RE: High tech weapons
Posted by:
Tom Iwanski
()
Date: February 11, 2001 03:19AM
Hello Bulldog and SK,
This has been an interesting thread, and though I do not consider myself an expert in this area, I would nonetheless like to add my comments.
I feel that there were three main factors that dictated the outcome of the war in the Atlantic. These were numerical strength, tactics, and technology. Having the advantage in any two of these categories would have been enough to assure victory in the Atlantic Theater, and thus influence the outcome of the war as a whole. I feel the Germans had a tactical and technological advantage very early, but the Allies turned the tables and ultimately gained superiority in all three areas, sealing the fate of the u-boats.
Numerical strength: Germany never had the number of u-boats required to win the tonnage war, especially after the U.S. entered the conflict and production of merchant ships and military hardware ramped up. By 1943, the resources dedicated to u-boat countermeasures were staggering. The \"swamp\" tactics used by allied forces were an example of the extravagant use of resources by the allies.
Tactics: I feel that England in particular was more tactically innovative, especially in developing effective methods for escorts hunting submerged u-boats. German methods of attacking a convoy, however, did not radically change, in part due to the limitations of the u-boats, and in part to limitations within the leadership.
Technology: Once again, I feel England had the edge in the \"timely\" development of weapons that made a crucial difference (the magnetron, the bombe, Collossus, HF/DF). Radar was certainly important, but HF/DF was equally effective for escorts fighting the verbose wolf packs. Ultimately it was the sum total of numerous innovations that tipped the scales so drastically in the allies favor.
And while I am aware that \"what-if\" scenarios are frowned upon, it is still a natural tendency to step back from the Atlantic theater and view how each side managed the war as a whole. With that perspective, it\'s hard not to notice the far reaching consequences of Operation Barbarossa, and the net effect the war with Russia had on Germany\'s ability to compete in those three categories.
Regards,
Tom
This has been an interesting thread, and though I do not consider myself an expert in this area, I would nonetheless like to add my comments.
I feel that there were three main factors that dictated the outcome of the war in the Atlantic. These were numerical strength, tactics, and technology. Having the advantage in any two of these categories would have been enough to assure victory in the Atlantic Theater, and thus influence the outcome of the war as a whole. I feel the Germans had a tactical and technological advantage very early, but the Allies turned the tables and ultimately gained superiority in all three areas, sealing the fate of the u-boats.
Numerical strength: Germany never had the number of u-boats required to win the tonnage war, especially after the U.S. entered the conflict and production of merchant ships and military hardware ramped up. By 1943, the resources dedicated to u-boat countermeasures were staggering. The \"swamp\" tactics used by allied forces were an example of the extravagant use of resources by the allies.
Tactics: I feel that England in particular was more tactically innovative, especially in developing effective methods for escorts hunting submerged u-boats. German methods of attacking a convoy, however, did not radically change, in part due to the limitations of the u-boats, and in part to limitations within the leadership.
Technology: Once again, I feel England had the edge in the \"timely\" development of weapons that made a crucial difference (the magnetron, the bombe, Collossus, HF/DF). Radar was certainly important, but HF/DF was equally effective for escorts fighting the verbose wolf packs. Ultimately it was the sum total of numerous innovations that tipped the scales so drastically in the allies favor.
And while I am aware that \"what-if\" scenarios are frowned upon, it is still a natural tendency to step back from the Atlantic theater and view how each side managed the war as a whole. With that perspective, it\'s hard not to notice the far reaching consequences of Operation Barbarossa, and the net effect the war with Russia had on Germany\'s ability to compete in those three categories.
Regards,
Tom
Subject | Written By | Posted |
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Vulnerability during schnorkeling? | Tom Iwanski | 02/05/2001 01:39PM |
RE: Vulnerability during schnorkeling? | James Stewart | 02/05/2001 09:14PM |
RE: Vulnerability during schnorkeling? | Steve Cooper | 02/06/2001 03:07AM |
Snorkeling and XXI | SuperKraut | 02/06/2001 08:49AM |
RE: T schnorkels | kurt | 02/07/2001 10:22PM |
T-valve snorkel | SuperKraut | 02/08/2001 01:29PM |
RE: T-valve snorkel | Bulldog | 02/08/2001 10:48PM |
Foresight | SuperKraut | 02/09/2001 08:16AM |
Winning with mediocre weapons | Bulldog | 02/09/2001 09:40PM |
High tech weapons | SuperKraut | 02/10/2001 09:07AM |
RE: High tech weapons | Bulldog | 02/10/2001 08:56PM |
RE: High tech weapons | SuperKraut | 02/11/2001 01:34AM |
RE: High tech weapons | Tom Iwanski | 02/11/2001 03:19AM |
RE: High tech weapons | SuperKraut | 02/11/2001 12:53PM |
RE: High tech weapons | Bulldog (which one?) | 02/11/2001 09:50PM |
Bulldog on Frasier | Rick Mann | 02/12/2001 03:49PM |
RE: Bulldog on Frasier | Bulldog | 02/12/2001 09:17PM |
RE: High tech weapons | SuperKraut | 02/12/2001 04:21PM |
RE: High tech weapons | Bulldog | 02/12/2001 11:20PM |
RE: T-valve snorkel | kurt | 02/10/2001 07:11PM |
RE: T-valve snorkel | Tom Iwanski | 02/10/2001 09:25PM |
RE: T-valve snorkel | Anders Wingren | 02/10/2001 10:40PM |
RE: Snorkeling and XXI | Tom Iwanski | 02/10/2001 09:15PM |
Snorkel history | SuperKraut | 02/11/2001 01:50PM |
RE: Snorkel history | Tom Iwanski | 02/11/2001 04:32PM |
RE: Snorkeling and XXI | Don Dirst | 02/06/2001 10:34PM |