General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
Von Clausewitz
Posted by:
SuperKraut
()
Date: July 19, 2001 03:13PM
<HTML>\">Sometimes I am tempted to re-write the famous Von Clausewitz \' statement as follows: war is the continuation of economic action with different rules.<\" There is a lot of truth in that and it quite possible if he were alive in the 20th Century he may well have said so. On the other hand, much of this was also true in the 19th Century when you look at colonialism. Also diplomacy and commerce have gone hand in hand for centuries.
As to my \"entertaining essays\", I have recently realized that it is better to make a clear distinction between a suggested strategy and the chances of its implementation. As long as Hitler was in power, the implementation chances of many rational strategies was virtually 0, however, that should not stop us from discussing potential strategies.
\">Basically Germany & Japan were at war against the rest of the planet and they did not have an atomic industry, so they did not have a chance.<\" A mixture of apples, oranges and cherries. First of all the strategic position and potential of Germany and Japan were quite different. Secondly the bomb is not the clinching argument that many people believe it to be.
In 1933 Germany was the second largest industrial power on the planet and the leader in science and engineering. The Nazis built up industry, but not enough, and they squandered the lead in science, although not in engineering. Germany had several strategic options, depending on the objectives. However, some objectives were not strategically feasible, for example the \"Lebensraum\" idiocy in Russia, 1941 Russia was not 18th or 19th Century America. The most reasonable and achievable objective was Grossdeutschland, Germany in the borders of 1914 plus the major German speaking pieces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The two most dangerous potential opponents of Germany, USA and USSR, both suffered from exploitable strategic weaknesses. The US, which accounted for well over half of the opposing industrial strength, was separated from the war by the Atlantic Ocean. A well planned strategy of ocean denial based on advanced submarines would have solved that problem and forced Britain to negotiate. It would also probably have brought the US into the war eventually assuming Germany did not commit the strategic blunder of declaring war on the US.
The US could not be beaten by invasion, but it could be isolated and discouraged from pursuing the war in Europe. Britain did not have to be beaten by invasion since it was far from self sufficient in food and raw materials, thus an effective blockade, a byproduct of isolating the US, would have forced a negotiated peace. The other weakness of the US and UK was the political unacceptability of losing the millions of men who would have been lost in the absence of the eastern front.
The Achilles heel of the USSR was the Bolshevik ideology and nationalism. The applicable strategy was to foment another \"Russian Revolution\" by supporting the nationalists and anti-Bolsheviks in the non-Russian part of the USSR, especially the Ukraine, the Baltic states and the Moslem states. The best way to implement this \"White Russian\" strategy was to wait for Stalin to attack Germany, ambush the attacking force and then counterattack. Turning the eastern war into a win win situation for Germany and the natives was, of course, completely contrary to Hitler\'s objectives.
Japan was at best a second rate industrial power with about ¼ of the German production. The strategic options open to Japan after Pearl Harbor were basically 0. The only viable strategic option the Japanese did have was to ignore the US and go ahead with their campaign in SE Asia. Roosevelt would have tried everything to goad the Japanese into making an attack, so the Japanese would have had to swallow a lot, however, had they succeeded, Congress would have had no casus belli to declare war.
The American atomic bomb in 1945 is Hitler\'s own fault. If he had not persecuted the Jewish Germans, the people who got Roosevelt to start the Manhattan project would not have left Europe. His continued persecution of the Jewish Germans and his total mismanagement of science policy prevented the German bomb. Further, the number of bombs was quite limited in the early days, so losing one in a shot down bomber was a major concern. German air superiority over the Reich would have prevented or greatly hindered the use of the bomb. The only scenario in which the bomb plays a major role would be one in which a weak Germany manages to hang on until autumn 1945.
\">….the U-boat fleet destroyed nearly 15 millions tons of shipping hardware spending 30.000 men but missed its strategical goal.<\" To reach its strategic goal, the U-boat fleet would have had to sink at least 15 million tons per YEAR starting in 1943 and do so by losing no more than 5 - 10,000 men per year, a feat quite possible with 2nd and 3rd generation electroboats and secure communications.
As for Stalingrad and Kursk, I think you are exaggerating the Soviet losses a bit and you forget that the Soviets captured the battlefield. If you look at the eastern front through the eyes of a strategy consultant, you see a lot of grand strategic incompetence. It is surprising the Wehrmacht did as well as it did considering their desolate supply situation and the inadequacies of their anti tank guns. At the very minimum Barbarossa came 11 months too early, at best it should not have come at all.
The bottom line is that there were strategies for a German win or for a draw, but none of them could be implemented as long as Hitler lived. If the new leadership, assuming a successful assassination, would have implemented these strategies is another question. Finally, after Kursk, the Germans were in the same boat as the Japanese after Pearl Harbor, up the creek with no paddle.
Regards,
SuperKraut
</HTML>
As to my \"entertaining essays\", I have recently realized that it is better to make a clear distinction between a suggested strategy and the chances of its implementation. As long as Hitler was in power, the implementation chances of many rational strategies was virtually 0, however, that should not stop us from discussing potential strategies.
\">Basically Germany & Japan were at war against the rest of the planet and they did not have an atomic industry, so they did not have a chance.<\" A mixture of apples, oranges and cherries. First of all the strategic position and potential of Germany and Japan were quite different. Secondly the bomb is not the clinching argument that many people believe it to be.
In 1933 Germany was the second largest industrial power on the planet and the leader in science and engineering. The Nazis built up industry, but not enough, and they squandered the lead in science, although not in engineering. Germany had several strategic options, depending on the objectives. However, some objectives were not strategically feasible, for example the \"Lebensraum\" idiocy in Russia, 1941 Russia was not 18th or 19th Century America. The most reasonable and achievable objective was Grossdeutschland, Germany in the borders of 1914 plus the major German speaking pieces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
The two most dangerous potential opponents of Germany, USA and USSR, both suffered from exploitable strategic weaknesses. The US, which accounted for well over half of the opposing industrial strength, was separated from the war by the Atlantic Ocean. A well planned strategy of ocean denial based on advanced submarines would have solved that problem and forced Britain to negotiate. It would also probably have brought the US into the war eventually assuming Germany did not commit the strategic blunder of declaring war on the US.
The US could not be beaten by invasion, but it could be isolated and discouraged from pursuing the war in Europe. Britain did not have to be beaten by invasion since it was far from self sufficient in food and raw materials, thus an effective blockade, a byproduct of isolating the US, would have forced a negotiated peace. The other weakness of the US and UK was the political unacceptability of losing the millions of men who would have been lost in the absence of the eastern front.
The Achilles heel of the USSR was the Bolshevik ideology and nationalism. The applicable strategy was to foment another \"Russian Revolution\" by supporting the nationalists and anti-Bolsheviks in the non-Russian part of the USSR, especially the Ukraine, the Baltic states and the Moslem states. The best way to implement this \"White Russian\" strategy was to wait for Stalin to attack Germany, ambush the attacking force and then counterattack. Turning the eastern war into a win win situation for Germany and the natives was, of course, completely contrary to Hitler\'s objectives.
Japan was at best a second rate industrial power with about ¼ of the German production. The strategic options open to Japan after Pearl Harbor were basically 0. The only viable strategic option the Japanese did have was to ignore the US and go ahead with their campaign in SE Asia. Roosevelt would have tried everything to goad the Japanese into making an attack, so the Japanese would have had to swallow a lot, however, had they succeeded, Congress would have had no casus belli to declare war.
The American atomic bomb in 1945 is Hitler\'s own fault. If he had not persecuted the Jewish Germans, the people who got Roosevelt to start the Manhattan project would not have left Europe. His continued persecution of the Jewish Germans and his total mismanagement of science policy prevented the German bomb. Further, the number of bombs was quite limited in the early days, so losing one in a shot down bomber was a major concern. German air superiority over the Reich would have prevented or greatly hindered the use of the bomb. The only scenario in which the bomb plays a major role would be one in which a weak Germany manages to hang on until autumn 1945.
\">….the U-boat fleet destroyed nearly 15 millions tons of shipping hardware spending 30.000 men but missed its strategical goal.<\" To reach its strategic goal, the U-boat fleet would have had to sink at least 15 million tons per YEAR starting in 1943 and do so by losing no more than 5 - 10,000 men per year, a feat quite possible with 2nd and 3rd generation electroboats and secure communications.
As for Stalingrad and Kursk, I think you are exaggerating the Soviet losses a bit and you forget that the Soviets captured the battlefield. If you look at the eastern front through the eyes of a strategy consultant, you see a lot of grand strategic incompetence. It is surprising the Wehrmacht did as well as it did considering their desolate supply situation and the inadequacies of their anti tank guns. At the very minimum Barbarossa came 11 months too early, at best it should not have come at all.
The bottom line is that there were strategies for a German win or for a draw, but none of them could be implemented as long as Hitler lived. If the new leadership, assuming a successful assassination, would have implemented these strategies is another question. Finally, after Kursk, the Germans were in the same boat as the Japanese after Pearl Harbor, up the creek with no paddle.
Regards,
SuperKraut
</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
To Adrian
|
SuperKraut | 07/17/2001 09:11PM |
|
RE: To Adrian
|
adrian | 07/17/2001 11:46PM |
|
Of gamblers and leaders
|
SuperKraut | 07/18/2001 06:53AM |
|
Plan Z and Ramifications
|
adrian | 07/18/2001 09:46AM |
|
Plan Z and Ramifications
|
adrian | 07/18/2001 09:47AM |
|
RE: Of gamblers and leaders
|
walter M | 07/18/2001 07:55PM |
|
Von Clausewitz
|
SuperKraut | 07/19/2001 03:13PM |
|
RE: Von Clausewitz
|
walter M | 07/19/2001 09:29PM |
|
RE: Von Clausewitz
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 07/24/2001 12:10AM |
|
RE: Von Clausewitz
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 07/24/2001 12:14AM |
|
The bomb, etc.
|
SuperKraut | 07/25/2001 10:55AM |
|
RE: The bomb, etc.
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 07/25/2001 03:57PM |
|
RE: The bomb, etc.
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 08/27/2001 11:15AM |
|
The failure of the will
|
kurt | 07/25/2001 09:44PM |