General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Of gamblers and leaders
Posted by:
SuperKraut
()
Date: July 18, 2001 06:53AM
<HTML>\">Germany\'s leaders were, for wont of a better word, inveterate gamblers.<\" There is no need to go to the plural, there was only one Führer and he carries most of the blame. The main failing of the military leadership was that they did not get rid of him earlier.
\">They were lucky that most of them came off - Rhineland \'36,Austrian Anschluss,Sudentland and the rest of Czecoslovakia in 1939.<\" Give some credit to Hitler, he was not a 100% fool, especially during the mid 1930s. The early operations were carefully studied and potential opposition evaluated. You must remember that the French were in no mood to fight on their own and the British were more afraid of the Bolsheviks than the Germans in the mid 1930s in addition to having some regrets about the excesses of Versailles. The Rheinland was a military occupation of demilitarized German territory and perfectly legitimate. One can argue that the Anschluss with Austria could have been accomplished by referendum. In fact, if the Nazis had not been anti-Semitic the Austrians would probably have voted yes with a big majority. As it was, a referendum would have been very close.
The Sudetenland was the first gamble, but not in the way you may be thinking. Hitler actually wanted a war with Czechoslovakia and was rather put out at Chamberlain for offering the Sudetenland as the compromise. Hitler did not get his war and probably saved his hide in the process. There were plans in the General Staff to arrest him for treason if he had ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia. How this would all have played out is open to a lot of conjecture, but I have my doubts about how long Hitler would have stayed arrested. BTW, a non-Nazi German government could most likely have gotten the Sudetenland through a referendum just like Austria. The British were amenable to such solutions at the time, although the French would have protested.
Rest Czechoslovakia was a major error of judgement and a failure of political analysis. It basically set the stage for British intervention in Poland, which was another signal completely missed by Hitler. Poland was a political and strategic gamble, but a military certainty. Hitler knew the Poles would fight, that the Wehrmacht would defeat them, but he did not expect a declaration of war by the French and British, an act which really upset his timetable.
\">Had the French and British reacted differently things might of been very interesting.<\" Fall Gelb was one of the most carefully planned and prepared military operations in history. The British were too weak to have done anything to foil it and the French would not have done anything as long as Gamelin was running the show. The Germans would have won this campaign no matter what the French did, however, it would have taken at least twice as long.
There is little doubt that the easy win over France made Hitler throw his remaining caution to the winds and embark on much less competently planned adventures, the best example being Barbarossa where the general Staff was not even consulted about feasibility, but told to do it with what they had available in June 1941.
\">This in turn was passed onto a economy and a population false beliefs.<\" Yes and no. The easy win over France did give most Germans a case of overconfidence, but it was not the only reason Hitler kept the peacetime economy. Hitler had an irrational fear that the home front would collapse like it did in 1918, so he overcompensated by coddling the civilian sector. The situation on the home front in Germany in 1940/41 was quite similar to the US during the Korean War. It was almost, but not quite, business as usual. Postponing the proclamation of \"total war\" until 1943 was a major error.
Your comments about forced labor and the failure to recruit women are right on target, except that you did not single out the vast scope for sabotage and espionage offered through the use of forced labor. Speer, who had some old WWI experts working for him, tried to fix all this when he took over as Armaments Minister, but Hitler overruled him. The main reason why WWII production did not get to the same levels of quantity and quality as WWI production is to be found here. German women were recruited into the labor force quite early during WWI and they did an outstanding job. Aside from the ideological issues, he may have seen working women as one of the causes of the home front collapse of 1918.
\">Raeder\'s plans for the fleet were never going to be ready until at least 1942/43. The outbreak of war caught the Kriegsmarine with only a fraction of the power envisaged for it.<\" Ah yes, we must discuss naval matters or the censors will come :-). You seem to be referring to the infamous Plan Z in which Raeder wanted to restore the glory of the High Seas Fleet and have another go at Jutland. Had the timing allowed Plan Z to be fulfilled, the British admiralty would have had kittens, but the Germans would still have lost the Battle of the Atlantic. Germany simply did not have the resources to go head to head with the RN and the US Navy and still fight a land and air war. The only viable strategy was ocean denial and that is best done with submarines. German naval strategy was on the wrong track from the beginning. As I have said in the past, there was no naval Guderian.
Regards,
SuperKraut
</HTML>
\">They were lucky that most of them came off - Rhineland \'36,Austrian Anschluss,Sudentland and the rest of Czecoslovakia in 1939.<\" Give some credit to Hitler, he was not a 100% fool, especially during the mid 1930s. The early operations were carefully studied and potential opposition evaluated. You must remember that the French were in no mood to fight on their own and the British were more afraid of the Bolsheviks than the Germans in the mid 1930s in addition to having some regrets about the excesses of Versailles. The Rheinland was a military occupation of demilitarized German territory and perfectly legitimate. One can argue that the Anschluss with Austria could have been accomplished by referendum. In fact, if the Nazis had not been anti-Semitic the Austrians would probably have voted yes with a big majority. As it was, a referendum would have been very close.
The Sudetenland was the first gamble, but not in the way you may be thinking. Hitler actually wanted a war with Czechoslovakia and was rather put out at Chamberlain for offering the Sudetenland as the compromise. Hitler did not get his war and probably saved his hide in the process. There were plans in the General Staff to arrest him for treason if he had ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia. How this would all have played out is open to a lot of conjecture, but I have my doubts about how long Hitler would have stayed arrested. BTW, a non-Nazi German government could most likely have gotten the Sudetenland through a referendum just like Austria. The British were amenable to such solutions at the time, although the French would have protested.
Rest Czechoslovakia was a major error of judgement and a failure of political analysis. It basically set the stage for British intervention in Poland, which was another signal completely missed by Hitler. Poland was a political and strategic gamble, but a military certainty. Hitler knew the Poles would fight, that the Wehrmacht would defeat them, but he did not expect a declaration of war by the French and British, an act which really upset his timetable.
\">Had the French and British reacted differently things might of been very interesting.<\" Fall Gelb was one of the most carefully planned and prepared military operations in history. The British were too weak to have done anything to foil it and the French would not have done anything as long as Gamelin was running the show. The Germans would have won this campaign no matter what the French did, however, it would have taken at least twice as long.
There is little doubt that the easy win over France made Hitler throw his remaining caution to the winds and embark on much less competently planned adventures, the best example being Barbarossa where the general Staff was not even consulted about feasibility, but told to do it with what they had available in June 1941.
\">This in turn was passed onto a economy and a population false beliefs.<\" Yes and no. The easy win over France did give most Germans a case of overconfidence, but it was not the only reason Hitler kept the peacetime economy. Hitler had an irrational fear that the home front would collapse like it did in 1918, so he overcompensated by coddling the civilian sector. The situation on the home front in Germany in 1940/41 was quite similar to the US during the Korean War. It was almost, but not quite, business as usual. Postponing the proclamation of \"total war\" until 1943 was a major error.
Your comments about forced labor and the failure to recruit women are right on target, except that you did not single out the vast scope for sabotage and espionage offered through the use of forced labor. Speer, who had some old WWI experts working for him, tried to fix all this when he took over as Armaments Minister, but Hitler overruled him. The main reason why WWII production did not get to the same levels of quantity and quality as WWI production is to be found here. German women were recruited into the labor force quite early during WWI and they did an outstanding job. Aside from the ideological issues, he may have seen working women as one of the causes of the home front collapse of 1918.
\">Raeder\'s plans for the fleet were never going to be ready until at least 1942/43. The outbreak of war caught the Kriegsmarine with only a fraction of the power envisaged for it.<\" Ah yes, we must discuss naval matters or the censors will come :-). You seem to be referring to the infamous Plan Z in which Raeder wanted to restore the glory of the High Seas Fleet and have another go at Jutland. Had the timing allowed Plan Z to be fulfilled, the British admiralty would have had kittens, but the Germans would still have lost the Battle of the Atlantic. Germany simply did not have the resources to go head to head with the RN and the US Navy and still fight a land and air war. The only viable strategy was ocean denial and that is best done with submarines. German naval strategy was on the wrong track from the beginning. As I have said in the past, there was no naval Guderian.
Regards,
SuperKraut
</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
To Adrian
|
SuperKraut | 07/17/2001 09:11PM |
|
RE: To Adrian
|
adrian | 07/17/2001 11:46PM |
|
Of gamblers and leaders
|
SuperKraut | 07/18/2001 06:53AM |
|
Plan Z and Ramifications
|
adrian | 07/18/2001 09:46AM |
|
Plan Z and Ramifications
|
adrian | 07/18/2001 09:47AM |
|
RE: Of gamblers and leaders
|
walter M | 07/18/2001 07:55PM |
|
Von Clausewitz
|
SuperKraut | 07/19/2001 03:13PM |
|
RE: Von Clausewitz
|
walter M | 07/19/2001 09:29PM |
|
RE: Von Clausewitz
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 07/24/2001 12:10AM |
|
RE: Von Clausewitz
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 07/24/2001 12:14AM |
|
The bomb, etc.
|
SuperKraut | 07/25/2001 10:55AM |
|
RE: The bomb, etc.
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 07/25/2001 03:57PM |
|
RE: The bomb, etc.
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 08/27/2001 11:15AM |
|
The failure of the will
|
kurt | 07/25/2001 09:44PM |