General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Doenitz, Ultra, and the Red Orchestra
Posted by:
kurt
()
Date: November 10, 2001 01:37PM
<HTML>Here is some speculation.
(Thanks for the thread on the Red Orchestra - I have Tarrant's book sitting on my bookshelf, ready to read - thanks to amazon and you guys
)
As the war dragged on past its early years, there began to be increasing suspicions by various people in the know on the German side that Enigma was being read by the British - as in fact was the case. Doenitz in particular became deeply suspicious. An investigation was ordered and ....
What they should have done (given the hindsight of history) is to realize that the enigma, despite being in theory mathematically unbreakable, was in fact being broken, and taken a few relatively minor countermeasures: change all the rotors with new ones of different wiring pattern at various intervals, tighten up usage techniques to avoid giving away cribs, add an extra rotor or two to the basic enigma machine, etc - Superkraut has explained all this several times. Even if the Germans didn't know that enigma was being broken, doing this as a precaution would take little effort - well worth it given the disasterous consequences for the Germans of a penetration of enigma.
What they actually did was to investigate the possibility of engima being broken, decide that it was impossible, and instead concentrate on 'internal enemies and spies'.
Why?
While Doenitz hedged slightly by adding a fourth rotor to the Navy only enigma (shark), he too fell into the trap of looking in the wrong place. In fact, he did perhaps the opposite thing he should have done - he slashed his already thin headquarters staff to lower the number of people with access to highly sensitive information - because it was felt that someone on his staff was a spy. This reduced his ability to independently assess technical problems and developments (such as enigma security) apart from the central bureaus, who were not serving him well. The central bureaus were too steeped in the mythology of their own inventions to assess them objectively. A good technical staff under Doenitz may have come to different conclusions.
I had wondered at this seemingly odd turn of events. Why would a smart, apolitical, and logical commander, working in a very high tech field of warfare, ignore the technical possibilities, and concentrate on such a paranoid exlanation as 'spies in our midst at the highest level'?
At fisrt I thought it may be because of the inherent paranoia of a dictatorial state like Nazi Gernamy, but perhaps the answer lies in the Red Orchestra. Perhaps Doenitz, and others in the high circles of German counterintelligence, discounted the possibilities of a technical breaking of enigma a la Bletchley Park because they had in fact suffered, and were suffering at the time of these events, a massive human spy penetration at the highest levels of their command from the agents of the Red Orchestra.
Taken in the light of the Red Orchestra, the credibility of a high level spy on Doenitz' staff compromising their every move seems very good - and a natural conclusion given that the very same thing was happening at the same time regarding activities on the Eastern Front.
Perhaps yet another service the Red Orchestra performed for the allied cause, however unintentionally, was to draw attention away from the technical possiblities of an enigma penetration, and thereby help protect the activities at Bletchley Park.
Thoughts?</HTML>
(Thanks for the thread on the Red Orchestra - I have Tarrant's book sitting on my bookshelf, ready to read - thanks to amazon and you guys
)As the war dragged on past its early years, there began to be increasing suspicions by various people in the know on the German side that Enigma was being read by the British - as in fact was the case. Doenitz in particular became deeply suspicious. An investigation was ordered and ....
What they should have done (given the hindsight of history) is to realize that the enigma, despite being in theory mathematically unbreakable, was in fact being broken, and taken a few relatively minor countermeasures: change all the rotors with new ones of different wiring pattern at various intervals, tighten up usage techniques to avoid giving away cribs, add an extra rotor or two to the basic enigma machine, etc - Superkraut has explained all this several times. Even if the Germans didn't know that enigma was being broken, doing this as a precaution would take little effort - well worth it given the disasterous consequences for the Germans of a penetration of enigma.
What they actually did was to investigate the possibility of engima being broken, decide that it was impossible, and instead concentrate on 'internal enemies and spies'.
Why?
While Doenitz hedged slightly by adding a fourth rotor to the Navy only enigma (shark), he too fell into the trap of looking in the wrong place. In fact, he did perhaps the opposite thing he should have done - he slashed his already thin headquarters staff to lower the number of people with access to highly sensitive information - because it was felt that someone on his staff was a spy. This reduced his ability to independently assess technical problems and developments (such as enigma security) apart from the central bureaus, who were not serving him well. The central bureaus were too steeped in the mythology of their own inventions to assess them objectively. A good technical staff under Doenitz may have come to different conclusions.
I had wondered at this seemingly odd turn of events. Why would a smart, apolitical, and logical commander, working in a very high tech field of warfare, ignore the technical possibilities, and concentrate on such a paranoid exlanation as 'spies in our midst at the highest level'?
At fisrt I thought it may be because of the inherent paranoia of a dictatorial state like Nazi Gernamy, but perhaps the answer lies in the Red Orchestra. Perhaps Doenitz, and others in the high circles of German counterintelligence, discounted the possibilities of a technical breaking of enigma a la Bletchley Park because they had in fact suffered, and were suffering at the time of these events, a massive human spy penetration at the highest levels of their command from the agents of the Red Orchestra.
Taken in the light of the Red Orchestra, the credibility of a high level spy on Doenitz' staff compromising their every move seems very good - and a natural conclusion given that the very same thing was happening at the same time regarding activities on the Eastern Front.
Perhaps yet another service the Red Orchestra performed for the allied cause, however unintentionally, was to draw attention away from the technical possiblities of an enigma penetration, and thereby help protect the activities at Bletchley Park.
Thoughts?</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
Doenitz, Ultra, and the Red Orchestra
|
kurt | 11/10/2001 01:37PM |
|
Interesting theory
|
SuperKraut | 11/10/2001 05:10PM |
|
Re: Interesting theory
|
oliver | 11/10/2001 10:04PM |
|
Re: Interesting theory
|
Yuri IL'IN | 11/11/2001 07:16AM |
|
Re: Interesting theory
|
kurt | 11/11/2001 09:44PM |