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Re: USS MEREDITH (DD 726)
Posted by:
michel
()
Date: August 28, 2004 08:31AM
just an information out of controversy
this text is issued from a Frebch translation of English book operation Neptune by commander Kenneth Edwards RN (1947)
the translation in English is a Google work
During the hours of night, we had the occasion to open fire on enemy planes with weapons with short range" This laconic sentence is extracted from the official report/ratio of the 60 flotilla of dredgers, ordered by the commander J.C. Richards, on board Vestal. Have refers to the night of the day D. The words most characteristic of this sentence are without any doubt "during the hours of night" the cover organized by the allied air forces above the zone of attack during and after the invasion was so tight that it - did not produce any powerful enemy air attack which could have made terrible devastations among the ships crammed of troops and wet with broad of the beaches. That does not want to say that there were no air raids in full day. There were sixteen of them, during the first twenty-four days - until June 30 - but they all of the "furtive" kind, were generally carried out by planes insulated which flew low, under protection from the clouds or that from smoke from the battle and the houses in flames. Day after day, the patrols of combined hunters not only gave their protection to the zone of ace, jump, but advanced inside the grounds until more than one hundred kilometers of depth. And however they met only seldom German planes in full day. However, the "furtive" raids caused a considerable irritation. One gave for them ordinary alarm, and, at the beginning, people with the sea or on the beaches could not believe that the German attacks would not become extensive. Once only, one "furtive" raid of day had an effect other than the irritation. It was six hours of the morning, at the day D + 1, when the H.M.S. Bulolo, headquarters of the Douglas-Pennant commodore ordering zone GOLD, accepted a bomb with the phosphorus of 250 kiiogs. It inserted the partition before room of the operations, and, without any doubt, if it had fallen a few meters further, it would have destroyed a whole étatmajor operations. In fact, it did not decrease of anything the capacity ship to control its zone, although three officers and a man were killed. effect of irritation of these furtive raids fell down, by an irony of the fate, on the allied air forces which prevented the enemy from trying the least left, because the ships, the boats and the men of the beaches tended to regard any low flying plane as an enemy plane. From night, it was different. Until we débouqué beaches, it did not occur a night without German planes appearing above dampings. The hunters of night and the patrols of interception were multiplied. But if they made pay a heavy tribute with the adversary, they did not manage to put a term at its raids. These German planes deprived a great number of men of the few hours of rest which they could have taken, but they was least their effects. Each pilots. Every night, from the planes came above dampings. One counted some up to fifty - whose great majority were used with the installation of mines. Without any doubt, principal defense against the invasion, adopted by the Admiral Kraneke who ordered the naval forces German of the west, under the orders of von Rundstet - consisted of an intense damping campaign of mines, for which it had secured the use of almost all the forces of German bombers available on the Western face. During the night which followed the day D, a great number of enemy planes flew over the zone of attack. Several ships saw mines with parachute falling into water. At this time the enemy activity was mainly directed against the American sectors, particularly zone UTAH and the vicinity of Cardonnet. In these zones, one made burst at least thirty basic mines, the day D - + 1. Unfortunately, these mines caused the loss of seven ships, including two American destroyers and the Tide dredger, of the Fleet of the United States. Thereafter, the centre of gravity of the German countryside of mining appeared to move in the east, towards the British sector, although the American sector was not forgotten. In the British sector, by - example, the 31° flotilla of dredgers, which was armed by Canadians and was ordered by A. J. G Storns, making function of commander, on board Caraquet made jump 19 mines the day D + 2, and not less than 42 the next day. It was necessary to take without delay of measurements to avoid the threat which represented a campaign of mining of such an intensity in a limited zone and not very deep water of bay of the Seine. One doubled the task of the dredgers, in particular that of the flotillas of small dredgers known under the name of B.Y.M. ' and which was - able to operate in not very deep water near the coasts. It was also necessary to set up an organization of monitoring to observe the fall of the mines with parachute and to mark their position for the dredging of the following day.
hope that give an idea of the luftwaffe action on D+ days
regards
michel
this text is issued from a Frebch translation of English book operation Neptune by commander Kenneth Edwards RN (1947)
the translation in English is a Google work
During the hours of night, we had the occasion to open fire on enemy planes with weapons with short range" This laconic sentence is extracted from the official report/ratio of the 60 flotilla of dredgers, ordered by the commander J.C. Richards, on board Vestal. Have refers to the night of the day D. The words most characteristic of this sentence are without any doubt "during the hours of night" the cover organized by the allied air forces above the zone of attack during and after the invasion was so tight that it - did not produce any powerful enemy air attack which could have made terrible devastations among the ships crammed of troops and wet with broad of the beaches. That does not want to say that there were no air raids in full day. There were sixteen of them, during the first twenty-four days - until June 30 - but they all of the "furtive" kind, were generally carried out by planes insulated which flew low, under protection from the clouds or that from smoke from the battle and the houses in flames. Day after day, the patrols of combined hunters not only gave their protection to the zone of ace, jump, but advanced inside the grounds until more than one hundred kilometers of depth. And however they met only seldom German planes in full day. However, the "furtive" raids caused a considerable irritation. One gave for them ordinary alarm, and, at the beginning, people with the sea or on the beaches could not believe that the German attacks would not become extensive. Once only, one "furtive" raid of day had an effect other than the irritation. It was six hours of the morning, at the day D + 1, when the H.M.S. Bulolo, headquarters of the Douglas-Pennant commodore ordering zone GOLD, accepted a bomb with the phosphorus of 250 kiiogs. It inserted the partition before room of the operations, and, without any doubt, if it had fallen a few meters further, it would have destroyed a whole étatmajor operations. In fact, it did not decrease of anything the capacity ship to control its zone, although three officers and a man were killed. effect of irritation of these furtive raids fell down, by an irony of the fate, on the allied air forces which prevented the enemy from trying the least left, because the ships, the boats and the men of the beaches tended to regard any low flying plane as an enemy plane. From night, it was different. Until we débouqué beaches, it did not occur a night without German planes appearing above dampings. The hunters of night and the patrols of interception were multiplied. But if they made pay a heavy tribute with the adversary, they did not manage to put a term at its raids. These German planes deprived a great number of men of the few hours of rest which they could have taken, but they was least their effects. Each pilots. Every night, from the planes came above dampings. One counted some up to fifty - whose great majority were used with the installation of mines. Without any doubt, principal defense against the invasion, adopted by the Admiral Kraneke who ordered the naval forces German of the west, under the orders of von Rundstet - consisted of an intense damping campaign of mines, for which it had secured the use of almost all the forces of German bombers available on the Western face. During the night which followed the day D, a great number of enemy planes flew over the zone of attack. Several ships saw mines with parachute falling into water. At this time the enemy activity was mainly directed against the American sectors, particularly zone UTAH and the vicinity of Cardonnet. In these zones, one made burst at least thirty basic mines, the day D - + 1. Unfortunately, these mines caused the loss of seven ships, including two American destroyers and the Tide dredger, of the Fleet of the United States. Thereafter, the centre of gravity of the German countryside of mining appeared to move in the east, towards the British sector, although the American sector was not forgotten. In the British sector, by - example, the 31° flotilla of dredgers, which was armed by Canadians and was ordered by A. J. G Storns, making function of commander, on board Caraquet made jump 19 mines the day D + 2, and not less than 42 the next day. It was necessary to take without delay of measurements to avoid the threat which represented a campaign of mining of such an intensity in a limited zone and not very deep water of bay of the Seine. One doubled the task of the dredgers, in particular that of the flotillas of small dredgers known under the name of B.Y.M. ' and which was - able to operate in not very deep water near the coasts. It was also necessary to set up an organization of monitoring to observe the fall of the mines with parachute and to mark their position for the dredging of the following day.
hope that give an idea of the luftwaffe action on D+ days
regards
michel
