General Discussions
This is the place to discuss general issues related to the U-boat war or the war at sea in WWII.
The failure of the will
Posted by:
kurt
()
Date: July 25, 2001 09:44PM
<HTML>Another interesting thesis from Superkraut - always thought provoking.
I would like to add my own perspective, which is basically in agreement with your post. Some I have posted before, so I apologize to those with good memories.
There is a basic, crucial point of view of Hitler\'s (the Japanese also subscribed to a similar variant) that turned out to be an incorrect assumption: that the war would be short because the allies would not have the willpower, the stomach, for a long war. He would succeed because of his iron will - his victory would be a triumph of the will. He had been proven right, and the \'experts\' wrong (or so he thought), before, in the pre-war period - and ignored the experts to his, and everyone else\'s, regret when it caming to starting a larger war.
Hitler put tremendous value on his superior willpower and determination - it would be the key to his success. He felt it was a key in bringing him to power, and behind his early military/diplomatic bluff successes (Rhineland, etc.) At first this thesis served him well, but as he became bolder, the allies became more alarmed, the populace\'s of the opponent countries more frightened, and more determined to resist him (the barbarity of the Nazi regime went a long way to steeling this determination, one might add). Hitler had a very poor and biased view of other countries, and constantly underestimated their mettle. He was stunned when GB and France declared war after the invasion of Poland - he doubted they had the stomach to confront him. No matter - they would quickly fold when the going go tough. True for France, but not for GB. He thought Russia would collapse under the strain of invasion - \'kick in the front door and the whole structure will collapse\'. Well, it turned out that the Soviets were made of sterner stuff. His view of the US as cowardly softies in the clutch of a Jewish cabble was shared (to their regret) by the Japanese.
It is critical to understanding the technical and industrial development of Germany in WWII to remember that Hitler constantly expected the war to be over soon - as Superkraut points out, the war was always 6 months from ending. Not till the war was over half over, after Stalingrad in 1943, did Hitler finally realize he was up to his eyeballs in a war to the death against powerfull, motivated, and determined foes.
One advantage of hindsight we have in this modern era over those who lived, and directed, WWII, is that we know how long the war would last. At the time no one did. But (and this is the important part) the allies all, from the moment they entered the war, knew they were in for a long haul war to the finish. Most expected the war to last longer than it actually did. The Axis (Both Germany and Japan) expcted the war to short, VERY short, measured in months, not years, because they expected their enemies to be \'quitters\' who would choose peace, even surrender, over a long, brutal war. Hitler expected a Franco-Prussian war, not a WWI.
With Germany locked into a mind-set of \'the war will end soon\', it was implausible to start any long term, advanced weapons development, such as advanced U-boat design or atomic bomb projects. These could not start seriously till 1943 - and by then it was too late.
In fact, a U-boat war by definition, is a long, attritional war. So even the development of a large U-boat fleet was implausible until Britian demonstrated its mettle - until after the failure of the Battle of Britian. As really was the case. U-boat production really didn\'t get into high gear till well into the war - long enough for allied ASW to beready for them.
PS Superkraut - you are a strategic business consultant? I had you pegged as a retired electric boat engineer.....</HTML>
I would like to add my own perspective, which is basically in agreement with your post. Some I have posted before, so I apologize to those with good memories.
There is a basic, crucial point of view of Hitler\'s (the Japanese also subscribed to a similar variant) that turned out to be an incorrect assumption: that the war would be short because the allies would not have the willpower, the stomach, for a long war. He would succeed because of his iron will - his victory would be a triumph of the will. He had been proven right, and the \'experts\' wrong (or so he thought), before, in the pre-war period - and ignored the experts to his, and everyone else\'s, regret when it caming to starting a larger war.
Hitler put tremendous value on his superior willpower and determination - it would be the key to his success. He felt it was a key in bringing him to power, and behind his early military/diplomatic bluff successes (Rhineland, etc.) At first this thesis served him well, but as he became bolder, the allies became more alarmed, the populace\'s of the opponent countries more frightened, and more determined to resist him (the barbarity of the Nazi regime went a long way to steeling this determination, one might add). Hitler had a very poor and biased view of other countries, and constantly underestimated their mettle. He was stunned when GB and France declared war after the invasion of Poland - he doubted they had the stomach to confront him. No matter - they would quickly fold when the going go tough. True for France, but not for GB. He thought Russia would collapse under the strain of invasion - \'kick in the front door and the whole structure will collapse\'. Well, it turned out that the Soviets were made of sterner stuff. His view of the US as cowardly softies in the clutch of a Jewish cabble was shared (to their regret) by the Japanese.
It is critical to understanding the technical and industrial development of Germany in WWII to remember that Hitler constantly expected the war to be over soon - as Superkraut points out, the war was always 6 months from ending. Not till the war was over half over, after Stalingrad in 1943, did Hitler finally realize he was up to his eyeballs in a war to the death against powerfull, motivated, and determined foes.
One advantage of hindsight we have in this modern era over those who lived, and directed, WWII, is that we know how long the war would last. At the time no one did. But (and this is the important part) the allies all, from the moment they entered the war, knew they were in for a long haul war to the finish. Most expected the war to last longer than it actually did. The Axis (Both Germany and Japan) expcted the war to short, VERY short, measured in months, not years, because they expected their enemies to be \'quitters\' who would choose peace, even surrender, over a long, brutal war. Hitler expected a Franco-Prussian war, not a WWI.
With Germany locked into a mind-set of \'the war will end soon\', it was implausible to start any long term, advanced weapons development, such as advanced U-boat design or atomic bomb projects. These could not start seriously till 1943 - and by then it was too late.
In fact, a U-boat war by definition, is a long, attritional war. So even the development of a large U-boat fleet was implausible until Britian demonstrated its mettle - until after the failure of the Battle of Britian. As really was the case. U-boat production really didn\'t get into high gear till well into the war - long enough for allied ASW to beready for them.
PS Superkraut - you are a strategic business consultant? I had you pegged as a retired electric boat engineer.....</HTML>
| Subject | Written By | Posted |
|---|---|---|
To Adrian
|
SuperKraut | 07/17/2001 09:11PM |
|
RE: To Adrian
|
adrian | 07/17/2001 11:46PM |
|
Of gamblers and leaders
|
SuperKraut | 07/18/2001 06:53AM |
|
Plan Z and Ramifications
|
adrian | 07/18/2001 09:46AM |
|
Plan Z and Ramifications
|
adrian | 07/18/2001 09:47AM |
|
RE: Of gamblers and leaders
|
walter M | 07/18/2001 07:55PM |
|
Von Clausewitz
|
SuperKraut | 07/19/2001 03:13PM |
|
RE: Von Clausewitz
|
walter M | 07/19/2001 09:29PM |
|
RE: Von Clausewitz
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 07/24/2001 12:10AM |
|
RE: Von Clausewitz
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 07/24/2001 12:14AM |
|
The bomb, etc.
|
SuperKraut | 07/25/2001 10:55AM |
|
RE: The bomb, etc.
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 07/25/2001 03:57PM |
|
RE: The bomb, etc.
|
Yuri IL\'IN | 08/27/2001 11:15AM |
|
The failure of the will
|
kurt | 07/25/2001 09:44PM |