdr. A.J. MacKenzie, RN), P 31, HMS P 34 (Lt. P.R.H. Harrison, DSC, RN), HMS P 46 (Lt. J.S. Stevens, DSC, RN) and HMS Utmost (Lt. A.W. Langridge, RN). After midnight, the patrol line was moved and she took up position in 36°18'N, 12°19.5'E. With the exception of aircraft, nothing was seen and in the evening of 13 August, she left her patrol for her onward passage to Gibraltar. (3)

24 Aug 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) ended her 13th war patrol (10th in the Mediterranean) at Gibraltar. (3)

27 Aug 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) departed Gibraltar for passage to Portsmouth. En-route she was ordered to patrol to the West of Cape Finisterre to intercept an inbound German blockade breaker making this her 14th war patrol. She was carrying only two Mark IV and two Mark II torpedoes. Nothing was sighted.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (3)

10 Sep 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) ended her 14th war patrol at Portsmouth. (3)

13 Sep 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) departed Portsmouth for Sheerness. She made the passage in convoy CE 119.

14 Sep 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) arrived at Sheerness.

15 Sep 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. J.B.de B. Kershaw, DSO, RN) shifted from Sheerness to the Chatham Dockyard where she was to be refitted.

24 Dec 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) completed her refit at the Chatham Dockyard. (11)

26 Dec 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) conducted trials off Sheerness. (11)

27 Dec 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) conducted trials off Sheerness. (11)

28 Dec 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) conducted trials off Sheerness. (11)

30 Dec 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Sheerness for Portsmouth. She made the passage in convoy CW 145. (11)

31 Dec 1942
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Portsmouth. (11)

2 Jan 1943
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) conducted exercises off Portsmouth. (12)

3 Jan 1943
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Portsmouth for passage to Holy Loch. She made the passage together with HMS P 229 (Lt. R. Gatehouse, DSC, RN) and HMS Oberon (Lt.Cdr. J.W. McCoy, RN). They were escorted HMS Unst (T/Lt. J.R. Smith, RNR) until 0830/04 when the armed yacht HMS Star of India took over the escort. (12)

6 Jan 1943
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Holy Loch to begin a training period. (12)

6 Feb 1943
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Holy Loch for Scapa Flow. The passage North through the Minches was made together with HrMs O 19 (Lt.Cdr. H.F. Bach Kolling, RNN(R)). They were escorted by HMS Pennyworth (T/Lt. R.A. Mason, RNVR). (13)

8 Feb 1943
HMS P 31 (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Scapa Flow to participate in A/S exercises. (13)

5 Mar 1943
HMS Ullswater (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Scapa Flow for Holy Loch.

7 Mar 1943
HMS Ullswater (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Holy Loch.

HMS Ullswater was renamed HMS Uproar the following day.

22 Mar 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Holy Loch for Gibraltar. During the day she carried out exercises with HMS Biter (Capt. E.M.C. Abel Smith, RN). Upon completion of these exercises she made rendez-vous with ORP Sokol (Lt.Cdr. J. Koziolkowski, ORP). They were escorted for the passage South through the Irish Sea by HMS La Capricieuse (Lt.Cdr. G.W. Dobson, RNR).

En-route she was ordered to patrol about 200 nautical miles North-West of Cape Finisterre, Spain to intercept an outbound German blockade runner making this passage her 15th war patrol.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (3)

29 Mar 1943
In the evening HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) was ordered to patrol in position 45°10'N, 12°50'W. For the next two days Uproar is ordered several times to take up patrol other positions. (3)

31 Mar 1943
In the evening HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) was ordered to continue her passage to Gibraltar. (3)

7 Apr 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 15th war patrol at Gibraltar. (3)

15 Apr 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Gibraltar for her 16th war patrol (11th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol of Marseilles.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (3)

28 Apr 1943
At 0556 hours two Mustang fighter aircraft passed overhead of HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) in position 36°59'N, 03°02'E. The leading aircraft machine gunned Uproar.

At 0800 hours HMS Uproar ended her 16th war patrol (11th in the Mediterranean) at Algiers. (3)

5 May 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Algiers for Malta where she was to join the 10th Submarine Flotilla.

No log is available for this period so no map can be displayed. (3)

12 May 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Malta. (3)

31 May 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Malta for her 17th war patrol (12th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol of the East Calabrian coast.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

5 Jun 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) attacked the Italian merchant Monte Cengio (ex German KT 16, 834 GRT, built 1943) with 4 torpedoes about 5 nautical miles East of Capo Colonna. she was escorted by the torpedo boat Clio. They were on passage from Messina to Taranto.

(All times are zone -2)
1000 hours - Sighted smoke bearing 210°.

1007 hours - In position 39°03'N, 17°17'E commenced attack on a 1500 tons motor tanker escorted by one Avio-class minelayer, two small motor minesweepers and one seaplane.

1059 hours - Fired 4 torpedoes from about 5000 yards. One explosion was heard 2 minutes and 40 seconds after firing the last torpedo. A counter attack followed in which 9 depth charges were dropped but these did no damage.

1134 hours - The last depth charges were dropped.

1150 hours - Returned to periscope depth. No escorts in sight. Thought to see the target outside Crotone harbour. Withdrew to seaward to reload.

[Monte Cengio reported that three of the four torpedoes passed under her. An Italian escorting aircraft dropped two bombs on the submarine but only one exploded. Clio dropped seven 50kg depth charges and eight depth charges of the intimidation type.] (3)

9 Jun 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) attacked the Italian merchant vessel Sezze (ex-French Espiguette, 1109 GRT, built 1920) with 4 torpedoes of Capo Stilo. No hits were obtained. She was escorted by the torpedo boat Francesco Stocco. They were on passage from Messina to Crotone and Taranto.

(All times are zone -2)
0940 hours - Sighted smoke of Capo Stilo.

0945 hours - Sighted an aircraft patrolling of Capo Stilo.

1000 hours - Closed Capo Stilo at speed for 15 minutes.

1025 hours - Started attack on a 2500 tons merchant vessel escorted by a Generale-class torpedo boat and a seaplane.

1114 hours - In position 38°37'N, 16°39'E fired 4 torpedoes at the merchant ship from about 7500 yards. Four explosions were heard but were thought to be the torpedoes hitting the beach and not to be hits.

1122 hours - An ineffective counter attack followed in which 21 depth charges were dropped.

1220 hours - Returned to periscope depth. A seaplane was seen very close. Went to 80 feet. The area was patrolled by aircraft during the whole afternoon.

[On Francesco Stocco the alarm was given by a lookout who observed a periscope and shortly after three torpedo tracks. The torpedo boat turned to port and they passed 200 metres astern. The torpedoes did hit a beach south of Soverato. At the same time an escorting aircraft sighted four torpedo tracks and gave the alarm, it dived on the submarine and released two bombs. Francesco Stocco dropped immediately intimidation depth charges (30kg) and combed the tracks and released 100kg depth charges set at a depth of 100 metres. She carried out a second run and released another seven 100kg depth charges but she had only two left. She dropped a few more intimidation depth charges and rejoined her charge. The hunt was taken over by submarine chasers from the 8th A/S Group.] (3)

13 Jun 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 17th war patrol (12th in the Mediterranean) at Malta. (3)

21 Jun 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Malta for her 18th war patrol (13th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to carry out a special operation, a periscope beach reconnaissance of the beaches to be used by the Canadian First Division for Operation 'Husky', the Allied landings on Sicily. Major J.M. Robinson was embarked to view the beaches and Lieutenant G.S. Sinclair, RNR, of COPP was to make sketches of these.

For the daily positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

22 Jun 1943
At 0407 hours, the beach was closed and the periscope reconnaissance carried out. (3)

23 Jun 1943
At 0413 hours, the beach was again closed and another periscope reconnaissance carried out. (3)

24 Jun 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 18th war patrol (13th in the Mediterranean) at Malta. (3)

2 Jul 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Malta for her 19th war patrol (14th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol in/off the Gulf of Taranto to provide cover during Operation 'Husky', the Allied landings on Sicily.

For the daily positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

18 Jul 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 19th war patrol (14th in the Mediterranean) at Malta. No target worthy of attack came within range. (3)

31 Jul 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Malta for her 20th war patrol (15th in the Mediterranean). She is ordered to patrol in the Adriatic.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

6 Aug 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) torpedoed and sank the Italian naval auxiliary D 15/Brindisi (1977 GRT, built 1931) 7 nautical miles north-east of Bari, Italy in position 41°11'N, 16°56'E.

This was the first attack carried out by a submarine of the Tenth Flotilla with the use of radar. Brindisi and the torpedo boat Rosolino Pilo were escorting the merchant Italia (5203 GRT, built in 1905) from Bari to Teodo.

(All times are zone -2)
2129 hours - Obtained a radar contact bearing 230°, range 5000 yards. It was at first thought to be a false echo as many had been obtained before but in view of later events it was thought to be a destroyer (if this was indeed correct this might have been the torpedo boat Rosolino Pilo.

2148 hours - Obtained a radar contact bearing 230°, range 7000 yards.

2149 hours - Sighted a darkened ship on the same bearing. Uproar was almost ahead so ran out for 3 minutes.

2155 hours - As Uproar would still be too close to fire torpedoes went full astern.

2158 hours - In position 41°11'N, 16°56'E fired 3 torpedoes from 500 to 600 yards. One hit was obtained.

2159 hours - Dived and took avoiding action. A few depth charges were dropped during the next hours but no damage was done to Uproar.

[Upon the torpedoing of Brindisi, Rosolino Pilo escorted back Italia to Bari, then returned with a number of small vessels to assist the survivors who had taken to three lifeboats. A tug towed the three boats back to Bari, there were eight missing from a crew of 112.] (3)

14 Aug 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 20th war patrol (15th in the Mediterranean) at Malta. (3)

24 Aug 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) conducted exercises off Malta. (14)

27 Aug 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Malta for her 21th war patrol (18th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to act as a beacon off Kuriat, Tunisia in an exercise with transport aircraft.

For the daily positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

29 Aug 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 21th war patrol (16th in the Mediterranean) at Malta. (3)

15 Sep 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Malta for her 22th war patrol (17th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol to the North of Elba Island, Italy and off Bastia, Corsica, France.

She made the passage through the Tunisian War Channel together with HMS Unseen (Lt. M.L.C. Crawford, DSC and Bar, RN), HMS Ultor (Lt. G.E. Hunt, DSC, RN) and ORP Dzik (Lt.Cdr. B. Romanowski). They were escorted by HMS BYMS 2028 (Skr. J.R. Clark, RNR).

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

22 Sep 1943
Around 1100 hours HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) torpedoed and sank the small Italian passenger ship Andrea Sgarallino (731 GRT, built 1930) north of Elba Island, Italy in position 42°50'N, 10°21'E.

Andrea Scarallino had some 300 civilians on board off which only four survived.

(All times are zone -2)
0928 hours - Sighted a ship bearing 040°. Started attack. Enemy course was 240°. Later this became 220°. The target was thought to be a naval auxiliary of about 500 tons.

0949 hours - Fired three torpedoes from about 2200 yards. The target was hit and sank quickly. Uproar withdrew to seaward. (3)

27 Sep 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) torpedoed and further damaged the German (former French) tanker Champagne (9946 GRT). The German tanker was grounded off Bastia, Corsica, France after being torpedoed on the 24th by HMS Ultor. The torpedo from Uproar hit the engine room and left the Germans no choice then to abandon their salvage attempt.

Late in the evening she attacked a merchant vessel with three torpedoes but no hits were obtained. This was probably the German San Pedro (ex-French, 5947 GRT, built 1931) who had sailed from Bastia for Leghorn escorted by four R-boats.

(All times are zone -1)
1659 hours - In position 42°42'N, 09°28'E fired one torpedo at a tanker that was either at anchor or beached. Range was 2400 yards. The torpedo hit the tanker in the stern.

1730 hours - The tanker was seen stern down and listing to port. Retired to seaward.

-------------------------------------------

2215 hours - Obtained a radar contact bearing 240°, range 9800 yards.

2219 hours - Commenced radar plot. Altered course to the north to run parallel to the target.

2226 hours - Altered course to close the target.

2248 hours - The plot gave an enemy course of 360°, speed 11 - 12 knots. Range was now 6700 yards.

2256 hours - Radar now gave a second echo ahead of the target. Range was now 4500 yards.

2302 hours - Sighted the target against the land. It was a merchant ship.

2306 hours - Target was now bearing 265°, range was 2400 yards. Radar now reported a third echo just astern of the target.

2308 hours - The enemy altered course to 010°. Speed was 11 knots. Commenced attack.

2312 hours - In position 43°00'N, 09°35'E fired three torpedoes from 1200 yards. No hits were obtained. Uproar dived after firing. No explosions were heard and no counter attack followed as well. It was thought the target was a merchant vessel of 6000 tons.

[The attack does not appear to have been observed.] (3)

2 Oct 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 22th war patrol (17th in the Mediterranean) at Algiers. (3)

8 Oct 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Algiers for Malta. She made the passage together with HMS BYMS 2074 (T/Lt. I.C. Hughes, RNR), HMS BYMS 2190 (T/Lt. J. McDowell, RNVR), HMS BYMS 2191 (???), HMS BYMS 2212 (T/Lt. R.A.L. Viner, DSC, RNVR) and HMS BYMS 2229 (T/A/Lt.Cdr. G.H. Clark, DSC, RNVR).

For the daily positions of HMS Uproar during this passage see the map below.

(3)

11 Oct 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Malta. (3)

25 Oct 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) is docked at Malta. (15)

2 Nov 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) is undocked. (16)

25 Nov 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) conducted exercises off Malta. (16)

27 Nov 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Malta for her 23th war patrol (18th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol off Southern France. She made the passage through the Tunisian War Channel in convoy MKS 32.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

6 Dec 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) torpedoed and damaged the German troop transport Virgilio (11718 GRT, built 1928, ex-Italian hospital ship) north-east of St. Tropez, southern France. She had been on passage from La Spezia to Marseille escorted by SG 15.

The Virgilio was later towed to Toulon and declared a total loss.

(All times are zone -1)
0750 hours - Sighted masts and funnel of a merchant ship to seaward escorted by one destroyer.

0751 hours - Commenced attack. Ran in for 13 minutes.

0807 hours - It was still difficult to estimate the range but it was thought to be 7000 yards. Enemy course was estimated to be 200° at a speed of 13 knots.

0810 hours - In position 43°23'N, 06°54'E fired four torpedoes at the merchant vessel. The target was a modern merchant vessel of about 6000 tons. It was thought to be the Virgilio. One explosion was heard 5 minutes and 53 seconds after firing this gave a range of 7500 to 8000 yards. HE ceased after the torpedo explosion. Uproar retired to seaward.

0828 hours - The 1st of 21 depth charges was dropped. All were dropped at random and none caused damage.

0850 hours - The merchant ship was heard starting and stopping his engines.

0855 hours - Went deep and altered course to the West again to close the target again for another attack.

1022 hours - The last depth charge was dropped.

1040 hours - HE of the target was getting louder. Retuned to periscope depth, the target was now about 1 nautical mile away. Uproar tried to get into a favourable attack position but in this she had not succeeded when visibility decreased and the target was lost out of sight.

[Virgilio was hit astern and her rudder was disabled. Initially towed by SG 15, she dropped anchor in the Gulf of Fréjus. UJ 2210, UJ 2221, UJ 6076 (some sources refer to her as M 6076), M 6020, M 6027 and the tugs Faron, Thésée and Cépet were ordered to her assistance. But the bad weather forced some of them to turn back. Finally UJ 6076 towed her to Toulon, screened by SG 15, UJ 2210 and UJ 2221. She was declared a constructive total loss.] (3)

11 Dec 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) attacked the Italian (in German service) Anagni (5818 GRT, built 1933, former French El-Mansour) with four torpedoes about 10 nautical miles South-East of Cannes, France. No hits were obtained. Anagni was escorted by the German patrol vessel SG 15 and the German motor minesweepers R 215. They were on passage from Genoa to Marseille.

(All times are zone -1)
0413 hours - Sighted a darkened ship bearing 088°. Range was 5 to 6 nautical miles. Started attack.

0422 hours - Forced to dive as the moon broke through the clouds. Uproar was directly up moon from the target. Before diving a small escort was seen to the right of the target.

0426 hours - Sighted the target through the periscope.

0440 hours - In position 43°26'N, 07°14'E fired four torpedoes from a range 4000 to 5000 yards. It was thought that the target was a merchant vessel of about 3000 tons. No hits were obtained.

0452 hours - The first of eight depth charges was dropped. All were distant. Returned to periscope depth but nothing was in sight. Uproar then withdrew to seaward and to leave patrol as all torpedoes were expended.

[Two explosions were heard near the target and more much farther which were probably torpedoes at the end of their run. SG 15 dropped six depth charges.] (3)

13 Dec 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 23th war patrol (18th in the Mediterranean) at La Maddalena, Italy. (3)

24 Dec 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed La Maddalena for her 24th war patrol (19th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol in the Gulf of Genoa and later off Southern France.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

28 Dec 1943
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) fires four torpedoes against the Italian merchant (in German control) Chisone (6168 GRT, built 1922) about 8 nautical miles East of the Gulf of Saint Tropez, France in position 43°16'N, 06°51'E. All four torpedoes fired missed their target. She was on passage from Genoa to Marseille, escorted by UJ 2220, SG 15 and R 215.

(All times are zone -1)
0840 hours - Heard HE and A/S transmissions. Closed to investigate.

0904 hours - Started attack on a 3000 tons motor vessel escorted by a 'destroyer' and an UJ boat. Range was 6500 yards.

0925 hours - In position 43°16'N, 06°51'E fired four torpedoes from 3000 to 4000 yards. All torpedoes missed. Uproar took avoiding action on firing and went deep.

0947 hours - The first of 25 very distant depth charges was dropped. A/S transmissions were no longer heard and HE was fading.

1000 hours - Returned to periscope depth. Nothing in sight. (3)

3 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ) attacked a merchant vessel in a convoy about 10 nautical miles East of the Gulf of Saint Tropez, France. Four torpedoes were fired but no hits were obtained. These were probably Avezzano (ex-Italian, ex-French Gouverneur Général Grévy, 4565 GRT, built 1922) and Siena (ex-Italian, ex-French Astrée, 2147 GRT, built 1921) escorted by SG 15 and R 215 on passage from Genoa (sailed at 1200/2) to Marseille.

(All times are zone -1)
0330 hours - Heard A/S transmissions bearing 100°.

0338 hours - Sighted a darkened ship bearing 100°.

0340 hours - Obtained a radar contact bearing 090°. Range 9800 yards. The echo was however soon lost.

0350 hours - Regained radar contact bearing 080°, range 5500 yards. Commenced radar plot.

0416 hours - The target was observed to alter course. Started attack.

0452 hours - Now closed to attack. Five ships were now visible. The first ship sighted was the largest one and was chosen as the target.

0507 hours - In position 43°16'N, 06°56'E fired 4 torpedoes from 2200 yards. No hits were obtained. The convoy attack consisted of the target which was a 3000 tons merchant vessel, another smaller merchant vessel, a small tanker and two 'destroyers' were the escorts.

0510 hours - Dived and took avoiding action. Three depth charges were dropped following this attack but these were not close. Uproar meanwhile retired to seaward.

[The attack appears to have been unobserved.] (3)

5 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 24th war patrol (19th in the Mediterranean) at La Maddalena, Italy. (3)

13 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed La Maddalena together with HMS Ultor (Lt. G.E. Hunt, DSC, RN) for Naples, Italy. They were escorted by HMS ML 121 (T/Lt. E.J. Bower, RNVR), HMS ML 134 (T/Lt. J.N. Barfield, SANF(V)) and HMS ML 558 (T/Lt. P.I. Fellows, RNVR). (17)

15 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Naples. (17)

17 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Naples for Salerno Bay. She was to exercise there for her beacon role during the Anzio landings (Operation Shingle). Uproar was escorted by HMS Tetcott (Lt. A.F. Harkness, DSC, OBE, RD, RNR). (17)

18 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Capri. (17)

19 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Capri together with HMS Ultor (Lt. G.E. Hunt, DSC, RN). They were escorted by HMS ML 560 (T/Lt. R. Edelsten-Pope, RANVR). They arrived at Naples later the same day. (17)

20 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Naples for her 25th war patrol (20th in the Mediterranean). She was to perform a special operation. She was to act as a beacon during the Anzio landings (Operation Shingle). (17)

21 Jan 1944
During the evening HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) succesfully carries out her beacon duties. Early the next morning she departed the area for Capri. (17)

22 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 25th war patrol (20th in the Mediterranean) at Capri. (17)

25 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Capri together with HMS Ultor (Lt. G.E. Hunt, DSC, RN). They were escorted by HMS ML 560 (T/Lt. R. Edelsten-Pope, RANVR). They arrived at Naples later the same day. (17)

27 Jan 1944
At 0630 hours (all times zone -1) HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Naples together with HMS Ultor (Lt. G.E. Hunt, DSC, RN). They were escorted by HMS ML 560 (T/Lt. R. Edelsten-Pope, RANVR). They arrived at Capri at 0900 hours.

At 1700 hours HMS Uproar and HMS Ultor departed Capri for La Maddalena. They were escorted by HMS Hoy (T/Lt. G.H. McNair, MBE, RNVR). (17)

29 Jan 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at La Maddalena. (17)

5 Feb 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed La Maddalena for her 26th war patrol (21th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol off Southern France.

For the daily positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

8 Feb 1944
At 0400 hours, HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) detected by radar a medium-sized merchant vessel at 6400 yards off Cape Camarat. As the submarine closed, gunfire was observed and the submarine dived but lost contact. (3)

16 Feb 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 26th war patrol (21th in the Mediterranean) at La Maddalena. (3)

26 Feb 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed La Maddalena for her 27th war patrol (221th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol off Southern France.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

29 Feb 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) torpedoed and sank the French merchant (in German control) Artésien (3152 GRT, built 1921) off Toulon, southern France in position 43°03'N, 05°59'E. She had been on passage from Marseille to Toulon escorted by the minesweepers M 6041, M 6043 and M 6044.

(All times are zone -1)
1410 hours - The Officer Of the Watch sighted masts and a funnel off Cap Sicié. If an attack was to be made it had to be done before the ship rounded Cap Cépet to enter Toulon.

1430 hours - The target was seen to be a merchant vessel of 3000 yards. A 'chasseur' was seen to be escorting the ship and two seaplanes were patrolling the area. Started attack.

1440 hours - In position 43°03'N, 05°59'E fired four torpedoes from 2000 to 3000 yards. Four explosions were heard of which at least one was thought to be a hit on the target.

1444 hours - The first of three distant depth charges was dropped.

1523 hours - Returned to periscope depth. Nothing in sight except the two seaplanes.

[Artésien sank in two minutes. Twenty-two were killed (three Germans, including her captain, and nineteen Frenchmen), eighteen were rescued. One torpedo passed under M 6041 which was drawing 2.5 metres.] (3)

9 Mar 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 27th war patrol (22th in the Mediterranean) at La Maddalena. (3)

21 Mar 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed La Maddalena for her 28th war patrol (23th in the Mediterranean). She was ordered to patrol in the Gulf of Genoa and off Southern France.

For the daily and attack positions of HMS Uproar during this patrol see the map below.

(3)

26 Mar 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) damaged the German tanker Matera (ex-Italian, ex-French General Gassouin, 5011 GRT, built 1926) with gunfire inside the harbour of Oneglia, Liguria, Italy.

(All times are zone -1)
1300 hours - Closed Oneglia for gun action against the tanker sighted in that port yesterday.

1455 hours - Surfaced in position 140 degrees, Oneglia outer breakwater light, 1 nautical mile and opened fire at the tanker, thought to be of 5000 tons that was moored alongside the south wall, Oneglia harbour. The third round hit the tanker at a range of 2000 yards.

1458 hours - Fire was returned from shore with small arms shortly afterwards followed by larger guns.

1500 hours - Dived and withdrew to seaward. In all 28 rounds had been fired. At least 16 hits were obtained on the tanker. (3)

29 Mar 1944
In the morning, while on patrol off Toulon, HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) was hunted by German A/S vessels. No depth charges were dropped however. (3)

30 Mar 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) fires four torpedoes at the German U-boat U-466 off Toulon, southern France. All four torpedoes fired missed their target.

(All times are zone -1)
0904 hours - Sighted the conning tower of a u-boat bearing 307°. Range was about 2 nautical miles. Started attack.

0918 hours - In position 43°03'N, 05°57'E fired four torpedoes from 5000 yards. No hits were obtained. The u-boat, escorted by two chasseurs, were seen to enter the harbour.

0927 hours - An aircraft dropped two bombs. Also a depth charge was dropped but none were close. Uproar meanwhile withdrew to seaward. During the remainder of the day the area was patrolled by aircraft

1248 hours - A/S transmissions were heard.

1614 hours - 30 Depth charges were dropped in 3 patterns. No damage to Uproar was done.

2046 hours - Surfaced.

[U 466 reported missed by three torpedoes. UJ 6075, M 6002 and M 6003 sailed from Toulon to hunt the submarine and attacked a contact at 1613-1641 hours.] (3)

3 Apr 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) ended her 28th war patrol (23th in the Mediterranean) at La Maddalena. (3)

9 Apr 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed La Maddalena for Algiers. Uproar was to proceed to the U.K. to refit.

No log is available for this period so no map of the passage to the U.K. can be displayed. (3)

11 Apr 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Algiers. (3)

13 Apr 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Algiers for Gibraltar. She made the passage in convoy GUS 36. (3)

15 Apr 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Gibraltar. (3)

19 Apr 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Gibraltar for Plymouth. (3)

29 Apr 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Plymouth. (3)

30 Apr 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) departed Plymouth for Portsmouth. (3)

1 May 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Portland but shortly afterwards continued her passage to Portsmouth where she arrived later the same day. She then departed Portsmouth for Sheerness. (3)

2 May 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at Sheerness.

4 May 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. L.E. Herrick, DSC, RN) arrived at London to refit at the Green and Silley Weir Ltd. Shipyard.

1 Sep 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) departed Sheerness for Dundee. She made the passage together with HMS Unshaken (Lt. J.S. Pearce, RNR). They were escorted by HMS Greenfly (T/Lt. D.B. Orr, RNVR). (18)

3 Sep 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) arrived at Dundee. (18)

6 Sep 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) departed Dundee for Scapa Flow. She made the passage together with HMS Unshaken (Lt. J.S. Pearce, RNR). They were escorted by HMS Loch Monteith (T/A/Lt.Cdr. K.W. Richardson, RNR). (18)

7 Sep 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) arrived at Scapa Flow. (18)

8 Sep 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) departed Scapa Flow for Rothesay. She made the passage together with HMS Shakespeare (Lt. D. Swanston, DSC and Bar, RN), HMS Unshaken (Lt. J.S. Pearce, RNR) and HMS Varne (Lt. I.G. Raikes, DSC, RN). They were escorted by HMS Cutty Sark. (18)

10 Sep 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) arrived at Rothesay. She was now assigned to training duties. (18)

19 Dec 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) is docked at Holy Loch. (19)

21 Dec 1944
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) is undocked. (19)

21 Feb 1945
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) is docked at Holy Loch. (20)

22 Feb 1945
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) is undocked. (20)

30 Jun 1945
HMS Uproar (Lt. J.N. Devlin, DSC, RN) is reduced to reserve. (21)

Sources

  1. ADM 199/400
  2. ADM 234/322
  3. ADM 199/1825
  4. ADM 199/1120
  5. ADM 173/16867
  6. ADM 173/17364
  7. ADM 199/1224
  8. ADM 199/1225
  9. ADM 199/2565
  10. ADM 173/17367
  11. ADM 173/17368
  12. ADM 173/17896
  13. ADM 173/17897
  14. ADM 173/18367
  15. ADM 173/18369
  16. ADM 173/18370
  17. ADM 173/19288
  18. ADM 173/19291
  19. ADM 173/19294
  20. ADM 173/20180
  21. ADM 173/20184

ADM numbers indicate documents at the British National Archives at Kew, London.


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